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

THE INTERNATIONAL
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OCTOBER, 1909.

THE MEANING OF LITERATURE FOR PHILOSOPHY.

ERNEST ALBEE.

ALL arts, except, perhaps, certain forms of purely decorative art, are inevitably interpretations of life, though it would certainly be going too far to hold that, as interpretations, they are of equal importance. In truth, of them all I should say without hesitation that literature is, and must be, the most significant interpretation of life taken in all its phases. Hence the universality of its appeal at any given time and the abiding character of that appeal, at its highest, not only for succeeding ages but for succeeding civilizations. If one may hazard a guess, it seems not improbable that the curious students of a remotely distant age will be painfully reconstructing (in terms of the historical imagination) the products of all the other arts we know, while Homer is still fresh to the eternal spirit of youth, and the baffled soul turns to the Book of Job once more, only to realize that the problem is still unsolved.

It would be apart from the main point to insist too much upon the perishable character of the materials used in many priceless works of art—*e. g.,* paintings, works of sculpture, and the world's monumental works in architecture—and at the same time to emphasize the obvious fact that books can be reproduced indefinitely, and that, in their case, the distinction between original and copy

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does not exist. Both of these are, in the higher sense, minor considerations. Nothing, indeed, could well be more ephemeral than vastly the greater part of what is intended as literature. The potential immortality of the very greatest works of literature rests upon anything but a material basis; it is due to the fact that they seem likely to make a more lasting appeal than anything else whatever to what is most fundamental in that mysterious complex which we call human nature. Moreover, the principal reasons why literature seems to have the advantage in this respect over all the other arts would appear to be: (1) that it is the most direct and inevitable interpretation of life, being in terms of language itself; (2) that it can deal with all phases of human experience in a way that is plainly impossible for any other art; and (3) that the technical conventions which, like any other art, it is bound to have—these naturally being different for each of its characteristic forms—are less of a barrier to contemporaries, and far less to those of succeeding generations, than the corresponding conventions of any other art.

You will notice that I have used the phrase 'interpretation of life' very freely as applying to all, or at any rate to most, of the arts; and that I have only claimed that literature is, on the whole, the most significant of such interpretations. And you have doubtless all been reminded of Matthew Arnold's contention that poetry—and he might better have said literature in general—is fundamentally a 'criticism of life.' The phrase has obtained great currency, and by many has come to be accepted as a matter of course; but it seems to me that all of Arnold's disclaimers of didactic intention fail to justify his formula as a valid, objective criterion for literature, and particularly for poetry, as a whole. That literature, even including poetry, *may be* a 'criticism of life' is obvious, though in my own opinion it always becomes such more or less at its own peril. Both the possibilities and the inevitable limitations of such a method

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are, as it seems to me, plainly illustrated in Arnold's own works, in poetry as well as in prose. Perhaps it was not given to a professional critic, not only of books but of tendencies of contemporary civilization, to grasp the important difference between 'criticism' of any kind, and of any degree of excellence, and that essentially creative character that belongs to literature in its highest forms.

We can plainly trace both tendencies in Wordsworth. It is to be feared that Wordsworth's didactic intentions were only too evident; in fact, he himself once said: "I wish to be considered as a teacher or as nothing." But it is the blessed prerogative of genius to give more than it promises, and often—thank Heaven!—something different from what it promises. Some of the most questionable books ever written, from the moral point of view, have thrown brilliant flashes of light upon the tragic side of human experience. I refer, not to the works as a whole—for a certain sane, though not necessarily conventional, moral perspective seems indispensable for sustained literary achievement—but rather to passages in which the ribald poet or the cynical playwright or novelist forgets himself and his grotesquely distorted views of life: with the 'second-sight' of genius he comprehends at a glance the baffling reality, and we ourselves (for nobody can see for us), we ourselves see things as they are, as they always were, and as they always must be—as we always knew they were, only that we have just discovered it!

And much the same thing is true, at the other extreme, of the poets of 'excellent intentions,' if they too have, as far too seldom they have, the really divine gift. To return to Wordsworth: that he had definite 'views' of life, most of them highly commendable, some of them, from the theoretical point of view, more than dubious, but all of them reducible to prose—perhaps their properest medium—is unquestionable. This Wordsworth is the stumbling-block of non-Wordsworthians; and may he

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rest peacefully in his grave! Nearly all these 'views' of life, so far as I know, had been expressed before, and sometimes better—Wordsworth's obvious debt to Rousseau is far too often forgotten—and yet this segregated moralist, who in his later years came more and more to shrink from all contact with the larger world, was, according to the judgment of many competent critics who cannot be accused of moralistic prepossessions, the greatest English poet of the nineteenth century.

At any rate, it will be well to try to understand the secret of Wordsworth's power, for it may throw some light upon the true function of poetry itself. Now, at the risk of uttering what may seem constructive blasphemy to the devout Wordsworthian, I am prepared to say that, in my opinion, Wordsworth's strictly philosophical views, such as he had, were of extremely little account; and I am quite ready to add what may seem a direct contradiction — that philosophy itself neglects Wordsworth, yes, and poets of far less significance, at its own peril.

So far as Wordsworth's theoretical and quasi-philosophical views are concerned, one cannot pass lightly over his Rousseau-like exaltation of rustic simplicity above all that we ordinarily mean by civilization, and his related apotheosis of childhood and even of infancy. The time of philosophy, at this all too busy day, is worth too much to be spent in exposing patent fallacies such as these. Agree with Wordsworth that rustic life (as led by the rustics themselves, observe) is the ideal; and then add (I refer to well-known letters) that the poor rustic is to be taught only so much as will enable him to read his Bible; and you will admit that we have here a rather quaint foundation for a philosophy fit to cope with the indefinitely complex problems of our modern civilization.

No, let us cease using misleading terms. Wordsworth was not a philosopher; neither was Shelley, Browning,

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or Tennyson. Those who present them as such are unconsciously doing them a great injustice. Arnold, perhaps, was just a little of a philosopher—but not in the least Shakespeare, the supreme creative literary genius of the world. No, poets are not philosophers; yet they are even more important, and their importance is of a kind that the philosopher himself should take into serious account. In his "Defence of Poetry" Shelley says: "The exertions of Locke, Hume, Gibbon, Voltaire, Rousseau, . . . in favor of oppressed and deluded humanity, are entitled to the gratitude of mankind. Yet it is easy to calculate the degree of moral and intellectual improvement which the world would have exhibited, had they never lived. A little more nonsense would have been talked for a century or two; and perhaps a few more men, women, and children, burnt as heretics. We might not at this moment have been congratulating each other on the abolition of the Inquisition in Spain. But it exceeds all imagination to conceive what would have been the moral condition of the world if neither Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Calderon, Bacon, nor Milton, had ever existed; . . . if the Hebrew poetry had never been translated; if a revival of the study of Greek literature had never taken place; . . . and if the poetry of the religion of the ancient world had been extinguished together with its belief."

It would be easy to criticise this passage, for the philosophers who hold the field are not merely negative or iconoclastic any more than the great ones of literature; but Shelley is right in emphasizing the all-importance of literature as a humanizing agency. Not only morality and religion (as distinct from superstition), but all civilization, seem to be based upon the progressive development of sympathy (not in the merely philanthropic sense) and imagination. In fact, the two presuppose each other to such an extent that neither can properly be considered apart from the other. If the child were not endowed with the capacity for sympathy from the

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beginning, there would be no motive for the larger play of the imagination, including other experiences than his own—often those of his animal pets—and without imagination sympathy would be incapable of development. But we need not linger in the nursery. The maturing individual and the eternally immature race show the operation of the same principle. Now this process does not go on by itself. Our moral experience is essentially social, and social development, with all its reciprocal give and take, requires leadership; yes, and a leadership more fundamental and essential, even, than that of the most enlightened government.

Who was it that said: "Let me make the songs of a people and you can make their laws"? The creative imagination of a people has nearly always found its highest and completest expression in its literature; and that inspired expression is not merely a human document for the future historian—though even for him it is often the best of documents—but a living thing so long as the ideals presented prove dynamic in the making and unmaking of civilizations. As Shelley says, "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world." And Wordsworth expresses the same thought somewhat differently when he says: "Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge. . . . If the time should ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to men, shall be ready to put on . . . a form of flesh and blood, the Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration." It is to this high function of the creative imagination that we must look for the secret of the power of representative poets as widely different, so far as their views of life are concerned, as Shelley and Wordsworth themselves.

Literature in the largest sense, then, is an ideal interpretation and reconstruction, in terms of the creative imagination, of man's essential relations, on the one hand, to his fellow-men, and, on the other hand, to the mysterious environment in which he finds himself. It is not a theory of life like philosophy—as such it is almost sure

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to fail—but a dynamic synthesis of the idealizing forces of human nature. Of course the world of the poet is not the world of brute fact, but it is not the less but the more real for that very reason. Man would indeed be 'like the beasts that perish,' were it not for the organizing and even creative ideals that make a spiritual life possible in this rather sordid setting of the drama of his uncertain destiny. In fact, the tangible results of these ideals are always in evidence, for they are nothing less than the rise and fall of civilizations, or, perhaps better, the perpetual transformation of civilizations. The walls of Thebes, you will remember, were supposed to have been raised at the sound of music; and other walls, at a more recent date, went down at the sound of the "Marseillaise."

Literature, again, is not a collection of more or less *naïve* theories of life, which it is the business of the philosopher to dissect and then put together again in terms of his own technical system; it is the most direct, the most inevitable, the most vital interpretation of life itself. As Wordsworth well said, the poet should always write "with his eye on the object;" and the same applies to literature as a whole. Of course the writer's personality is always a decisive factor; but the less he thinks about his personality or his merely individual views of life, the better, for life itself, in some aspect or other, is always his subject. He may be a classicist or a romanticist, a realist (in the æsthetic sense) or an idealist, but that is his own concern. Nobody can decide such matters for him; it is temperament and artistic environment, including the age in which he lives, that determine him. The absolute essentials of true art are sincerity, imagination, and felicitous expression, such as will recreate the vision in the mind of the reader or the beholder or the listener. It is possible to tell the truth in many languages; and it is the business of the artist, whatever his medium or method or artistic creed, to bring out the vital truth of the side of experience that he is

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dealing with. And it hardly need be added that artistic truth can never be reduced to merely intellectual terms. Here, at any rate, 'appreciation' cannot be reduced to terms of mere 'description,' no matter how teleological the latter may be.

When we insist, as Arnold is fond of doing, upon the all-importance of 'human interest' in literature, we are likely to forget that human interest involves all that is actually interesting to normal human beings, and that it does not prove a man abnormal if his interests turn out to be wider than, or profoundly different from, our own. But there are two fundamental motives or tendencies in literature which it is well to distinguish, even though they not infrequently exist together. The first may be called the 'dramatic' motive, *i. e.*, the imaginative interpretation of purely human relationships, not excluding the physical environment, however conceived, or even the religious hopes and fears of the individuals concerned, in so far as these are actual factors in the universal drama of human life. The second motive is almost equally easy to recognize in certain forms of literature, but much more difficult to name. For purposes of this discussion, it may be called the 'prophetic' motive. What is referred to under this head is not the imaginative rendering of the religious aspirations or hopes and fears of individuals, considered as such—all provided for in terms of the 'dramatic' motive—but the audacious attempt of the creative imagination, not only in so-called 'ages of faith,' but in ages of doubt as well, to deal with the ultimate problems of human life and destiny. All the great mythologies we know are to be referred to this function of the creative imagination; and the poets have their revenge on time itself, for, after the civilizations which they helped to create have passed away, the ideal values that they had partly concealed in the vesture of space and time shine forth in their eternal significance.

But the prophetic function of poetry is not less important in our own day, when the popular misconception of

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science too often usurps the place of the Divine and philosophy consents to be its prophet. Even now the poet can recreate

> That blessed mood,
> In which the burthen of the mystery,
> In which the heavy and the weary weight
> Of all this unintelligible world,
> Is lightened;

and with him we can say:

> And I have felt
> A presence that disturbs me with the joy
> Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
> A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things.

"Tintern Abbey," indeed, was written and published one hundred and eleven years ago. But the poet-prophet is not a less significant figure now, when our very civilization is fighting for its life. In our own country, unfortunately, to the less thoughtful public the drama largely means dramatized versions of popular novels or whitewashed French plays put on the boards by a syndicate standing for anything but the highest artistic traditions; but in a sister country, at any rate, which we too often think of as the land of dry-as-dust scholarship, 'the divine fire' is still burning, and one of the most pitiless realists of the German stage has also written, in "The Sunken Bell," the last great tragedy of the too-aspiring human spirit which would overstep human limitations, only to sink to inhuman depths. In the meantime, 'the twilight of the gods' draws nearer. Our Valhalla may be doomed; but, if so, it will be because, as in the case of that other one, the majestic structure was founded on a forgotten lie. No lie can be eternal, for truth is eternal or it is nothing. The strictly scientific historian informs us, if

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I understand the matter, that in the last resort nothing is really accomplished, since human nature remains essentially what it was at the beginning; but the creative imagination of the poet-prophet is not daunted at the universal wreck of empires and creeds and civilizations, for he alone has not forgotten that facts are dead as soon as they become such; he alone has always remembered to listen to

> That lyre of life
> Whereon himself, the master harp-player,
> Resolving all its mortal dissonance
> To one immortal and most perfect strain,
> Harps without pause, building with song the world.

ERNEST ALBEE.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

THE UNIQUE CASE OF SOCRATES.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

IN the history of philosophy there is no figure that awakens as many interesting and helpful, and, I may add, varied and baffling suggestions, as does the quaint and inscrutable Athenian sage who used as freely to confess his own ignorance as he did his physical ugliness, and as relentlessly to expose the sham wisdom of others as he did the sham beauty of face and form that concealed the ugly soul; who more than any other man possessed that sublime indifference to non-essentials which comes from a recognition of their relative worthlessness. Not that there was anything of the Laodicean in his make-up; for Socrates was in earnest, madly in earnest, in his search after truth. And there is no philosopher more familiar to all men. Everyone knows about Socrates, from the gossip of his domestic infelicities with the trying, and no doubt much tried, Xanthippe, to the story of his sublime farewell to his friends ere he drank the fatal cup. And who

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has not heard that Socrates used to say, that the superior wisdom which his fellow citizens sometimes attributed to him consisted in the simple fact that he knew that in truth he knew nothing. But it not infrequently happens that what we are most familiar with, we least understand; and many and various are the estimates that students have made of this familiar philosopher and his distinctive achievement. And when one turns to the earliest records, made by his disciples and friends, one finds the same perplexing discrepancies. Here are many men representing his views, a Plato, a Xenophon, a Diogenes, an Antisthenes; and all giving different accounts; and Socrates himself has written never a word by which we might test their reports. The first impression one is likely to gather is, that the real Socrates was probably an interesting and unusually magnetic personality, with an exceptional genius for stimulating others to construct philosophies, but possessed of no definite philosophy of his own.

Yet it is precisely in the variety of these interpretations that we are to look for one of the secrets of his strength. For my part I doubt not that had some recording Boswell tagged about continually at the heels of Socrates, noting down his every word and preserving it for posterity, we should say, upon comparing that record with the Platonic portrait: "A good photograph; a poor likeness. His mere words reveal as little the secret of his power, as does that Silenus face that nature gave him disclose the strength and purity of the soul that lived behind it." None the less, would that we had such a record, that we might make the comparison! But what I wish to emphasize is, that the difficulty in interpreting Socrates springs from the wealth and not from the poverty of his genius. Think of it! A man in the private walks of life, a poor, and by birth obscure citizen of Athens, was able to shake his city-state to its very foundations. And how? Simply by his philosophical conversations. And was able so to influence some of the greatest men of his time, and among them the world's greatest poet-philosopher, that ever after

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they are unable clearly to distinguish their own thinking from his, to tell exactly where his views break off and their own constructive thinking begins; and are willing, nay eager, to make him the mouthpiece of their own best intellectual endeavor. Such a man is greater than any account given of him. And I sometimes grow impatient over works that appear on Socrates,—and scarcely a year rolls round that does not bring its burden of Socratic monographs,—written by some petty pedant or other who prides himself on being an 'objective' historian, the objectivity of whose work is chiefly shown in the free use of negatives and in the careful elimination from the portrait of every trace of genuine vision. Such a work recently fell into my hands. It dragged its weary length through more than a half a thousand pages, and in the end made of Socrates merely a genial and decidedly insipid social reformer with a utilitarian program. No, Socrates was one of those men, of whom the world has contained a few, who positively refuse to be classified. You can find no pigeon-hole into which he will fit. No label will stick. And if in what follows you think that I am trying after all to label him, and are inclined to take my label off and try another, I ask you: Consider him awhile from this angle before viewing him from another, and then be sure that the real Socrates was greater than either you or I have made him.

The crisis which Socrates faced was at once religious and philosophical. He catches an inspiration,—no more, no less,—of a way of escape. That inspiration gives rise to a program, which ages will be required to carry out, and to a new[1] ideal of the wise, virtuous, and religious man. But, and this is the most striking point, he is himself a marvellously complete embodiment of this new ideal.

Thus he comes to occupy a position altogether unique

[1] In saying 'new' I do not mean made out of whole cloth. Nothing in that sense new is ever effective. But we date, and rightly, an idea or ideal from the man who, besides making it articulate, gains for it a hearing and makes it tell.

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in the history of philosophy; one can find a parallel only by turning to the founders of new religions. He is not a teacher merely, but an example, and as such is glorified, idealized, and in later times almost deified. Even the prosy Aristotle comes under the spell, though at a great distance. If he wants to illustrate a point in his writing, it is the figure of Socrates that at once presents itself to his mind. And down to the present day we catch an echo of this baser use in our logic books where, all but universally, Socrates's mortality is made a peg to hang *Barbara* on. With Plato, however, Socrates is simply philosophy itself alive and at work, dispelling the clouds of ignorance, stimulating one to clearer and more consistent thinking, and making for general human righteousness. Over the "Euthyphro" you might write, as a sub-title, The way a philosopher comes into inevitable conflict with the unthinking but cock-sure traditional pietist; over the "Apology," The way a philosopher defends himself and his calling; over the "Crito," The way a philosopher shows his reverence for the State; over the "Phædo," The way a philosopher should face death; over the "Republic," The way a philosopher expounds the nature and the inherent desirability of the righteous life. With Xenophon, Socrates is the pattern good citizen. In later times he sits to the Stoics for the portrait of the sage, is in fact, barring Zeno, the one case of the complete realization of their ideal. When in doubt what to do, ask yourself what would Socrates have done? For "though you are not yet a Socrates," to quote Epictetus, "you ought to live as one seeking to be a Socrates."

The death-blow was long since dealt to the German fiction *die Sophistik,* which used to be regarded as a sort of malignant power that went to and fro in the Greek world, seeking what innocent youths it might find to corrupt, teaching them how to make a show of wisdom which gave them the advantage over their less skilled brethren, so that they could make the worse appear the better reason, bring all men into their power, and make their own

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capricious wills prevail. Yet it is still the custom to make the Sophists in some peculiar sense responsible for the chaotic condition in which we find philosophy, morals, and religion in the time of Socrates. This is only to fall into the common human error of mistaking a symptom of a disease for its cause. The simple truth is that the old education had proved insufficient to meet the needs of the Athenian youth and the old teachers incompetent to satisfy the new felt want. And all of a sudden Athens blossoms into a sort of informal university. The Sophists were its self-appointed professors, and they delivered their lectures in the market place, in the gymnasia, or, better still, in the house of some wealthy Callias, a patron of the newer learning. It was to be sure a university with a free elective system, and with no rigid requirements; so the education it dispensed was not characterized by special thoroughness or aimfulness; and its professors bid for pupils, crying up their own wares and sometimes crying down those of their rivals. They had their several specialties; one taught rhetoric, another virtue, one astronomy, another the nice discrimination of words; most of them were ingenious interpreters of the poets and adepts in the art of deluging an audience with words. And yet the reporters for the yellow journals, or the mischief making gossips who supplied their place in Athens, might have wrested from almost any of their speeches sayings that would make the teeth of the hard-shell conservative chatter. "Nothing exists; if anything did exist, we could never know it; if perchance a man should come to know it, it would remain a secret, he would be unable to describe it to his fellow men." Or again, "Man is the measure of all things." Or again: "With regard to the gods I know not whether they exist or not, or what they are like. Many things prevent our knowing; the subject is obscure, and brief is the span of our mortal life." Or again, another Sophist might be found, in Machiavellian fashion, explaining the serviceableness of religion as an adjunct to the police force of the state, and telling how some clever pre-

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historic genius invented the gods; and another might be heard translating the religious traditions of the Greeks into ethical allegories.

The scepticism indeed is there, and nothing is sacred from its disintegrating touch. But the Sophists found it; they did not create it. It had been preparing in the bosom of Greek philosophy from the time when one of the earliest philosophers identified the material stuff of which the universe was supposed to be made, with the divine. Xenophanes had contributed his share when he came forward, in opposition to the anthropomorphic religion of his people, ridiculing the view which made the gods come into being and pass away, living a life of passion and wearing the body of man, and roundly condemning Homer and Hesiod for ascribing to the gods all things that were a disgrace among men. Euripides was not helping matters by introducing the gods upon the stage. The moral disputes of Olympus were argued in the presence of the Athenian populace and became common property. The gods were all the while losing the prestige of distance. The extent of the moral chaos of the time may be seen from the impassioned speeches which Plato puts in the mouth of his brothers in the second book of the "Republic." Justice was regarded as the lesser of two evils, or as due to the force of social compulsion; the good was another name for the expedient; virtue was to be pursued for the respectability that it gave, or for the sake of the rewards in store for the just man on one side of the grave or the other. In short, men were kept in the path of virtue by the police, the parson, and Mrs. Grundy. But the desirable consequences that were supposed to come from leading a virtuous life were viewed as something altogether extraneous to virtue itself. These are the things the young men hear 'dinning in their ears,' and they appeal to Socrates as the one man who can help them to a higher view. Nothing could show more clearly than this passage does, the place which, in Plato's mind, Socrates occupied in the moral crisis of his day. And the

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work of the philosophers too, culminating as it did in contradictory views of reality, and checked by no rigorous method, must share the blame for the prevailing distrust of reason. If this scepticism is more pronounced in the Sophists, if it was they who gave it most definite and telling formulation, that is only because they were the foremost representatives of the enlightenment of their age.

There is a story that Plato tells, that, whether it be an artistic invention of the pupil or whether it report an actual occurrence,—and this I hold to be a question as unimportant as it is unanswerable,—gives the key to what I have called Socrates's inspiration. In the "Phædo" Socrates is telling of his early interest in philosophical speculation and of his inability to find any satisfaction therein. One day he heard a friend reading from a book by Anaxagoras which declared that mind was the author of all things. "Here at last," he exclaims, (I paraphrase his story) "I thought that I had found a philosopher after my own heart. But judge my disappointment when I found that, although asserting mind to be the cause of all things, he then went on to speak of air and ether and what not, as if anything rather than mind were the cause. For if mind be the cause, then we can show that each thing is as it is because it is best for it so to be. It is as if one should assert that mind is the cause of my actions, and then should go on to explain that I am sitting here in prison because my body is made of bones and muscles divided and disposed in certain ways. So far as they are concerned, I might have been in Megara long ago. If mind is the cause of my actions, I am here because I chose the better part of remaining, instead of running away and playing truant when friend Crito made the opportunity for me to do so, and of enduring the punishment which the state saw fit to inflict." This teleological idea, the notion that all has its place in the unity and harmony of the good, Socrates never deserts. But in the work of Anaxagoras he finds it no sooner asserted than abandoned. So far the criticism bears a certain resemblance

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to the criticism often heard in our day of 'intellectualism,' that "the absolute is useless for deductive purposes. . . . You cannot enter the phenomenal world with the notion of it in your grasp, and name beforehand any detail which you are likely to meet there."[2] And Socrates confesses his inability to apply the notion in this fashion. Even if mind be the author of all things, one cannot of course take one's place forthwith at the point of view of divine wisdom, and discover how things are by seeing how it is best for them to be. But he has a second string to his bow. There is another voyage, failing this more ambitious venture, that man may hopefully undertake. He may turn from the macrocosm to the microcosm, to the world within, the world of human thought and action, and, guided by the Anaxagorean inspiration, seek to discover mind as author of all things there. Yet here again one can find no short and easy path to divine vision. For one finds in this inner world for the most part chaos and confusion, ignorance and anarchy. The inspiration but defines a program, appoints a task, an endless task; calls the mind to stand forth and perform its creative function in its own world, and thus to fulfill its own divine nature. In short, Socrates acquires a sublime confidence in reason as the author of all, and is consequently indomitably optimistic. And while he distrusts the power of human reason to apply this principle to the physical world, or even to the inner world as actually existing,—a distrust which spares him the necessity of considering the problem of evil which Plato, not sharing it, had to face,—he is no less confident that human reason is able to reach certain and universal truth, precisely in so far as it succeeds in putting reason in control in fashioning the inner world into unity and aimfulness.

Thus Socrates's answer to the sceptic who would say: All is relative; man is the measure; therefore there are only individual opinions, and 'truth' is merely a compli-

[2] James, "A Pluralistic Universe," p. 126.

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mentary characterization of one's own beliefs, is in effect: I grant man is the measure, there is no escape, but let us see whether we do not come more and more into agreement, in proportion as we think our own individual thoughts. If and in so far as we do, we keep acquiring confidence in our individual reason as having a common or universal nature. The existing confusion is brought about, not because men are thinking for themselves, but because they do not think enough; because there are certain rules of the game which they continually violate. The trouble is not that men are sceptical, but that they are not radical enough in their scepticism. They stop short when it suits their capricious convenience. The first rule of the game of thinking is to get your ideas clear and definite; the second is, never shuffle your meanings; and the third is, always follow through.

Thus, coming at a time when the moral and religious home of his people is already laid waste, Socrates does not sit idly in the midst of the resulting desolation, gazing wistfully into the past and dreaming of a restoration of the good old days of simple faith which fancy conjures up, after the fashion of the indolent conservative; nor does he desert the old place, after the manner of the Sophists, in search of new dwellings apart from religion; nor yet does he seek in vain, like Aristophanes, to rouse the people to rebuild the old home from the remaining fragments. Nay, the house must first be made more desolate still by tearing down the few columns and walls left standing, in order to make room for the foundations of the new temple of God which his awakened religious consciousness dimly descried in the future, which was to rest on a thorough knowledge of self. And from this point of view we can easily see how Socrates should come to be regarded as the most destructive and dangerous of the Sophists. There was a large class of words,—words too on every one's tongue,—which derived their meaning largely from the old and discredited religious sanctions. They were words applying to all the relations of life:

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courage, piety, temperance, justice, holiness, and the like. These too must be submitted to the searching test of reason.

It is always the first result of scepticism to make men misologists. The old religious sanctions under which we have long been living secure, are passing away. Reason herself has dealt the fatal blow. But in their place we can see nothing definite coming. When reason attempts to put something positive in their place, she seems baffled; confusion confronts her. Many claimants appear for the vacant land, with apparently equally good and equally bad title. Who shall settle the rival claims? Is it not rather a task beyond our power? Why then spend time and strength in a vain cause? Better turn from theory to practice; put on the cloak of humility and go out into the garden and work. It is the well known position of the ethically inclined sophist of all ages. But, easy as this solution seems, it takes little reflection to show its worthlessness. And this is Socrates's answer: You cannot turn to the practical life without first reckoning with the problems of philosophy and religion which you scorn. For how can a man work to any profit if he have no definite aim; and how could he realize that aim without knowledge of the tools at his disposal? The aim according to Socrates and the Sophists alike, is the well-being of man. But what, then, is man? Unless I can answer this question, how can I know what is best for him? The first rule for the truly practical man to observe is: Know thyself. The prevailing scepticism of the day is itself responsible for the change in the center of interest, which is sometimes credited to Socrates, from the outer world to man and his interests. The cry is, Teach us the things that will avail us in life. And Socrates devotes his life to the heeding of this cry. Not, to be sure, in the way men who pride themselves most on being 'practical' intend. He does not lay down a series of rules and precepts for obtaining fame and wealth and power, or even for obtaining virtue. He goes to the root of the matter. We must

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first make ourselves clear as to the aim of life, before we can say anything about the means for realizing that aim. That the well-being of man is the aim of life needs for Socrates no proof. After all, it is an identical proposition.[3] But we have not got very far when we have said this. Who shall say wherein the well-being of man consists; who shall give this idea a form fit for use, and valid for all? The answer must of course be man; but what man? Any one you please; or the majority of men? No, clearly the 'one best man,' that is, the one who best knows himself. If we could only find him! But how should we recognize him when found unless we also knew ourselves? Thus the prime necessity is universal self-knowledge; the recognition that man is the measure is followed by the conviction that we can and must know that measure. And when we look about us, we find every one acting and speaking as if he knew it. In every one's mouth are the words justice, piety, temperance, and the rest of the words by which we judge conduct in ourselves, in others, and in the state, and seal it with our approval or disapproval. And when we judge of an act, we judge it by reference to an end more or less consciously present to our minds. Yet it is in these very matters concerning conduct that we find the greatest differences among men; and it is just here that differences lead to greatest enmities. This existing confusion shows that men are not clear in their own minds as to the meaning and implication of the terms they are using, or as to the end they would reach.

At any rate it is worth while to see whether a mental house-cleaning would not remove this discord. The slovenliness of most of what passes for thinking is covered up by the use of words of many meanings, and by the further trick of, consciously or unconsciously, shift-

[3] Even the Westminster catechism, after telling us that "the chief end of man is to glorify God," adds, "and to enjoy him forever," and thereby merely declares that the true well-being of man is to be sought in the enjoyment of God rather than in the enjoyment of worldly vanities.

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ing one's ground when in a difficulty. These things are the stock in trade of demagogues and other princes of the plausible; and they are also the source of that conceit of wisdom so striking in the young, and in popular idols, but also found wherever men are content to lead the 'unexamined life,' the life that Socrates held to be unworthy to be lived by a man. And the procedure which Socrates follows is defined by the contrast. He starts of course where he finds himself, with the principle he judges to be the strongest. Was there ever an absolutist who thought he could start anywhere else? Then he seeks to make his meaning precise and clear, and, having done this, to test its value by applying it to experience, to see whether he can retain the principle when it is given full range. As some one has said, speaking of Hegel, get your notions clear, then give them plenty of rope, and see whether or not they hang themselves. In most cases you will find that they will. This for Aristotle is the substance of Socrates's achievement: "inductive reasoning and universal definition," two things, he adds, which are "the very foundations of knowledge."

Certainly, this is the task to which Socrates devoted his life, probing and testing the opinions of himself and his fellow-men, everywhere bringing about that conviction of ignorance which, like the conviction of sin in later times, is the necessary preparation for the higher life. Aristotle declared the purpose of the tragedy to be the purging of the emotions through pity and fear. It was not to amuse, nor to point a moral, but by an earnest and serious action so to awaken the emotions of pity and fear, that afterwards the hearer would find himself in the possession of purer emotions, which could then be trusted to take care of themselves. Socrates's work has a similar aim: by presenting ignorance in its true light he would purge the intellect, and by banishing the conceit of knowledge which bars the way to truth, leave the intellect purer and freer. It could then be trusted of itself to bear the fruits of intellect; just as the emotions after the presenta-

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tion of the Oresteia could be trusted to ring truer than before. So he approaches every one whom he can reach, old and young, artisan and statesman, poet and sophist, questioning each about that which he is reputed to know; and everywhere he finds the same result, ignorance masquerading as wisdom, and that most of all in matters that concern the highest welfare of man. And he sets himself relentlessly to the task of tearing off disguises, breaking idols, exposing shams, and seeking to put conscious ignorance in the place of conceit of knowledge. It was not a task to make its devotee popular. The 'enlightened,' now as well as in the days of Socrates, prefer to remain in the undisturbed possession of comfortably vague and sliding views on principles that concern conduct and life; and the conservative always hates the man who 'strays from the broad and beaten ways.' But Socrates was little concerned about his popularity. He is firmly persuaded, as he assures us, that God has commanded him to spend his life in the search after truth, and in examining himself and others.

And this brings us to the other half of his teaching. Were we to stop here with what has been said, we might perhaps regard the Socratic elenchus as performing a function analogous to the Cartesian doubt or the Baconian iconoclasm,— a process whereby the slate is wiped clean and made ready for a fresh start,—and, following Aristotle, we should credit him with having seen, and clearly exhibited in his own procedure, what are surely essential conditions of all sound thinking; and we should give him all glory for these achievements. But we should still miss the secret of his hold upon his followers. To them he appeared primarily as a great moral and religious teacher, inspiring men through his example as much as, if not more than, through his teaching. This is more obvious even in Plato than in Xenophon. It is a striking note in almost all of the dialogues except those that are concerned with the more technical issues of dialectic, and those which were written in Plato's later years in which

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Socrates has either disappeared altogether or no longer carries the title *rôle*. It is shown in the whole attitude of Socrates toward the younger men and their reverential devotion to him; in many a casual remark like the praise of the blunt old warrior Laches; in the unconscious tribute of the earnest youths in the "Republic"; in the bald and unrestrained speech of Alcibiades when in his cups.

And it is certain that Socrates viewed himself as having a divinely appointed mission to his fellow-men.

"Fellow Athenians," he exclaims in the Platonic version of his "Apology," "I love you; I am devoted to you; but I shall obey God rather than you. And while breath and strength hold out I shall never cease from pursuing wisdom, or from exhorting any one of you whom I may meet, speaking frankly to him, and saying in my usual fashion: My friend, as a citizen of Athens, a city greatest and most famous for its wisdom and power, are you not ashamed to be so greedy for wealth and name and fame, so careless and so thoughtless about wisdom and truth and the perfecting of your own soul? And if he contradicts me, and says that he does care about these things, I shall not take him at his word and straightway let him go, but I shall question him and cross-question him and test him, and if I find that he is not virtuous but only says that he is, I shall rebuke him for prizing least what is of most value and prizing most what is of less worth. This service I shall render to every one I meet. . . . Be assured, this is God's command. And I hold that no greater blessing has ever befallen you in Athens than this my service to God. For I spend all my time going about among you, persuading you, old and young alike, not to be so solicitous about your bodies or your possessions, but first of all, and most earnestly, to consider how to make your souls as perfect as possible; and telling you that wealth does not bring virtue: rather, virtue brings wealth and every other human good, private or public."

The defence is simple, downright, and to us, more than twenty centuries later, convincing. Yet it is easy to see why it did not convince his judges. He does not and could not meet the charge in the sense intended by his accusers. He was a heretic and a revolutionary from their standpoint. And the almost defiant tone of the defence seems to indicate that Socrates was conscious of the fact that the position for which he stood was in irreconcilable antagonism with the traditional beliefs of his countrymen. And yet Socrates speaks throughout as if he felt that in his trial he was standing for a principle, and that the highest religious principle; and that nothing short of

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absolute acquittal freely given by his judges could suffice. He must carry that principle through, unsullied by compromise of any kind, to triumph in his acquittal, or, failing that, equally to triumph in his death, which alternative he fearlessly faces. It had been the custom in Athens for one accused to bring in wife, children, and relatives, and make a scene in court in order to work upon the sympathy of the judges. In place of doing this, Socrates seizes the opportunity to read the Athenians a lesson on the disgracefulness of this practice, which he regards as undignified and impious, both on the part of the accused and on the part of his judges, and he adds: "Were I to persuade you, were I to overpower your oaths by my importunings, I should clearly be teaching you to believe that there are no gods. In my very defence I should literally be accusing myself of unbelief." We have here a new note in religion. Piety is shown not in ceremonial and creed, but in conduct. And God is no longer conceived as a power to be placated, or even, in more philosophic fashion, as the cause and substance of things, but rather as the embodiment of the ideal that lives in our human strivings.

Thus unceasing self-examination, our distinctively human privilege, is regarded as the fundamental religious duty. It is only by this pathway that one can come to a knowledge of God. After the purging process, when the world within has been reduced to a condition resembling the primitive cosmic chaos of Anaxagoras, the mind steps in and puts things in order. Socrates had noticed the fact that the peculiar mark of knowledge is a certain spontaneity. Question a man rightly, and he will discover the truth for himself. But how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already within him, waiting, as it were, to be elicited? We can know our ignorance only in so far as, from the point of view of a larger vision, that ignorance is shown up in its own inadequacy. And this possibility which is ours, of continually setting aside, and once for all, the less com-

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plete in favor of the more complete view, not only gives us increasing confidence in the objective value of individual reasoning, but also defines the nature of knowledge as an infinite progress toward the goal of perfect wisdom, which is and can be infinitely progressive only because that goal is also active in us as an ever present guide in our search after truth. Socrates views this under the image of reminiscence, which is referred to in the Phædo as his favorite doctrine. It is as if the soul in reaching knowledge were harking back to its divine inheritance.

And the moral chaos is removed in the same way. Morality consists in knowing how rightly to love and how rightly to hate. It was an old Greek view. And down beneath all human longing is the fundamental homing instinct, the desire to recover the divine vision. And the world of human affections is graded as is the world of human truth,—so many stepping stones toward the vision of beauty absolute, toward possession and birth in beauty absolute. There is something of the mystic in Socrates, and I am not sure that what is called Platonic love should not rather be called Socratic love. In the "Symposium" the other characters are drawn to life; why not Socrates also? The mysteries of love which the wise Diotima revealed may well enough be Plato's interpretation of the eros motive in the life of Socrates. The speech of Alcibiades would rather bear this theory out.

However this may be, Socrates's application of the reflective principle and method to religion, led him to regard God as the highest wisdom, and through this concept at once to strike the death blow to polytheism and at the same time to gather the world of human activity, with all its contradictions, into one comprehensive whole; and, in the latter consequence, to save the independence and freedom of the individual from the chains of outer authority, while yet preserving the harmony of the whole. Thus he could stand for an individualism of the strongest dye without dissolving the world into a chaos of social atoms, each seeking its private gain. For the individual,

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taken in his full compass and depth, as he appears to the man who truly knows himself, has not lost sight of his fellows. He is thus able and in duty bound to stand above society and the state and religion, to judge and condemn these institutions where they fail of wisdom, but at the same time to reverence them as representing after all, however inadequately, that highest ideal which is his own aim. It is this that marks the religious from the irreligious reformer. The one sees too far to be proud, and reverences the institutions which he would remove because seeing in them what they would be and are not, and destroys only that he may build. The other, puffed up by a little wisdom, sees merely what these institutions are not, and is content to destroy.

The perennial problem of freedom has been well put in a saying ascribed to the Pythagoreans: "How find that freedom which, without unity, is an illusion; and that unity which, without freedom, is a snare?" Socrates, with his view of God and man, and of the relation of one to the other, and of the divinely appointed human task, endless, never fulfilled, but a task that man may be always fulfilling, has given us the key to the solution of the problem, and at the same time projected that solution into the future as an ideal that will be forever drawing us on. Yet this view is indeed destructive of the old Greek view of authority, as of any view which makes the source of authority external. And we can readily see how he should have been regarded as the most dangerous of the Sophists. A doctrine which the conservative regards as dangerous, is always doubly dangerous when espoused by a man of unimpeachable character. When a wicked man upholds a dangerous doctrine, his wickedness is its easy refutation. Besides, the Socratic individualism was not the latitudinarian individualism of the average Sophist, with its live and let live, every man for himself. That view at least left room for the conservative to hug his own chains. Socrates's individualism was one that spoke with authority.

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And it is in this same combination of individualism with authority that we find the explanation of the extraordinary hold which Socrates had upon his disciples, so that they regarded him as the hero of the moral and intellectual drama of mankind. It was a characteristic of the divine, as Socrates viewed it, to be in need of nothing; and that man was likest to the divine who was most the master of himself and his circumstances. "So frugal was he," writes Xenophon, "that I do not know whether any one could earn so little by the labor of his hands, as not to procure sufficient to have satisfied Socrates." And yet there was nothing of the ascetic about him. He could enjoy a banquet with the best of them, and, if drinking was in order, could carry enough to qualify as a Scotch gentleman, though no one ever saw him under the influence. It is a characteristic picture which Plato gives us in the "Symposium," where, one by one, the guests fall under the table, and in the early hours of the morning Socrates is represented as earnestly trying to convince Agathon and Aristophanes, the only other survivors, that the genius of comedy is the same as the genius of tragedy. But the tragic and the comic poet are already nodding, and soon join the great majority, while Socrates goes off as dawn is breaking, takes his morning bath and goes about his business, quite in his accustomed way. And he can endure hardships too, cold, hunger, and the dangers of war, with the same imperturbability. His was a life always steadied and ordered by reason. In him his followers could see a living example of a moral law at once self-imposed and at the same time worthy to count as the voice of God. The gods of Greek tradition had passed on a few noble precepts, and many ignoble examples. And herein is evident the fact that the Greeks had outgrown their gods. Any one who would take Zeus as his model of conduct, would soon be guilty of the most heinous crimes. Socrates has not only introduced a higher conception of the divine nature, he has also been a worthy example of the ideal which that conception puts for hu-

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man conduct. And it is thus that he comes to occupy a position in philosophy analogous to that of the founders of religions. And similarly in the region of theoretic philosophy he stands for the doctrine that truth is always individual, and that at the same time there is a pattern truth, valid for all men. And so, somewhat idealized perhaps, he comes to be regarded as the living embodiment of that truth which is at once individual and universal.

Socrates moves throughout his life as a man conscious of his weakness, and also of his strength; of the former, because he has not yet realized the wisdom and the good which is his right as a man; of the latter, because he has none the less succeeded in clearing away the stumbling blocks of ignorance enough to find in himself the evidence of the divine, dimly though he has compassed its depths. One feels in reading the story of his life, of his untiring, almost fanatical pursuit of truth and virtue, that he is with a man filled with the missionary spirit, and made of the stuff of martyrs, because he feels himself to be in some mysterious way in touch with God, (Doesn't the familiar divine sign prove it?) and knows that no evil can befall a good man either in life or after death. He is in fact a philosophical prophet and priest, an Isaiah come to meet a religious crisis that had taken the form of a philosophical dispute. And the religion of Apollo has never found a nobler expression than in the simple life and peaceful death of the Athenian sage.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

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KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE.*

J. E. CREIGHTON.

THE motto of the Phi Beta Kappa society, "Philosophy the pilot of life," furnishes the text for the reflections that I have to lay before you to-day. This motto suggests the famous saying of Socrates in the "Apology," that a life without criticism or examination is not a life worth living for a human being. For φιλοσοφία in your motto, as I understand it, signifies just the free exercise of thought that finds its function in examining and testing the opinions and beliefs that pass current in ordinary life. It is this faculty of reflecting on experience, and finding its value in terms of some general principles, that differentiates the life of man from that of the lower animals. Philosophy in this sense, as reflection, or the effort to estimate the meanings and values that are involved in different experiences of life, may be said to be the essential birthright of man, and is always present in some degree in every human consciousness. The term 'reflection' may suggest that this activity is something external to, or that supervenes upon, the ordinary experience of men. But it is no foreign or borrowed gleam that reflection throws upon our ideas, but the internal light of reason itself, the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. Thinking is not therefore a mere incident, a secondary intention, as it were, of human life. Nor do we adequately characterize its relation to life when we emphasize its utility as the essential instrument and indispensable guide of practice. Reflection, as the free and unrestricted play of ideas, is rather to be regarded as the essential business or primary intention of human life. Philosophy is thus no foreign pilot that has been

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taken on board, but the expression of what is most truly and intimately the individual's own nature. It is not merely regulative, but constitutive of life, being the heart and center from which flow all its practical activities, and to which they all again return for constant adjustment and renewal. It is the ever-present fountain of youth, the vivifying and transforming element of our experience which has the power to make all things new. Without it, our highest activities would be blind and mechanical, our righteousness would be like the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, having no connection with the innermost center of our personality. For mere practical activities tend to become mechanical and perpetuate themselves through habit; and when they lose all connection with the reflective source of rational life, they are incapable of maintaining their spiritual vitality and become empty forms without substance.

When we thus attempt to regard life in its true ideal significance, to see life steadily and to see it whole, it seems possible to rise above the opposition between knowledge and practice. Nevertheless, it may be said, this is a mere counsel of perfection, an ideal that cannot be realized under the actual conditions that constitute our finite and fragmentary mode of existence. We find that, as a matter of fact, there is a tendency to separate, and oftentimes to sharply oppose, these two aspects of experience, giving either one the primacy, and regarding the other as of secondary or merely derivative importance. Knowledge, for example, is sometimes regarded as the pilot of life in the sense that it is the indispensable instrument for the attainment of practical ends, the means through which man gains mastery over the forces of material nature or discovers a common basis for coöperation with his fellow-men. From this point of view, ideas are valued in terms of their usefulness in practical application, and there naturally arises a certain impatience with regard to knowledge that is not directed toward some practical end. On the other hand, those who live the reflective life

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are apt to take up an equally one-sided position in defense of knowledge against the claims of practice. They are too often ready to maintain that ideas are debased and contaminated by being applied to practical affairs, and that knowledge is higher and purer when it remains isolated in the realm of the pure idea.

It is perhaps true that this is not an altogether just characterization of the position of those who are unwilling to subordinate knowledge to practice or to evaluate ideas in any offhand way in terms of their practical consequences. Yet I think the champions of knowledge for its own sake have not infrequently been led to define knowledge in a purely negative and abstract way as against practice, seeking to vindicate the claims of the intellectual life by separating it too sharply from the functions and offices through which it expresses itself. To separate knowledge from life, as something that might be contaminated by life's everyday demands and uses, is to take up an indefensible position. In so far as this attitude has existed, the prevailing demand that knowledge shall justify itself is a reasonable protest against an interpretation that not only robs knowledge of practical significance, but, in so doing, also renders it empty and impossible from an intellectual standpoint. For in the midst of our disputes about the relative importance of knowledge and action, it may at least be recognized that either one, when taken in complete isolation from the other, becomes contradictory and self-destructive; the most unpractical of all men being he who is narrowly or exclusively practical, and the stupidest and most unenlightened man, he who deals only in abstract principles which have no relation to what is real and concrete.

In maintaining the value and dignity of knowledge, as is done by this society, there is involved no antagonism to what is practical; on the contrary, your motto emphasizes the essential and necessary relation between knowledge and life. What, however, is fundamentally antagonistic to the spirit and traditions of the Phi Beta Kappa society

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is that practical attitude which lays exclusive or primary emphasis upon external goods, which can have, at best, only a subordinate place as means or instruments in a rational life. We must distinguish sharply between what is truly practical for a man and what the word usually implies. It is, however, impossible to reconcile the conflicting positions by any mere definition of terms. There exists a genuine and radical antagonism between philosophy, as the love of wisdom, the pursuit of that which is in itself real, and the demand for practical efficiency, that which will yield some tangible cash value in a given situation.

It would be idle to conceal from ourselves that truth is about the last thing the average mind esteems or desires. The practical man is always impatient of the person who insists on facts or principles, despising these as not leading to immediate results. The spirit of the world, as Morley aptly satirizes it, is that "thoroughness is a mistake, and nailing your flag to the mast a bit of delusive heroics. Think wholly of to-day, and not at all of to-morrow. Beware of the high, and hold fast to the safe. Dismiss convictions and study the general consensus. No zeal, no faith, no intellectual trenchancy, but as much low-minded geniality and trivial complaisance as you please." Cynical as these counsels sound when thus baldly stated, they can scarcely be said to exaggerate the prevailing worldly spirit of the man who prides himself on his practical good sense. It is not the mere absence of light that is depressing, but the open contempt for truth as something that is without significance in the affairs of life. It may appear to the young man going out into life that the practical forces are so strong and all-pervasive at the present time that the only prudent course is to capitulate and learn the rules of the game. But, after all, if his college life and the fellowship of societies like this have given him any glimpse of ideal values, his loss of courage can only be momentary. It is encouraging to remember that the history of the conflict between the ideal and the prac-

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tical is the history of civilization, and that numbers have never been able to overhelm the cause we represent. The history of success is the history of minorities.

The forces that war against light and knowledge in the name of practical expediency assume various forms, and sometimes profess themselves champions of the highest spiritual interests. They may perhaps be classified under two heads: materialism, which demands that the fruits of knowledge be forthcoming in terms of external goods of some kind, and practical or sentimental idealism, which is likewise eager for quick return of profits and impatient with knowledge that does not contribute directly to the amelioration of the life of the individual or society. The influence of materialism is not due to the strength of its arguments; in fact, nothing is easier than to show theoretically that the evaluation of life in terms of material goods is thoroughly short-sighted and unpractical. But the appeal of materialism is rather to the desires than to the reason. It works through the longing that individuals feel for honor or wealth or personal enjoyment, or even presents itself in the name of the intellectual or æsthetic life, as a demand for the means of cultivation and self-realization. These influences are so subtle and insidious, as well as so constant and pervasive, that the individual is often led captive unawares, the good seed of idealism being gradually choked by the cares of the world, and the effort required to maintain one's position as a man of affairs and to rank well with one's fellows. However, the practice of materialism soon leads to its expression in theory. When the indifference to ideas is boldly expressed in the form of a cynical theory, or, worse still if possible, in the Polonius-like advice to young men to throw aside ideas and aim at practical things, the paralysis of mind and soul have become complete, truth and the love of wisdom being expressly repudiated.

However seductive the rewards of material success, the futility of making these things the ends of life is, on re-

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flection, clearly enough apparent. But the case is different when appeal is made to the desire to attain practical results of a higher order. The desire to serve society, to benefit one's fellow-men, is one of the noblest impulses of human nature, and appeals strongly to men of idealistic temperament. It is perhaps not too much to say that the increase of this spirit is one of the most hopeful manifestations of our own time, implying, as it does, a growing consciousness of the profound truth that we are all members one of another. Nevertheless, there is a real danger, I venture to think, in the philanthropic ideal when taken as an ultimate or exclusive end of life, and thus opposed to the pursuit of knowledge. The danger is that attention may become so exclusively fixed on practical results as to lead to impatience with the slow processes of thought, and thus to a contempt for truth as opposed to what seems for the time being to be the good of the individual or society. And it scarcely needs to be pointed out that, when this happens, the good will is itself perverted. There is a strange paradox in all spiritual life, yet a paradox that ceases to be perplexing when we remember that the mind is not a collection of separately acting faculties, but an organic whole. The paradox to which I refer is not merely that the corruption of the best is the worst, but that even the best thoughts and motives, when over-emphasized and taken apart from the other elements with which they are naturally and normally associated, prove contradictory, and are transformed into their opposites. Thus the desire to benefit society, when dissociated from the love for knowledge, soon degenerates into the extremest and emptiest form of egoism, into the desire for power or honor; or it leads straightway to the conviction that the practical end is so important that it must be realized at once and at all costs. It is never safe to love anything better than truth, no matter how high or holy it may appear to be. "He who begins by loving Christianity better than truth," says Coleridge, "will proceed by loving his own sect or church better than Chris-

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tianity, and end by loving himself better than all." As John Morley puts it:

> The law of things is that they who tamper with veracity, from whatever motive, are tampering with the vital force of human progress. Our comfort, and the delight of the religious imagination, are no better than forms of self-indulgence when they are secured at the cost of that love of truth on which, more than on anything else, the increase of light and happiness among men must depend. We have to fight and do lifelong battle against the forces of darkness, and anything that turns the edge of reason blunts the surest and most potent of our weapons.

I shall try, a little later, to show that the intellectual life, in its most complete exercise, includes within itself the highest practical activities. There can be no ultimate opposition between truth and goodness, between the ends of the intellectual and the moral life, when these are rightly understood. At present, however, I am rather concerned to point out how the prevailing emphasis on practice, although in its two forms seeming to appeal to quite a different order of motives, leads in both cases alike to an indifference to ideas that is destructive of the highest results.

I have put the matter in this way, dwelling on the antagonism between the ideals of your society and the prevailing tendencies, not for the purpose of bringing discouragement, but rather, so far as I may, to sound a trumpet and to summon you to arms. And, as is usually the case, the foes within are here more dangerous than the foes without. The greatest danger is that the prevailing skepticism shall effect an entrance into our own minds and thus paralyze our efforts in behalf of learning. At the present time, it is essential, above everything else, that scholars, and the universities as the representatives of scholarship, should renew their faith in the sovereignty and efficacy of truth. May it not be, that the indifference to learning on the part of undergraduates of which we are hearing so much at the present time, is to some extent the outcome and reflection of our own skepticism and worldliness? Unless scholars can keep alive in their own

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hearts the love of truth, unless they are really absorbed in its pursuit, they cannot hope to inspire others with reverence for knowledge as for something high and noble. The fault must lie in ourselves and not in our stars. Even when circumstances seem most unpromising, the love of truth is a motive to which one may always confidently appeal. Next to distrusting his own reason, for the scholar the most fatal step is to assume that truth has no power to awaken a response in the minds of others. Indeed, these are both expressions of the same paralyzing skeptical attitude. To distrust human reason is to forget the fundamental fact that a knowledge of the genuine nature of reality is, as Plato says, the true nourishment of the soul, and that it languishes and dies when it turns away from truth and feeds upon opinion. Indifference to truth can never long maintain itself, in the face of light and conviction. It is vain, said Kant, to pretend to be indifferent regarding questions to which the human reason, from its very nature, can never be indifferent.

The first duty of the scholar, then, when he appears to be surrounded by hostile forces, is to keep his own light trimmed and burning:

> To abate not one jot of heart or hope
> But steer right onwards.

And he may derive encouragement by reminding himself that the cause of civilization is bound up with the maintenance of ideas, with the perpetuation of the spirit of free inquiry. The cause in which he is enlisted is far-reaching, and of the highest importance. Without the work of the scholar who acknowledges as his master no other sovereign than truth, who restricts his inquiries by no practical or instrumental considerations, the spirit of freedom would perish from the earth. Not only would no real advances in the moral or intellectual life be possible, but with the free exercise of thought there would soon pass away the higher ideas and ideals that form the basis of our civilization. What the practical man holds in

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light esteem, the scholar's work of promoting and keeping alive the cultural ideas that form the basis of civilization, regarding it as effeminate or unfit for a man with red blood in his veins, is, on reflection, seen to be the most practical and important concern of humanity. And, similarly, the disinterested pursuit of ideas, that often appears to the man enthusiastic for practical reforms to be nothing more than a refined kind of selfishness, shows itself as the necessary basis and support for the moral life. "The love of knowledge for its own sake," says Locke, "is the principal part of human perfection, and the seed-plot of all the virtues." There is therefore no ground for discouragement at the present time; and above all no reason for the scholar to feel that his day is over, that his place is to be taken by the practical inventor or the politician or philanthropist who can show results that are valuable to society.

It may help to give force to these considerations, and to make them more concrete, if we consider their application more specifically to some of the problems of university life at the present time. As is well-known, very serious criticisms have been recently brought against the educational results that are being attained by the colleges and universities of the country, and various causes have been assigned as explanations of existing evils, and a variety of remedies proposed. Now, even if we agree among ourselves that these defects have been set forth in a somewhat sensational way, it is still impossible to deny that conditions are serious enough to call for our most earnest attention. It must be admitted, too, that the faculties and governing bodies of these institutions have to accept the primary responsibility for existing conditions, and that on them falls the duty of correcting abuses. I have no specific remedies to propose, but I feel sure that any program of reform must proceed from, and go along with, a renewal of faith in the value of ideas, and of courage in proclaiming them on the part of university teachers. It may be impossible to make headway directly against the

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spirit of the age, as it expresses itself outside the university; it may even be impossible to refuse admission to college to students whose aims and capacities render them to a great extent impervious to ideas; but it is incumbent on those of us who are teachers to hold up a different standard and to maintain an asylum where science and letters may be preserved and advanced, and from which they may go forth to the service of humanity. And I may add that the university has the right to expect the same spirit of devotion to truth from her loyal alumni. To be loyal to the university involves the duty of being loyal to the idea of a university, to its essential spirit and highest purpose. There is perhaps nothing so thoroughly discouraging to a university teacher, nothing so provocative of deep-seated pessimism, as the lack of sympathy often shown by alumni with the highest aims and interests of their alma mater. The noisy loyalty that discharges itself solely on the plane of sport is too often a hindrance, rather than an inspiration, to the work of the faculty. But, after all, the main responsibility for educational results must rest with the faculty; and the new spirit, if it is to come, must first find its expression through them. I have attempted to state some familiar truths regarding the essential nature of the scholar's vocation, and the grounds which he may find for encouragement, even when conditions appear most unfavorable to his efforts. But, looking at the matter from the actual position in which the individual teacher finds himself to-day, it may seem that these considerations are mere empty words, and that as things are they will remain. It is impossible, it may be urged, for either the teacher or the student to maintain standards essentially different from the society by which he is surrounded. And, moreover, even if we grant that the promotion of the intellectual life is the highest possible aim, when we take human nature and actual conditions as they are, have we any reasonable hope of success? Have not our demands been too high, the plan of education too far removed from the

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interests of our American youth, to call forth their activities? Let us come down from the heights, and, taking human nature as it is, aim at practical results, at giving our young men a training for life, at making them efficient leaders of business and qualifying them for holding political offices. They may happily in the process acquire some modicum of liberal culture and some respect for ideas. In spite of the element of truth that such statements contain, I cannot help feeling that they point entirely in the wrong direction. A university teacher is not the man to talk about taking human nature as it is, or of gratifying the actually existing interests of students. For his concern is with human nature as it ought to be, his function to awaken and call out interests that are yet only latent and which the student may not yet know that he possesses. It is a poor philosophy to take human nature as it is, and to fail to bear in mind that which it is capable of becoming. Moreover, if the university cannot maintain any higher ideals, or appeal to different interests, than those which are dominant in the outside world, what reason is there for its continuing to exist? The practical preparation for life may be better obtained in professional schools or in contact with the actual conditions of business life.

The question of the relation of the university teacher to practical life is most important, and one that demands serious consideration. It may be that here is one source of his weakness. The older type of college professor was, as a rule, much less actively engaged in practical affairs than their successors are to-day. As a rule, too, the teachers in the great European universities occupy themselves much less with practical matters than we do. They accept scholarship and teaching as their high vocation, reckoning other things as for them of altogether secondary importance. But, among ourselves, the unpractical type of college professor, who lived in the world of ideas and was somewhat oblivious to mundane affairs, is rapidly vanishing. In the "Republic" Plato speaks of

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the necessity of compelling the philosophers to resign for a time the contemplation of the idea and to take part in the affairs of the state. At the present time, however, there seems to be no compulsion necessary in order to induce scholars to take up practical pursuits. It is so much easier to act than to think! We not only waste our strength on all kinds of practical questions regarding the organization and administration of the university, but we are also ready to lead reform movements in church and state, direct charities, organize conventions, or give advice on any practical subject whatsoever, under the pleasant conviction that we are rendering important public service, and also demonstrating that the college professor of to-day is a very wide-awake, practical person. Of course, all these activities may be good, but do they not tend to distract the mind of the scholar from his own proper business? The good may easily become the enemy of the best; and the best and highest for every man is his own station and its duties. Where the line is to be drawn in any case is a question for the individual. How far any college teacher may find it possible to engage in practical affairs will depend partly on his temperament, and partly on the degree of absorption that his own particular studies demand. But, if he finds that these things tend to distract his mind, and to dull the edge of his scholarly interest, let him not lay the flattering unction to his soul that he is doing something higher and more important. There can be no doubt that the highest efficiency for the scholar and teacher requires that he should sit apart from the practical world. He must, in a sense, renounce the world, and live in the inner realm of ideas, never allowing the things of sense and time to occupy the chief place in his heart. This does not imply that he is to be oblivious to what is taking place around him or indifferent to the interests of the society in which he lives. But he must realize that he can serve those interests best by devoting himself to his own proper work, by laboring to the utmost of his strength that the truth which it is

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his duty to teach be not error, that the light within his own soul be not darkness. He must be in the world but not of the world, having made the advancement and propagation of learning the great end and object of his existence. It is, of course, true that this breed of men has not entirely disappeared from the faculties of our colleges and universities. Otherwise, our condition would be hopeless indeed. But I think there are comparatively few teachers who will not admit that the pressure of outside distractions is seriously interfering with their devotion to scholarship and dulling their finer enthusiasm for truth. "The world is too much with us;" we are too anxious and troubled about many things, and tend to neglect the one thing needful. And truth is a jealous mistress, who will not grant favors to him who serves her with half a heart.

Moreover, there is no other motive than reverence for truth that will supply moral fiber strong enough to withstand the temptation, under which the teacher always labors, to obtain immediate results by pleasing his hearers, by giving them something that will appeal to their immediate interests and fancies, something that will produce an immediate effect. The desire to influence one's students in a practical way—even to make them better morally—is no proper substitute for the effort to lead them to think clearly and independently, and with a veneration for truth to follow the argument wherever it leads. Without this element, instruction degenerates into a mere play of subjective opinions, and furnishes no true nourishment for the mind. "The hungry sheep look up and are not fed." When the guiding principle is lost, there is danger that the relations between teacher and student may tend toward the condition which Plato has described in the "Republic," as characteristic of the democratic state:

"The teacher, in these circumstances," he says, "fears and flatters his students, and the students despise their masters and tutors. And, speaking generally, the young copy their elders and enter the lists with them in speak-

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ing and acting; and the elders unbend so far as to abound in wit and pleasantry, in imitation of the young, in order, as they say, to avoid seeming morose or exacting.''

It may perhaps be said, however, in defense of the practical teacher, that the main business of the universities is not to make scholars, but to train up men for the professions and for the service of the state. The most valuable and efficient teachers, therefore, will be men of the world who can give the student the outlook on life of the practical man and instruction in what will be of value to him when he leaves the university. There are two things that may be said in reply to this objection. In the first place, it would seem to have much more force when applied to the instruction demanded by professional schools and colleges than to the colleges of arts and sciences, of which I am now speaking. And, secondly, it cannot be granted that it is necessary to be engrossed in the affairs of the world in order to understand it. The spectator of time and existence, the man who would penetrate deeply into the meaning of things, must sit apart and observe and reflect. It is only thus that he can attain an objective point of view; his vision is obscured by too near a prospect or by being himself in the heat of the conflict. It is true, of course, that the majority of the students who attend the universities will not devote their lives to scholarship. Nevertheless, it is a mistake on the part of the university to adopt any other end than that of producing scholars. The first function of the university is to see that the race of scholars shall never fail, to inspire and train men who shall perpetuate and advance the cause of learning. And it is of fundamental importance that this shall be done, and that a fair share, at least, of the very ablest and most capable men should be led to devote themselves to teaching and scholarship. Otherwise, if the noblest and best are drawn off into the practical professions, the cause of learning will be left to the spiritually lame and halt, the mediocre, cautious type of men who look forward merely to comfortable po-

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sitions and Carnegie pensions. But after the demands of scholarship have been met, still the business in life of the majority of the students will be to apply ideas in various fields. This fact, however, is no argument for lowering the intellectual standards of the university in their case or for the assumption that knowledge and scholarship are for them of secondary importance. For the university becomes false to its essential function as soon as learning is subordinated to any other end. When a university becomes a social club, or depends for its support on the reputation of its athletic teams, it has ceased to be a university, and should surrender its charter as an institution of learning.

Moreover, it is of the utmost importance that the men who are to go out into the world to administer its practical affairs should be imbued with a loyalty to truth and a passion for light and clearness of ideas. If we would train men for the state, let us not forget that this is what the affairs of the state demand: the clear-headed courage that comes from loyalty to truth, the patience and resolution that proceed from a faith in principles, the fine sense of justice that can only be maintained by the man who has learned to rise above his own individual point of view and to understand the true objective relations of things. To develop character by implanting a reverence for truth, and a desire to serve under her banner, to awaken in their students a love of light and a passion for clear and distinct ideas, this is the high duty of universities. If it is true that this aim has been somewhat obscured of late, if, growing skeptical of the value of ideas, we have put moral training and social experience and other false gods in the place of truth, then we must put away these idols from amongst us, and remember the high vocation unto which we are called. But is this practical, it may be asked? Must not the university conform to the conditions and needs of the country, and is not the demand of the country for practical, efficient men? Well, what is the test of efficiency? It is surely to be rated not primarily

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by the quantity or amount of the activity, but rather by the quality of the end achieved; not by the sensational character of the immediate results, but by the permanent value of that which has been realized. If, then, we insist that we must look to the end in defining efficiency, it is certainly true that to train and discipline the intellectual faculties, awaken the desire to see things clearly and to see them whole, is in the highest sense to promote efficiency. The university can have no higher or more practical function than to implant in its students the love of reality and truth, and the hatred of falsehood and shams.

The object of the Phi Beta Kappa society is the promotion of the spirit of liberal scholarship. More particularly, as I understand, it stands for literature in the broadest sense, for the humanistic studies that deal with the immaterial achievements of man's intellect. It is especially in these fields, however, that it is difficult to maintain an invigorating intellectual atmosphere at the present time. There seem to be wanting to the representatives of these branches of learning two sources of encouragement and stimulus that are enjoyed by the workers in the natural sciences. These are, first, the consciousness of the immediate applicability of their results to the practical interests of mankind; and, secondly, the courage and confidence that come from success in actually advancing the confines of knowledge and making absolutely new discoveries. The scientific worker has the advantage over his colleague who is a humanist, also in the more general recognition of the importance of his results on the part of the public. Science may have its uses, and if it does not go too far afield it may be tolerated by the practical spirit; but letters and liberal culture the practical man regards as something weak and effeminate, something not worthy of the attention of serious, grown-up men. Even if it be desirable that students in the earlier years of their course should get a taste of language or literature or philosophy, it is felt by many that in their later years they should devote themselves to something

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more serious, if possible to studies bearing on some vocation. We find a striking picture of this attitude toward liberal study in the "Gorgias." Callicles, a Sophist of the worst type, remonstrates with Socrates on continuing to waste his time on a useless study like philosophy.

"Philosophy," he says, "as a part of education is an excellent thing; and there is no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but when he is older the thing becomes ridiculous, and I feel toward philosophers as I do toward those that lisp and imitate children. . . . When I see a youth continuing the study in later life and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was saying, such a one, even if he have good parts, becomes effeminate. . . . What is the value of an art that converts a man of sense into a fool? Then take my advice, learn the philosophy of business, and leave to others these absurdities; for they will only bring you to poverty. Take for your model, not these word-splitters, but solid, respectable men of business who have shown their wisdom by becoming well to do."

The reproach that liberal culture is useless and effeminate, then, is not peculiar to our time, but represents the universal estimate of all those who apply a purely worldly standard of value. But there always has existed another standard of what is worth while in human life; and on the maintenance of that standard the cause of civilization rests. The teachers of the humanities at the present time have need of all their courage in order to stand firmly and aggressively against the Philistinism that nowadays vaunts itself in high places. They must refuse to compromise with the enemy, or to accept some inferior post in order to be kept alive, but continue to do battle for the supremacy of man's spiritual ideals. And to carry on this work in the universities there is need of recruits, men of imagination and brains, "the fairest of our youth," as Plato says, "men sound in mind and wind, with a quick apprehension, a good memory, and a manly and lofty spirit." To such men the old call is still ringing out: Who will go up to the help of the Lord against the mighty? We cannot doubt that the universities will produce a breed of men to carry on this work. The fight is not over. It would be pessimistic to cry, "Zeus is now dethroned and Vortex reigns in his stead."

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The representative of the humanities, therefore, who recognizes the full significance of his own work, has certainly not less real or solid grounds for enthusiasm than his colleague who occupies himself with science. For it is his mission to carry knowledge to its fullest and highest fruition, to interpret man to himself in the light of his past achievements and history. Knowledge is only real and genuine when it takes the form of self-knowledge. It is only then that it becomes human and liberating, that it is the truth that makes us free. And in order to know one's self as human, it is necessary to know humanity. "What should they know of England who only England know?" Kipling asks. Similarly, to know one's own mind, involves an understanding of what mind has achieved and become. In order to become rational and human, the individual must go beyond himself and enter into the heritage that belongs to him as a member of the family of rational beings. Culture is defined by Matthew Arnold as the effort to know the best that has been thought and said in the world. This, of course, implies more than a process of passive acquisition of foreign material. What we have inherited from the past we have to make our own, employing it as the means for the promotion of our total perfection, as Arnold tells us. The humanist accordingly has the duty of making the past live again, not of mechanically reproducing its accidental and temporal aspects, but of interpreting it in terms of its permanent and eternal significance. And, as this work must be done by each age in the light of its own problems and conditions, it demands powers that are at once creative and critical. Indeed, all true criticism is at the same time creative. The genuine humanist, then, like the real scientist, is not deprived of the inspiration that comes from creative activity. He is called upon to advance knowledge, to contribute to the sum-total of ideas. The function which he is called upon to perform is to contribute to the solution of that most difficult and fundamental of human problems, the problem of self-knowledge. It is

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the most difficult, for it is the all-inclusive problem, being the interpretation of reason by reason. It is the most important, for only so far as the mind knows itself is it free. The history of the human race, as Hegel says, is the development of the consciousness of freedom. Or, in other words, it is the development of the consciousness of the true end and destiny of man that constitutes the real education of both the individual and the race.

Philosophy thus becomes the pilot of life in the highest and most complete sense when the desire for wisdom and enlightenment enters into mind as its dominant and controlling purpose. This motive, at its highest and best, includes within itself the outer life of practice as its necessary means of realization and mode of expression. Truth can only be realized through contact with the objective world, and through sympathy and appreciation of the thoughts of our fellow-men. The intellectual life is not something isolated and abstract, something opposed or antagonistic to the virtues of practical life. The scholar cannot be essentially self-centered or selfish, or a man of cowardly spirit or low passions. In so far as these things enter into a man, they destroy his enthusiasm for truth and warp and pervert his ideas. On the other hand, when the desire for light and wisdom becomes the controlling principle of life, all the lower passions and desires are dried up at the roots. The practical life becomes the means and instrument of reason, its impulses and activities being tested and evaluated in the light of the most complete knowledge that is attainable. And, finally, the more we reflect, the more firmly will we be convinced that devotion to truth, "loyalty to loyalty," in Professor Royce's fine phrase, is the only soil from which the other virtues can spring. For if this be lacking, if a man be indifferent to truth, regarding it as a thing of no practical importance, there is remaining no longer any center or core of personality, to which a consistent or a coherent character might attach. To be disloyal to our own best convictions, then, is the only skepticism that we

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need to dread. For this is to obscure the very fountain-light of our being, to cherish "the lie in the soul," as Plato puts it, which destroys and corrupts the entire character.

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RELIGION AND THE PSYCHICAL LIFE.*

EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES.

AS human life becomes complex, it is specialized into many social organizations and activities. The homogeneity of primitive society differentiates into numberless classes, parties, associations, and alliances. Law, art, science, and religion, in the early stages of society, are scarcely distinguishable from each other. In advanced civilizations they often appear separate and sometimes antagonistic. Not only do they seem to diverge from each other, but they tend to lose connection with the stream of concrete activity which produced them. Each specialized interest in turn develops parties and schools of thought within itself which threaten its unity. Obviously this is true of religion, and the case is not greatly different in law, art, and science. Such parties and their doctrines develop around partial, special interests, and finally become remote, abstract, and rent by internal conflict. Some Protestant sects have as their distinguishing mark a doctrine of the ordinances or the observance of a certain day of worship! It is possible, however, to put these varying developments within their proper genetic perspective, where their divergence may be understood and their ultimate source in vital processes

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be made clear. Religion, with its changing forms, may thus be seen in its natural, concrete character as a phase of all socialized human experience. None of its manifestations remains the unmodified embodiment of all the spiritual values of this growing experience. Both apologists and critics of religion have neglected this fact. They have been misled by the persistent and pernicious fallacy which identifies a part with the whole, or a stage of development with the whole process. If one starts with the assumption that religion is synonymous with animism, then in a scientific age religion becomes remote from life and is destined to perish. Or if by religion is meant the development of the Hebrew tradition, it is a foregone conclusion that there is no religion among native Africans and Australians.

The results of genetic social psychology make it possible to overcome the various partial and limited conceptions of the relation of religion and life. Since the religious consciousness, according to these results, is just the consciousness of the greatest interests and purposes of life, in their most idealized and intensified forms, it is evident that in its generic nature religion is a most intimate aspect of human life. This may be shown in detail with reference to ceremonies, mythology, sacrifice, and prayer in primitive cults. Everywhere the sacred objects and functions are those in which the life of society is felt to center. But different stages in social development estimate these things differently and express social valuations in different ways. When all phases of life are permeated by superstition and magic, religion shares in this confused, childish attitude. But when custom has been criticized and given moral character through reflection and self-direction, religion may center in moral ideals and in rational methods of control. In early society, religion is more likely to remain identified with older customs, but even there the different phases of social life interact. Economic conditions compel reconstruction in traditional customs and often produce an

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advance in morals which finally registers itself in religious symbols. Or, again, a prophetic religion may gain moral insight through its leaders, in advance of the masses, and thereby become an effective moralizing agency. In some instances the religion of one people has been taken to other races, and has presented sharp contrasts to the existing cults. Religion, in such a case, may become the occasion of social reconstruction and moral progress; but such an aggressive religion always requires an interpretation in terms of the historic social life of its origin. It is necessary to achieve an imaginative reproduction of the actual life of the society in which a religion arose, in order to make it effective in a new environment. Christianity undoubtedly presented high moral ideals and great ethical energy to the perishing civilizations of Greece and Rome. But it was not Christianity alone. The whole idealized social history of the Hebrew people, through its own literature, was carried over to the Gentiles. The task of infusing the history and concrete life of this people with warmth and color for the nations of Europe has been the great task of generations of Christian scholars, orators, and artists. At the same time, the growing life of the peoples which accepted Christianity has necessitated modifications in that religion. The culture of the Renaissance demanded, and the democracy and science of the present time demand, great readjustments in the prevailing religious institutions. The moralization of religion moves forward with the practical and ethical developments of the race. This is becoming clearer as the processes of social evolution are better understood. New ethical problems constantly arise in modern life with the emergence of new commercial and industrial activities. For example, the new methods and forms of the organization in industry represented by the corporation and the labor union, necessitate a new meaning for the term justice. This sense of new social relations is demanding recognition in new developments of religious activity and doc-

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trine. Along with these claims for specific modifications, there is also a growing insistence upon the underlying principle of evolution. The age of invention and discovery has destroyed the old static life. With the wider knowledge of nature which science affords, the doctrine of development is passing into practical terms and taking the form of an ideal of individual and social progress.[1] A consequent readjustment of religion is recognized as necessary in order to enable it to embody the spirit of the new life which society is attaining. This readjustment is demanded, not in this or that particular, but as a continuous, thorough-going process to be conscientiously facilitated and maintained. The age begins to regard experimentation and progress as moral demands in every sphere of activity, and is therefore attaching religious significance to them. The movement is under way which is destined to exalt the very process of development to the place of a religious obligation. It may even add the attribute of evolution to the character of the Deity and embody the quality of dynamic, purposeful activity among the cardinal virtues. If the organized, institutionalized forms of religion appear barren and powerless, it is likely that a more real and vital religious consciousness will be found in other social movements, which are not yet designated as religious and may not even regard themselves as such. These conventionalized, lifeless forms arrogate to themselves the name of religion, and thereby succeed in creating the illusion that religion itself is inert and decadent. It is this fact which lends the color of truth to the statement that religion is characteristically conservative, and naturally follows rather than leads civilization's pioneers. This has come to be a common view among a certain school of social theorists. An almost equally extreme view on the opposite side is that which attributes social progress too largely to re-

[1] The tendency is expressed in many recent works such as Rauschenbusch, "Christianity and the Social Crisis;" Francis G. Peabody, "Jesus Christ and the Social Question."

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ligious initiative, ignoring the complex economic, social influences which are operative. A truer view is this, that the ideal values of each age and of each type of social development tend to reach an intensity, a volume, and a symbolic expression which is religious. There is accordingly a conflict among religious as among all other types of social experience. If the religious struggles are the most tragic, it is because all parties are here contending for what seem to them the most profoundly important interests of life. Such struggles are finally settled, not by argument or war, but by the onward movement of the whole social development of mankind. Professor Ross has contrasted the religious aspects of this movement in terms of "legal religion" and "social religion." The former belongs, in his view, to the patriarchal type of society, the latter to that type of society in which sympathy and brotherhood prevail. He recognizes that religion persists in new forms with changing intellectual and social interests:

"Geology, or higher criticism, or comparative mythology, may undermine particular beliefs with which ethical-religious feeling has associated itself. But the soul of religion has a marvelous and little-suspected power of escaping into new forms of belief." "In western society, the beliefs that create legal religion are perishing before our eyes. They stand in flat contradiction to our knowledge, and as the state becomes more able to secure civil order, the social ego takes less pains to keep them alive for the sake of their usefulness. The idealism that creates social religion, however, is not suffering so much. . . . Social religion then has a long and possibly a great career awaiting it. As it disengages itself from that which is transient and perishable, as the dross is purged away from its beliefs and the element of social compulsion entirely disappears from it, social religion will become purer and nobler. No longer a paid ally of the policeman, no longer a pillar of social order, it will take its unquestioned place with art and science and wisdom, as one of the free manifestations of the higher human spirit." [2]

This concrete, essential relation of religion and life is evidenced also in a psychological analysis of ideals. Psychologically, ideals are more or less remote ends of

[2] "Social Control," pp. 213, 216.

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action, whose realization is sought through the mediation of reflection and effort. The term moral has been used to designate those ideals which pertain particularly to human social welfare, in distinction from the claims of religion, which seeks authority for action and conduct in the will of a Deity. This contrast between moral and religious conduct belongs to that conception of the world which makes a rigid distinction between the natural and supernatural, between the human and divine. But if religion is identified with the most intimate and vital phases of the social consciousness, then the distinction between morality and religion is not real. That which makes an end or ideal of action moral is the fact that it is accepted with awareness; that it is compared with other ends; that it is analyzed; and that it is voluntarily chosen as good. This means that the social significance of the end desired is taken into account. All truly human conduct is necessarily social because its means and ends, its source and its consequences, are socially conditioned. Just because man's mind is a social reality, his moral or reflective ideals are also social. It is true that many social ends, both among primitive and civilized peoples, are not moral. They have not been reflectively selected; but all moral conduct is by necessity social. It follows that some forms of early religious consciousness may be lacking in moral quality, but that no genuinely moral consciousness can be without religious quality. In so far as religion is non-moral, it is primitive and controlled by custom. On the other hand, all moral ideals are religious in the degree to which they are the expression of great, vital interests of society. Religion, in the minds of its best representatives at the present time, consciously and frankly accepts as its highest conception the ideal of a kingdom or brotherhood of moral agents, coöperating for the attainment of further moral ends. A representative theologian gives the following statement as the central doctrine of Christianity: "Jesus was wholly concerned with ethics, with begetting and fostering in

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men the Godlike life. The word 'character' summarizes the great interest and life-purpose of Jesus Christ."[3] Professor Coe, after giving a psychological statement of the nature of ideals, says: "It should be noted also that there is no break between morals and religion as we here conceive them. Both move within the sphere of the good. The race becomes religious just where it becomes moral, namely, wherever our uncouth ancestors took a step beyond instinct by defining some object as their good and forming corresponding ideals."[4] The attempt to delimit the field of natural morality from religion presupposes, in the older writers, a dualism between human and divine, natural and 'regenerated' natures. Without the definite assumption of this dualism the line between morality and religion becomes obscure and tends to vanish completely.[5]

When one turns from the theologians and theorists to the concrete experience of religious people, the presence and importance of the moral ideal as the core of religion is still more evident. One result of Starbuck's investigation gives striking confirmation to this point. His subjects were representative of average orthodox evangelical church members. They insisted that the most constant and persistent element in their religious consciousness was the moral ideal.

"In adolescence," writes Starbuck, "when the new life bursts forth, its most important content was ethical. During storm and stress and doubt, that which remained firmest when life was least organized was this same instinct. And now we find, in describing their fundamental attitudes toward life, that the respondents already in the late teens and twenties mention conduct almost as frequently as at any later time in life. . . . It should be recalled that among the things which are given as absolutely essen-

[3] Stevens, "Doctrine of Salvation," p. 475.

[4] "Moral and Religious Education from the Psychological Point of View," *The Journal of Religious Education*, Vol. III, December, 1908.

[5] Palmer, "The Field of Ethics," Chap. IV. The attempt in this chapter to show what religion adds to morality issues in the claim that it adds "horizon, stability, and hope!" But are not these qualities afforded to some degree by every ideal?

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tial, the *sine qua non* of religion, conduct was most frequently mentioned.'' [6] The respondents say: ''The test of religion is conduct towards my fellow-beings.'' ''Religion is more a *life*, a living, than a system. It is a series of daily actions which determines conduct. Its essence is the daily doing of good to one's fellow-men.''

This conscious recognition of moral conduct as the deepest thing in their religious experience, is all the more impressive when it is taken in connection with the fact that much of their training in religion must have emphasized the customary doctrine that mere morality has nothing in common with religion. Theoretically, the popular presentation of religion moves largely within sacramentarian conceptions. The saving power of ordinances survives in practice even when the doctrine has been silenced. It is the usual keynote of evangelistic appeals that the good works one does in his natural state are of themselves of no avail. It is necessary to 'surrender,' 'obey,' 'confess' and receive a 'spirit,' in order to become genuinely religious. Of course, all such expressions may be given a justifiable and reasonable moral content, but in religious usage they ordinarily mean that in this way a new life, which was foreign before, comes into one's experience. Thenceforth it gives efficacy to good resolutions and good deeds. But in spite of the prevalence of such teaching, the investigation referred to above shows that ''during storm and stress and doubt'' that which remained firm was the natural ethical character; and it was this moral life which afterwards constituted the substance of religion.

The comparison of this moral and social religious ideal with the medieval notion of saintliness is thus described by Professor James:

''The Catholicism of the sixteenth century paid little heed to social righteousness; and to leave the world to the devil whilst saving one's own soul was then accounted no discreditable scheme. To-day, rightly or wrongly, helpfulness in general human affairs is, in consequence of one of those secu-

[6] ''Psychology of Religion,'' p. 321.

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lar mutations in moral sentiment of which I spoke, deemed an essential element of worth in character; and to be of some public or private use is also reckoned as a species of divine service.''[7]

The clear apprehension of the concrete relation of religion to the total life process furnishes a corrective for the erroneous view that, within the individual, religion is due to some unique faculty or instinct. The extreme form of the faculty theory of psychology arose historically with individualism, while individualism in turn accompanied the differentiation of the old social unity into various activities. As Professor Dewey says:

''This extreme individualistic tendency was contemporaneous with a transfer of interest from the supernatural church-state over to commercial, social, and political bodies with which the modern man found himself identified. . . . The individualistic tendency found a convenient intellectual tool in a psychology which resolved the individual into an association or series of particular states of feeling and sensations; and the good into a like collection of pleasures also regarded as particular mental states.''[8]

The psychologists of that period, whether of the associationist or intuitionist type, viewed the mental life as separated into discrete elements and processes. Reason, feeling, and volition were distinct from each other. The rational nature, the moral nature, the religious nature were taken as having their own psychological mechanisms. The activity and development of these endowments identified the individual with the corresponding human interests. The operations of reason made him rational, those of the moral nature made him moral, and those of the religious nature made him religious. But modern life is revealing, not merely the harmony of its various departments in working alliance, but their vital and organic relations with each other in purposive life history. In the same way, the various phases of human nature are found to be more than attributes or qualities inhering in man's metaphysical being. They are different aspects, stages, or abstracted processes of the total, pulsating life of the

[7] ''Varieties of Religious Experience,'' p. 354.
[8] Dewey and Tufts, ''Ethics,'' pp. 220, 221.

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organism. The normal mental life is a complex, functionally organized activity. Like other high biological organisms, man is capable of doing a variety of things and of gaining a wealth of experience in the process, but there is but one mental life involved. The various interests which he pursues—business, art, science, politics, religion—employ his whole nature. Their differences are those of direction, of emphasis, of methods. This functional specialization of activity creates appropriate systems of habits and attitudes, and these systems may be called different 'selves,' but the differences between such selves are only relative and provisional. Religion in this view, like all other interests, is a matter of habits and attitudes. The religious nature is not something distinguishable and separable in any mechanical and exclusive way. Such a 'nature' is just one of the selves in a functional and relative sense. It has no more independence or uniqueness than one's artistic nature or one's scientific nature. Religion, like every other specialized interest of man, involves the reaction of his entire nature. It is not the product of any one agency within him. In its most natural, normal development, it is just the expression and appreciation of those ideal relationships and values which are inherent in all earnest moral effort.

These considerations concerning the naturalness of religion have suggestive application to particular phases of religious experience. Recent studies have undertaken to describe and classify various phenomena, such as faith, prayer, worship, and mysticism.[9] There is usually a tendency to limit these terms in a way which betrays a failure to relate them with sufficient concreteness and complexity to the total activity of the religious consciousness. The fallacies of taking religion apart from life and of mistaking some partial factor for the whole, reappear in the treatment of special topics.

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[9] *The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education,* Clark University Press.

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Faith is very commonly viewed in this way. It is regarded as peculiar to religion and as due to some special endowment or experience. Faith is called the instrument of religion, and knowledge the instrument of science. But in reality religion and science both involve the whole mental life, emotion, imagination, reason, and action. They are differentiated by their center of interest within the total life history of human action. Science, religion, art, and other interests are distinguished simply by emphasis upon different aspects of human purposive action. They therefore harmonize with each other while maintaining relatively definite characters of their own. The phenomena of faith at once appear simple and clear, when viewed with reference to the moving circuit characteristic of all purposive activity. It is the piecemeal and unarticulated view, which makes faith the occasion of so many problems and mysteries. It is not to be supposed that all difficulties of interpretation disappear when these phenomena are approached with the methods and presuppositions of functional psychology. But it is nevertheless true that many difficulties are at once resolved or eliminated.

When faith is examined psychologically and compared with similar phenomena in other than religious experiences, it is found to correspond with the purposive factor in activity. It may be said that wherever there is an ideal of any kind, there is faith. This is clear and obvious in so far as ideals are conceived dynamically. An ideal as an end of action,—that is, as something desired, something for whose realization means are intelligently sought, and something toward whose attainment effort is confidently put forth,—involves faith. For faith is just that interest, confidence, and vivid envisagement which makes the ends sought so vital and appealing. Faith is a vital working interest in anything. It is the attitude which belongs to a *live* proposition, accepted as a practical plan of action. Religious faith is differentiated from other types of faith simply by the ends or ideals which it seeks.

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Faith in ideals which are felt to be the highest, the most valuable, and the most essential, is religious faith. Religious faith is therefore only another term for the religious consciousness itself, since that consciousness is purposive and dynamic, and centers in supreme ideal values.

From this point of view several specific problems concerning faith may be settled. The beginning of religious faith is the point at which religious ideals become warm and attractive. The psychological process by which they attain this warmth and attractiveness is that of the association of ideas. The ideas are brought to attention by suggestion, inquiry, education, or in some chance way. By recurring to the attention, by gathering associations sometimes unconsciously, these ideals finally move over into the focus of attention and interest. There they become the object of effort and influence conduct. This beginning of interest, of enthusiastic devotion to ideals, is described in religious biographies as the attainment of faith. It is often attended by keenest satisfaction and by a sense of calm and peace, together with the active attitude. There is likely to be a very pronounced emotional quality in such an experience. This has led some writers to consider faith as peculiarly an emotion. Professor Leuba takes this view: "The core of the faith-state is a particular attitude and an increased efficiency of the will in consequence of which an ideal of life becomes realizable. It is a constructive response to a need; a specific emotion of the sthenic type, subserving, as emotions do, a particular end."[10] But if faith is rightly held to be equivalent to confident purposive activity, then it may include also the intermediate stage of reflective analysis, reasoning, and scientific experiment, within which the best means of attaining the ideal are selected. During this process the faith attitude is not absent. It gives zest, support, and

[10] "Faith," *The American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, Vol. I, 1904, p. 73.

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even patience in the quest for knowledge, for although the scientific inquiry might at first seem to arrest and thwart the attainment of the ideal end, experience teaches that science facilitates the realization of practical ideals. Professor Leuba refers to faith-beliefs as propositions which are often accepted by the religious convert without rational examination, and held by him in a quite non-rational way. That is undoubtedly true in many cases, especially where religion has become conventionalized into dogma. But if religious faith attaches, as it may, to propositions which are socially significant and scientifically verifiable, it is possible for that faith to become the incentive and support of the most elaborate scientific investigations and rational control. That is, a rational procedure is normal and, in modern society, increasingly necessary to purposeful or ideal activity. It is as natural and necessary in the ventures of faith, in the sphere of religion, as in the realm of business or statecraft.

There is also at hand, in this functional view, a reconciliation of faith and works. It is because faith has been used erroneously to designate the more intellectual, passive assent to creedal statements that it has seemed possible to divorce it from works. In the proper sense, faith is a vital interest and therefore one which moves on to complete itself in action. There are many difficulties and dangers, however, in the process. Religious education has often emphasized the memorizing and repetition of sentiments without relating them to practice. It has often left its *protégés* stranded in a sea of contemplation. But these phenomena are just as deplorable in religion as in language and literature. Did anyone ever learn the forms of a foreign or a 'dead' language without relating them to useful objects? Did anyone ever become a dreamer and sentimentalist in the realms of literature? Faith is normally dynamic and practical, whether in religion or elsewhere. It is just a convenient term for the propulsive, forward-striving effort of human nature. It

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is at its best when, under the control of the highest intelligence, it fulfils, in practical ways, with energy and power the noblest ideals of the race.

Prayer,[11] even more than faith, has been regarded as psychologically peculiar to religion. But it is not. It is in reality a fundamental characteristic of all consciousness, especially of that in which there is a keen sense of personal needs. Prayer, as is abundantly illustrated in primitive religion, is a natural expression of the social character of all consciousness. All thought, unless it be in the case of exceedingly refined and abstract mental processes, is personal and interlocutory. The conscious life of the individual is largely an interplay between the different selves of his different attitudes and habits. These argue, confer, advise, and contend with each other quite as actual people do. These selves may be exalted moral beings with which the lesser selves of one's actual temper and deeds seek communion, and from which they petition aid of every kind. One particular type of self often becomes the standard for the individual, and this self is largely or solely formed upon the model of some definite historical or imaginary character. Where this is true, prayer may attain all the vividness of personal communion, even including hallucinations and visions in which the ideal personality speaks to one or intervenes in one's behalf. It is noticeable that with the increasing rationalization and organization of experience, prayer tends to lose this character of literal, direct appeal to a definitely imagined being. It becomes more and more an aspiration to understand the laws and nature of reality, whether in the large or in detail, and to work in harmony with the forces and tendencies of such reality. On the contemplative, æsthetic side, adoration and reverence are directed to the magnitude, power, progress, and beauty of nature and of society. The two chief factors in prayer

[11] An excellent discussion of prayer is that of Anna Louise Strong: "A Consideration of Prayer from the Standpoint of Social Psychology." The University of Chicago Press, 1908.

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are craving and contemplation. Just what expression these shall have, depends upon many factors. The expression changes with the growth of intelligence and with the development of new symbols, but the aspiration and reverence continue to characterize all human consciousness which is sensitive to the ideal values of life.

What is true of prayer is true of other forms of worship. All take their place within the circuit of teleological activity. All express attitudes toward the processes of life, toward individual and social achievements. They express all moods and represent all phases of failure and success, of despair and hope, within the experience of mankind. The symbolic forms of worship are originally the free and natural expression of concrete social experience. They are the art forms in which mankind have registered their spiritual values. Religion, in its creative periods, has ever employed the drama, music, and painting, and in its higher forms, poetry, sculpture, and architecture. No religion has ever been devoid of all these arts, and no religion of civilization has ever been permanently lacking in any of them. These æsthetic forms are also the natural means employed to symbolize the ideals of patriotism, of war, of industry, and of science. In this æsthetic element, then, the religious consciousness is normally at one with other human interests; and here, as in other respects, religion is differentiated by the inclusiveness and ideality of the ends which belong to it.

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THE ORGANIZATION OF TRUTH.

JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM.

THE movement of modern philosophy is revealing, with increasing clearness, the need of appraisal and organization in the realm of truth. The relations and perspectives of truth have been neglected as beside its increasing accumulations. It is here that we have missed our way. All truths have been reduced to a common denominator — correspondence with reality. But the content of truth exceeds this common denominator. We need organization, not reduction. Unless we can find and preserve an inherent and universal order and hierarchy of truths, we shall be tossed about between truths which we have discovered but cannot correlate until we are crushed among them. What we call half-truths—by which we mean ill-adjusted truths—wreck our lives. We wander in a maze and cannot find ourselves amid the myriad discoveries which we have made but cannot master. Dirt has been called matter misplaced. Error is often simply truth misplaced. The pressing problem is, How shall we organize truth? How shall we learn the secret of its proportions, values, adjustments, so that we may know how to regard and relate truth, how to master and not be mastered by knowledge?

No valid organization of truth can be made until we can agree upon some solar center, some supreme and regulative reality by reference to which to relate and appraise truth. Can we find such a touchstone?

In an exceedingly penetrative passage in the second book of his "Microcosmos," Lotze makes some noteworthy statements concerning what he calls the "world of values" which have led to important results. "Our varying judgments of life," he says, "have never been able to shake the belief that in its feeling for the value of things, and their relations, our reason possesses as

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genuine a revelation as, in the principles of logical investigation, it has an indispensable instrument of experience."[1]

It is as suggestive as it is surprising to find Lotze speaking of feeling *(Gefühl)* as a possession of *reason.* "Even the simplest and apparently driest notions," he observes, "are never quite destitute of this attendant feeling; we cannot grasp the conception of unity without experiencing a pleasant satisfaction that is part of its content, or that of antagonism without participating in the pain of conflicting opposition." Yet Lotze recognizes the colorlessness of the feeling attending the operations of "an uninterested understanding" as contrasted with "the inspirations of a reason appreciative of worth that rejects even the thinkable so long as it is only thinkable and does not besides, by the inherent excellence of its content, win recognition of its worth in the world."

This appreciation of values as a kind of feeling—if one chooses to apply this very inadequate term to it—has very little to do with pure ratiocination, the mere logical process. It is in the insights of the intuitive reason, of moral judgment, that it asserts itself most strongly. To perceive a great truth truly involves a warm feeling, an inspiration, an appreciation of its supreme worth not only to the individual, but to all minds.

It would be an exaggerated estimate of Lotze's service to philosophy to attribute to him the *discovery* of the principle of truth-values. That principle has been operative in philosophy from Plato downward. "Truth in so far as it is good and useful," was the pursuit of Stoicism. All the ethical philosophies have been grounded in this principle, notably Kantianism. Yet on the whole, philosophy has failed to give open and adequate recognition to value as a prime factor in truth. Reason has been too generally represented as a cold, indifferent, truth indicator, unerring and unconcerned,

[1] See Book II, Chapter V.

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knowing truth simply as truth, without distinction or degree. The times have long been ripening for a revolt against this absolutism of intellect, both in philosophy and in theology. When, therefore, Lotze so cogently presented the principle of truth-values, it is no wonder that it took ready root and developed into the movement which has become the most characteristic in modern theology—Ritschlianism. In philosophy the corresponding movement is pragmatism. Pragmatism, though it has no immediate connection with Lotze, springs from the same dissatisfaction with intellectualism, the same determination to get nearer the heart of reality, to put the finger closer to the pulse of life.

It would be interesting to draw a parallel between Ritschlianism and pragmatism. They agree in pouring contumely upon metaphysics as the source of all our woes, in holding up to scorn that speculative tendency which has ridden with so loose a rein through all the fields of being and not-being, the actual and the possible, the comprehensible and the incomprehensible. For Ritschlianism, as for pragmatism, the absolute is the prince of bogies. To aim at anything like finality is to commit the unpardonable sin. To indulge in speculation is as vain as to study the pavement while the procession is moving. In this common disdain for theory, pragmatism and Ritschlianism join hands.

They are at one, too, in their rejection of universal standards and their appeal to individual experience, the sense of value, significance, immediacy. Not that either is avowedly individualistic; indeed both emphasize social values rather than individual. Yet the only test of social values which either offers is that of a consensus of individuals. And that consensus is at most suggestive, so that the individual who disagrees with his fellows has as good cause to regard his own judgment as true as they to regard theirs as true.

But when it comes to the *kind of values* that pragmatism and Ritschlianism respectively emphasize and ad-

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vocate, there is a distinct cleavage. Pragmatism places all human interests upon a single level and pronounces that to be true which is workable, and thus worthful, in any sphere of activity. A man is perfectly justified in making the world of sensation the chief fact of existence if he so chooses, and there is no ground for arguing with him that he has made a mistake. But the Ritschlian, on the other hand, although he, too, has no consistent ground upon which to uphold his cause, is nevertheless convinced and anxious to convince others that the real values of life lie in the realm of the ethical and religious. *Why* it is so, the Ritschlian refuses to consider,—*that* he regards as a mere matter of theory as useless as it is impossible,—but he is as sure that the pragmatist who does not happen to care for religious values, is wrong as he is that the rationalist, who tries to *prove* that religion is true, is wrong. Thus the two schools agree much and differ much. They play the same prelude and much the same interlude, but the postludes are in different keys.

Enough has been said, perhaps, to indicate the often-pointed-out wantage of pragmatism which is also that of Ritschlianism, namely, a standard of values, without which value is a mere will-o'-the-wisp, an empty phantom. Without a universal, eternal principle of valuation, which holds wherever there are moral intelligences, there can be no such thing as value in any sense that is worth the name. Thus we are brought back by the inevitable but kindly grasp of Reason, that will not let us go, and made to realize that, wander as we may, we are encompassed by a great, beneficent, rational order, around us, above us, within us. In other words,—as true philosophy, from Plato to Professor Royce, has perceived,—this is a Logos-world.[2] Consequently *Value* is a rational, not an empirical, judgment.

The principle of the primacy of Value dethrones

[2] See "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy," p. 469.

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Reality as the main truth-criterion and restores the Platonic supremacy of the Good. Not that the Good is not also the Real, but it is the Real just because it is the Good. In coming back to the Good, however, as the highest truth, we are returning to it in a new light and with a far truer understanding of its nature. The Good is now seen no longer as impersonal, no longer as an abstraction, but as distinctly and wholly *personal.*

The lack of a clear recognition of the personality of Good was, perhaps, the chief defect of Platonism, opening the way for the errors and extravagancies of Neoplatonism. Plato saw that the Good is supreme, but he did not clearly grasp its personal character. And all through the history of ethics and philosophy, there has been a tendency to confuse goodness with impersonal qualities, as if there were something in common between a good house, or a good umbrella, or a good piece of meat, and a good man. It is only by metaphor, and because of our disposition to interpret everything in the light of our own consciousness, that goodness can be predicated of an impersonal object. But because this habit, in itself entirely natural and right, has passed over, uncritically, into ethics and philosophy, the real character of the Good has been partially obscured.

Goodness can only be voluntary. There can be no true good except as there is reason and will. Nor can reason and will, regarded as abstract powers, constitute or effect goodness. It is only in that vital, indescribable fusion of the powers and qualities which we call personality that the truly Good consists and acts. It is this truth of the supreme reality and worth of personality that we are finding to be the master light of all our seeing. Philosophy is as a merchantman seeking goodly pearls until this pearl of great price is found.

The *summum bonum* is Personality. That only can be good which is personal. And that only can be *true,* in the highest sense, which is *good,* that is, personal. Here, then, in *personality* we have found the touchstone of truth.

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If it be asked how we know this, the appeal can only be made, as has been said, to the sense of values as trustworthy and decisive.

But what, then, is this sense of values? Has Lotze given it its due account when he describes it as a "feeling," a "pleasant satisfaction"? Is not the sense of values more than this? Does it not consist rather in a direct, rational act,—the intelligent affirmation of a spirit, a person, of that which he sees, either immediately or upon reflection, to be eternally good? And is not the "feeling" that attends this recognition, and is part of it, simply that accompaniment and attestation of right recognition which moves a person? The sense of values, in other words, is the rational self-attesting recognition by a person of himself and others as persons, of his relations to them, and of the external world as an instrument and expression of those personal relations, accompanied by that sense of approval or satisfaction which belongs to such recognition.

It is in this recognition of reality as personal, of truth as inhering in personal relations and therefore as involving values, that we find a basis for that insistence upon the integrity of selfhood, the whole and undivided self, which is so marked a trait in modern philosophy. When reason and will, for example, are regarded, not as impersonal *automata,* but as inseparable activities of a single self, we see how futile is the effort to exalt one at the expense of the other. If, with Thomas Hill Green, we define will as "an effort (or capacity for such effort) on the part of a self-conscious subject to satisfy itself," and reason as "the capacity on the part of such a subject to conceive a better state of itself as an end to be attained by action," then we may go on with the same writer to recognize that "the error which lies in the treatment of reason and will as separate faculties we may correct by bearing in mind that it is one and the same self of which reason and will are alike capacities, that in every moral action good or bad, each capacity is exerted as much as

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the other, and that every step forward in the self-realization of the divine principle in man involves an act of the will no less than reason, not merely a conception of possible good for man, but the adoption by some man or men of the good as his or theirs."[3]

When we approach the task of the organization of truth upon the principle of values inhering in personality, we perceive at once that truth which has to do with moral and spiritual relations, takes immediate precedence of all other. The well-being of persons depends, first of all and most of all, upon the right knowing and the right doing of personal obligations. What do I owe to myself, to other selves, to the Supreme Self?—that is what concerns me most, namely, ethics. Of course, that requires that I know them and myself as spirits, persons; it involves spiritual knowledge. All the truth concerning the world about us that has been garnered in all the ages, is as nothing compared with this. To recognize God and men as persons and to live with them as such—that is indeed the highest of all truth and wisdom. It is the first and second great commandments. This is the realm both of law and of poetry, of I *ought* and I *may,* of love and of freedom, of "truths that never can be proved" and yet are the most sure and basal of all—selfhood, faith, right, goodness, God.

But although moral and spiritual truth is central and supreme, it is not all of truth. Human persons live in a world of sense and force, of deed and of danger, and their personal conduct and relations are closely bound up with correlations and adjustments to natural environment. Personality, in its expression and development, is vitally concerned with the use and control of the body and of that remoter body that comes within the wider compass of the senses and the imagination. There is a truth of doing things, or relating ourselves rightly and efficiently to that outer world that offers itself as the medium and in-

[3] "Prolegomena to Ethics," Chapter on "Good and Moral Good."

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strument of personality, and this truth is of next greatest value to moral truth, namely practical truth. It is this order of truth that pragmatism has helped to bring to the front,—working truth. Only, pragmatism has carried its principle far beyond its legitimate bounds. Under the dominion and slavery of his environment man can never be himself. He must rise and gain the mastery of the physical world, he must know how to do things and control physical forces before he can reach his highest selfhood. The instinct that prompts men to action is a true instinct, and the truth that they gain by action is real truth, though it has to do externally only with a transient order. All the great material enterprises, as well as the lesser individual conquests of nature, are based upon this kind of truth. Not that they are of any worth in themselves, save as they give scope and range to personality, but in that respect, applied science finds its valuation. The truths of applied science are of genuine worth because they promote better conditions of living and so serve personality.

There is another order of truth that has often been put in advance of practical truth but really ranks below it, namely intellectual truth, or theoretical truth. In putting theoretical truth below practical, I am not saying that it is not real and essential truth, but that it is of less value. The deed ever outranks the theory. Theory is for practice, not practice for theory. The theory of religion, or theology, and the theory of morals, or ethics, have a vital place and office of their own, but it is secondary, not primary. So in the realm of science; pure science is for applied science, and not *vice versa*. It is greater to dig a canal than to demonstrate a theorem. Pure mathematics has its own place and value, but it is not nearly so important as to make the right change. Theory, to be sure, often *seems* superior to practice, especially when it detaches itself from practice and floats away into an expansive cloud that fills the sky; but its detachment from life is its weakness, not its might. It

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will be objected to this appraisal of theory and practice, that animals can do things, take care of themselves, adjust themselves to their environment, in a word that they have practical understanding, yet they cannot theorize. But this fact does not invalidate practical truth, it simply indicates that the range of truth in the animal mind is limited. It is not so much in the lack of the intellectual faculty, the power to theorize, that the animal is inferior to man, as in the lack of power to *idealize,* that is, to recognize personal realities and relations. Idealizing is very different from, and far above, theorizing. It is no less than the discerning of those personal, or spiritual meanings which inhere in all things as related to personality. It is because practical truth is on the whole nearer to personality than theoretical, that it exceeds it in value.

This division of truth into personal, practical, and theoretical truths does not imply their separation. The attempt to separate them is just as prolific of confusion as is the ignoring of their distinctions and valuations. The unity of personality demands the unification of life in all its phases. To scorn theoretical truth in the interest of practical, or practical and theoretical truth in the interest of spiritual and moral, is to create a false and disastrous schism. It will not do for the spiritual to say to the practical, "I have no need of thee," nor for the practical to say to the theoretical, "I have no need of thee." That is the danger to be avoided on the one hand; yet it is no greater than the opposite danger with which this paper is concerned, of confusing those value-distinctions of truth which make up its unity. It is here chiefly, I repeat, that we have gone astray—through lack of the full recognition of the true truth-criterion, personality.

Two things remain to be said, lest the whole purpose and attitude of this paper be misunderstood. First, by *personality* is not meant individuality,—that purely egoistic, incidental concourse of qualities in each man, which

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gives him his particularity,—but rather that universal moral selfhood which underlies his racial individuality and constitutes him a unique yet universal, eternal person. Second, it needs repeated emphasis that such a conception of personality and of the truth-values growing out of it, implies a rational idealism. The fundamental values are not empirical values, but ideal. The very recognition of values is a rational act. The standard of values is not a shifting, but an eternal standard. The concrete application of this standard may wait upon the judgment of experience and life, but the large principles of truth-valuation are the same in all ages, because they rest upon that recognition of the central worth and reality of personality which has been implicit in all human life and thought, but which is now becoming increasingly explicit, to the clarification of our confused philosophies and practices.

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ETHICS AND POLITICS.

R. M. MACIVER.

"IT is not, perhaps, the same thing in every case to be a good man and to be a good citizen."[1] In this tentative form Aristotle gave expression to a doubt which has often been echoed since his day, alike in philosophic thought and popular representation. Thinkers and statesmen alike have declared that the laws of ethics not only do not coincide, but sometimes must actually conflict with the principles of politics.[2] And yet to accept

[1] Aristotle, "Ethica Nichomachea," V, 2, 11.

[2] Lord Acton, in his introduction to Mr. Burd's edition of "The Prince," collected a remarkable number of representative opinions bearing out the above statement.

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this position would be not simply to limit the sphere of ethics, it would be to undermine the foundations of ethics. If the ethical claim is not necessarily and always valid, it is meaningless and contradictory. It is not enough to mark off two distinct spheres, each with its own laws, as if there were two sciences of conduct, one determining the action of man as man, the other of man as citizen. All such attempts involve the same faulty analysis which is responsible for the original problem. To meet the difficulty, no less than to see how it arose, it is necessary to understand the relation that exists between the individual man and the various societies of which he is a member and in which his life is fulfilled. It is a problem in the interpretation of individuality.

Historically, the recognition of individuality has taken the following form. It is assumed at first that some one relationship,—generally the tribal, though sometimes a religious association takes the place of the tribe proper—provides an adequate controlling principle for the whole of life and conduct. One society sums up the whole value of human life, until slow experience proves its inadequacy to meet all the demands made upon it. It appears then that man is a member of more than one society, since no one by itself can fulfill his sphere of activity. The individuality of man refuses to be summed up in a single relationship. The family, the church, the industrial society are seen in their distinctness from the state, and the idea of citizen becomes gradually clarified and limited. Now, strictly speaking, the attribution of individuality implies that no number of 'memberships' is a full account of the being to whom it is attributed, but it is only a very developed society that can understand that the man is more than the citizen because he is a man, not merely because he is also a kinsman or churchman. The way of freedom lies through the recognition not of individuality as such, but of a widened sociality, which is after all the greater part of the truth.

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The following analogy seems to the writer to suggest the truth of this matter. What we perceive as an individual object we know only, or at least can describe only, as a complex of general attributes. Similarly we recognize the individuality of man in the various relationships into which he enters. What we are recognizing are various aspects of his nature, all of them social, *i. e.*, all capable of general expression. But just as in fact no number of common attributes is ever the adequate description of the individual object, so no number of associations is ever the full measure of the individuality of man. All the sides of his nature admit of, or rather demand, a common, that is, a social expression, but the expression because common is never exhaustive. The more the forms of recognized relationship increase, the less becomes the unexpressed residue, but it is never a vanishing quantity. The average man can be largely and for all practical purposes, but never wholly, summed up in his memberships. As his life grows complexer, these increase, and besides the formal and recognized institutions of society there spring up, answering to new needs, various unconstituted informal groupings, unions, cliques, and so forth, the essence of society being recognition and intercommunication of some common interest.

I have labored this point, obvious as it is, because the failure to recognize it accounts for much confused thought concerning the relations of politics and ethics. There has generally been a tendency to make one form of society not merely superior but all-comprehensive, and with authority proportional to its comprehensiveness. In the early stages of society it was the patriarchal or more generally the tribal relation that determined human activity; in certain Eastern countries and in the Europe of the Middle Ages it was, theoretically at least, the ecclesiastical relation; but as a rule the claim to comprehensive control has been based on the political relation, the relation of the man to the state. It was so in the days of Aristotle. Aristotle called man a "political ani-

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mal" where we would have said "social,"[3] but the Greek language made no distinction. The Greeks did not distinguish society from the state—or the political organization of society; the state accordingly was supposed to determine conduct in every instance,[4] so that ethics was strictly a political and therefore a relative study. The individual had no wider standpoint than that of citizenship. In our own day socialism seems to be desirous of establishing in practice the same identification that held for the Greeks in theory, of making society one with the state, summing up the family[5] and the individual in their relation to the state. Further it may be fairly held that even Hegel, for all his distinction of the family and 'civic' society from the state, never really freed himself from the Hellenic conception from which he started. If we remember the association of the term 'state' with the organization of a community in respect of government and law, is it not at least misleading to call the State "objective mind," "the realized ethical idea or ethical spirit," "the ethical whole and the actualization of freedom," and so forth?[6]

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[3] So we speak of 'political economy' where 'social' would be the more appropriate adjective.

[4] This is not to say that the state was supposed to dictate in every instance; it means that all conduct was supposed to be determinable by consideration of the welfare of the state.

[5] Even moderate socialists speak of children being 'born to the state' as if that were an adequate expression of the fact.

[6] See Hegel: "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts," §§ 257, 258. *Die Wirklichkeit der sittlichen Idee—der sittliche Geist. Der Staat an und für sich ist das sittliche Ganze, usw.*

Mr. Bosanquet, following Hegel in his "Philosophical Theory of the State," seems rather confused in this matter. He, too, speaks of the state as the "incarnation of the general or real will . . . *understood as the will that wills itself*" [italics are mine], but yet admits that state action is necessarily external action, limited to the "removal of hindrances." What other will is left, on this view, from the way of whose fulfilment the will that wills itself removes hindrances? Mr. Bosanquet is fond of saying "society or the state," as if the two terms were almost interchangeable, and it is difficult to understand alike his definition of the term "state" (pp. 150 *ff.*) and the distinction he actually draws between state and society (p. 184).

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This doctrine would seem to lead us back, under vastly altered circumstances, to that Hellenic view which found indeed a unity in all the relations of human life, but found it by the entire subordination of all other relations to the one. This was to make ethics coincide with politics, whereas ethics should itself be the science which seeks the unity of the various relations of men to one another, of which one is the political. Ethics, recognizing the various claims made by the various societies upon men, should seek to determine, in the light of the single and chief end of man which these in different ways fulfill, the place of each in the life of conduct. There would thus be but one science of conduct, and whatever problems might arise would at least be recognized as within the limits of that science, as purely ethical problems. It is in fact as absurd for politics to set up absolute rules to decide what the citizen ought to do, as it is for economics to make absolute rules for 'economic man.' The citizen and the economic man so considered are abstractions. It is only the science of ethics which, considering the whole nature of man, can or should determine how far the claims, valid *in abstracto,* on the citizen or economic unit, hold for the man who is an individual, a political, and a social being at once.

The political claim is not in danger thereby, nor its importance and necessity diminished. A clear recognition of the claims of the state is only possible when its nature and its limits also are realized. When it is realized that political is only one form of social activity, then only is the true value of the state manifest. Its very definite limits constitute the reverse side of its very definite claims. If it can work only through institution and visible external organization and so far as such means are effective, yet that organization constitutes the basis, the essential basis which upholds and preserves the common life and common interest of society, and is consequently itself established in the common will to maintain that end. And thus is justified its claim or 'right,' first of all in all mat-

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ters where the preservation or welfare of the community as a whole is involved. Because whatever is detrimental to the state-organization, endangers that very life of society in which alone the individual can realize himself, therefore its claim has, ethically (and its force must ultimately have an ethical basis) a high preëminence. But, on the other hand, when this authority is made absolute and all-comprehensive, there arises that tyranny of the political society which most competent observers have found in the Hellenic states, and which is so marked a characteristic of the Platonic "Republic." There the organization absorbs private and family life, comprehends within itself all the social relations, æsthetic, religious, ethical, thus contradicting the factor of freedom and spontaneity which is essential in these. In the Platonic state there was indeed a twofold externality thrust upon the inner life. For not only was a rule imposed upon that life so that its development was no longer free, but that rule came *ab extra,* from an original constitution autocratically determined, and could not, at least in the long run, be regarded as self-imposed. This was the direct consequence of a view which made the political relation, in which externality is necessarily involved, all-comprehensive.

The political relation, then, for the solution of our problem, must be clearly recognized as one particular type of social relation. We may then regard political science as a branch of sociology.[7] Just as economic science investigates one form of social activity, political science investigates and abstracts another. These various sciences give the basis of ethics, which must regard man in the total humanity into which the different social relationships enter. But since conduct is an expression of the whole character of a man, the sciences just mentioned

[7] The science of sociology is necessarily indefinite: if it comprehends the various social relations, it breaks up into a group of sciences, of which economic science and political science are the best defined, whereas if it studies simply the common character of all social mind, it becomes a social psychology too abstract to be very fruitful.

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can never be truly normative. Ethics alone stands out as the science of conduct, because it alone can look beyond the various particular spheres, and, regarding man as in his complete self-consciousness he presents the world of his activity to himself, can thus alone lay stress on motive, the inward and vital principle of action. The other sciences but analyze certain of the relations which that consciousness finds in the world of its activity. Again, so far as they are simply analytic or descriptive, there is no possibility of antagonism between these sciences and ethics. The facts of existence can never enter into conflict with the ethical claim, since every such claim is relative to the conditions under which action must take place. It concerns what I ought to do under the given circumstances, not what the circumstances ought to *be* or to have been. To the ethical mind certain of these conditions, certain of the facts of existence, may seem undesirable as hindering the ethical development of those who are subject to them, but since only action and the conscious principle prompting to action, the choice of an alternative, is morally good or evil, it follows that the necessary conditions of a particular act, however they may have arisen, cannot, in relation to that act, be called morally good or evil. The scientific fact is simply the given condition. Because every ethical act is determined by the recognition of conditions, every change of circumstance must modify its external character (if its inner quality of ethical is to remain the same), and so every extension of our knowledge must affect the direction or manifestation of ethical decisions.

It is a fact not always recognized by scientists that while the different sciences, at least those which bear on the facts of human life, furnish a basis for ethical theory, they can never become themselves normative, if only because, being limited each to one particular sphere or relation of life, they can never lead us to the comprehensive viewpoint at which all those relations appear focused in the central consciousness of the one subject of

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all relations, to the viewpoint from which action is understood in the light of motive.

This conclusion appears to solve the much-vexed question from which we started, the question of the relation of political and ethical claims. The answer offered is that there can be no theoretical conflict here, because politics regards man simply as a member of political society, *i. e.*, in a particular *abstract* relation, whereas ethics regards man in his concreteness as a human being, one of whose characteristics is to be a 'political animal.'

The subject, however, is of such importance, historically at least, that it may be permissible to work out this solution in detail.

Political science looks upon the state as a unity; and even when it avoids the dangerous biological analogy of the organism, must at least talk of the general or common will of the community. But it will simplify our discussion if we remember that however much meaning we put into such expressions as 'collective mind' or 'common consciousness,' so far as laws of action are prescribed, the actions must be those of individuals who feel or recognize this community. When we talk of the state acting as a whole, we can only intelligibly mean the action of individuals realizing their common membership and pursuing an organized course sustained by the idea of a common good. Hence we may conveniently consider the question under two aspects. The organized state must contain two classes, ruler and subject, governor and governed. The ideal of self-government can never be so realized as to break down this division, and even if it could, even if ruler and ruled were actually identical, the two aspects would still remain.

This division gives us the two great historical problems concerning the relation of politics and ethics, one of which, touching the duty of the citizen, might be called Aristotle's problem, while the other, the duty of the prince or governor, might be called the problem of Machiavelli.

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The latter may be first disposed of, being more obviously due to a confusion of thought.

(1) Machiavelli sought for the principle by which in an age of corruption a ruler could maintain a united state, and his observation told him it was not by following the recognized principles of ethics but rather by violating these. Hence his famous advice to the prince: "You have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all these things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity, friendship, humanity, and religion." So he boldly declared that right and wrong have nothing to do with government.

The faultiness of this analysis is obvious. Machiavelli, not content with isolating ruler from ruled, actually isolates the citizen from the man. The ethics, the right and wrong upon which he turns his back, prescribes laws for an abstract being who is a man and yet not a citizen; his politics dictates to a citizen who is nothing more. Thus his politics by its own false abstractness has given an abstractness to his ethics also. Hence a wrong use of absolute terms, and a wrong dilemma. He says, for instance: "Inasmuch as it needs a good man to reorganize the political life of a city, and a bad man to become by violence lord of a republic, it is therefore very rarely found that a good man will desire to acquire rule by bad means, even for a good end,[8] or that a bad one, having acquired rule, will act justly or think of using for good the authority he has won by evil." Strictly speaking, this distinction of good 'end' and bad 'means' is impossible and meaningless. If goodness and badness is an attribute of will alone, a means cannot in itself, in abstraction, be judged either good or bad. In so far as it is merely means, in so far as the sole reason why it is entertained is its causal relation to the end, in so far, in

[8] *Cf.* the words of Walpole: "No great country was ever saved by good men, because good men will not go the lengths that may be necessary."

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more technical language, as it enters into the intention of the agent without forming part of his motive, so far it cannot be judged as if it stood as end in itself, but must be regarded in the light of *the* end. So the question comes to be: Is a certain end such as to justify—not a *moral* wrong, for if justified it cannot be such: there is neither here nor elsewhere question of the greater right set over against the lesser wrong, but—a certain loss of those 'goods' which in one way or another (according to our conception of the moral end) morality secures? It is a question not between ethics and politics, but within ethics, a problem of values, a question to be answered only in the light of the ethical end, of such a final standard of value as we are able to set up. Similar questions arise everywhere in the interweaving relationships involved in the different social activities, and these are all ethical questions.

(2) If we turn next to the side of the subject in the state, another and more real difficulty presents itself. This difficulty arises ultimately from the fact that political self-government is at best only a partially realized ideal, and that therefore there must be occasions when the law will come as an external command, alien or even antagonistic to the inner principle. So long as the subject feels that it is his representative who is acting, that the voice of law is the voice of the general will, he is virtually, as regards the principle of conduct, in the position of the governing authority, and thus can always obey in accord with the ethical maxim. But what of the citizen to whom the command comes as the mandate of an external authority? What of the citizen whose ethical sentiment is offended by the command?

(It might be said that since the law, even when enacting in favor of universally accepted ends, demands their fulfillment from a maxim other than the ethical, *viz.*, by attaching a penalty to disobedience, it is always antagonistic to free moral action,—and this is the position of the anarchist,—but the reply is that law, regard-

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ing its own violation as exceptional, does not regard its observance as the consequence of the penal sanction, that in fact the political suasion is intended to apply only in the exceptional cases where the ethical sentiment, in virtue of which alone its enactment was possible, does not exist.)

It is first to be noted that, even when the law does come as an external command, *i. e.,* where it is felt by the subject to be alien or antagonistic to his ethical sentiment, it may still be fulfilled in accordance with the ethical principles. Under the Hellenic conception this would, of course, invariably happen, for if "the goodness of the citizen is relative to the state,"[9] it must be expressed in obedience to the state. This theory is perfectly brought out in Plato's "Crito," where Socrates, regarding himself as unjustly condemned, yet refuses to avail himself of the means of escape put within his reach, because so to thwart the law would be to deny the *ethical* principle. It is of no use, he says, to put forward as a ground for disobedience the plea that the sentence is unjust.

'And was that our agreement with you?' the law would answer, 'or were you to abide by the sentence of the state? . . . Tell us, What complaint have you to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In the first place, did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage?' None, I should reply. 'Or against those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and education of children, in which you also were trained? Were not the laws, which have the charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?' Right, I should reply. 'Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true, you are not on equal terms with us: nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you.'[10]

Whether Socrates 'did well to die' or not, he died true to the Hellenic doctrine of the state.

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[9] Aristotle's "Politics," III, 4, 3.

[10] "Crito," p. 50.

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To us also, though we may discard that doctrine, the principle of obedience to law once laid down has a strong if not the same absolute claim, but our argument must be a different one. The general case is, of course, where the end secured by 'loyalty' outweighs in importance the end the law seems to contradict, primarily where disobedience would strike at the security of the state or tend seriously to weaken the habit of law-abidingness so essential to an ordered community. In that case, since the security of the state is indeed the basis of all moral life, since at the least it protects the 'life' without which the 'good life' is impossible, its claim is paramount. An instance here, I think, would be the case of a country's going to war in what seemed to a minority an unjust cause. While the citizen whose ethical sentiment is offended by that action must protest against it, and before the final decision do what he can to prevent it; yet, once the decision is taken and the issue becomes the very security of the state, it is his first duty to make that end his own. In such a case the political end may become simply and solely the ethical end, not being of itself coextensive, but rather in that conflict of ends which is the heart of every moral issue becoming established as the 'ought.' In a word, it is always 'conscience'—or whatever the inner principle of action be called—that is the ultimate court of appeal, even though it err. Because conscience is essentially individual, always, however clarified, a particular *perspective* of the universal, we must always, in the analysis of conduct, remain at the point of view of the individual with *his* recognition of a common good.

It is possible to misapprehend this point. It is in no sense an argument for 'individualism.' The individualism which followed Aristotle did not really solve Aristotle's problem, for while the Aristotelian view seemed to regard man simply as a member of a state, the post-Aristotelian philosophy regarded man simply as abstract individual, and as the latter being was

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the greater abstraction of the two, the reaction, as may sometimes happen, represented less the true account. It had not yet become clear that the individuality asserted is a question more of freedom, of spontaneity of action, than of difference in action, that in fact the principle of freedom, instead of narrowing, really widens the area of the common will (so that political philosophy may find a certain satisfaction in regarding free and common action as ultimately identical). It may be admitted that none of the ancient thinkers had attained to what must be the center of any political theory, a clear doctrine of the general will, its character and its limitations. Aristotle, identifying the state with society, identified the general or common will of the state with the infinite complex of willing which is the life of society. Further, he at least did not use the term 'state' loosely, but clearly declared that a state was identified by its constitution.[11] Hence the problem. Aristotle saw the difficulty of reconciling the theory of the Hellenic state with the claim of individuality. The two were in fact incompatible. The more adequate conception of individuality, the realization that man is a member of the state and also something more, disposes of the Aristotelian problem by modifying the Aristotelian theory of the state. For either the 'goodness' of a citizen is not to be regarded solely in the light of state-claims, or else such goodness is to be distinguished from the true ethical goodness, and the good citizen, like the good economist and the good churchman, ceases to be identified with the good man. But in the latter case, if we talk of 'good economist' or 'good citizen,' we are really using the term 'good' in a specialized sense, and no true opposition is logically possible. There is therefore no possible conflict between ethics and politics; they cannot be regarded as opposing or even as distinct normative sciences. Even such a question as that of

[11] "Politics," III, 3, 9.

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"priority" between the two, elaborately discussed, *e. g.*, by Sidgwick,[12] is essentially meaningless.

In conclusion we may indicate in a word what real problem underlies the false distinction made between ethics and politics. The inward character of ethical action obviously renders possible an opposition between the public or authoritative and an individual conception of some end of action. I have tried to show how obedience, even to an alien political end, such obedience being calculated to further the ethical end, may often remain free or ethical. On the other hand, it is obvious that cases must arise where the motives inspiring such obedience cease to bear, where the individual conception of the public good refuses to coincide with the state-conception. This is the real problem,—a problem that does occur, though perhaps rarely. Nor, after what has just been said regarding the nature of ethical action, can we agree with those thinkers (*e. g.*, Plato and Spinoza) who held that it is in every case the individual's duty to suppress his own conviction in favor of that held by the community in general. It is noteworthy that these philosophers held a purely static view of political society, whereas perhaps the strongest argument in support of the individual's claim to obey his conscience is based on the developing, progressive character of society. As a community advances on its way, it must therefore move from one conception of the end to another. But the recognition of the broader, or the altered, end does not come as a revelation to a whole people or state at once. The way of change is from the smaller to the greater; the recognition moves from the individual to the society. It operates first at an individual point. It would seem that there are cases where both the antagonistic views are right, where the state is justified in suppressing what seems a destructive doctrine, and where the individual, believing it to mean not destruction but

[12] "Methods of Ethics," Chap. I, 2.

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a better reconstruction, cannot choose but maintain it. Was not the Athenian state as much justified in banishing Anaxagoras and in putting Socrates to death as the Roman state in seeking to drive out foreign cults?[13] All new gospels are not true. What is there in the end but experience to test their truth? The fact of progress, or of change, involves a certain relativity in ethics, and out of the heart of relativity springs the true ethical problem.

The state must at least maintain its law, however 'conscientious' the objection of the individual. The individual must seek to be loyal to the ethical end, even when, in rare cases, such loyalty is incompatible with obedience. Considering the function of the state and its importance, the cases where disobedience would be the greater loyalty must indeed be rare, but, considering the difficulty of realizing self-government, the cases where obedience finds its ethical justification only in a consideration of the greater as opposed to the lesser good, may not be inconsiderable.

R. M. MacIver.

University of Aberdeen.

[13] On political, *i. e.*, not on religious grounds.

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RELIGION AND MORALITY.

HENRY W. WRIGHT.

IN a former number of this periodical, I presented a view of moral development as a progressive organization of conduct.[1] This organization is effected through the instrumentality of *volition,* the central activity of self-conscious personality. In all its forms, from the simple impulse to choice after deliberation, volition is an organizing agency. Now the universal conditions of human life require all men to make certain adjustments in the organization of their conduct. Of these fundamental conditions, the first is the possession, by all men in common, of a set of natural impulses inherited from animal progenitors. These impulses must be harmonized and correlated as the first step in self-organization. The result of this primary adjustment is the development of individuality and a definite self-interest. A second condition essential to all human life is that of social relationship. Every human being is born into the society of his fellows, and becomes conscious of self only as he becomes conscious of others also. The organization of conduct requires, therefore, as the second step in its progress, the adjustment of individual interest, which is narrow and self-centered, to the larger welfare of society. These two adjustments, when perfectly achieved, complete the organization of human conduct as far as man's natural and social life is concerned.

There is, however, a third condition essential to the life of man, not mentioned in the previous article, because to consider it carries one out of the sphere of morality proper. It is the presence in human life of *universal reality.* This condition necessitates a third adjustment,

[1] "Evolution and Ethical Method," INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1905, p. 59.

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the adjustment of man to the universe, the integration of universal reality within the life of the human self. This, the final step in the organization of conduct, is an affair of religion rather than of morality. The conception of religion which it suggests is not unfamiliar,—in fact it is most common at present, although differently expressed by different thinkers, according to each one's philosophical bias, as the 'final synthesis of subject and object,' or the 'feeling of harmony between ourselves and the universe,' or a 'faith in the ultimate conservation of values.' But when understood in connection with the theory of moral development just outlined, this conception of religion as an adjustment of man to the universe is illuminating, both as to the development of the religious consciousness and the relation of religion and morality.

If we thus regard religion as the final step in self-organization, it is possible to distinguish three necessary stages in its evolution, and also to show why these three stages are directly dependent for their specific character upon the degree of moral development attained by the self. The first two adjustments, which belong properly to the field of morality, are logically prior to that of religion; since the final adjustment of the self to the universe can be attained only when its capacities have been fully realized in its natural and social environment. But notwithstanding the fact that such a relation of dependence exists between them, these different steps in the process of self-realization do not occur in strict temporal sequence. Thus religion does not delay its appearance until moral development is complete and the individual thoroughly socialized. We find the religious adjustment attempted in the lowest stage of human culture. The universe presses in upon the individual and forces him to take toward it some attitude. It is inevitable that the attitude taken should vary with the character of the self. The form of belief required to adjust man and the universe, will depend upon the needs and aspirations of the

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human self and the view taken of the universe. Thus religion while distinct from morality is still dependent on it, and its successive stages are determined by the successive epochs in moral development.

At the lowest stage the self consists of a medley of different impulses, unregulated except by those customs which have grown up as conditions of social survival, and whose significance is not understood by those who obey them. Anything like a controlling aim or life-purpose is entirely absent from the consciousness of the self at this stage. The universe is regarded as an aggregate of objects or agencies capable of ministering to the desires of man or of inflicting upon him dire calamities. Religion at this stage takes the form of belief in divinities which, in response to human appeal, have power to influence the objects and forces of nature so that they may minister to human needs. As there are many impulses and many objects, so there are many gods. Each main source of food-supply has its divinity, so have springs and wells. There is a god of the chase and one who controls procreation. The leading attribute of deity at this stage is *Power*. This power is neither exclusively physical nor mental but something of both, the two not being clearly distinguished. The worship of such divinities takes the form of an endeavor to placate them by offering and sacrifice. They are assumed to have the same desires as man, and their favor is sought by gifts of food and drink. Within this stage fall the various forms of religion usually regarded as primitive, from animism, through the different forms of nature-worship, to polytheism.

In the second stage we find the self in possession of a well-developed individuality, the result of subordinating the many conflicting impulses to a few controlling aims and ambitions which represent the interest of the self as a unit. The universe is consequently looked upon as a factor influencing the fortunes of the individual. The form of religion here needed to adjust individual interest and the universal order, is belief in a power able to

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guarantee to the individual who fulfills certain stated conditions, the realization of his own ambitions. Hence the tendency at this stage is to conceive of God as a conscious individual in whom the attribute of *Justice* is added to the power possessed by divinities of an earlier stage. He is regarded as one who rewards or punishes man according to his deserts. As the human individual has his own interests and ambitions, so God is believed to have his own designs and purposes. These are expressed in laws and decrees supernaturally revealed. The man who obeys these divine laws is rewarded with happiness and the fulfillment of his ambition, while he who disobeys is punished by misery and deprivation; for God is not only Legislator but Judge of all the world. The reward of those who obey the divine commands is first supposed to come within the limits of earthly existence. But experience proving that fortune does not discriminate between the deserving and the undeserving in this present world, the reward of the individual who serves God and hence deserves his favor is postponed to a future life. This stage includes types of religion from organized polytheism through henotheism to monotheism,—at least such monotheism as makes God sharply individual and separate from the world.

Finally, in the third place, we have the social or ideal self more or less fully developed, as the result of the adjustment of individual interest to the welfare of society. Man seeks to realize now, not narrow self-centered ambitions which are different from, and opposed to, the good of others, but those larger ends which embrace the well-being of humanity. He looks upon the universe, not as deciding his fortunes as an individual, but as determining the destiny of man and the reality of those ideals, social and intellectual, which are being slowly and painfully realized in the course of human progress. The kind of belief required to adjust the individual, thus socialized, to the universe, is faith in the existence of a universal principle of such character as to conserve the highest

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human welfare and guarantee the reality of those values to which man attributes supreme worth. Now man, at this height of his moral development, regards the complete social life,—the recognition of brotherhood, the feeling of sympathy, and the practice of coöperation,—as the object of supreme worth in human life. Hence the religion that gives reality to those values which man holds highest, is one which finds the nature of God, the universal principle, most completely expressed, not in power, nor in justice, but in *Benevolence*. Faith in such a God, who is the expression of infinite benevolence, gives to those altruistic qualities and habits which the social life demands, a foundation deep in the nature of reality. The individual who sacrifices health and possessions and even, in extreme cases, physical existence itself, in the service of others, receives from such a faith the assurance that he has not lost but gained reality thereby; for such a life approaches most nearly to the Absolutely Real. At this, the culminating stage in the evolution of the religious consciousness, man adjusts himself to the universe, not by sacrifice offered to win the favor of a capricious divinity, nor by obedience to a law externally imposed by a deity who has his own ends to attain, but by faithfully discharging his duties in society and devoting his life to the service of his fellow-beings. Thus the claims of religion and morality are brought into perfect harmony, and man, by the performance of earthly duty, identifies himself with Universal Reality. This final form of religion may be called theism (if we contrast theism with deism), or, as has been suggested, spiritual pantheism.

It is interesting to note in conclusion that while the form of the religious consciousness is normally determined by the degree of moral development, occasionally their positions may be reversed and religion may serve to direct and determine the course of moral development. This occurs when a people, occupying a certain level of moral development, have brought to them, from the outside, a form of religion appropriate to a higher level. In

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such cases the religion may act as a potent force of moral uplift, drawing the native morality up to its own plane. This effect would be produced if a people living the life of natural impulse, partially regulated by custom, should be taught to believe in a God of justice, who rewards and punishes according to individual desert. Such religion would lead the people in question to look into the future and consider consequences, thus hastening the organization of their lives by comprehensive purposes and controlling aims. It is doubtful if this salutary effect would follow, however, if the religion and the morality were too widely separated in degree of development. Thus a people living the life of natural impulse could hardly grasp the true significance of a God of benevolence. They must inevitably translate this benevolence into terms of kindly—but unregulated—impulse, and their attitude toward such a deity would not be essentially different from their attitude toward the divinities previously worshiped.

Probably religion performs its most signal service, however, when an individual who is self-centered in his interests, is brought to believe in a God of benevolence. The mental outlook of such an individual is totally changed, and the comparative values which attach to things completely reversed. Greater reality is seen to attach, not to the narrow considerations of selfish ambitions, but to the broader concerns of human welfare. Thus he is encouraged to devote his life to disinterested social service.

HENRY W. WRIGHT.

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DISCUSSION.

MR. BENN ON NIETZSCHE: AN EXPLANATION.

My attention has been drawn to the fact that in my article on the "Nietzsche Revival" in the July number of this JOURNAL, the reference on page 427 to Mr. A. W. Benn is inaccurate, and I have reason to think that it has been misunderstood. I did not intend to suggest that Mr. Benn is a disciple or an apologist of Nietzsche. His published work on the subject is sufficient evidence to the contrary, and I regret to find by reference to my article that in speaking of several writers together I did not sufficiently distinguish their respective attitudes. This was doubtless due to the fact that my allusions to Mr. Benn were inserted after the article was practically finished. His own very pointed and discerning criticisms on the incoherences of Nietzschian ethics are to my mind inconsistent with Mr. Benn's high estimate of Nietzsche's originality, and my references to him were designed to emphasize this point. I am sorry, however, that a certain looseness of expression on my part should have represented in the character of an adherent one so well aware of the defects of the Nietzschian school as Mr. Benn has shown himself to be.

HERBERT L. STEWART.

The Queen's University of Belfast.

In reference to Mr. Stewart's very satisfactory disavowal of any intention on his part to class me among the adherents of Nietzsche, I wish to add that I am not less opposed to the whole doctrine of the Superman than Mr. Stewart can be, the object of my article having been to refute that doctrine out of its author's own mouth. At the same time I can see no incompatibility between this position and my estimate of Nietzsche as "a truly ethical genius." Even in political controversy one may credit the leader of the opposite party with a genuine devotion to the good of the country while absolutely condemning the means by which he is endeavoring to bring it about.

A. W. BENN.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS. By Edward Westermarck, Ph. D. Volume II. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1908. Pp. xv, 852.

It is difficult to give in a review any idea of the great merits of Dr. Westermarck's work. For it consists not so much in any theory which could be quoted and examined as in the vast mass of well-arranged facts which he has collected with reference to every branch of morality. It is only possible to indicate what are the divisions in which this treasure of detail is arranged.

In the first volume (reviewed in the JOURNAL, in October, 1906) Dr. Westermarck explained his theory of the development of moral ideas, and then commenced his survey of the ideas which have been actually held by mankind. He began with those ideas which concern the agent's duties to other men, and resumes this subject at the beginning of the second volume, the first two chapters of which (XXVIII and XXIX) deal with the right of property. He concludes his survey of the past and present with an anticipation that "the law of property will sooner or later undergo a radical change." The ground for this statement is that "though ideas of right and wrong may for some time outlive the conditions from which they sprang, they cannot do so forever."

The next two chapters concern regard for truth and good faith. This includes not only the duty of stating what is believed to be the truth, but also the idea of seeking the truth. Dr. Westermarck rejects the theory of M. Réville that Christianity has been specially favorable to the disposition to seek truth at any price. Dr. Westermarck's appeal to history against this doctrine seems, to me at least, quite convincing.

Politeness, gratitude, and patriotism are then discussed, and this part of the subject closes with a discussion of the origin and development of the altruistic sentiment. Among many interesting things in this chapter we may quote the author's opinion that "man was not originally a gregarious animal, in the proper sense of the word; . . . he originally lived in families rather than in tribes." This conclusion is based partly on the habits of the manlike apes. The family is thus earlier

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than the tribe, and lost some of its relative importance when the tribe arose. But afterwards, again, "the family was strengthened because the clan was weakened . . . the father became a patriarch only as the inheritor of the authority which formerly belonged to the clan. But . . . at a higher stage the family again lost in importance." We may notice in passing that Dr. Westermarck considers it probable that in primitive man, as in other mammals, the generative power was restricted to a certain season.

From duties to others we pass to duties to self. In the chapter on Suicide, perhaps the most remarkable fact mentioned is the opinion which was held by certain early Christians that the suicide of Judas was a greater sin than his betrayal of Jesus. We also learn that certain American Indians compel a man who has cut himself to pay his mother's family compensation for shedding the family blood, while his father's family receive "tear-money," and any friends who are present must be compensated for their grief at the accident. The remaining self-regarding duties are considered under the heads of industry, restriction in diet, and asceticism.

Duties arising out of the relation of the sexes form the next division. We come first to marriage, which Dr. Westermarck defines as "a more or less durable connection between male and female lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring." In this sense Dr. Westermarck believes that marriage has existed through the whole history of our species, being "an inheritance from some apelike progenitor." (For the proof of this and various other propositions on this subject the author refers to his earlier work, "History of Human Marriage.") From a social point of view, however, such a connection cannot be called a marriage until it is regulated by some custom or law.

The theory by which Dr. Westermarck accounts for the almost universal condemnation of incest is somewhat elaborate. The sexual instinct being very variable, he considers it probable that from time to time some men would feel an aversion to sexual intercourse with those women with whom they had been brought up from childhood. Such an aversion would be perpetuated and strengthened by natural selection. For most of the people with whom any person lived would be his near relations, and intercourse with near relations is more or less detri-

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mental to the offspring. Those families in which such an aversion was hereditary would tend to supplant those who did not possess it.

In this way a strong sentiment might arise against the marriage of persons who had been brought up together. But, says Dr. Westermarck, "the objection has been raised that, if my explanation of the prohibition of incest were correct, connections between unrelated persons who have been brought up together should be as repulsive as connections between near kin." His answer is: "I do not deny that unions between the nearest blood relatives inspire a horror of their own; and it seems natural that they should do so considering that from earliest times the aversion to sexual intercourse between persons living closely together has been expressed in prohibition against unions between kindred." But what the theory, as it seems to me, fails to explain is why the aversion to intercourse between persons brought up together *should* have been expressed in prohibitions against unions between kindred. Why was it not expressed directly by prohibition against unions between people brought up together? It is true that intercourse between people brought up together is only injurious to the species when they are also close kindred. But then this fact is not known to all the primitive peoples who condemn incest as such, and cannot account for this expression of the original aversion being chosen.

Dr. Westermarck does not regard polyandry as primitive. "On the contrary, this form of marriage seems to require a certain degree of civilization." "Monogamy is all the more likely to have been the general rule among our earliest human ancestors as it seems to be so among the manlike apes."

Chapters follow on celibacy, adultery, and homosexual love. "During the Middle Ages," we are told, "heretics were accused of unnatural vice as a matter of course. Indeed, so close was the connection between the two delinquencies that the same name was applied to both."

We now pass to the duty of men toward the lower animals, in which connection is also treated the doctrine, generally prevalent in the Church of Rome, that no such duties exist. This somewhat remarkable view, however, was also held, as Dr. Westermarck reminds us, by so good a Protestant as Kant.

The next topic dealt with is the duties we owe, or are held to owe, toward the dead. Dr. Westermarck is inclined to think

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that the belief in the continued existence of the dead is universal among savages, and to doubt the accuracy of the statements which affirm that certain tribes have no such belief. But the belief in the form which it generally takes among savages is not very cheerful. "Generally speaking, my collection of facts has led me to the conclusion that the dead are more commonly regarded as enemies than as friends." The author thinks that the mourning fast, and other ceremonies connected with death, are essentially "a precaution taken by the survivors, and not a tribute to the dead." An instance is given of an African tribe who "bestow as much care on the tombs of foes who have fallen near their villages as on those of their own warriors"—a practice which must evidently arise from fear.

The question of the proper treatment of the dead includes, of course, the question whether it is desirable to eat their bodies, and a special chapter is devoted to cannibalism. Wherever this prevails, it has always, Dr. Westermarck thinks, had to conquer an original and instinctive aversion, common to man and the other animals. "Although our knowledge of their habits in this respect is defective, there can be little doubt that carnivorous animals as a rule refuse to eat members of their own species; and this reluctance is easy to understand considering its race-preserving tendency."

The last division of the subject is the duty of men toward the gods. Here Mr. Westermarck distinguishes between magic and religion in a manner substantially similar to that adopted by Hegel and Dr. Frazer. "Religion may be defined as a belief in and a regardful attitude toward a supernatural being on whom man feels himself dependent and to whose will he makes an appeal in his worship. Supernatural mechanical power, on the other hand, is applied in magic. He who performs a purely magical act utilizes such power without making any appeal at all to the will of a supernatural being."

He continues: "This, I think, is what we generally understand by religion and magic. But in the Latin word *religio* there seems to be no indication of such a distinction. *Religio* is probably related to *religare,* which means "to tie." It is commonly assumed that the relationship between these words implies that in religion man was supposed to be tied by his god. But I venture to believe that the connection between them allows of another and more natural interpretation—that

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it was not the man who was tied by the god, but the god who was tied by the man." In support of this view Dr. Westermarck gives some very interesting observations made in Morocco.

Two chapters follow on the duties to gods. These duties have, in various countries, included the slaughter at solemn festivals of deified men. Dr. Westermarck, on this subject, remarks: "As Dr. Frazer himself observes, in the chain of his evidence a link is wanting: he can produce no direct proof of the idea that the soul of the slain man-god is transmitted to his royal successor. In the absence of such evidence, I venture to suggest a somewhat different explanation, which seems to me more in accordance with known facts—to wit, that the new king is supposed to inherit, not the predecessor's soul, but his divinity or holiness, which is looked upon in the light of a mysterious entity, temporarily seated in the ruling sovereign, but separable from him and transferable to another individual."

It is interesting to hear that in Scotland, as late as 1767, a young heifer was offered in the holy fire during a cattle plague.

"The idea of sacrifice being a conductor of imprecations," says Dr. Westermarck, "has hitherto almost entirely escaped the notice of students of early religion." He is himself disposed to attribute considerable importance to this practice of sacrifice, and quotes several instances in support of it.

The last subject treated of is gods as guardians of morality. On the atrocity of the sin of atheism, as compared with unworthy conceptions of the divine idea, the author quotes Plutarch's well-known remark: "I for my part would much rather have men to say of me that there never was a Plutarch at all, nor is now, than to say that Plutarch is a man inconstant, fickle, easily moved to anger, revengeful for trifling provocations, vexed at small things." Dr. Westermarck's criticism is that "Plutarch seems to have forgotten that a person is always most sensitive on his weak points, and that the weakest point in a god is his existence."

Dr. Westermarck is of opinion that Pfleiderer and Caird have considerably exaggerated the extent to which primitive morality was affected by religion. "I have been led to the conclusion that among uncivilized races the moral ideas relating to men's conduct toward one another have been much more influenced

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by the belief in magic forces which may be utilized by man than by the belief in the free activity of gods."

I trust that even this very inadequate abstract of the contents of Dr. Westermarck's work may be sufficient to make evident the value of this great contribution to learning.

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

Justice and Liberty. A Political Dialogue. By G. Lowes Dickinson. London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1908. Pp. 229.

The three speakers in this political dialogue may be described, with a certain freedom but not altogether inaccurately, as an aristocratic and a democratic socialist and a defender of the existing order. In relation to their ideas, my position is paradoxical. While I have a strong disposition to agree with everything that the two idealists say in condemnation of the present industrial anarchy, which they describe as a mixture of oligarchy and ochlocracy, I think that, as against them, the practical-minded banker has on the whole the best case. In none of the systems outlined do I find justice a conspicuous feature; but Stuart seems to me right in what he says about liberty. "No free society would ever tolerate Collectivism at all" (p. 136). "I insist that even an unskilled laborer benefits by and consciously enjoys his freedom under the present *régime*" (p. 141). "There would, I am sure, be less freedom, in a very real sense, under Collectivism, than there is now, not only for the few but for the many" (p. 143).

Again, the Utopian aristocrat Harington seems to me to have a better case than the academical democrat Martin when he declines to sacrifice the best that the highest faculties can produce under the condition of leisure for the sake of a more evenly diffused material comfort. His aristocracy, he says, would see that an appropriate share of labor and talent was devoted to noble and beautiful things. Martin replies that he does not know whether the love of beautiful and noble things is a permanent factor or a transitory phase in human nature, but he hopes that it is permanent; and if the instinct for art persists, then it will have a healthier and nobler development under his social democracy because it will be the spontaneous



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outcome of popular forces, and not the foster-child of patrons. But in this society all are to do task-work under public authority. "In a well-ordered community," it is laid down (p. 93), "no able-bodied person ought to receive anything except as the direct reward of his labor." Works of art and imagination are apparently to be produced only by persons who devote their spare time to them. This means that they are not conceived as essential ends of human society.

Martin, however, in spite of temporary appearances, is not much worse than the others on this point. All agree at bottom in making industrial production the essence. Harington, for example, would breed systematically for minute specialization of function, except in his highest class; and this is only an apparent exception, for the business of his aristocrats is to live and govern so as to make such a society work. They are not to resemble Plato's guardians, but "Renaissance princes." Thus their demand for splendor of life would call forth intense industrial activity in all other ranks. These are to consist of various kinds of worker-castes. Martin would breed for a high average of capacity; but to him justice seems to require that reward should be estimated, as far as possible, not by product but by effort. "In that way one would discourage deliberate idleness." "A weaker or stupider man, working harder than one who is stronger and more intelligent, but producing less, ought to receive a higher wage" (p. 101). For labor at the same occupation this may have to be modified in deference to the economists by "the principle of efficiency"; but application will be all the more rigorous as between different occupations. Even here, indeed, the concession is made that the community "will not be so stupid as to offer a wage below the level of efficiency"; but the principle of proportion to disagreeable effort (as if there were any absolute standard of this for all types) is regarded as coming nearest to ideal justice. Since the community is to own all the land and all the capital, the collectivist Inquisition will at any rate not fail for want of material power. In order to approximate to this ideal, Stuart is led to make a concession for which the best that can be said is that it is half-hearted. As a defender of the present order, he, of course, thinks inheritance and bequest favorable to industrial effort; but he allows Martin to draw up a compromise, in which property would be held by individual capitalists as em-

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ployers of labor, but could not be bequeathed. Thus the kind of people who are "paralyzed by a competence" (p. 116) would disappear, and this would so far be favorable to industrial production. Whether it would be favorable to science or literature is not asked. What seems to be expected is that, since all would be educationally and socially equal, some who took the lowest rank industrially would "reserve their higher faculties for some creative work" when their routine work for a living was over. "Thus you might find a man who has chosen for his public and necessary task something disagreeable that others desire to shirk on condition of being allowed more leisure for pursuing scientific research or for writing poetry" (p. 184). Clearly, the society does not think these occupations sufficiently important to take anyone's whole time; or it is too invidious to allow this, because they are supposed to be delightful.

At the end of the account I have not been able to distinguish very clearly between Martin's own view and that which he tries to enforce on Stuart; but the result might have been expected. Modern plutocracy, systematized and deprived of all its anomalies, and collectivism, worked by the most competent industrials, would tend to coincide. The three types of community are described finally as having been set up "like beautiful statues"; but I must confess that I find no beauty in any of them. I quite agree with the author that "if an ideal is to result, an ideal must be willed"; and I am glad to think that, as he says, "justice is a power; and if it cannot create, it will at least destroy." Thus I am all the more disappointed not to be able to agree with any distinctive position adopted. I find neither true democracy nor true aristocracy (which are perhaps not incompatible) in the conception of the just order which he sets forth as the basis of collectivism. Is it not contradictory, for example, to speak of "adventitious natural advantages" (p. 100)? Yet it is on the ground that superiorities in strength or intelligence are "accidental gifts of nature" that the proposal is made in effect to penalize them. The view indeed is not consistently maintained; for Martin argues that, under Collectivism, there will remain as the stimulus to the able man the recognition of his services (p. 119). This certainly agrees better with what I take to be the common-sense view as regards personal merit. On the metaphysics of the question there might be some ultimate disagreement. With all

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the disputation there has been on the problem of free-will and necessity, this question has scarcely been enough discussed; but for a decision on it and the application of that decision to individual cases I cannot think that collective society will ever be competent.

T. WHITTAKER.

London.

IS IMMORTALITY DESIRABLE? By G. Lowes Dickinson. (The Ingersoll Lecture, 1908.) Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909. Pp. 63.

The author's main purpose in this lecture, as the title indicates, is to ask whether immortality, supposing it possible, is desirable, and to express his own opinion regarding the kind of immortality that one might rationally desire. At the opening of the lecture, and again at the close, however, he refers to the possibility of immortality, giving some general reasons why he considers it an open question whether or no it is a fact. "That the soul dies with the brain is an inference, and quite possibly a mistaken one. If to some minds it seems inevitable, that may be as much due to a defect of their imagination as to a superiority of their judgment. To infer wisely in such matters one must be a poet as well as a man of science" (p. 5). The spirit of Mr. Dickinson's discussion is, in general, indicated by this quotation. It is from the literary standpoint, and with frequent references to literature, that he deals with his topic, clothing his thoughts in the clear and charming prose that has delighted readers of his other books, and exhibiting everywhere sincerity and restraint in the expression of his opinions. These personal qualities are what give impressiveness to the lecture, and it is therefore not a little disconcerting to find the author turning at the end to 'psychical research' as a scientific means of deciding regarding survival after death, and adopting the familiar tone of censure against those who through prejudice and indifference are neglecting "a branch of scientific inquiry which may have results more important than any other that is being pursued in our time." To establish the fact of survival would not prove immortality, Mr. Dickinson admits; but he thinks that it would remove the principal objection against it. But would it tend to prove immortality desirable? On the

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contrary, one cannot avoid the conclusion that if the "Reports" published in the Proceedings of the Society for Physical Research are to be accepted as science, the question of the desirability of immortality is decided in the negative. For surely the 'gibbering ghost' hypothesis of the psychical researchers belongs to the type of immortality which Mr. Dickinson would exclude as undesirable!

In discussing what kind of immortality is desirable, the author rejects 'eternal recurrence,' 'an immortality with hell,' and the positivistic conception of immortality. The conception of a continuation of an identical soul substance without any survival of consciousness—an hypothesis defended by Mr. McTaggart—does not seem to Mr. Dickinson so wholly unsatisfactory and unmeaning as it has to Mr. McTaggart's critics and as, I must confess, it does to me. An immortality which carried with it the continuance of self-consciousness would be, however, in Mr. Dickinson's opinion, much more desirable. For the development of the powers of the individual for good seems to require a continuity of experience analogous to that which we are aware of here; and it is only as rendering possible such a development that immortality is in the highest sense desirable and significant. "The whole strength of the case for immortality, as a thing to be desired, lies in the fact that no one in this life attains his ideal. . . . The conception that death ends all does not empty life of all its worth, but it destroys, in my judgment, its most precious element, that which transfigures all the rest; it obliterates the gleam on the snow, the planet in the east; it shuts off the great adventure, the adventure after death" (pp. 32, 33).

J. E. Creighton.

Cornell University.

Studies in Mystical Religion. By Rufus M. Jones, M. A., D. Litt. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1909. Pp. xxxviii, 518.

A comprehensive, critical, and sympathetic treatment of mysticism is greatly needed. The comparative study of religion has brought together a vast amount of material elucidating the character and development of man's religious life.

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There is already a number of excellent works describing, classifying, and attempting to explain the theological conceptions and ritualistic performances of various peoples in different ages. It is natural that the interest should at first have centered upon the ideas characteristic of each system, and that the significance of the cult should have found a more tardy recognition. This was no doubt due to the growing emphasis on the ethical content of religion. Just as the metaphysical element in the creeds seemed less important than the moral, acts designed to influence invisible spirits naturally appeared less valuable than acts expressing the relations of living men. Prophets and reformers appealed more strongly to the investigator than priests and augurs. At present, however, the interest among competent workers in this field is more equally divided between ritual and dogma.

But the scientific study of mysticism lags behind that of creed and cult. This phase of religious life is perhaps least understood and therefore apt to be discussed with most dogmatism. Ardent advocacy or relentless opposition is more frequently met than a calm and impartial estimate. The first demand of science is that, so far as possible, all material bearing on the subject should be collected and considered by the investigator. Most writers on mysticism deem it sufficient to seize upon a number of typical representatives; and the choice both of these and of their leading ideas is generally dictated by personal preference. Unless a student is something of a mystic himself, he is not likely to understand a mystic. But mystics, as a rule, are poor historians; they are seldom endowed with the critical judgment that is indispensable in dealing with documents of the past. A rare combination of wide and varied learning, critical acumen, and sympathetic insight is required of the historian of mysticism. Before the master-builder comes, there are many stones to be brought from the quarries and many designs to be submitted. Two of the most interesting and important contributions recently made are the work of Delacroix, "Études d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme" (Paris, 1908) and the present volume by Professor Jones.

The author possesses certain admirable qualifications for the task he has undertaken. He is in heartiest sympathy with his mystics; for he is a mystic himself and can speak of them as one who has shared their deepest experiences. At the same

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time, his sturdy common sense, his strong attachment to a group of moral principles necessarily determining the conduct of life, and his comparatively slight interest in mystical speculation give a balance to his judgment not often found among mystics. His position allows him freedom to move beyond canonical boundaries and to estimate with fairness heretical movements. He has walked in some of the less trodden paths of ecclesiastical history. He writes with a modesty and freedom from assertion that are most commendable. He does not claim to present a complete history of mysticism. The purpose of his book is to be an introduction to a series of works by the author and others on the development of the Society of Friends. This should be borne in mind.

The first three chapters deal with early Christianity. Of these, the one on Montanism is a fine example of thoughtful appreciation and discriminating criticism. After a chapter on "Roots of Mysticism in Classical Literature," there follows a discussion of the Church Fathers, with special attention to Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine. Pseudo-Dionysius and Johannes Scotus Erigena are well treated; the Waldenses are described; a glowing tribute is paid to Francis of Assisi; Amaury, Ortlieb, and the pantheistical mystics are declared to "belong to the brave list of those who have grandly trusted the soul and who have helped, even at great risk and cost, to set it free"; the Beghards and Beguines are treated with discernment; and Eckhart is eulogized. With regard to Merswin and "the Friend of God from the Oberland" Professor Jones takes the ground that, while it is not possible to prove that Merswin wrote "The Banner of Christ" and "The Book of the Nine Rocks," he may have been known to Nicolaus, who enlarged these works as the author of some parts. No light is thrown upon John Tauler by "The Book of the Master of Holy Scripture," which is admitted to be a fiction. The author of "Theologia Germanica," Tauler, Ruysbroek, Gerhard Groote, Thomas à Kempis, Wyclif, the Lollards, the Anabaptists, the Familists, the Seekers, and the Ranters are discussed; sometimes, as in the case of the Anabaptists, with much historical detail.

In order to understand the author's principle of inclusion and exclusion, it is necessary to remember that he is primarily interested in describing the spiritual predecessors of the Friends.

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Thus many movements of thought and life are introduced which do not represent mysticism so much as a practical opposition to sacerdotalism, sacramentalism, oath-taking, or retaliation. Professor Jones finds it necessary to make an excursion into paganism. He remarks with true insight: "The fact cannot be too often pressed that historical Christianity is a product of many movements, a religion woven out of many strands of faith and thought and practice." But was it wise to confine the attention to the Socratic school? When once the boundaries of Christianity had been crossed, why should not the "roots" of a religious mysticism, defined as "a direct and intimate consciousness of the divine presence" (p. xv), have been traced back at least to the great historic religions of Egypt, Syria, Babylonia, Persia, and India? Would it have been possible for the author to speak of Plato as "the father of speculative, as distinguished from simple, implicit, unreflective mysticism" (p. 58), or of "the tendency to treat the sense-world as unreal and shadowy" (p. 62), as beginning with Plato, if he had taken into consideration the development of thought in India? Philo of Alexandria is not mentioned in this work. Yet his influence upon mystical religion has certainly been far greater than that of Plotinus. The Egyptian substratum in the thought of the philosopher of Lycopolis is as unmistakable as the Jewish in Philo's speculation. Was there no "immediate awareness of relation with God" among the ancient Hebrews worthy of recording in this volume? And can the origin of mysticism be intelligently discussed without a reference to the 'mysteries'? A consideration of the Muslim and Jewish mystics of the Middle Ages would have been very valuable, and it is by no means certain that the modern type of religion in which the author is interested, has not drawn some of its life from these sources.

Within the pale of Christendom, one misses, in this book, above everything else, a fair and sympathetic treatment of the mystical religion that did not lead to outbreaks of heresy and schism. In fact, one almost gets the impression that all mystics worth mentioning were heretics. Yet there is always a mystical religion, deep and sincere, that lives and moves and has its being within the boundaries of orthodox faith and long-established customs. It breathes forth its aspirations in hymns and prayers and liturgies, processions, genuflexions, contemplation of images, sacraments and sacrifices, fasts and feasts and veneration of the

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saints. No song has ever sung itself into the heart of man as that which was born of Christian dogma and of Christian ritual. What a wealth of mysticism there is in the hymns of Bernard of Clairvaux and in his Commentary on Canticles! What glowing warmth of religious feeling the paintings of the Madonna, the worship of the Virgin, and the prayers for the dead betray! There is a mysticism that attaches itself to, and feeds upon, the cult, just as there is a mysticism that detaches itself from, and becomes independent of, all ritual performances. The student of religion must learn to appreciate the great conservative forces as well as those that tend to vary the type.

The author's failure to mention so many mystics in Spain, Italy, and France of whom one naturally thinks, is probably occasioned by this negative attitude toward Latin Christianity. It would have been helpful in many ways to have had a presentation of the mystical religion of such thinkers as Alejo de Vanegas, Malon de Chaide, Diego de Estella, Juan de Avila, Luis de Granada, Luis de Leon, Teresa de Avila, and Miguel de Molinos; and of the Italians, Cardano, Telesio, Campanella, and Giordano Bruno. Madame de Guyon, Fénelon, and Jean de Labadie were profoundly influenced by Molinos, and in turn influenced Princess Elizabeth and Anna Maria Van Schuurmann with whom William Penn came in contact. A comparison of Bossuet and Fénelon would have been valuable. The picture of the Anabaptist movement would have been more complete, if the union of mysticism and rationalism in Hans Denck and in Tiziano and his friends at Vicenza had been set forth, and the religious life of David Joris had been analyzed. The introduction of a larger amount of material would have justified the exclusion of much historical material available elsewhere, and would have rendered it more possible to discern how far mysticism depends, for its characteristic life, upon a resolute following of 'the inner light,' regardless of the trammels of fixed dogma and the stimulus of established ritual. It would likewise have helped us to decide whether there is a necessary connection between the acceptance of this 'inner light,' as the supreme guide, and the attitude on certain moral questions, taken by Jesus of Nazareth, Francis of Assisi, some of the Anabaptists, the Quietists, and the Friends.

The author feels that there is a profound difference between the mysticism which, in his apt and striking phrase, "comes

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home, with empty hands," and the mysticism which brings back from its heavenly journey reliable knowledge and impulses to noble living. Now, was there ever an eager spirit pushing "beyond the flaming walls of the world" who returned more empty-handed, so far as things metaphysical are concerned, than Gautama, the Buddha? Yet he most consistently taught and followed the principles of non-resistance and overcoming evil with good. Among Christian mystics there are those whose conception of ultimate reality is an absolute blank, without its involving any approach to Buddhist ethics, and others whose quietism is wedded to well-defined doctrines and prevalent modes of worship. The author of the Fourth Gospel is certainly more of a mystic than Jesus, whose career is singularly free from visions, ecstasies, mantic inspiration, and flights of philosophic speculation. There is no emphasis in this gospel on those principles of Jesus which the Friends have so nobly championed. When Professor Jones maintains that 'John' was less mystical than Paul, because he harked back to an objective experience, the vision of the life of Jesus and the listening to his words, he apparently still adheres to a view abandoned by critical students of the gospel. The man who wrote this wonderful work, probably between 135 and 140 A. D., certainly beheld, with the eyes of a mystic, the glory of the Logos, and heard, with the ears of a mystic, the metaphysical disquisitions that are so different from the words recorded by the Synoptists.

In a second edition, Professor Jones will, no doubt, revise the text so as to remove certain inconcinnities and infelicitous statements. On page 31 Ignatius is said to have died 110 A. D.; on page 501, *circa* 117. There is no evidence for either date. Page 77 closes the doors of the Academy at Athens 529 A. D.; page 78, 527 A. D. Did the Apostle of Ireland really come from Gaul (p. 115)? The statement that Samosata is "not far from the ancient Ur of the Chaldees" (p. 134) will not help anyone to find the home of Paul and Lucian. The distance being about six hundred miles, it would not be much worse to say, "Haverford, near Chicago." The little book that Luther edited does not bear the name "Theologica Germanica" (p. 291). To find "Theologische Studien und Kritiken," pp. 666-738 (so p. 223!), would take a good deal of a man's time. It should be 1839, pp. 663-744. Under the heading, "Rise of Anabaptism," in the Chronology (pp. 503 *ff.*), we find twenty-seven dates referring to

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the life of Luther and six dates referring to the Anabaptists; under the heading, "Anabaptists in Great Britain," there are sixty-one dates, none of which seems to refer to the Anabaptists. If it is "Saint Columban," why should not the title be given to Columba (pp. 116, 501, 509)? Consistency would seem to demand either the omission of this title everywhere, or its use in the case of all such persons as have been duly canonized. The former practice would appear to an outsider as most in harmony with the principles of the Friends.

While a truly scientific treatment of mysticism is still a *desideratum,* the spirit in which this book is written and the information it contains cannot but prove profitable and cause the reader, interested in some of our most important ethical questions, to look with eagerness for the succeeding volumes of the series.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

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NEOPLATONISM IN RELATION TO CHRISTIANITY. An Essay. By Charles Elsee, M. A. Cambridge: University Press, 1908. Pp. xii, 144.

Published as the expansion of a prize essay, this little work claims to be a contribution to the history of philosophical theology rather than of philosophy proper. The best parts of it are the accounts of writers like Origen, Synesius, and "Dionysius the Areopagite" among the Platonizing Christians, and of the author of the "De Mysteriis" on the pagan side. The important influence of Neoplatonism on Augustine is set forth at length; and the influence of the school on medieval thought is well brought out. In the exposition of the Neoplatonic doctrine itself, there is occasionally some want of exactitude. Plotinus is described (p. 55) as calling his first principle, among other names, Being (τὸ ὄν). Now the first principle, with Protinus, is always said to be beyond being, which it produces. This is distinctly stated in one of the passages referred to in the footnote ("Ennead," II, 1). Again the author says: "Plotinus accepted in its entirety the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence, and the state of ecstasy is neither more nor less than the temporary realization of the longing which the spirit feels for its return into the world of Ideas" (pp. 58, 59). In reality, Plotinus

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treats the doctrine of reminiscence as partly mythological; and ecstasy is a realization of the return to that which is beyond the world of Ideas. Here, of course, is the mystical element in Plotinus; but what is meant when it is said in relation to his system generally that he "does not attempt to establish his fundamental doctrines by argument" (p. 54), I do not understand.

There are some minor slips in the history of philosophy; but the author's essential error seems to me to lie in maintaining, as he does, that Plotinus, in the construction of his system, had a concealed polemical intention against Christianity, and that, for the purpose of upholding the ancient religion, he "edited and retouched Christian theology in the light of Platonic philosophy." Mr. Elsee's chief argument for this is what he takes to be the systematic avoidance by Plotinus of the term Logos as the title of the principle of Mind in his system. To have adopted this term, he thinks, would have betrayed dependence on Philo, and this would have meant association with Christianity. For it was Philo who had first revived it in the sense of universal Mind or Reason; in which sense it had almost dropped out of Greek philosophy for five hundred years after Heraclitus (p. 24). Now this is historically quite erroneous. Historians generally allow that Heraclitus used the term Logos in this sense, though an authority like Professor Burnet has disputed it; but what is not disputable is that the Stoics so used it systematically. During the period of eclectic Platonism and Stoicism, Philo adopted it for his theological purpose. From him the Christians took it over. Plotinus, later, reacting not against Christianity, in which he had no direct interest, but against the Stoic materialism, preferred for the generalized meaning the Aristotelian use of the term Nous, while still using Logos in many subordinate senses. Everything is quite straightforward when it is once recognized that the Judæo-Christian speculative development in pure thought simply reflects the movement of Hellenic philosophy at each stage. It is influenced, but does not exercise influence in return. The thinking of Tertullian is colored by Stoic materialism; that of Clement and Origen by eclectic Platonism; that of later Fathers by the Neoplatonism which in some form had become the philosophical creed of the educated classes. To an abstract thinker like Plotinus, working in essential freedom from the authority of

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texts and myths, the writings of Philo and Origen, able as they were in their way, would have seemed nothing but a mass of confusion. Mr. Elsee himself has noted that, when it was a question of dealing with doctrines founded on assumed revelations, he left the polemic to disciples like Porphyry, of the second order in speculative power but with more philological interest.

The relation between Neoplatonism and Christianity is in fact only one case of the general relation between the ancient culture and the new religion. It is really difficult to exaggerate the impermeability of the classical tradition, as long as it lasted, to Judæo-Christian influences. Of course it may be said that this shows the deadness of that tradition. The new in its inchoate form contained the promise of life. It could assimilate the elements of the old that it needed, while this could not take up anything from it in return. This no doubt was true for the time. Lucian, as Mr. Elsee notes, had seen in the second century the impossibility of maintaining classicism in religion. The result therefore was destruction as the preparation for a new birth. What a philosopher of sufficient originality could still do was to carry thought forward to a point at which it could both seriously influence the intermediate period and become the starting-point of the next great transformation.

T. WHITTAKER.

London.

SOME ASPECTS OF RABBINIC THEOLOGY. By S. Schechter, M. A., Litt. D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909. Pp. xxii, 384.

It is a most unfortunate result of the acrimonious hostility that has prevailed between Judaism and Christianity ever since the great schism which threw off the daughter body at a tangent from the mother that even to this day there has been given to the world no adequate presentation of Judaism. It must be admitted by the Jewish theologians that the prime fault lies at their own doors, because as yet they have failed to make proper presentation of their theology and life to the Gentiles. They have written for their native audiences on provincial lines and on domestic subjects, ignoring out of a proud indifference

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the necessity of an apologetic to the world. Yet this religion is worthy of a complete and truthful apologetic; if it is not customarily rated among the universal religions of the world, except in a historical sense, the blame lies with its professors, who thereby fall short of the universalism which lies on the face of their religion. Hence for presentations of Judaism, all except those rabbinically trained must have recourse chiefly to books written by Christian scholars, some of which are works of enormous industry and patience, but all of which are condemned by Jewish scholars as lacking a proportionate understanding of their religion, and as, in most cases, animated by an antagonistic spirit. Hence such books as Weber's "Jüdische Theologie" and Bousset's "Religion des Judentums im Zeitalter Jesu Christi" are faulted, even bitterly, as inadequate presentations. And there must be some truth in such criticisms, for none can write intimately about a living religion except those who are inside. In apologetic and self-assertion Judaism has certainly fallen short of its ideal, although the centuries of opprobrium under which the Jew has suffered offer an excuse for this lack.

But with the emancipation of the Jews in more modern times and with their growing sense of power as a vital factor in the world's life, their scholars are coming to take a more positive position. They are admitted now on equal terms into scholastic and theological forums, and such productions as the *Jewish Quarterly Review* and the *Jewish Encyclopædia* evince a fresh and healthy purpose to maintain their own in the presence of all rival theologies and systems. In fact, we may suppose that they feel the need of establishing a certain defensive apologetic of their faith for the sake of their own adherents, when the very liberation which has emancipated the Jew threatens to break down the barriers that have held the race together as a peculiar people.

A book like this of Dr. Schechter's is most welcome because it comes from one of the greatest living Jewish scholars, who, with a profound faith in his religion and his people, nevertheless is a man of the world in his scholastic culture and his human sympathies. The work has a modest scope, "Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology"; there is no attempt at a complete presentation of Judaism, though we trust that the same hand may be spared to give the world a more thorough treatment,

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because Jewish theology is a most baffling subject, more complicated and elaborate than even the intelligent man is wont to think, regarding Judaism as merely a preliminary stage to Christianity and maintaining its existence only as a foil thereto.

After an introductory chapter dealing with the scope of his subject, the author treats in six chapters the theological idea—original with Judaism—of the kingdom of God. This discussion is of great importance to Christian theologians. It may be noted that Schechter regards Messianism as an integral element of Judaism. The succeeding chapters would probably be of more interest to the readers of the JOURNAL, the writer taking up in them the topics of the law, imputed righteousness, holiness, saintliness, sin and its origin, divine grace, repentance and reconciliation,—in a word, the method of the moral and spiritual life of the Jew. Dr. Schechter denies the current interpretation of *torah* as law,—it means instruction (though it was the Hellenistic Jews who translated it by *nomos*, a term to which he objects)—and especially girds at the view which has prevailed in the Christian Church since the days of Paul that the law was a yoke and burden upon the Jew for whom the gospel was a blessed emancipation. He shows that Protestant theologians and modern liberal students have been unfair to the spirit of Judaism, which has found in "the yoke of the law" a delight. May we suppose that the law has itself exercised an eliminating effect upon the Jewish community, sloughing off the elements which found that yoke a burden? A parallel to these contradictory views of the law is found at the end of the Middle Ages. Who would think, from reading Thomas à Kempis, with his absorption in the sacramental and monastic systems of the church, that the great storm of the Reformation was even then brewing? And so in our judgment upon the spiritual value of the law: there were the many who from the psalmists down found it an almost intoxicating delight, while others, whose classic example is Paul and of whom no statistics are obtainable, felt it to be a curse.

Very much in these chapters is of prime importance to the student of the spiritual ideas of Christendom. Indeed, the study of Christian origins has by no means done justice to Judaism, especially in regard to the ethical contributions of the mother to the daughter church. The Jewish ideas of righteousness, sin, reconciliation, run parallel to those of Christianity, and

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we believe that this field is of far more importance in the investigation of Christian ethics than the eclectic Græco-Roman world to which contemporary theology is now devoting its researches. Even where there is not interfusion of Jewish and Christian influences, the correspondence may be often due to parallel developments from the common stock of Rabbinism, which was already established in principle and essence before the rise of the Christian Church.

The book is concluded with a valuable bibliography of the Jewish authorities referred to and an admirable topical index.

J. A. MONTGOMERY.

Episcopal Divinity School, Philadelphia.

GOD. AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF MAN'S HIGHEST IDEAL AND A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SCIENCE. By Paul Carus. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1908. Pp. iv, 249.

This volume forms a part of the "Christianity of To-Day Series." It presents the conception of God to which the author has been led by his own experience and reflection, and which he regards as Christian as well as scientifically correct. Forced by his intellectual growth to abandon the ideas of his youth, he could find no satisfaction amid the ruins of his supernatural world. From atheism he worked his way to what to him is a Christian idea of God, even though some of his friends insist upon styling it "the God-conception of atheism." He now utters his message, not hesitatingly, as guesses at the riddle of existence, but with confidence, as the solution of the problem of the ages. He has no sympathy with an agnosticism that continues to hold the judgment in suspense after arguments have been advanced sufficient to bring conviction to his mind.

Dr. Carus is convinced that the existence of God is scientifically demonstrable. But this god is not an extra-cosmic individual, nor the sum of all things, but the formal principle, the cosmic order, the uniformities of nature. Beyond the world of matter and energy, there is the intrinsic reality of those eternal laws of form, formulated in logic, arithmetic, geometry, algebra, pure mechanics, and pure natural science, dealing with

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causation and conservation of matter and energy. This reality is God. It is form. But form is more real than substance. If there were no objects to be numbered, the law that two times two make four would still exist. If there were no matter or energy, the law of the conservation of matter and energy would still exist. There is no truth in nominalism. Plato rightly divined that the form-giving ideas were objective realities. Kant committed the error of supposing them to be subjective. "On this little mistake which was inadvertently made hinges the philosophy of his critical idealism." This god, consisting of the uniformities of nature, or the formative ideas, is not eternally conscious of himself, is not a self, but becomes conscious incidentally in the course of the world process.

As there is no individual god, so there is no individual man surviving the shock of death. But there is the formative influence, the spiritual significance, which remains. During man's life, his soul is nothing else than this formative influence, this spiritual significance. Hence the soul is in reality immortal, though the individual ceases to exist. Will does not shape intelligence, but intelligence informs and fashions will. The formative influence of man's personality is not indefinite, but definite, just as that of the uniformities of nature, or God.

Dr. Carus writes with deep moral earnestness. His book throbs with vitality. His style is clear, vivid, breezy. He leaves no problems unexplained. The reader is forced along irresistibly, with little time to notice, or disposition to lament, the mighty systems of thought that fall shattered by the wayside. He who knows the truth can afford to be generous, and sometimes patronizing. The "little mistake" of supposing ideas to be subjective instead of objective must have been made "inadvertently" by Immanuel Kant. Herbert Spencer has "noble intentions," "studious habits," and "versatility in writing on various subjects," though "his philosophy is wrong in its roots and exercises a baneful influence." Mr. Wilkinson, of Burma, a friendly critic, is urged "to stick to his God-conception so long as he is incapable of perceiving the deeper truth of a more philosophical interpretation of facts," since "the babe that cannot as yet digest meat should not become dissatisfied with the milk, else it will starve." Dr. Carus says: "Charity in theological discussions is a new feature which corresponds to politeness in the realm of the other sciences." To make it really

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new, there should be in it no suggestion of the quality that has made the word 'charity' in an economic sense so unpleasant.

Dr. Carus clings to the term 'God,' even though in using it he is bound to convey to almost every one a wrong idea of what he has in mind. He even takes up the cudgels for the term 'Trinity' (though not in the place where the Index announces: "Trinity doctrine defended"; the defence will be found on pp. 207 *ff.*, not 227 *f.*). The Holy Spirit, it appears, is "the various ideals of mankind as they appear to-day in the advance of civilization, in science, art, invention, and social progress." But "the Logos, or World-Reason, takes shape in him who is perfect, in the God-man, the realized ideal of manhood, the paragon of mankind." If this refers to Jesus of Nazareth, it is ethically the most significant statement in the book. If not, to whom does it refer?

Aside from these creedal terms, hallowed by usage, Dr. Carus is quite willing to change the terminology. He does not like 'theology,' but would have 'theonomy' in its place. This would be a polite way of suggesting that what has hitherto posed as a science, dealing with the religious phenomena of man's life, might henceforth hide itself in alleys and backwoods with astrology, alchemy, and others of that ilk, while the new science would be recognized with astronomy and its sisters in academic halls. He would change 'religion' to 'panpathy,' which has not even euphony to commend it; and substitute for 'monotheism,' 'nomotheism.' If "new wine should be poured into new wine-skins," new thoughts voice themselves in new words, a new attitude toward life express itself in a new mode of living, why not apply this process to the highest of our ideals and the profoundest of our conceptions?

Even among those who heartily respond to the eloquent appeal Dr. Carus makes for the noblest possible life, in view of that immortality of which alone we can be sure, there may be some who, seeking for the highest ideal after which to fashion their life or from which to draw inspiration, will find it difficult to discover in the god Dr. Carus proclaims, either the virtues that should be emulated or the qualities that might make fellowship possible. Would it be wrong in them to turn from the "cosmic order" or the "uniformities of nature," which should be their god, that they might catch glimpses of a more realizable and inspiring ideal in the lives of Jesus and his mother, or any

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other men and women capable of leaving a deep impression on them? A dear friend of the reviewer, Professor Nathan Soederblom, of Upsala, remarks, in a recent work: "A man may, indeed, have doubts as to the divinity of God, but he cannot doubt the divinity of Christ." Essentially the same thought would perhaps be expressed in a form that comes nearer to our modern consciousness, if it were said that the highest ideal is suggested in human life rather than in the order of nature. It is not to be denied, however, that, by a process of personification, these "super-personal, super-real uniformities of nature" may warm the modern mystic's heart and inspire a truly devotional feeling. Witness the hymns with which the volume concludes.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

Cornell University.

WHAT IS PRAGMATISM? By James Bisset Pratt, Ph. D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909. Pp. xii, 254.

This book consists of six lectures given at the Glenmore Summer School in 1908, and the author frankly warns us in his preface that his attitude is that of a critic. He is a very painstaking, serious, and efficient, but too lenient critic. When one is convinced, as undoubtedly Mr. Pratt is, that pragmatism is very poor philosophy, why should one not say so more forcibly? I feel sure that many a reader of Mr. Pratt will close the book with the thought that pragmatists have made a rather poor case of it, but not so very bad a case when one realizes that most philosophy is hair-splitting anyway; and this judgment will be due to Mr. Pratt's method of refutation. In my opinion, Lectures II, III, and IV should have been condensed into one.

The first lecture already abundantly proves that whatever pragmatism has been emphasizing with good reason is by no means the special property of pragmatism. As a matter of fact, philosophers do not harp upon these things because there is no need of doing so; for, after all, we no longer live in the Middle Ages. "Away with logomachy and meaningless abstraction!" pragmatists cry, and Mr. Pratt answers: "But alas! where is the foe? Who is it that is championing logomachy and meaningless abstractions? If belief in clear thought and the other admirable things named above be pragmatism,

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are we not all pragmatists? . . . And if we are all pragmatists, and there be no foe to fight, the rather disconcerting question presents itself, Why should we make such fuss about it?" (p. 8, *cf.* p. 138). Or, when it comes to 'truth,' pragmatists say it is 'usefulness,' and ask, *Does it work?* (p. 15)—but *who* does not ask, *Does it work?* "Pragmatism either stands for an absurdity or else, so far as I can see, it has contributed nothing of importance to the problem in question" (p. 38). Again, when pragmatists gravely say that we should discuss only that which is worth discussing, and further insist that the intellectual desire to know be admitted as a pragmatic interest; in this case, says Mr. Pratt, "I cannot see that pragmatism helps us one whit in the solution of our problem" (p. 43). And that is about all: whenever it is reasonable, pragmatism is commonplace itself.

The only originality it can claim consists in various attempts to obliterate the distinction between logical and psychological truth (what man will consider true and what he ought to consider true); the pragmatic criterion, "the expedient in our way of thinking," being of a psychological and ethical nature, would not be applicable if one remained strictly in the domain of logic. This confusion, the original sin of pragmatism, is so obviously unphilosophical that no pragmatist of insight will ever follow his arguments to the end. Professor James even found it impossible to adhere to the original theory of Mr. Peirce, which is perfectly consistent with pragmatic principles, although obviously untenable, that "any difference of philosophical meaning can be brought down to some particular consequence in future practical experience." Mr. Peirce meant 'active experience,' but Professor James feels compelled to admit that it may be either *active* or *passive* (p. 19). But if this suggestion of Professor James is accepted, where is the difference from any other philosophy? Mr. Schiller makes the same concession when he says, "All consequences are practical sooner or later" (p. 23). What difference then remains between practical and non-practical, and what becomes of pragmatism?

In Lectures II, III, and IV Mr. Pratt searches the book of pragmatists diligently, patiently, persistently, and he finds nothing except ideas regarding which nobody disagrees; or else ever-renewed attempts to do away with the intellectual

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criterion of truth in favor of the practical, all of which was already explained in Lecture I. In Lecture II, for instance, Mr. Pratt examines at great length the pragmatic theory: "a claim not yet verified is not yet a truth." One certainly can accept this proposition from the standpoint of the theory of knowledge (which is psychology), meaning: As long as I do not realize the truth of a theory, it is not a truth *for me.* But from the logical point of view the proposition is absurd; whether a child knows the theorem of Pythagoras or not does not make the theorem less true *per se.* Of course, the point is that pragmatists wished to take advantage of the ambiguity of words in the proposition in order to abandon the distinction between a truth of which we are conscious and a truth *per se.* We 'make' the truth, they say; and how can we 'make' it? To be sure, only by accepting the pragmatic test. Mr. Pratt devotes many pages to refuting this sophistry, when one single sentence of his would have sufficed: "It is clear enough that there is a difference between a thing and its tag" (p. 62).

In Lecture III the author tests the extraordinary attempt of pragmatists to reduce the meaning of *verifiability* to that of *verification* (pp. 101 *ff*). Mr. Pratt rejects it by saying that it is a confusion between *truth* and *trueness.* Nothing can be plainer to anyone accustomed to deal with philosophical problems; hence, why devote almost an entire lecture to the subject, especially since it is the same theory which has already been refuted in Lecture II: "a claim not yet verified is not yet a truth"?

The fourth lecture, both as regards the pragmatic argument and the refutation, is likewise a repetition, in other words, of the third and of the second lectures. Under the pretext of finding out whether knowledge is *saltatory* or *ambulatory,* pragmatists try to accuse other philosophies of transcendentalism. When Mr. Pratt comes to determine what 'transcendentalism,' in this case, really means, he finds that pragmatists are just as guilty of indulging in it as their imaginary foes. Here again we see plainly enough the purpose of the pragmatists in "insisting that knowledge can be sufficiently described without going beyond the experience of the knowing individual" (pp. 166, 167). They want us to believe not only that the 'knowledge' of truth depends upon our perception of it, but that our perception 'makes' the truth. A single sentence

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would have been enough to dispel the misunderstanding so skillfully brought about, and it is regrettable that Mr. Pratt waited until page 167 to ask the question, "When one is mistaken but satisfied, does he know?"

To sum up, Mr. Pratt ably refutes all the arguments of the pragmatists which he examines. What he does not do, but what he might have done, is to make us realize that they are practically the same argument all the time. Pragmatists will certainly not consider themselves beaten by the many refutations; they will simply offer the same arguments under still other forms, and Mr. Pratt will have the trouble of a new refutation. In other words, instead of exposing various applications of the pragmatic method, the author ought to have exposed the method itself; it would have been both shorter and more effective. It is of no use cutting off the heads of the monster, as they will grow as fast as they are cut: one must pierce his heart.

A word concerning the last two lectures. In the fifth, Mr. Pratt explains that while personally pragmatists have generally shown strong religious inclination, the strictly logical attitude of pragmatism toward religion should be skepticism; and in the sixth he expresses his regrets that pragmatism must ultimately favor low ideals in philosophy, that it must take us away from the Platonic, spiritual view of things. He does not like to see biologists apply their formulas to ethics, or 'scientific' psychologists account for our emotions and thoughts as if they were only physiological reactions. One might agree with Mr. Pratt that pragmatism ought theoretically to lead to such non-Platonic conceptions; but as a matter of fact, has he not shown himself in Lecture V that the actual affiliations of pragmatists are rather with theology than with materialism? So let us wait; pragmatism may be forgotten when the time for logical application comes.

Bryn Mawr College. A. SCHINZ.

MISCELLANIES. Fourth Series. By John Morley. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1908.

Lord Morley describes his fourth series of "Miscellanies" as "fugitive pieces, but perhaps not altogether without a clue." The clue is to be found in the fact that four of the seven papers

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which compose this volume treat directly of the philosophy of politics, while the remaining essays contain a good many incidental observations on statesmen and statecraft, which further illustrate the author's mind in regard to the principles and methods of government.

The book opens with the well-known Romanes lecture on Machiavelli, about whom it has long been impossible to say anything new, but whose system of thought remains as a touchstone and a challenge. Lord Morley does not side with those who balance his repulsive doctrines with his ardent patriotism. He treats him as a cool, dispassionate thinker, giving utterance to ideas held and applied before and after him, though never expressed with such unflinching power. Machiavelli studied human affairs with the passionless objectivity of the anatomist, rarely praising or blaming, rarely sorrowing or rejoicing, never pitying, never surprised. But this man of pure reason, "like most of those who take a pride in seeing human nature as it is, only saw half of it." "Machiavelli and his school saw only cunning, jealousy, perfidy, ingratitude, dupery; and yet on such a foundation they dreamed they could build. What idealist or doctrinaire ever fell into a stranger error?" Lord Acton in his famous introduction to the "Prince" has traced the wide acceptance of the Machiavellian philosophy by men of every race and creed down to our own day, and has reminded us that he is not a vanishing type but a constant and contemporary influence. But his creed is pure atavism, and Lord Morley has no sort of doubt that the fight is going against him. "Energy, force, will, violence still keep alive in the world their resistance to the control of justice and conscience, humanity and right, and Machiavelli represents one side in that unending struggle; but at the bottom of the outcry against him there has been the sound instinct that mankind are "far too profoundly concerned in right and wrong, mercy and cruelty, justice and oppression to favor a teacher who, even for a scientific purpose of his own, forgets the awful difference."

The essay on Guicciardini is naturally less concerned with the deeper problems of politics and morals; but the quotations from the "Ricordi" introduce us to the mind of a more careful observer than his great contemporary. The immense authority which his histories possessed for three centuries was upset in the work with which Ranke made his début; but as his reputa-

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tion as a historian declined, his fame as an acute though cynical student of the changing fortunes of men and states has risen.

It is a relief to turn to the political thinkers of our own time who fill the latter part of this volume. They at least speak a language that we can understand, and are not ashamed to appeal to high principle for their enmities and enthusiasms. Modern publicists may and do differ in the intensity of their admiration for average human nature, but the rank cynicism of the Renaissance has gone forever. Our problem is no longer to build up a stable state on a foundation of pure selfishness, but to give play to the moral forces and spiritual possibilities inherent in civilized man. We know that society has made great progress, and we believe that it is capable of further progress if wisely guided; but is society being wisely guided? Is democracy, the fundamental fact of our time, a good form of government? Is it compatible with order and liberty? These questions are answered very differently by Mr. Lecky and Mr. Hobhouse, whose opinions are submitted to searching criticism in two essays of remarkable interest.

The appearance of Lecky's "Democracy and Liberty" in 1896 was no small surpise to a world which had only known him as a learned and judicial historian. There was, indeed, a good deal of useful information to be found in its pages; but it was passionate, dogmatic, superficial and partisan to an astonishing degree, and destroyed its author's reputation as a thinker. The incompatibility of democracy and liberty is an old thesis, and democracy has been sharply criticised by such men as Maine and Fitzjames Stephen; but Lecky's attack was little more than the outpouring of the fears and prejudices of a mid-Victorian Whiggism which had outlived its day. Lord Morley's analysis of the book in the "Nineteenth Century" was crushing. Its mistakes in matters of fact were corrected, its extraordinary contradictions in thought were calmly pointed out. In one breath Lecky laments the extension of the suffrage, the destruction of the balance of power, the breakdown of the constitution; in the next he declares that the national character is good and is every day growing better.

No one knows better than Lord Morley that democracy has its special weaknesses and difficulties; but it has come to stay and we must make the best of it. This was the attitude of Tocqueville, and it is the attitude of most thoughtful men to-day.

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How little Liberalism involves adulation of Demos is seen in Mr. Hobhouse's brilliant book, "Democracy and Reaction," which forms the text of the closing essay in this volume. Lecky had complained of the evil that democracy was doing; Mr. Hobhouse points out the dangers to which democracy is now exposed—a cheap and unscrupulous press, the influence of organized wealth, the appeal to bellicose passions, and to a blustering Imperialism. As Lecky's book was inspired by hatred of the Newcastle programme, so Mr. Hobhouse's essay was written under the stress of the Boer war. Lord Morley was a protagonist in both these chapters of English history, and he endorses Mr. Hobhouse's conclusions and most of his arguments. His comment on the book will serve equally as a summary of his review of it. "We are sensible all the time of the pulse of a strong humanity and of that warm faith in social progress which is, in other words, faith in men, hope for men and charity for men."

The three remaining essays deal with Mr. Frederic Harrison's Byzantine romance "Theophano," "Comte's Calendar of Great Men," and "John Stuart Mill," the latter being the latest and ripest of Lord Morley's numerous tributes to his friend and master. Though their writings cover very different ground there is much in common between the two men, both in temperament and in ideas—the same dignity and disinterestedness, the same willingness to learn from experience, the same tempered faith in human nature, the same steadfast devotion to the public weal.

G. P. Gooch.

London.

Aus meinen Leben. Jugenderinnerungen. Von Friedrich Paulsen. Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1909. Pp. 210.

It had been the intention of Professor Paulsen to publish, during his lifetime, the part of his memoirs dealing with his early youth and including his years at the *Gymnasium,* but he died before the plan could be carried out. After his death it was decided to extend the original scope of the autobiography, and the publishers have now printed the carefully prepared manuscript left by the author, which brings the narrative down to the beginnings of his career as an academic teacher. It is possible that the later portions, embracing the period of his

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greatest usefulness and productivity, may be given to the public after the notes in the possession of the family have been properly arranged and edited: a prospect in which all who have read the present installment will doubtless find satisfaction.

The story told in this book is the "plain, unvarnished tale" of the early life of a man who rose from the unpretentious surroundings of a German peasant home to a professorship of philosophy and pedagogy in the leading university of Europe. It is a simple story, modestly and honestly told, revealing the rugged manliness of the narrator and affording a glimpse into the times and circumstances of which he formed a part. The book is a piece of *Kulturgeschichte,* as every successful biography must be, outlining as it does the social, economic, political, educational, moral and religious setting of the period with which it is concerned, and showing the influence of this many-phased environment upon the development of a healthy human personality. It is the intimate insights which this portrayal of an uneventful life gives into the different situations, and the sober judgments pronounced upon the same, that lend the little work more than a personal interest and value.

The account opens with a description of Paulsen's North-Frisian ancestors who inhabited the islands on the west coast of Schleswig and followed the sea until the devastating storms of 1825 drove them to the mainland and into the less hazardous pursuits of agriculture. The manner of life within the parental home and in the village community is set forth, the varied occupations of the early peasant household are explained, together with the secular and religious recreations and the civic functions of the villagers. There is an interesting chapter on the village school first attended by Paulsen, which was largely patterned after the old sixteenth century type in its methods and subjects of instruction, and which did much to deaden the minds of its pupils with its mechanical memorizing and barren religious lessons. Fortunately for the bright boy who spent seven years in this dismal atmosphere, a highly gifted teacher at last appeared, who appealed not merely to the memory, but to the intelligence of his pupils and encouraged them to think. It was this man's fruitful instruction that awakened in Paulsen the desire to "study," a desire which was at first opposed by his parents, whose only child he was. They quite naturally

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expected him to preserve and enjoy what they had acquired by their hard labor, and his quick-witted mother contrasted the independent life of the tiller of the soil with the dependence of those in the learned callings. But the parents yielded and sacrificed their hopes; the boy was prepared for an upper form in the *Gymnasium* by Pastor Thomsen, and became a pupil at Altona.

The chapter discussing the methods employed and subjects studied at the Altona *Gymnasium,* the comparative merits of the teachers, the temptations and transgressions of the pupil, who for the first time in his experience had been allowed to shift for himself in an entirely new environment, will prove instructive to those interested in the education of boys. For Paulsen the gymnasial years were years of self-estrangement, years of perverted living and thinking, upon which he continued to look back with disgust for a long time to come. The eager zeal for study which had marked the close of his Langenhorn school days had cooled and given way to mere routine learning; for a spell much of his time was wasted in idleness and dissipation. It is not strange that a country boy who had never been away from home should have lost the way when left to his own devices in a large city and, what is worse, thrown with older companions of bad habits. Nor is it strange that his better nature and the influences of his home training should have reasserted themselves and that he should have won his moral independence at last.

The beginning of the young man's life at the university was not very promising. In accordance with an early plan agreed upon by himself and his parents, he matriculated as a student of theology, although he no longer felt any particular inclination for the subject, having grown farther and farther away from the religious convictions of his boyhood. His studies were at first disconnected and without plan; he drifted like a ship without a rudder, and sought relief in the hollow amusements of student life, which simply intensified his feeling of the futility of existence. By a happy accident Lange's "History of Materialism" fell into his hands, the first book which he had ever read with a passionate interest, and this turned his thoughts in the direction of philosophy. At Berlin, under the influence of Trendelenburg, his studies began to take shape; Trendelenburg taught him how to go about his work, and with

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definite problems to solve his interest in philosophy developed.

The concluding chapters tell of his work in preparation for the private docentship, of his failure to receive the *venia legendi*, of the publication of his work on the "Development of Kant's Theory of Knowledge," of the renewal of his application and the granting of the same by the faculty at Berlin, and the beginnings of his career as a teacher of philosophy. The chapters are enriched by interesting accounts of the professors whom he heard, of the friendships he formed, of the political changes taking place in Germany, and of his military service as a volunteer in the army.

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During the Managing Editor's absence abroad for a year, editorial correspondence and manuscripts should be sent to Professor Frank Thilly, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS

JANUARY, 1910.

THE ETHICAL ASPECT OF THE NEW THEOLOGY.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

"IF there is one thing more than another," writes the late Master of Balliol, "which we may regard as the authentic stamp of the highest literary productions of the modern spirit, it is the breaking of the barriers between man and nature. Modern poetry has taught us to see in nature something closely akin to that which is highest within us." What appears in literature as the breaking of the barriers between man and nature, appears in politics as the breaking of the barriers between man and man, in religion, of the barriers between man and God. Even the Protestant and evangelical movement, which in some of its utterances seems most remote from the spirit of pantheism, draws from it its chief doctrine of direct revelation to the human soul of a God who hears and communes with it through its aspirations after good. Nor shall we be far wrong in connecting the prevalent rejection of individualism and the acceptance of the reality of the general will, as the guiding principle of social reform, with the same trend of thought and feeling. If this means anything, it means the belief in the presence in every one born into society, of an informing spirit capable by grace and guidance of leading him into organic communion with a fuller because more universal life.

Viewed in this light the New Theology comes before us,

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not as the heresy of an individual or group of individuals, but as the reassertion of a truth that no religion can be without, and that may be said to have been hid with all religion from the foundation of the world. This is admitted by its critics in their more sympathetic statements about it. "The New Theology," writes Dr. Gore in his eloquent book on The New Theology and the Old Religion, "is a convenient name for a current mode of thought which in its teaching about God lays the greatest stress upon what is called the Divine immanence. God, says the New Theology, is the self of the Universe and He is my deeper self and yours."[1] It stands, we may say, for the awakening of religious thought to the truth that the universe is one; the Infinite is here or nowhere; the world is begotten of God, not as something outside and independent of him which "he lets run round his finger," but as that in which (as it in him) he lives and moves and has his being. What is matter of surprise is not that the new thought should have made itself clearly and powerfully felt, in these days, in current theology, and have taken hold of clerical and lay mind alike as no other question except Darwinism,—itself a part of it,—but that it should have been so long in doing so. Perhaps it has not really been as long as we think and the present upheaval is merely the external audible expression of a force that has been working a silent revolution during the last half century. Be this as it may, the fact is before us and calls upon all who value religious truth for a conscious readjustment of their ideas comparable to nothing less than that which took place at the Protestant Reformation or at the introduction of Christianity itself. Henceforth the evidences of God's presence must be looked for, not in particular revelations at chosen times, but in the actual constitution and movement of the world around us. His action can no longer be taken as a distant, to many a fading, light by means of which certain events in the past are

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 10 and 42.

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to be explained, but rather as the master light of all our seeing in the world that is around us in the present. No single historical event or series of events, standing alone, however well attested, can any longer be accepted as the basis of religious faith. We must see God in history as a whole or not at all. If the single event or series of events is to stand as evidence, it must be seen in continuous perspective with the scheme of nature and history as a whole, and with the inward witness of the individual spirit. This is the essence of Modernism. Stated in its general form, I venture to suggest that it is the essence of common sense, and, as I think can be proved, of Christianity. [2]

But to see the truth in the new is one thing, to see how it is to be harmonized with what is true in the old, is another. That its representatives have failed to make this clear is the burden of the conservative critics. Nature and history, the New Theology maintains, are not something different from God. They are not merely to be conceived of as created or permitted by him, but to be the very garment that we know him by. But what, it is asked, on this view of God, becomes of human freedom and the deepest of all distinctions, the good and the evil? These seem to require the precisely opposite view of a God who is above and in a sense outside his creatures; and yet the New Theology provides no clear vindication of it. With a true instinct, Dr. Gore has made this question the center of his attack. He sees clearly enough that unless an answer is forthcoming to this question, the New Theology cannot hope to maintain itself against the weight of human experience and our sense of responsibility to ourselves and others. "You cannot dare educate a child in the belief that nothing he may do could have been otherwise. All possibility of moral progress is bound up with the

[2] Strictly speaking, 'Modernism' is a wider term than 'New Theology.' It stands for the general tendency of thought and feeling ("the claim to be free, to understand and to enjoy," as Green defined it) of which in a particular field the new theology is an interpretation. For the purpose of this article I use the terms synonymously.

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belief in moral freedom. You can give no account on such a theory of the ineradicable consciousness of guilt and shame which belongs to a fairly good man when he has done really wrong, 'the self-contempt bitterer to drink than blood.' " I do not propose to enquire whether the accusation of failing to guard against a fatalistic interpretation of the new doctrines is justified in the case of any individual writer or of the whole school. In the space that remains I wish to try to indicate what seems to me to be the primary and essential condition of a satisfying answer to the problems that are raised, the one stable rallying ground of those who would at once remain faithful to the truth that is in the old and to the new light that, in the words of the great New England hymn, the Lord has broken forth out of his Word.

I do not think I need waste time in proving that the way is closed and never likely to be opened again to any mere reassertion of the old doctrines of transcendence. The same deep underlying convictions that lead men to reject a doctrine of pure immanence lead them also to reject a merely supereminent God. It is instinctively felt that both the motive and the direction of progressive moral effort depend on belief in the actual presence of the divine in the world about us and in the hearts of men. Extremes meet, and to believe in a God whose nature is nowhere expressed as an organic part of the world of our ordinary experience, is to empty it of any principle of moral judgment or ground of moral choice as effectually as to believe in a complete and undifferentiating immanence. An authoritative papacy and moral direction by Encyclical is the natural and necessary complement of such a faith. One thing at least that we owe to the recent outburst of Modernism is that it has made this clear, and in doing so has *inter alia* put an end for the present to the Anglo-Catholic movement, as a movement toward union with Rome.

It may not be so readily agreed, but it seems to me no

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less certain, that the time has gone past, as far as theology is concerned, when men's minds could be satisfied with any attempt at compromise as between two contradictory principles. The intellectual demands of an age like our own are a far more formidable factor in the crisis than many are prepared to recognize. Men will not be frightened into obviously insecure logical positions by theological or even by ethical bogies. It is for this reason that I find Dr. Gore's argument as a whole inconclusive. With the best will I have failed to find in it a point of view which offers a real synthesis. Equally unsatisfying is the attempt at compromise in the Confession of Faith recently published by some leading Congregationalists. God, it explains, is "transcendent as Maker and Ruler of all things and yet through His eternal Spirit immanent in the world and particularly in man and his history."[3] As a popular statement of what is implied in the religious consciousness and what theology seeks to explain, I have nothing against it. As a statement of the philosophical ground on which it is possible to maintain the union, what I again miss is any real attempt to show how the two truths are related to each other.

If the statement means anything for philosophy, it is an attempt to meet the difficulty by distinguishing between God as the source of material nature and God as the inspirer of human life. In the one sphere he is said to be transcendent,—essentially different from the world he has created and which he rules,—in the other he is immanent, the truth or reality of wills that appear to be independent of him. But apart from the arbitrariness of such a distinction, what difficulty, we may ask, does it remove from our path? It is true that it avoids the error of identifying the ultimate principle of all things with matter and motion, but it does this at the expense of the unity of the world, and, if pressed to its consequences, would lead us back to the Manichæan doctrine of a material principle in

[3] *The Times*, February 27, 1908.

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its essence impervious to spirit. Similarly from the side of spirit, it avoids the error of conceiving of the divine as essentially distinct from the human and only to be united with it by some miraculous principle acting from without, but it leaves the relation between them wholly unexplained and, so far as the above statement is concerned, opens the way for just such a pantheistic interpretation as it seeks to avoid. What the coming generation will require of its theology, whether it be New or Old, is that it shall show how these two principles are not merely both required to satisfy our practical and religious needs, but spring from a common root of essential truth, of which they are necessary and mutually complementary aspects. Apart from such a demonstrated unity, there can be no stable footing for either of the opposing tendencies. They will drift according to accidental bias either into a doctrine of pure naturalism or into the obscurities and superstitions,—perhaps, as we are warned by ominous words in Dr. Gore's book as to the possibility of permanent alienation from the divine and of everlasting perdition,[4]— into what it is not too much to call the "inhumanities of the old religion."

Where is such a point of view to be found? So far from being anything particularly metaphysical or recondite, it is I believe contained in what is the most characteristic and generally accepted doctrine of our time. If we were to ask what is the most significant of the ideas that for the last century have been pressing for recognition in every field of thought and endeavor, we should have little hesitation in pointing to the idea of evolution. We are accustomed to think of it in terms of biology, but the idea has a far wider application as the general description of all processes, whether of life or mind, in which the issue is determined by the interplay of the environment and real latent potentialities in the thing or creature itself. Any detailed *prolegomena* to the applica-

[4] See particularly Sect. IV, *The Idea of Sin.*

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tion of this idea to theology is here out of the question. The point clearly to grasp is the one which recent philosophy has been occupied in trying to bring home to us, namely: the place of end or purpose in everything that has life,—perhaps also in things devoid of life in the recognized sense of the word. To live is to seek to embody in actual reality what previously was a mere potentiality or need. And as in all living things this need is continuous while the actual form is transient, we are forced to conceive of the object of the *nisus* or endeavor as real in even a deeper sense (albeit it has itself no existence in time) than its actual temporal embodiment. By the same line of thought we are forced to conceive of the two factors as in essential relation with each other. The creature could not be what it is apart from the *nisus* that makes it seek to be what it is not yet. On the other hand the creature seeks to be what it is not yet, just because it has already realized it so far as to be what it is.

This comes out more clearly when we turn from nature in general, as recent psychology has taught us to do, to the analysis of the processes of consciousness in terms of end. It is in mind that the idea of evolution has its clearest, perhaps its only truly comprehensible, application. From whatever side we look at human life, from that of knowledge, conduct, or production, it comes to us as a process of *search*,—a purposeful direction by ideas of that which is not yet but which we desire shall be. To this, logical and ethical analysis adds that no satisfactory account can be given of these ideas themselves except when they are seen in relation to the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty, of which they in turn are partial (sometimes lamentably distorted) embodiments. To these ideals, what has already been said of ends in general still more manifestly applies. As ideals they are beyond us, fading, as we reflect upon them in their perfection, into an infinite distance from us. Yet it is no less true that they are in us, not only in the sense that they are in our minds, but that they have already made our minds, and

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with this our lives, what they actually are. What truth man has discovered and actually holds, what beauty he has achieved and actually enjoys, what good he has done and actually lives by, have their being from their relations to that which they are not completely, yet which they partially portray. In a word, the ideal is *in* the world just because it is *above* it; it is recognized as above it just because it is already manifested in it. While the ideals that work in the mind of man and force themselves through his untiring activity into the forms of time, are the *causa essendi* of what actually exists, the real, as it offers itself to his senses and memory, is the *causa cognoscendi* of the ideal.

Turning from these general considerations as to the nature of reality to the theological problem with which we started, there is no point on which modern religious writers are more agreed than that the divine is most adequately conceived of in terms of the unity of men's highest ideals. Yet the present conflict of opinion is sufficient indication how inadequately they have realized what such an admission carries along with it. This, I think it will be now obvious, is precisely the point of view of which we are in search, seeing that the unity of these ideals in a completely developed spiritual life can now be seen to be at once something transcending anything which man either has or can attain, and something which combines the indwelling principle of all that he already is.

The claim that is here put forward that this idea should be made the starting point of all future theology, could only be rendered convincing by its detailed application to the great facts of the spiritual life and the great doctrines which are the attempt to give intellectual expression to them and, as Father Tyrrell has shown, run like a binding thread through the ages. Nothing of the kind is of course here possible. I confine myself to a single illustration from the religious consciousness itself and the sense of sin, which is an inseparable part of it.

It is, I believe, just such a union of the two elements

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of the immanent and the transcendent in human life that makes religion possible and finds expression in all its highest utterances. On the one side, religion is the acknowledgment of the transcendence of the divine: God is high, we cannot attain unto him. Yet this consciousness is only rendered possible by the sense that we have *already* in some measure attained, and that, in what we are, we are already akin to, and have in a sense anticipated, what we may become. It is for this reason that the sense of infinite distance is ever on the point of turning into the conviction that the Word is nigh us, even in our mouth and in our heart. These are not two different views of the relation of the soul to God, to be held now at one time and now at another, but they are essential parts of the unity of religious consciousness and, as all religious experience witnesses, stand in such intimate union with each other that the more a man realizes the one, the closer he is to the other; the more he realizes his own worthlessness before God, the nearer he is to the promises of his grace.

The true doctrine of sin is only a further application of the same principle. It is often brought against the supporters of the immanence of the divine that they make God responsible for sin or (which comes to the same thing) make the sense of sin an illusion. I believe there is a sense in which we have to admit this objection. We have to admit that were it not for the consciousness of God, for the presence of God (if you like) in our lives, there could be no sin. As St. Paul puts it, "I had not known sin except for the law," and the law is of God. It is the divine in us that makes possible the rejection of the divine. We are led astray, and the light that leads astray is light from heaven. But this admission is far from obliterating the distinction between good and evil or making God responsible for our rebellion. On the contrary, it may, I think, be shown to be the only view that secures us from such a conclusion and gives an intelligible meaning to the common doctrine (otherwise a mere subterfuge), that God *permits* though he does not tempt us to

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sin. For the coming theology at any rate it will be difficult to find any third alternative between Manichæism and the doctrine that the possibility of moral good is essentially bound up with the possibility of evil, and that the revelation of the divine in human life (and so far as we know in the universe at large) is in proportion to the extent of the redeeming power which one has over the other.

It is easy to anticipate the difficulty that some will feel in such a doctrine. To those who are accustomed to think of God under the form of human personality or of a mind standing to our minds as that of another individual, without ever reflecting what it is in each of us that underlies and makes our own personality, it is bound to appear as the attempt to substitute a vague aspiration (in main part the creation of our own idealizing imagination) for a living, substantial, and independent reality,—a faith, it may be said, "as vague as all unsweet." Such an interpretation seems to rest on a double fallacy. If what has been already said of the nature of our ideals as the living forces which have been the source of, and which live on in all that we most value in art, science, morality, and religion, it is the reverse of the truth to think of them as mere empty longings or as the illusions by which we cheat our aching hearts. That we can so misinterpret them can only come from our deadness to the stirrings within us of

> The mighty hopes that make us men,

and our habitual insensibility to the value of their great creations in the life about us.

To the same mental inertia is due the second mistake of never permitting our minds to carry us beyond the ordinary anthropomorphic conception of the Divine. There is (as Hegel said) a sense in which we cannot be too anthropomorphic. We cannot too strongly insist that we should think of God in terms of the highest in ourselves. But this turns into a snare when we seek to surround the Eternal with the limits of human personality. We may, I think, be agreed that we are called on by our religion to

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conceive of God as a Spirit, not in the sense of an emaciated or bodiless soul, but of the fullest form of spiritual life of which we ourselves are capable. And this means that useful as personality may be as a way of envisaging the source of such a life, it can only be an obstruction to the spiritual vision when taken as a limit of our conceptions.

But these are only after all details for the theologians of the future to work into clearness. What I am here concerned for is the principle and starting point. And this I hope I have made sufficiently plain.

I wish to conclude by noticing that the principle of the solution is not any more than the problem itself a new thing in theology. Both the problem and the solution are as old as Plato. Plato's doctrine of ideas stands, in the history of theology, for the intellectual recognition of the transcendence of the divine in life. But no sooner had Plato recognized the transcendence of the idea, than he perceived that no real significance could attach to it unless it were also seen to be immanent in things. It was the problem of the reconciliation of the two principles that occupied him in the crisis of his thought as represented by the great dialogues of the "Republic," the "Philebus," and the "Timæus." The principle of his solution is well known. Whichever of the later dialogues we take up, the idea we find prominent in it is that of an end or purpose, an inner effort or striving after Good as the source of what is best in nature and human life.

Even more definitely, Aristotle brings the threads of his great treatise on theology (otherwise confusing enough) together in the question of the relation of God as the good and the best to the universe. "Is good," he asks, "included as something separate and as an adjunct in itself transcendent? Or is it immanent, pervading the whole arrangement of the constituent parts? Or does it exist in both ways at once, as in the case of a disciplined army; for in the army good belongs both to the array and to the

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general, and indeed more to the latter, seeing that the array is directed by the general and not the general by the array."[5] His own solution is that it is both at once, and for no other reason than that it is the end to which the whole creation moves. "It causes motion after the manner of a beloved object, and that which it causes to move causes motion in other things."[6]

From Aristotle we know it passed to Dante. "All things, whatsoever they be, have order among them, and this is the form that makes the universe like unto God. Within the order I speak of, all things incline by diverse lots, some nearer, some further from their goal. Wherefore they move to diverse harbors over the great sea of being, each with the instinct that is given it to bear it on."[7] The greatness of the passage consists, not in the originality of the thought,—which as we have seen was Plato's and Aristotle's,—but in the genius which led Dante to see in it the quintessence of Christianity.

If it be asked why, in the centuries that have intervened, we have lost hold of the clue that the genius of ancient and mediæval theology placed in our hands, the answer probably is to be sought in the subjection of reason in matters of religion to the authority first of a Church and then of a Book. This subjection doubtless has had its place in man's spiritual economy,—a school-master perhaps to bring us to freedom. None the less it has had the effect of breaking the true continuity of theological thought and of diverting attention to conceptions of the Divine Nature which were bound sooner or later to come into conflict with the course of divine revelation itself. What is chiefly wanted at the present time and as the basis of the theology of the future, is to return to this great tradition, taking up the clue where it was dropped and applying it to the facts of the spiritual world as our experience deepened by the intervening ages has enabled us to conceive of them.

BIRMINGHAM. J. H. MUIRHEAD.

[5] Metaphysic, XII, 1075 a, 11. [6] *Ibid.*, 1072 b, 3. [7] Paradiso, I, 103.

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THE PRESENT TASK OF ETHICAL THEORY.*

JAMES H. TUFTS.

A UNIVERSITY teacher of engineering, in a recent conversation on general questions of human interest, lamented what he styled the "cold-storage ethics" taught in our colleges and universities. I do not propose to discuss the appropriateness of his characterization, but shall assume that whatever may be true of the elements presented to beginners, ethical theory itself ought to make advance. As compared with logic and metaphysics, ethics has received less than its share of attention in this country. Even the Pragmatist movement, which professes to be concerned especially with what is vital and practical, has given more discussion to almost every other part of the field than to ethical theory. The aim of this paper is to point out some of the reconstructions and new constructions which are called for in our fundamental ethical conceptions, if they are to maintain their scientific standing, to interpret the moral life of to-day, and to furnish guidance to education, jurisprudence, and other agencies of social reform.

Doubtless any such reconstruction in the light of what is temporal and practical, will stand self-condemned in the eyes of those who see in ethics only a pure science of eternal truths, which has nothing to learn from the changing conditions of experience. As against the separation of all empirical material from ethics, I am content to side with the great idealist when, in response to the inquiry whether it is enough to have understanding of the essence of justice, and to be acquainted only with the divine circle and sphere, knowing nothing of the human circle, he replies: "The knowledge which is only superhuman is

* Rewritten from an address delivered before the Johns Hopkins University, February, 1908.

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ridiculous in man," and adds that even the impure and uncertain art which uses the false rule and the false circle must be thrown into the cup of the good "if any of us is ever to find his way home."

It may not be the province of ethical theory to organize prophylaxis, or guide criminal and civil jurisprudence. But I submit that it is the business of ethical theory to make such statements of the elements of the self as can be used by eugenics and education, and so to define personality and the state that jurisprudence may find a more adequate standard for its conceptions, when it considers either individual rights or social welfare. Anyone who reads judicial decisions in which these conceptions are discussed, will recognize how often the conceptions of individual and society are mutually exclusive. It is rare that an opinion shows such awareness of the import of its terms as the concise comment of Justice Holmes: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." No more important task confronts ethical theory, in the United States at least, than to frame conceptions which may do for our conditions what the ethical masters of former days have done for their age.

But there is a further reason for the reconstruction in question, namely, that the conceptions of ethics, however pure they may appear to be, bear unmistakable proof of their construction under special conditions, and are determined in their content largely by the special theories to which they were opposed. None of the conceptions of ethical theory can be regarded as 'pure.' Thus it is easy to see that the method of rationalism with the goal of freedom, which is conspicuous in Kant and his followers, reflects the modern political development on the one side, the movement for religious and intellectual freedom on the other. In political life, the way to freedom lay through the control of arbitrary power by law. In the religious and intellectual spheres, freedom from dogma and superstition was achieved under the flag of reason. Again, in Utilitarianism the method of analysis and the definition of the

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standard were subsidiary to the goal of democratic satisfaction, as over against privilege fortifying itself by mysterious sentiments and intuitions. And in evolutionary ethics, the biological influence is too obvious to require mention.

Two features of the present situation which are highly important for ethical theory are: (1) The increasing development of general scientific method, and its successful application to the mental and social sciences and the problems of human welfare; (2) the increase in social organization of all kinds, and the corresponding reaction upon the life of the individual.

The science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gave man a far more intelligible cosmos. As Galileo showed the heavens to be of one sort with the earth, as Newton reduced their manifold movements to the expression of a simple law, as Kant and Laplace deduced present complexity from simple origins, the *flammantia moenia mundi* were opened far wider than by the speculations of Democritus and Epicurus. And the psychology of the eighteenth century made a beginning in the work of understanding the inner springs of conduct. But science seems to be taking on, more and more, a positive and constructive attitude. As astronomy, its function was primarily to enlarge the mental horizon. As chemistry and biology and electrical physics, it doubtless enlarges our views of the universe, but it also brings into the fore the control of natural resources, of health, and possibly of heredity. Economics, which at one time seemed merely a 'dismal science' of observing 'iron laws,' is now aware that the discovery of a law is only the first step in intelligent progress. The law of gravitation does not prevent men from flying. Political science, in the highly suggestive recent book of Mr. Graham Wallas, is likewise directed to the more positive tasks of comprehending the working forces of political life, and the moral possibilities of such knowledge are pointed out.

The second factor which both requires ethical recon-

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struction and offers suggestions for it, namely, increasing social organization, need not be dwelt upon. It has received recently a lucid statement in Professor Cooley's "Social Organization."

It is proposed, then, to outline briefly certain reconstructions in such conceptions as Reason, the Self, Freedom, Happiness, and the State.[1]

1. 'Reason' has doubtless been one of the most fruitful conceptions under which the moral life has been interpreted. It has always stood for an organization of life by intelligence, as contrasted with control by impulse, passion, habit, dogma, or political constraint. But in Kant's system it got its definition, to a considerable extent, by its opposition, in the theoretical sense, (1) to particulars of sense, and (2) to the understanding, which stood for the world of physical science. The particulars of sense meant the sensationalism which reduced all experience to its abstract analytic elements. The world of the understanding meant such a mechanically determined universe as that of the *Système de la Nature,* which had no room for purpose.

The situation to-day is changed. In the first place, 'sense' itself has been brought within the psychical and the rational. That is to say, modern scientific method does not recognize the mutual exclusion of sense-perception and reflective thought. It insists rather on the constant reference of hypotheses to particulars and upon the constant interpretation of particulars by theory. And in the second place, we do not need to set the world of law over against the world of purpose. The first formulation of social, economic, historical, political, and biological laws like the first formulations of mathematical physics seemed to carry this implication. Now we are realizing

[1] As one of the tasks of ethics I should certainly include that of a study of the actual ethical standards recognized in various sections and classes. This, however, has been so well enforced by Professor Sharp (Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, No. 303) that I do not need to dwell upon it.

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that the formulation of laws is itself a work of selective purpose, and is but a first step to the realization of further purpose. So in the psychological sphere, it is no longer a sharp opposition of impulse or habit to reason, but rather a question of the greater or lesser intensity and scope of attention. From the standpoint of present science, the great antithesis which is most important is that between the method of trial and error and the method of definitely adapting means to consciously selected ends. If this were the conception of reason held up as an ethical authority or an ethical value, it would not only command more ready assent, but would be far more fruitful as a basis for definite responsibility and direction.

The two conceptions, the Self and Freedom, were likewise defined by Kant largely by their contraries. The self which asserts itself in the moral life is the intelligible self, opposed, on the one hand, to the phenomenal world and self of causally determined time experience, and, on the other, to the lawless and selfish desires. In the former of these aspects, its supremacy means transcendental freedom; in the latter, the freedom of autonomy. Green, again, in his conception of self-consciousness as reproducing an eternal self-consciousness, and by its relation of particulars to itself, as rising above the animal life to moral capacity, shows a similar influence.

The conceptions suggested by the present scientific method and by the present social organization, seem more significant for ethical theory than these more negative determinations. Science does indeed transcend time, and social organization may be said to transcend—if not space, at least the separation of human individuals. But they both do this in a positive way. Science transcends time, not merely in framing timeless concepts, but also,—and this is much more to the point,—by its actual ranging through time in its every selection and purposive act. Science indeed 'discriminates itself' from the particulars with which it deals, and relates these to its purpose, and

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thereby distinguishes itself from the animal procedure. But the conception of a unity of purpose, rather than of a unity *versus* plurality, gives the conception of a self which is more adequate for moral theory.

It is perhaps scarcely necessary to say that this conception of the self needs to be supplemented by social psychology. This has been done in part, but only in part. Psychology has thus far been following lines comparable to those of general biology. Ethical theory needs for an adequate conception of the self in relation to conduct, studies comparable to ecology, on the one hand, and to the study of special types, on the other. Neither jurisprudence nor education can work effectively without such more specific determination of the self.

The positive conception of constructive science affords also a valuable point of view for considering what theory has tried to embody in the term Freedom. I do not question that there have been psychological analyses which have pointed out with sufficient acuteness the fallacies of the past. But the conflict is settled only to be reopened. And the reason for this is not mere stupidity. It is because the kind of liberty or determinism at issue is largely a matter of what it is opposed to. When the conception of outside control *versus* inner spontaneity was shaped by political imagery of slavery *versus* liberty, or anarchy *versus* law, the adjustment was brought about by the conception of autonomy. Or, in so far as the issue was directed against mechanically caused action by the libertarians and against uncaused, unrelated action by the determinists, the higher point of view was found in the insight that causality was itself a category of the mind in its synthesis of experience, and that mechanism was an abstract aspect of experience. Now, however, the issue is more frequently presented in the biological and sociological terms. Is one completely determined by heredity and environment? When the question is so stated, light seems near from the analogy of the sciences which deal with these fields. In so far as science is taking active

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steps to control heredity through eugenics, it is certainly answering the first part of the question. In so far as the methods of publicity and social influence give each a chance to know and affect the public sentiment, social psychology is answering the second.

The libertarian, one might say, has been right in the insistence that there is a distinctive characteristic of human conduct, as compared with mechanism or brute life. He has been right in his conviction that conscious decision involves a new element not contained in the antecedents. He has usually been wrong in the conceptions by which he has tried to interpret these convictions. Science in its constructive work affords in its contrast with trial and error, or mere natural selection, a conception for the first aspect of the demand. Kant indeed saw in part this active character of the mind in science, as versus the old conception of passive copying of reality, but the selective, purposive character needed the general advance of science, on the one hand, and the special studies of comparative psychology, on the other, to bring it clearly to view.

In some respects the teaching of social organization is still more suggestive on the psychology of choice, and with the increasing recognition of the social nature of consciousness, the bearing of the method of social organization upon the question of determination by environment becomes increasingly pertinent. The corresponding question stated in social terms is, whether the action or decision of any group,—political party, club, or the like,—is all 'framed up,' or fixed in advance, or whether in conference or discussion there is really a factor present not already existent in the particular wills. It is recognized that this very fact of conflict and collision, of mutual stimulation and modification, marks off a genuinely free body. In like manner the decisions of the individual contain a distinctive character which we may, if we please, call freedom, when they give to each impulse or idea its part in the adjustment, and so involve a genuinely new factor.

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But the moment we conceive our question in terms either of scientific control or of social psychology, we recognize that freedom is not a question of yes or no, but rather of how far and how much. To say that there is no control of nature by science, is palpably absurd; to say that all progress is due to natural selection of accidental variations, is becoming less and less plausible with the conscious organization of industrial, social, and political agencies. On the other hand, the limitations of our education, our economics, and our legislation are too obvious to need mention, and from social organization the same lesson follows. For the conclusion and actions of a group vary greatly in the extent to which all voices are heard and all opinions weighed. To get the whole question of freedom conceived as a question of degrees, and to get the conditions clearly defined would, I believe, be great service to the work of education and the conceptions of jurisprudence.

Another great conception which ethical theory inherits is Happiness. No adequate system of ethics will fail to give some place to human interests and their objects. The relation of happiness to pleasure, as presented in the "Utilitarianism," has no doubt been argued and analyzed more than sufficiently. But the much more fruitful definition of the "Liberty,"—"utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being,"—has received less attention. To find out, if possible, what these interests are, is a worthy task for ethical theory. To apply a scientific method to this end, was a thought that might well come to such a mind as that of Spencer. It appears in his attempt "to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness." But it is evident that, as he carries out this plan, he has failed to take into account sufficiently that it is a progressive being whose interests are to be discovered. He deduces his conception of justice largely from the conditions of survival in animal life. He deduces his concep-

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tions of the sphere of government from the conditions of military life. He does not consider that the whole method of human progress in a scientific age may relate itself to that of earlier times, as the psychological process of conscious, purposive action relates to the cruder method of trial and error. He does not see that the different method of social interaction now at work makes possible, and indeed necessary, a very different conception of happiness from that which could be possible in an earlier time. It is not intended to imply that taking science and social organization as guides will mean defining happiness as a combination of university research with unlimited newspapers and social clubs. But that it may mean a progressive sharing by each more fully in the thought and life of the world, and that collective agency, whether of government or of voluntary coöperation, will accomplish much for the interest of a progressive being which has been impossible in the past, I do believe to be the indication of both science and social organization.

Finally, there is the field of the philosophy of law and of the state in which, despite our extraordinary political activity, American philosophers have had little to say. Individualism has expressed in classic form its conceptions. Idealism has set another philosophy of society over against the standards of natural rights and individual utility. Idealism from Plato down has meant, in social philosophy, the discovery and emphasis of those new values which emerge only in association and organization, for it is in organized society that the 'general,' the 'universal' relations, and hence the 'ideal' self, are realized. Now it naturally goes along with this looking for what is universal, that we see things *sub specie æternitatis*,—that the sharp angles are rounded off, that fret and passion seem too small in comparison with the larger movement. Hobhouse has forcibly indicted idealism in England for swelling "the current of retrogression" against democracy. In contrast with the "plain, human, rationalistic



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way of looking at life and its problems," "every institution and every belief is for it alike a manifestation of a spiritual principle." Its main effect has been "to soften the edges" of all hard contrasts between right and wrong, truth and falsity, to throw gloss over stupidity, and prejudice, and caste, and tradition, to weaken the bases of reason, and disinclinement to the searching analysis of their habitual ways of thinking,"—a charge which might be set over against Fichte's indictment of the eighteenth century. But it would be easy to retort that just at present it is individualism, and a "plain common-sense way of looking at things," which govern very largely the conceptions of political life, in the United States at any rate; and it is under a governmental theory based largely upon them that individuals and corporate persons have been able to acquire such portentous power as to place privilege on a firmer basis, in certain respects, than it has ever held in the old world. Finally, socialism, borrowing from both English radicalism and Hegelian idealism, proposes a third view of social order and progress which attracts increasing attention.

The fact is that all three philosophies got their shaping under special conditions. The philosophy of the "Liberty" and the whole radical movement was a middle-class movement against privilege embodied in institutions and government. The socialism of Marx gloried in representing the proletariate. But just as definitely, the idealism of Hegel, which has been the prevailing type in recent English philosophy, was a military and professional class reaction [2] against particularism. Monarchy is for him a necessary part of the state. War is an agency for preserving ethical health, and preventing "the corruption which would be occasioned by a continuous or eternal peace." Neither the individualism of English radicalism

[2] The class standpoint of Hegel is forcibly brought out in a recent monograph by Dr. E. L. Talbert on "The Dualism of Fact and Idea in Its Social Implications."

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nor the idealism of Prussian militarism, nor the socialism of the German proletariate affords an adequate statement for present political and social philosophy. Scientific method suggests new possibilities for democracy, which none of these older schemes could conceive. Social organization makes it increasingly evident that no class philosophy, whether it be the philosophy that announces itself as that of a class, or that which unconsciously reflects the point of view of a single class, can accomplish what it seeks. Some may hold that the idealism of Hegel yields just recognition to all elements of society. But by Hegel, the state, which, as he says, expresses the universal most clearly, is treated almost entirely in categories of authority and government. Interests of industry and education are given their place in the bourgeois society which represents the sphere of individual interests regulated by the community.

But in the century that has gone, and particularly in American democracy, other aspects of the universal element in human life have come to the foreground. Science and education are not at present merely means for individual development which the community may regulate. They are agencies through which a finer type of universal, a higher conception of unity, is gradually becoming conscious. Agencies for general information which Hegel could not have foreseen, have rendered this possible. Or, again, our industrial and commercial life, in spite of all its opportunities for individual greed and its demand for regulation, is, nevertheless, aiding powerfully in a conception of sympathy, of common welfare, of constructive morality, which is gradually transforming the function of government. The legislature and the administrative officer may still be, as for the earlier idealism, the formal agents for the expression of the universal moral will; but the fact that this must now be guided by scientific intelligence in the framing of the laws for commerce, for education, for industry, for public health,—all this requires such a different type of administrator that it makes the older

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conception of a monarch seem singularly ridiculous when emphasized as an important feature.

Unless signs fail, the people of the United States are to make an increasing demand for the reform and expansion of law to suit the new social and economic conditions. It is the privilege and duty of ethical theory to contribute conceptions which will aid legislatures and courts in their task—to take the words of the Federal Supreme Court—of "so dealing with the conditions which exist as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people."

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL ATTITUDE.*

W. R. SORLEY.

THE portrait of the philosopher has been drawn by many hands and from different points of view, sometimes by his friends, more frequently perhaps by his foes. Pictures of the latter sort are familiar, and have on occasion been preserved for us by the humor of the philosopher himself. He strays through the world aimlessly, of no use to anyone else and but a helpless creature himself, a stargazer who stumbles on the beaten highway,—this is the practical man's idea of him. Or he appears as a spinner of cobwebs, a man who mistakes his own fancies for realities and thinks nothing of evolving facts from his inner consciousness,—and this is how he often seems to the man of science. Yet again the artist or poet tends to look upon him as a cold analyst in whose hands the life and beauty of the world disappear:

> Do not all charms fly
> At the bare touch of cold philosophy?

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* Inaugural Address to the Philosophical Society of the University of Liverpool.

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It is well for the philosopher thus sometimes to see himself in caricature. It is his business to deal with the conceptions which enter into practical life, which are elaborated by the scientific inquirer, and which guide the artist's imagination; and, if he cannot gain the approbation of these specialists, he ought at least to be able to say something in explanation of their adverse opinion and in vindication of his own character.

It is not altogether vain to expect that this vindication may be inferred from the portrait of the philosopher as it has been drawn by himself. From it we may at any rate gather some idea of the attitude and temper which he regards as proper to his profession. Self-portraiture of this sort is not uncommon with the greater philosophical writers. Sometimes it is a mere sketch that we find, thrown off almost by the way, at other times we have a finished and full-length picture.

Of all these descriptions the most famous and most comprehensive is that which Plato connects with the meaning of the word philosophy. It is not wisdom that the word signifies, but love of wisdom.[1] And in the lover Plato finds the analogue of the philosopher: the soul of a philosopher guileless and true is as the soul of a lover.[2] The lover who follows and worships beauty is already on the path which leads to philosophy. "The true order of going . . . is to use the beauties of earth as steps" towards celestial beauty. Going thus "from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is."[3]

And as love, if it have its way, lands one in philosophy, so the philosopher also displays all the features of love.

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[1] Phædrus, 278.
[2] Phædrus, 249.
[3] Symposium, 211. (Jowett's translation.)

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For Love, as the myth has it, is half divine and half human, the offspring of Plenty and Poverty:

> He is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him; and he is hard-featured and squalid, and has no shoes nor a house to dwell in. [But] he is bold, enterprising, and strong, a hunter of men, always weaving some intrigue or other, keen in the pursuit of wisdom, and never wanting resources; a philosopher at all times, terrible as an enchanter, sorcerer, sophist.[4]

He shares the characters of both his parents, allied to the gods and yet among the poorest of the poor. No god or wise man is a seeker after wisdom: he does not need to seek after that which he has already got. And the ignorant and foolish do not seek wisdom, for they do not feel the want of it. Thus the philosopher is in a mean betwixt two, just as Love was born of opposites.

> Wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and love is of the beautiful; and therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean betwixt the wise and the ignorant. And this again is a quality which Love inherits from his parents; for his father is wealthy and wise, and his mother poor and foolish.[5]

The most essential point in this description,—so it seems to me,—is not the fervor, the passion, the disinterestedness, with which the seeker follows truth, as the lover does his object. Undoubtedly this is a real characteristic. Plato holds that to the philosopher, as to the lover, all things pale, in importance, in comparison with one: the world is naught until he possesses the object of his search. But this fervor, this disinterestedness, springs from a deeper source. What is it that causes the restless eagerness of the lover? Plato's mythology is bold enough to answer, It is because the object which he seeks was once part of himself, till a jealous god divided them, and he cannot rest until he has regained what is akin to him by nature. And this is the poetical rendering of the answer to the other question, when we ask,

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[4] Symp., 203.
[5] Symp., 204.

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What is it that impels the philosopher to his unresting search for truth? the reply must be: Because there is a natural affinity between his mind and the truth which he seeks. He is not yet wise, for truth has to be sought; he can never be completely wise, for there are hindrances to the full view of truth which mortal nature can never finally overcome. But he is not altogether ignorant: if he were he would have no impulse to philosophy; he can recognize the truth when he sees it, and this shows that his mind is allied to truth, and has kinship with it. Therefore the philosopher does not need to wait for truth to come to him from the outside. He is himself active in its pursuit, driven onwards by an impulse which is of identical nature with the goal to which he presses.

Covered as it is with poetical and mythical imagery, this is the dominating feature in the Platonic portrait of the philosopher. In his speculative activity the philosopher is simply seeking to realize his own inmost nature; truth is not something imposed upon him from without; it is his own reason made manifest. There are other features than this in Plato's view; but they are, I think, less essential. Such, in particular, is the view that the rational activity of the soul is clogged and impeded by the body, so that philosophy,—the true life of the soul,—becomes necessarily a meditation of death. Important as this view may have been for Plato himself at one time of his life, and powerful as it has been in most Oriental conceptions of the philosophic and religious life, it is yet a detail due to the belief in a fundamental opposition between soul and body. The effects of this belief have been too profound for me to wish to minimize its importance. But it is not essential to the conception of the philosophical attitude as an active process in which the soul realizes what is akin to its own nature,—the vision of truth and reality.

This view of truth and the philosopher's attitude to it finds its most characteristic opponent in the conception of truth as merely the mirroring of an order of nature

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which is altogether external to it. In the early days of modern thought Bacon gave expression to this doctrine in the famous aphorism that into the kingdom of nature as into the kingdom of grace entrance can only be obtained *sub persona infantis*. If this view holds true, then the philosopher's attitude should not be creative, as Plato thought; it should be receptive only. He must watch and wait for nature's teaching, and to it he must submit his mind. It is true that by this submission he may be able in a measure to reverse the relation and become nature's master. But his mastery extends only to a certain manipulation of natural forces so that they may be utilized for works of practical advantage. For practical purposes he seeks control; but of his philosophical attitude submission is the keynote: the mind has no creative or even anticipatory function; it has to follow, not to lead. In the Platonic view the primacy belongs to mind. In Bacon's, nature is not only first; it is hardly too much to say that it is everything; for it is the declared purpose of Bacon's method to make the path to scientific comprehension so level and uniform, that mental caliber will count for nothing and that any and every mind may travel on the road to truth with equal security of reaching the goal. This then is the fundamental opposition: while Plato insists on the creative function of mind, Bacon distrusts the mind left to itself, and forbids any anticipation of nature.

From the founders of modern philosophy we may extract yet another picture of the philosopher's attitude. To Descartes the attitude of the philosopher is essentially one of criticism. His familiar injunction that we must doubt wherever we can doubt before we can be assured of truth, has impressed on the modern consciousness an ideal of the solitude of the thinker's career. The philosopher must seek out each truth for himself; he can admit nothing which does not compel his individual assent. He is the critic of all creeds, however many their adherents, if by any means he may reach thereby some assured con-

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viction for his own soul. On the one hand, therefore, the Cartesian appeals to reason; and this reason we may either interpret in the full Platonic sense, or we may allow it to fall to the humbler level on which Bacon placed the understanding. On the other hand, it is to individual reason that the appeal is made. Nothing can be taken on trust. The slow stages by which truth reveals itself in the consciousness of the race find no recognition, and no value is allowed them for any man's thinking. Each individual must examine and ascertain for himself; would he be a philosopher he must cut himself off from all historical belief; there is one test of truth only,—the clear consciousness that a proposition cannot be denied.

What truth there is in this view of the solitude of the philosophical thinker, and what the true relation is between individual conviction and historical beliefs, I cannot even attempt to inquire; the inquiry would lead too far away from the points which I have more immediately in view.

In all these descriptions there is one thing,—and that of the greatest significance,—which is not made clear. What exactly is it that distinguishes the attitude of the philosopher from that of the inquirer who is occupied with one of the special sciences? To a large extent clearly their attitudes must be the same. The scientist should be animated by the enthusiastic love of truth which inspires the philosopher in Plato's portrait; he should exhibit the loyalty to fact which Bacon enjoined; he should have the independence of judgment,—the trust in reason only,—on which Descartes laid stress. In all this we do not get the distinctive features of the philosopher as such. Even Plato had not separated them in thought from the features which all men of science should display.

Yet no one knew better than Plato the difference between the work of special branches of knowledge and that synoptic view of reality which is the mark of the philosopher. Indeed this word of Plato's, 'synoptic,' may be

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taken as describing one view of the distinctively philosophical attitude,—a view which, in its modern form, has diverged in many respects from the Platonic. The scientist is necessarily occupied with one special department; the philosopher must strive after a conception of the whole of things. Thus the specialist has grown to be suspicious of the philosopher as a smatterer, a jack-of-all-trades, who interferes in everybody's business, without being himself master of any. This is undoubtedly his danger. But it is a mistake to suppose that the philosopher has no specialty,—if by that be meant a problem, a sphere of inquiry, which is distinctively his own. His place is in the central exchange of human knowledge. And yet the metaphor is a poor one. For his business is not simply to put different specialists into communication with one another; he has to interpret the results of each in the interests of the whole of knowledge.

What then is his attitude in the solution of this distinctive problem? How must he comport himself to the results of the sciences? Is he simply to piece them together, and then present this combination of particulars, in some general form, as the truth about the universe as a whole so far as ascertainable in the existing state of the sciences? This—or something like it—would be the Baconian account of his attitude. But 'anticipation of nature' cannot be excluded even from the special sciences, in which advance depends upon hypothesis. It is not possible to make a whole out of a few scattered fragments without the ideal contribution of the intellect. Least of all is this possible in the unification of knowledge out of the special sciences: it needs creative function to make a One out of many. We must remember, however, that in some sense the same holds of the scientific attitude of mind. It, too, seeks unity in the multiplicity of particulars; it selects the significant, infers the cause, and generalizes the phenomena. The facts alone do not give these results; they do not even compel them, except for the understanding mind. Hence, if philosophy

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is nothing more than a coördination of the results of the sciences, the philosophical attitude does not appear to be essentially different from the scientific. One group of facts or relations after another is merged into a higher order or shown to be subordinate to it. The methods which enable us to pass from lower to higher, within the field of scientific generalization, would seem to require no fundamental change when we pass to the final generalization which expresses our intellectual attitude to the world as a whole.

And so it might be were all human interests merely intellectual. But doing and feeling are as fundamental as thinking. Perhaps they are even more fundamental; for it is at least a tenable view that thought had its origin in mankind because it served to facilitate the doing of things. However this may be, the interests are different; and the difference may be described as one of point of view; we may look at things simply in order to understand their occurrences, or with a regard to their worth or value.

And this worth or value may be of different kinds, each of which may have its appropriate method of inquiry. Just as one science differs from another according to the department of fact with which it deals, so we may distinguish different sciences (or different studies) of value,—practical, æsthetical, and so on. Further, just as we regard all the special sciences as capable of being subordinated to one supreme and architectonic science, so we must seek for some general account of the nature and laws of value. This general theory of value might perhaps, by stretching the meaning of an old term, be called Ethics; or a new term, Axiology, might be used for it. But, by whatever name we call it, the need is clear for a general treatment,—or general theory,—of value. This treatment of value has as good claim to be called philosophy as that coördination of the special sciences by which the title is sometimes monopolized. Historically its claim is undoubted; in all ages the quest of beauty

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and goodness has belonged to the philosopher as well as the pursuit of truth. And the reason for this is more than historical. Worth is as fundamental a conception as reality; appreciation as fundamental an attitude as description,—or even as any form of interpretation which does not itself involve appreciation.

No two attitudes toward experience can be more distinct than these two. We may understand events after the manner of the sciences and yet be without any appreciation of their worth or significance for life. Even if we could express the universe in a single formula, so that the present carried with it to our mind both the clear record of the past from which it has sprung, and at the same time enabled us to foretell the whole course of future history,—even in this case, with all the fullness of knowledge which can be imagined as belonging to man, there might be complete absence of any appreciation of value: nothing might seem more worth doing or more worth having than anything else; there would be one event to the righteous and to the wicked. Or, rather, 'righteous' and 'wicked' would be terms without any meaning; beauty as well as virtue, utility and pleasure even, would be words and nothing more. Lack of practical interest, of moral or of æsthetical appreciation, would not even put any difficulty in the way of the scientific understanding of things; though assuredly no man of science is without such appreciation. On the other hand the attitude of appreciation,—whether moral or practical or æsthetic,—cannot be entirely divorced from some knowledge or ideas about the objects which call forth this attitude. But there is no kind of proportion between the two attitudes; the artist or the man of moral insight may have the slightest of scientific equipments, and his mind may harbor many erroneous beliefs about the universe. The world of values forms a system by itself. It need not be independent of the system of reality as known; but it is different from it and it supplements it. If it were entirely absent, we should neither

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know, nor care about knowledge, for truth itself falls within the system of worth; it has value for the rational being. However knowledge may have begun, it has now a value of its own; we estimate the value of particular facts and particular theorems by their tendency to realize in our minds the system of truth, whether for some one science or for a comprehensive view of things as a whole.

We need not assume that there is any fundamental incoherence between the two worlds of facts and of values. But they are different and must not be confused; we may be able to describe without attaining to just appreciation; and insight into values is not always accompanied by a true understanding of cause and effect or of the other relations of the real. Nor can inquiry along one of these lines only satisfy the demands,—even the intellectual demands,—of a being who is capable of acting and feeling as well as of knowing. The complete philosopher must be a citizen of both worlds; his final and most characteristic task must be the reconciliation of the two authorities.

The most obvious way by which this reconciliation may be sought, and has been sought, is by subordinating one of them to the other: values have been reduced to facts, or facts have been regarded as created by values. In the former method the philosopher's attitude of mind is identified with that of the scientist; in the latter it is subordinated to that of the practical man or artist or moralist; and each method calls for remark.

Of the first this may be said: All values, it is contended, resolve themselves into facts of experience. A thing's utility is in the works it produces and their subservience to our purposes, and these purposes are realized only in our future experiences. Goodness and beauty also are of the same nature; when we judge that a thing is good or feel it to be beautiful, this fact belongs to our mental life; as such its causes can be traced and its effects calculated. It is easy to see, however, that this way of explaining value as a fact explains everything

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but the value of the fact; we are shown the causes of the good deed, but how good it is, or whether, after all, it is good and not evil,—for this no reason is given. So long as we keep to the system of causal connections, there is one explanation for good and evil, for beauty and ugliness. At some point in the chain of causal explanation the judgment of goodness or of beauty must enter, as it were, from without, or else it is not reached at all. Value is like life: it proceeds only from itself. It is a permanent and insistent element in experience; it is not the product of something other than itself.

It seems to have been the fate of philosophy to be the sport, from time to time, of the scientific conceptions which may happen to be most prominent at the period; and, under this influence, the value-conceptions have received a narrow 'scientific' explanation. In the seventeenth century mathematics gave the clue; the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were the day of the experimental and descriptive sciences; and the philosophers tended to be content with psychological explanations. For the thinkers of the later nineteenth century and after, the biological conception of evolution has had the same importance that mathematical method had for the thinkers of the seventeenth. It has also given currency to a type of philosophy in some respects similar. What is called Naturalism has had a revival, though in a modified form. The universe is no longer conceived as simply an equilibrium of interacting forces. This conception is supplemented and modified by the new emphasis laid on the historical process, which produces new combinations and accounts for the adaptations which exist between living beings and their environment. If he can give to goodness or to beauty its place in the historical process,—if he can show how the experience of it arose and to what other experiences it leads,—the naturalist is satisfied that he has done all that can possibly be done, that he has 'explained' goodness or beauty. That he has not really explained that which is its es-

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sence, namely, its worth, but only traced its coming and going,—this has been already maintained. But something more has to be said about the method by which Naturalism seeks to explain value.

The method contains a subtle difficulty within itself. If everything is to be accounted for simply by its place in the evolutionary order, then reason also,—the faculty by which all explanation is contrived and received,—must submit to the same judgment. Intelligence and reasoning must have come gradually into being at the call of other phenomena which led up to them; there must have been many tentative and critical stages in the development before it got anything like a firm place as a characteristic of some types of conscious life. If the method of evolution holds upon which the biologists rely, then the earth must hide the remains of many unsuccessful varieties,—kinds of living beings which had struck out different sorts of ideas and other ways of combining them than those which have survived in the human race. Those other beings may have thought, for instance, that the part is equal to the whole, or that anything may be the cause of anything, or that contradictorily opposed propositions can both be true; and they got swept into the world's rubbish-heap because the possession of these ideas hindered instead of helping them in the competition for food and mates. What else can the naturalist mean by calling these ideas false? If he means anything more, he admits a standard of truth independent of nature and its all-pervading evolution. The ideas in question led to disaster and death; they were unsuccessful; they did not work; that is all he can mean by false. And, in the same way, he can mean by true only that which does work, which brings success, which preserves life or what else we may desire. Clearly, it is within a narrow range only that we can have grounds for being convinced of truth, if this is what truth means. A true idea is an idea which has survived because it tends to life; a false idea (if it is still believed) is one which happens to survive although

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it tends to death rather than to life. The distinction may not suggest a very luminous criterion of truth. But it is all that can be got; and it ought perhaps to convince man of the vanity of attempting to know what lies beyond the empirical interests of his life.

In the days when Calvinists were still confident and militant in presence of the facile rationalism of their time, one was used to the argument that human nature was so utterly corrupted by the Fall that the reason of man was altogether untrustworthy in all matters of religion and theology. The doctrine is no longer heard in these days of temporizing theologians. The theory of the Descent of Man has taken the place of the old doctrine of the Fall; and the biological philosophers have served themselves heirs to the theologians. This is only one of the places where they have done so. But they are not fully conscious of their heritage, especially here. For their doctrine cuts at the very roots of their own position. If the biological process is to be taken as the final account of things, reason included, then certainly we have no right to speak of the truth of ideas in any other sense than this, that to hold them is of use to human beings within that little range of experience which preserves our life. How then can we justify ourselves in making any assertions about evolution or the universe as a whole? The naturalist has climbed to a great height on the tree of speculation, and he has then with infinite pains and deliberation cut off the branch which supported him. This reflection, however, is by the way. The point which I have more particularly in view is that the theory which makes reason a mere incident in the development of animal consciousness, and truth a short-hand expression for the survival of an idea due to its usefulness, cannot establish the conclusion that all worth also is but a stage in the process. If reason is only what the naturalist makes it, it cannot be trusted to explain the significance and worth which man finds in life and which he expresses in his moral and æsthetic ideals; for he has reduced reason to the posi-

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tion of a mere instrument in the service of that most elementary value which consists in life-preservation.

The reconciliation of the world of fact or existence with the world of worth or values would be a problem easy to solve if we could reduce value to fact or fact to value. The former method has been tried, and we have seen not only that it shirks the explanation of the value that it sets out to explain, but that, in attempting to justify its procedure, it turns itself into its opposite, making all values depend upon something that is a mere instrument of those values that are lowest or most elementary. It is no matter of surprise, therefore, to find that this opposite line of thought has its adherents, and that the truth of every proposition about existence is made to consist in the value that it contributes to life. For the moment, indeed, the air is full of this doctrine; it is preached from the housetops, and no corner in the mansions of thought is so secluded as to be undisturbed by the reverberation. It is hopeless to escape the contention altogether. But I am reluctant to add to the noise of many voices; and what I have to say will be restricted to the limited purpose I have in view.

In the first place, from our present point of view we may begin by assuming that something objective is meant: when it is said that the true is the useful or the valuable, some objective utility or value is in view. Otherwise, if any kind or degree of utility will do, the same proposition may be useful to me and useless to you; it may even change its character from utility to uselessness and back again to utility many times a day. If this is what is meant, if any utility will serve, and the same proposition may be false to you and true to me, true now and false a minute hence, what shall we say of this proposition 'the true is the useful'? All we can say is that we have no use for it, and that accordingly it is not true, judged by the standard of truth set up by those who promulgate it.

Let us assume, then, that we have not to do with any

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mere doctrine of relativity, that, when we are told that the true is the valuable or the useful, something objective and fairly precise is intended. Then we have to ask, In what sense is value used in this connection? For there are many different kinds of things to which we give this name: there is one value of goodness, and another of beauty, and yet another of that ordinary utility which consists in preserving life and promoting its conveniences. With which of these shall we identify the truth of fact and reality? If we take the last alternative and understand by value simply conduciveness to life and to the conveniences of living, then, as we have already seen, we must regard truth also as a kind of value and accordingly simply as a circumstance favorable to persistence in the struggle for life; and, looked at in this way, it is impossible to assert truth of naturalism or pragmatism or any such far-reaching philosophical theory: the engineer is hoist with his own petard. And if we take any other alternative than this, and identify truth with value in the sense of goodness or beauty, we lift the argument to a different plane. It is impossible to hold of all the particulars which enter, or can enter, into our experience, that their goodness or their beauty proves that they are true in the sense of really existing. The essence of all moral activity consists in realizing a good which did not exist before, and would not exist without, that activity; artistic production gives material embodiment to beauty which would remain unexpressed were it not for the artist's ideal and the artist's skill. The whole significance of human life,—perhaps the whole significance of the world's history,—rests upon an existing disparity between the present actualities of things and the values which may possibly be realized in or through them. If fact and value can be identified at all, it cannot be the fact of the moment or a particular fact or class of facts; reality must be fully realized before its nature can be equalized with our idea of value: as Plato held, if the good is the source of all reality, it cannot itself be identi-

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fied with any part of the temporal process, but must stand above it in dignity and power,—the purpose and final cause of all reality.

And thus we return to our problem. In the opposition of fact and value,—or, to use more comprehensive terms, of reality and worth,—lies the fundamental divergence of human conceptions. The philosopher cannot be content with the attitude of the scientist, whose business is only with what is; nor is it enough for him to follow the moralist or the artist in the contemplation of that which should be. Their limitations belong to their purpose, which is a limited one; he seeks a further goal. Again and again the philosopher is tempted to find in that which is, the ground of what should be; and he is succeeded by others who seek in what should be, the ground of what is. In these speculations what is explained is too often simply explained away,—until it reasserts its rights and returns as the dominant conception in a system of opposite characteristics. The philosopher should hold firmly to both conceptions; but his view should extend into the distance in which they may perchance meet and be reconciled.

If this is the deepest problem and the final goal of speculative thought, then the Platonic portrait of the philosopher's attitude conveys a truer idea than the Baconian. Bacon's metaphor of childlike submission to nature's teaching is a very inadequate account even of the scientist's attitude: it would never have led to the interpretations of nature which form the achievements of modern science. The man of science has to go out to meet nature, trying and testing all her ways, until he himself succeeds in bringing to bear upon her processes the ideas by means of which they yield themselves to interpretation. Yet, great as are the scientific uses of the imagination, they are necessarily limited by the sole and sufficient purpose of science, that of understanding the nature and laws of things. So far as he is seeking this understanding only, the philosopher must follow the endeavor of the scientist to give a true rendering of what

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is. But he cannot restrict himself to this problem without ignoring the greatest of human interests. The nature of reality and the meaning of worth appeal to him equally. To attain a point of view from which their relations are intelligible is the object of his search; and this involves something more than loyalty to facts; it needs equal loyalty to ideals of worth. That it is hard to maintain the attitude of impartial regard to fact, on the one hand, and to ideal, on the other, need not be denied. That it is still harder to reach the point of view that will comprehend them both harmoniously, is obvious. It may be that no philosopher has ever attained, or ever will attain, a fully satisfactory solution. He may be fated always to be a seeker. But the search is not therefore vain. Science, as we have seen, has to frame and use conceptions which go far beyond the mere data of sense-perception, and their abundant verification is evidence of a harmony between the intellect of man and the truth of things. His ideas of worth lay claim to a similar objectivity. And it is this that justifies the creative attitude of the speculative philosopher. It is because his own mind has in it something akin both to objective fact and to objective worth that he embarks on the quest for their final synthesis.

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CHRISTIAN MORALS AND THE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM.

THORSTEIN VEBLEN.

IN the light of the current materialistic outlook and the current skepticism touching supernatural matters, some question may fairly be entertained as to the religious cult of Christianity. Its fortunes in the proximate future, as well as its intrinsic value for the current scheme of civilization, may be subject to doubt. But a

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similar doubt is not readily entertained as regards the morals of Christianity. In some of its elements this morality is so intimately and organically connected with the scheme of Western civilization that its elimination would signify a cultural revolution whereby occidental culture would lose its occidental characteristics and fall into the ranks of ethnic civilizations at large. Much the same may be said of that pecuniary competition which to-day rules the economic life of Christendom and in large measure guides Western civilization in much else than the economic respect.

Both are institutional factors of first-rate importance in this culture, and as such it might be difficult or impracticable to assign the primacy to the one or the other, since each appears to be in a dominant position. Western civilization is both Christian and competitive (pecuniary); and it seems bootless to ask whether its course is more substantially under the guidance of the one than of the other of these two institutional norms. Hence, if it should appear, as is sometimes contended, that there is an irreconcilable discrepancy between the two, the student of this culture might have to face the question: Will Western civilization dwindle and decay if one or the other, the morals of competition or the morals of Christianity, definitively fall into abeyance?

In a question between the two codes, or systems of conduct, each must be taken at its best and simplest. That is to say, it is a question of agreement or discrepancy in the larger elementary principles of each, not a question of the variegated details, nor of the practice of the common run of Christians, on the one hand, and of competitive business men, on the other. The variety of detailed elaboration and sophistication is fairly endless in both codes; at the same time many Christians are engaged in competitive business, and conversely. Under the diversified exigencies of daily life neither the accepted principles of morality nor those of business competition work out in an untroubled or untempered course

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of conduct. Circumstances constrain men unremittingly to shrewd adaptations, if not to some degree of compromise, in their endeavors to live up to their accustomed principles of conduct. Yet both of these principles, or codes of conduct, are actively present throughout life in any modern community. For all the shrewd adaptation to which they may be subject in the casuistry of individual practice, they will not have fallen into abeyance so long as the current scheme of life is not radically altered. Both the Christian morality and the morality of pecuniary competition are intimately involved in this occidental scheme of life; for it is out of these and the like habits of thought that the scheme of life is made up. Taken at their best, do the two further and fortify one another? do they work together without mutual help or hindrance? or do they mutually inhibit and defeat each other?

In the light of modern science the principles of Christian morality or of pecuniary competition must, like any other principles of conduct, be taken simply as prevalent habits of thought. And in this light no question can be entertained as to the intrinsic merit, the eternal validity, of either. They are, humanly speaking, institutions which have arisen in the growth of the Western civilization. Their genesis and growth are incidents, or possibly episodes, in the life-history of this culture—habits of thought induced by the discipline of life in the course of this culture's growth, and more or less intrinsic and essential to its character as a phase of civilization. Therefore the question of their consistency with one another, or with the cultural scheme in which they are involved, turns into a question as to the conditions to which they owe their rise and continued force as institutions,—as to the discipline of experience in the past, out of which each of them has come and to which, therefore, each is (presumably) suited. The exigencies of life and the discipline of experience in a complex cultural situation are many and diverse, and it is always

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possible that any given phase of culture may give rise to divergent lines of institutional growth, to habits of conduct which are mutually incompatible, and which may at the same time be incompatible with the continued life of that cultural situation which has brought them to pass. The dead civilizations of history, particularly the greater ones, seem commonly to have died of some such malady. If Christian morality and pecuniary competition are the outgrowth of the same or similar lines of habituation, there should presumably be no incompatibility or discrepancy between them; otherwise it is an open question.

Leaving on one side, then, all question of its divine or supernatural origin, force, and warrant, as well as of its truth and its intrinsic merit or demerit, it may be feasible to trace the human line of derivation of this spirit of Christianity, considered as a spiritual attitude habitual to civilized mankind. The details and mutations of the many variants of the cult and creed might likewise be traced back, by shrewd analysis, to their origins in the habits enforced by past civilized life, and might on this ground be appraised in respect of their fitness to survive under the changing conditions of later culture; but such a work of detailed inquiry is neither practicable nor necessary here. The variants are many and diverse, but for all the diversity and discord among them, they have certain large features in common, by which they are identified as Christian and are contrasted with the ethnic cults and creeds. There is a certain Christian animus which pervades most of them, and marks them off against the non-Christian spiritual world. This is, perhaps, more particularly true of the moral principles of Christianity than of the general fabric of its many creeds and cults. Certain elemental features of this Christian animus stand forth obtrusively in its beginnings, and have, with varying fortunes of dominance and decay, persisted or survived unbroken, on the whole, to the present day. These are non-resistance (hu-

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mility) and brotherly love. Something further might be added, perhaps, but this much is common, in some degree, to the several variants of Christianity, late or early; and the inclusion of other common principles besides these would be debatable and precarious, except in case of such moral principles as are also common to certain of the ethnic cults as well as to Christianity. Even with respect to the two principles named, there might be some debate as to their belonging peculiarly and characteristically to the Christian spirit, exclusive of all other spiritual habits of mind. But it is at least a tenable position that these principles are intrinsic to the Christian spirit, and that they habitually serve as competent marks of identification. With the exclusion or final obsolescence of either of these, the cult would no longer be Christian, in the current acceptation of the term; though much else, chiefly not of an ethical character, would have to be added to make up a passably complete characterization of the Christian system, as, *e. g.*, monotheism, sin and atonement, eschatological retribution, and the like. But the two principles named bear immediately on the morals of Christianity; they are, indeed, the spiritual capital with which the Christian movement started out, and they are still the characteristics by force of which it survives.

It is commonly held that these principles are not inherent traits of human nature as such, congenital and hereditary traits of the species which assert themselves instinctively, impulsively, by force of the mere absence of repression. Such, at least, in effect, is the teaching of the Christian creeds, in that they hold these spiritual qualities to be a gift of divine grace, not a heritage of sinful human nature. Such an account of their origin and their acquirement by the successive generations of men does not fit these two main supports of Christian morality in the same degree. It may fairly be questioned as regards the principle of brotherly love, or the impulse to mutual service. While this seems to be a characteristic trait of Christian morals and may serve as

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a specific mark by which to distinguish this morality from the greater non-Christian cults, it is apparently a trait which Christendom shares with many of the obscurer cultures, and which does not in any higher degree characterize Christendom than it does these other, lower cultures. In the lower, non-Christian cultures, particularly among the more peaceable communities of savages, something of the kind appears to prevail by mere force of hereditary propensity; at least it appears, in some degree, to belong in these lower civilizations without being traceable to special teaching or to a visible interposition of divine grace. And in an obscure and dubious fashion, perhaps sporadically, it recurs throughout the life of human society with such an air of ubiquity as would argue that it is an elemental trait of the species, rather than a cultural product of Christendom. It may not be an overstatement to say that this principle is, in its elements, in some sort an atavistic trait, and that Christendom comes by it through a cultural reversion to the animus of the lower (peaceable) savage culture. But even if such an account be admitted as substantially sound, it does not account for that cultural reversion to which Christendom owes its peculiar partiality for this principle; nor is its association with its fellow principle, non-resistance, thereby accounted for. The two come into play together in the beginnings of Christianity, and are thenceforward associated together, more or less inseparably, throughout the later vicissitudes of the cult and its moral code.

The second-named principle, of non-resistance and renunciation, is placed first in order of importance in the earlier formulations of Christian conduct. This is not similarly to be traced back as a culturally atavistic trait, as the outgrowth of such an archaic cultural situation as is offered by the lower savagery. Non-resistance has no such air of ubiquity and spontaneous recrudescence, and does not show itself, even sporadically, as a matter of course in cultures that are otherwise apparently un-

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related; particularly not in the lower cultures, where the hereditary traits of the species should presumably assert themselves, on occasion, in a less sophisticated expression than on the more highly conventionalized levels of civilization. On the contrary, it belongs almost wholly to the more highly developed, more coercively organized civilizations, that are possessed of a consistent monotheistic religion and a somewhat arbitrary secular authority; and it is not always, indeed not commonly, present in these.

Christianity at its inception did not take over this moral principle, ready-made, from any of the older cults or cultures from which the Christian movement was in a position to draw. It is not found, at least not in appreciable force, in the received Judaism; nor can it be derived from the classical (Græco-Roman) cultures, which had none of it, nor is it to be found among the pagan antiquities of those barbarians whose descendants make up the great body of Christendom to-day. Yet Christianity sets out with the principle of non-resistance full-blown, in the days of its early diffusion, and finds assent and acceptance for it with such readiness as seems to argue that mankind was prepared beforehand for just such a principle of conduct. Mankind, particularly the populace, within the confines of that Roman dominion within which the early diffusion of Christianity took place, was apparently in a frame of mind to accept such a principle of morality, or such a maxim of conduct; and the same is progressively true for the outlying populations to which Christianity spread in the next four centuries.

To any modern student of human culture, this ready acceptance of such a principle (habit of thought) gives evidence that the section of mankind which had thus shifted its moral footing to a new and revolutionary moral principle, must have been trained, by recently past experience, by the discipline of daily life in the immediate past, into such a frame of mind as predisposed them

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for its acceptance; that is to say, they must have been disciplined into a spiritual attitude to which such a new principle of conduct would commend itself as reasonable, if not as a matter of course. And in due process, as this suitable attitude was enforced upon the other, outlying, populations by suitable disciplinary means, Christianity with its gospel of renunciation tended to spread and supplant the outworn cults that no longer fitted the altered cultural situation. But in its later diffusion, among peoples not securely under Roman rule and not reduced to such a frame of mind by a protracted experience of Roman discipline, Christianity makes less capital of the morality of non-resistance.

It was among the peoples subject to the Roman rule that Christianity first arose and spread; among the lower orders of the populace especially, who had been beaten to a pulp by the hard-handed, systematic, inexorable power of the imperial city; who had no rights which the Roman master was bound to respect; who were aliens and practically outlaws under the sway of the Cæsars; and who had acquired, under high pressure, the conviction that non-resistance was the chief of virtues if not the whole duty of man. They had learned to render unto Cæsar that which is Cæsar's, and were in a frame of mind to render unto God that which is God's.

It is a notable fact also that, as a general rule, in its subsequent diffusion to regions and peoples not benefited by the Roman discipline, Christianity spread in proportion to the more or less protracted experience of defeat and helpless submission undergone by these peoples; and that it was the subject populace rather than the master classes that took kindly to the doctrine of non-resistance. In the outlying corners of the western world, such as the Scandinavian and British countries, where subjection to arbitrary rule in temporal matters had been less consistently and less enduringly enforced, the principle of non-resistance took less firm root. And in the days when the peoples of Christendom were sharply differentiated into

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ruling and subject classes, non-resistance was accepted by the lower rather than by the upper classes.

Much the same, indeed, is true of the companion principle of mutual succor. On the whole, it is not too bold a generalization to say that these elements of the moral code which distinguish Christianity from the ethnic cults, are elements of the morals of low life, of the subject populace. There is, in point of practical morality, not much to choose, *e. g.*, between the upper-class medieval Christianity and the contemporary Mohammedan morality. It is only in later times, after the Western culture had lost its aristocratic-feudalistic character and had become, in its typical form, though not in all its ramifications, a kind of universalized low-life culture,—it is only at this later period that these principles of low-life morality also became in some degree universalized principles of Christian duty; and it still remains true that these principles are most at home in the more vulgar divisions of the Christian cult. The higher-class variants of Christianity still differ little in the substance of their morality from Judaism or Islam. The morality of the upper class is in a less degree the morality of non-resistance and brotherly love, and is in a greater degree the morality of coercive control and kindly tutelage, which are in no degree distinctive traits of Christianity, as contrasted with the other great religious systems.

In their experience of Roman devastation and punishment-at-large, which predisposed the populace for this principle of non-resistance, the subject peoples commonly also lost such class distinctions and differential rights and privileges as they had previously enjoyed. They were leveled down to a passably homogeneous state of subjection, in which one class or individual had little to gain at the cost of another, and in which, also, each and all palpably needed the succor of all the rest. The institutional fabric had crumbled, very much as it does in an earthquake. The conventional differentiations, handed down out of the past, had proved vain and mean-

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ingless in the face of the current situation. The pride of caste and all the principles of differential dignity and honor fell away, and left mankind naked and unashamed and free to follow the promptings of hereditary savage human nature which make for fellowship and Christian charity.

Barring repressive conventionalities, reversion to the spiritual state of savagery is always easy; for human nature is still substantially savage. The discipline of savage life, selective and adaptive, has been by far the most protracted and probably the most exacting of any phase of culture in all the life-history of the race; so that by heredity human nature still is, and must indefinitely continue to be, savage human nature. This savage spiritual heritage that 'springs eternal' when the pressure of conventionality is removed or relieved, seems highly conducive to the two main traits of Christian morality, though more so to the principle of brotherly love than to that of renunciation. And this may well be the chief circumstance that has contributed to the persistence of these principles of conduct even in later times, when the external conditions have not visibly favored or called for their continued exercise.

The principles of conduct underlying pecuniary competition are the principles of Natural Rights, and as such date from the eighteenth century. In respect of their acceptance into the body of commonplace morality and practice and the constraining force which they exercise, they are apparently an outgrowth of modern civilization,—whatever older antiquity may be assigned them in respect of their documentary pedigree. Comparatively speaking, they are absent from the scheme of life and from the common-sense apprehension of rights and duties in medieval times. They derive their warrant as moral principles from the discipline of life under the cultural situation of early modern times. They are accordingly of relatively recent date as prevalent habits of thought,

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at least in their fuller and freer development; even though the underlying traits of human nature which have lent themselves to the formation of these habits of thought may be as ancient as any other. The period of their growth coincides somewhat closely with that of the philosophy of egoism, self-interest, or 'individualism,' as it is less aptly called. This egoistic outlook gradually assumes a dominant place in the occidental scheme of thought during and after the transition from medieval to modern times; it appears to be a result of the habituation to those new conditions of life which characterize the modern, as contrasted with the medieval, situation. Assuming, as is now commonly done, that the fundamental and controlling changes which shape and guide the transition from the institutional situation of the medieval to that of the modern world are economic changes, one may with fair confidence trace a connection between these economic changes and the concomitant growth of modern business principles. The vulgar element, held cheap, kept under, but massive, in the medieval order of society, comes gradually into the foreground and into the controlling position in economic life; so that the aristocratic or chivalric standards and ideals are gradually supplanted or displaced by the vulgar apprehension of what is right and best in the conduct of life. The chivalric canons of destructive exploit and of status give place to the more sordid canons of workmanlike efficiency and pecuniary strength. The economic changes which thus gave a new and hitherto impotent element of society the primacy in the social order and in the common-sense apprehensions of what is worth while, are, in the main and characteristically, the growth of handicraft and petty trade; giving rise to the industrial towns, to the growth of markets, to a pecuniary field of individual enterprise and initiative, and to a valuation of men, things, and events in pecuniary terms.

It is impossible here to go narrowly into the traits of culture and of human nature which were evolved in the

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rise and progress of handicraft and the petty trade, and brought about the decay of medievalism and the rise of the modern cultural scheme. But so much seems plain on the face of things: there is at work in all this growth of the new, pecuniary culture, a large element of emulation, both in the acquisition of goods and in their conspicuous consumption. Pecuniary exploit in a degree supplies the place of chivalric exploit. But emulation is not the whole of the motive force of the new order, nor does it supply all the canons of conduct and standards of merit under the new order. In its earlier stages, while dominated by the exigencies of handicraft and the petty trade, the modern culture is fully as much shaped and guided by considerations of livelihood, as by the ideals of differential gain.

The material conditions of the new economic situation would not tolerate the institutional conditions of the old situation. There was being enforced upon the community, primarily upon that workday element into whose hands the new industrial exigencies were shifting the directive force, a new range of habitual notions as to what was needful and what was right. In both of the characteristically modern lines of occupation,—handicraft and the petty trade,—the individual, the workman or trader, is the central and efficient factor, on whose initiative, force, diligence, and discretion his own economic fortunes and those of the community visibly turn. It is an economic situation in which, necessarily, individual deals with individual on a footing of pecuniary efficiency; where the ties of group solidarity, which control the individual's economic (and social) relations, are themselves of a pecuniary character, and are made or broken more or less at the individual's discretion and in pecuniary terms; and it is, moreover, a cultural situation in which the social and civil relations binding the individual, are prevailingly and increasingly formed for pecuniary ends, and enforced by pecuniary sanctions. The individualism of the modern era sets out with industrial aims and

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makes its way by force of industrial efficiency. And since the individual relations under this system take the pecuniary form, the individualism thus worked out and incorporated in the modern institutional fabric, is a pecuniary individualism, and is therefore also typically egoistic.

The principles governing right conduct according to the habits of thought native to this individualistic era are the egoistic principles of natural rights and natural liberty. These rights and this liberty are egoistic rights and liberty of the individual. They are to be summed up as freedom and security of person and of pecuniary transactions. It is a curious fact, significant of the extreme preponderance of the vulgar element in this cultural revolution, that among these natural rights there are included no remnants of those prerogatives and disabilities of birth, office, or station, which seemed matters of course and of common sense to the earlier generations of men who had grown up under the influence of the medieval social order. Nor, curiously, are there remnants of the more ancient rights and duties of the bond of kinship, the blood feud, or clan allegiance, such as were once also matters of course and of common sense in the cultural eras and areas in which the social order of the kinship group or the clan organization had prevailed. On the other hand, while these institutional elements have (in theory) lost all standing, the analogous institution of property has become an element of the natural order of things. The system of natural rights is natural in the sense of being consonant with the nature of handicraft and petty trade.

Meanwhile, times have changed since the eighteenth century, when this system of pecuniary egoism reached its mature development. That is to say, the material circumstances, the economic exigencies, have changed, and the discipline of habit resulting from the changed situation has, as a consequence, tended to a somewhat different effect, — as is evidenced by the fact that the

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sanctity and sole efficacy of the principles of natural rights are beginning to be called in question. The excellence and sufficiency of an enlightened pecuniary egoism are no longer a matter of course and of common sense to the mind of this generation, which has experienced the current era of machine industry, credit, delegated corporation management, and distant markets. What fortune may overtake these business principles, these habits of thought native to the handicraft era, in the further sequence of economic changes, can, of course, not be foretold; but it is at least certain that they cannot remain standing and effective, in the long run, unless the modern community should return to an economic régime equivalent to the era of handicraft and petty trade. For the business principles in question are of the nature of habits of thought, and habits of thought are made by habits of life; and the habits of life necessary to maintain these principles and to give them their effective sanction in the common-sense convictions of the community are the habits of life enforced by the system of handicraft and petty trade.

It appears, then, that these two codes of conduct, Christian morals and business principles, are the institutional by-products of two different cultural situations. The former, in so far as they are typically Christian, arose out of the abjectly and precariously servile relations in which the populace stood to their masters in late Roman times, as also, in a great, though perhaps less, degree, during the 'dark' and the middle ages. The latter, the morals of pecuniary competition, on the other hand, are habits of thought induced by the exigencies of vulgar life under the rule of handicraft and petty trade, out of which has come the peculiar system of rights and duties characteristic of modern Christendom. Yet there is something in common between the two. The Christian principles inculcate brotherly love, mutual succor: Love thy neighbor as thyself; *Mutuum date, nihil inde sper-*

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antes. This principle seems, in its elements at least, to be a culturally atavistic trait, belonging to the ancient, not to say primordial, peaceable culture of the lower savagery. The natural-rights analogue of this principle of solidarity and mutual succor is the principle of fair play, which appears to be the nearest approach to the golden rule that the pecuniary civilization will admit. There is no reach of ingenuity or of ingenuousness by which the one of these may be converted into the other; nor does the régime of fair play,—essentially a régime of emulation,—conduce to the reënforcement of the golden rule. Yet throughout all the vicissitudes of cultural change, the golden rule of the peaceable savage has never lost the respect of occidental mankind, and its hold on men's convictions is, perhaps, stronger now than at any earlier period of the modern time. It seems incompatible with business principles, but appreciably less so than with the principles of conduct that ruled the western world in the days before the Grace of God was supplanted by the Rights of Man. The distaste for the spectacle of contemporary life seldom rises to the pitch of 'renunciation of the world' under the new dispensation. While one-half of the Christian moral code, that pious principle which inculcates humility, submission to irresponsible authority, found easier lodgment in the medieval culture, the more humane moral element of mutual succor seems less alien to the modern culture of pecuniary self-help.

The presumptive degree of compatibility between the two codes of morality may be shown by a comparison of the cultural setting, out of which each has arisen and in which each should be at home. In the most general outline, and neglecting details as far as may be, we may describe the upshot of this growth of occidental principles as follows: The ancient Christian principle of humility, renunciation, abnegation, or non-resistance, has been virtually eliminated from the moral scheme of Christendom; nothing better than a sophisticated affectation of

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it has any extensive currency in modern life. The conditions to which it owes its rise,—bare-handed despotism and servile helplessness,—are, for the immediate present and the recent past, no longer effectual elements in the cultural situation; and it is, of course, in the recent past that the conditions must be sought which have shaped the habits of thought of the immediate present. Its companion principle, brotherly love or mutual service, appears, in its elements at least, to be a very deeprooted and ancient cultural trait, due to an extremely protracted experience of the race in the early stages of human culture, reënforced and defined by the social conditions prevalent in the early days of Christianity. In the naïve and particular formulation given it by the early Christians, this habit of thought has also lost much of its force, or has fallen somewhat into abeyance; being currently represented by a thrifty charity, and, perhaps, by the negative principle of fair play, neither of which can fairly be rated as a competent expression of the Christian spirit. Yet this principle is forever reasserting itself in economic matters, in the impulsive approval of whatever conduct is serviceable to the common good and in the disapproval of disserviceable conduct even within the limits of legality and natural right. It seems, indeed, to be nothing else than a somewhat specialized manifestation of the instinct of workmanship, and as such it has the indefeasible vitality that belongs to the hereditary traits of human nature.

The pecuniary scheme of right conduct is of recent growth, but it is an outcome of a recently past phase of modern culture rather than of the immediate present. This system of natural rights, including the right of ownership and the principles of pecuniary good and evil that go with it, no longer has the consistent support of current events. Under the conditions prevalent in the era of handicraft, the rights of ownership made for equality rather than the reverse, so that their exercise was in effect not notably inconsistent with the ancient

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bias in favor of mutual aid and human brotherhood. This is more particularly apparent if the particular form of organization and the spirit of the regulations then ruling in vulgar life be kept in mind. The technology of handicraft, as well as the market relations of the system of petty trade, pushed the individual workman into the foreground and led men to think of economic interests in terms of this workman and his work; the situation emphasized his creative relation to his product, as well as his responsibility for this product and for its serviceability to the common welfare. It was a situation in which the acquisition of property depended, in the main, on the workmanlike serviceability of the man who acquired it, and in which, on the whole, honesty was the best policy. Under such conditions the principles of fair play and the inviolability of ownership would be somewhat closely in touch with the ancient human instinct of workmanship, which approves mutual aid and serviceability to the common good. On the other hand, the current experience of men in the communities of Christendom, now no longer acts to reënforce these habits of thought embodied in the system of natural rights; and it is scarcely conceivable that a conviction of the goodness, sufficiency, and inviolability of the rights of ownership could arise out of such a condition of things, technological and pecuniary, as now prevails.

Hence there are indications in current events that these principles,—habits of thought,—are in process of disintegration rather than otherwise. With the revolutionary changes that have supervened in technology and in pecuniary relations, there is no longer such a close and visible touch between the workman and his product as would persuade men that the product belongs to him by force of an extension of his personality; nor is there a visible relation between serviceability and acquisition; nor between the discretionary use of wealth and the common welfare. The principles of fair play and pecuniary discretion have, in great measure, lost the sanction once af-

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forded them by the human propensity for serviceability to the common good, neutral as that sanction has been at its best. Particularly is this true since business has taken on the character of an impersonal, dispassionate, not to say graceless, investment for profit. There is little in the current situation to keep the natural right of pecuniary discretion in touch with the impulsive bias of brotherly love, and there is in the spiritual discipline of this situation much that makes for an effectual discrepancy between the two. Except for a possible reversion to a cultural situation strongly characterized by ideals of emulation and status, the ancient racial bias embodied in the Christian principle of brotherhood should logically continue to gain ground at the expense of the pecuniary morals of competitive business.

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PAUPERISM: FACTS AND THEORIES.

THOMAS JONES.

AN individualist of the straightest sect would logically object to any poor law at all, but room was found in the *laissez faire* philosophy of the nineteenth century for a poor law as, at the worst, a sink for the lost and, at best, an ambulance for the wounded in the competitive fray. Meanwhile the logic of experience was forcing the administrators of the poor law, on the one hand, and the governors of our cities, on the other, to increase the collective provision for the damaged poor, and to devise measures which would tend to prevent the downward drift to pauperism. But the text-books of the schools continued to repeat the old maxims, unconscious of the corrections of experience, and no new and adequate theory of pauperism was forthcoming. The collectivists, who might have supplied one, were preoccupied with justifying the municipalization of

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gas and water and similar services; the field of poor law theory was left almost entirely to the Charity Organization Society. This society never seemed able to recover from a pre-natal chill caught in 1834, and its limbs have been cramped from its birth in 1869. The laws of growth are still somewhat obscure, but it is well known that parents have been startled by the rapid increase in height of their children during or immediately after an attack of scarlet fever or whooping cough. It was with a similar shock of surprise that 'the charitable public' read the summaries of the Majority Reports of the Poor Law Commission, and beheld their trusted and numerous representatives grown almost beyond recognition, as a result of a diet of 452 witnesses and over 100,000 answers to questions, to say nothing of innumerable written statements, personal visits, and prolonged confinement with four dissenters. The charitable public adjusted its glasses and muttered something Professor Fawcett had said forty years ago about having as many paupers as you choose to pay for and the mischief of paying for any. Did not outdoor relief lower the rate of women's wages all round? Did not the Charity Organization Society believe that, in the interests of the poor, "institutional relief is the only safe method of poor law relief"?[1] Was the workhouse test not an efficient and indispensable if "drastic instrument of social surgery"? If men rejected the test and kept out of the House, "they moved off to better work;" if they succumbed and went in, they were "deterred" till they quickly went out again, when they once more became "independent." Was it not the glory of Scotland,—that complacent land of sturdy independence and sober thrift,—that it refused relief to able-bodied man and woman however destitute? Did not the one fact explain the other? What must have been the consternation of this school of pauperism to read in the Scottish Report of the Majority deliberate judgments like the following:

[1] Cf. C. O. S., Occasional Papers, 1900, No. 24, *passim*.

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It does not appear to us that the Scottish system of giving out-relief to poor persons partially incapacitated from work has any appreciable effect on the labor market (p. 112).

The statistics of pauperism since 1869 furnish in themselves convincing proof that the Scottish outdoor relief system has not led to any widespread demoralization of the people (p. 113).

In the Highlands, the difficulty in dealing with such cases [aged and infirm] is very great, and the suffering which the poor endure rather than avail themselves of the comparative comfort of the poorhouse is considerable (p. 121).

We think it somewhat remarkable that, notwithstanding the proverbial thriftiness and independence of the Scottish nation, there should not exist in any of the large towns of Scotland a single Provident Dispensary or a 'Public Medical Service' on a provident basis, such as we have found in many towns in England (p. 158).

More startling still to those who have confined their studies to the traditional text-books, must be the decisions reached by the majority on the subject of relief to the able-bodied in Scotland. The qualification for relief in Scotland is destitution coupled with disability to earn a livelihood. The operation of this famous law is now found to be productive of grave anomalies and hardships. Scandals have been averted only by the authorities "having shown common sense and not having stretched it too far and to the breaking point." Much ingenuity has been exercised to circumvent the law. Parochial Boards have assumed "a sort of constructive disability" as a pretext for granting relief. "In Glasgow, practically every applicant for outdoor relief, whether able-bodied or not, is offered poorhouse relief. This mechanical use of the poorhouse as a test of the 'disability' of an applicant has resulted in a considerable proportion of the inmates of poorhouses being able-bodied." In fact, a special investigator appointed by the commission found that the population of the ordinary Scottish poorhouse was in all respects exactly similar to the population of the ordinary English workhouse!

Accordingly, we propose that disability to earn a livelihood should no longer be one of the necessary qualifications for poor relief. To the criticism that this will admit the able-bodied, and break with the old traditions of

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Scotland, we would reply that, until 1866, the able-bodied were admittedly relieved under the Poor Law, and, as we shall show, without any apparent evil results; that, since then, the able-bodied have continued to be, and still are, relieved by the Poor Law,—to almost as great an extent as in England; and that it is better to relieve them openly, and under proper regulations, than to endeavor to maintain, by means of subterfuge and evasion, a law that would be inhumane if it were not violated (p. 82).

We have quoted at length from the Scottish Report because it speaks with less uncertain voice than the English Report, and because the Scottish system has so often been held up to our approbation.

The effect of the series of Majority Reports on 'the charitable public' has been rather bewildering. They saw with regret barrowfuls of 'Occasional Papers' leave the prim shelves of Denison House for the shabby stalls of Charing Cross Road. Old watchwords and formulæ were fading away and new ones were as yet vague and indistinct. And the question which pressed for answer was: Could one continue to support a society whose diagnosis of social ills has been demonstrated to be so inadequate and misleading? Others there were who asked: Were not the proposals of the Majority still far too deeply imbued with a theory of social dependence which had been proved to be out of harmony with many of the facts of poverty and destitution?

In a bibliography of poor law literature Mr. Thomas Mackay points out that "the opposition" to the Charity Organization Society view of pauperism "has not often sought the publicity of print." He could only chronicle three or four fugitive pamphlets. Significantly enough, one of these was by Mr. George Lansbury, and another was a Fabian tract. They contained hardly more than hints of heresy. Few suspected that they held the germs of the full-blown wickedness of the Minority Report. If the Majority were unsettling, the Minority were staggering. They seemed (so the press said) to open the floodgates to universal pauperism. They would undermine virtues like thrift, independence, and charity, institutions like the home and the family, and, direst fate of all, they would hand

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over the whole nation or a considerable proportion of it,—not only the poor,—to "official surveillance from the cradle to the grave." It might be depressing to find that the Majority had turned their backs on 'the principles of 1834,' but it was comforting to know that they had halted far short of the socialistic Utopia of the Minority with their reiterated and italicized boast that "it is now administratively possible, if it is sincerely desired to do so, to remedy the evils of unemployment . . . at least to the same extent as we have remedied the evils of typhus and cholera, negro slavery, and the labor of little children in cotton mills." But while the Minority Report, with its religious belief in the indefinite improvability of mankind and its claim of a clean, healthy, sufficient and supervised subsistence for every destitute man, woman, and child, repelled the "Spectator" and the 'charitable public' generally, it has come with the compelling power of a new gospel to thousands of young men and women eager for a constructive organic campaign against the squalid poverty of our cities. Is their hope misplaced? Should they have ranked themselves with the Majority? Wherein lies the strength of the Minority's appeal? What dangers lurk concealed in their fluent pages? Are these dangers fundamental and unescapable?

On a number of points the two Reports are in substantial agreement. In the words of Lord George Hamilton, the chairman of the commission:

> They practically condemn the same things, notably the general workhouse, the absence of classification, and the lack of curative and restorative methods of treatment, the general inadequacy and want of investigation connected with outdoor relief; both are equally emphatic in condemning a system of mere deterrence, and both urge that in the new processes to be adopted, relief should be associated with a continuous attempt to strike at the sources and roots of pauperism and destitution. (Scotland, p. 283.)

The chairman goes on to point out that "it is upon the organization and machinery which is to replace the existing system and to give effect to the new policy and processes of treatment that the real difference has arisen.

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The machinery which is to be brought into existence to give effect to new principles is a matter of quite as great importance as the principles themselves." In what follows we shall examine one of these principles and its application to the treatment of children and the sick.

It was one of the 'principles of 1834' that the position of the able-bodied male pauper should be less eligible than that of the lowest grade of independent laborer. This principle was to be applied by means of a deterrent workhouse test. This treatment was not explicitly prescribed by the Act of 1834 for any other class than that of able-bodied men, but it has nevertheless profoundly affected the provision for all classes of destitute persons. There can be no doubt, as Professor Muirhead has put it, that the fear of the poor law has been the beginning,—if but the beginning,—of industrial wisdom in many instances, and that the surgical operation performed on the laborers of 1834 had salutary effects which should never be minimized or forgotten. Neither should they be exaggerated. Justice demands that we should place to the other side of the account the enormous injury done for three-quarters of a century by a repressive and deterrent system which starved the minds and paralyzed the wills of tens of thousands of men, women, and children within the workhouse walls; half-fed tens of thousands of children on outrelief; caused untold suffering to the aged and infirm who dreaded the House; hardened the officials who operated the system; perpetuated indiscriminate charity; facilitated vagrancy, and above all coarsened national ideals of brotherhood. The spectre has withdrawn from one institution after another and from one class after another, but its dark shadows still linger everywhere, clouding the vision and confusing the action of officials and guardians. The monumental embodiments of this confusion are the mammoth mixed workhouses,—whited sepulchres, 'erected regardless of expense,' where men and women rot in idleness and comfort, and the no less degrading but dirty and dreary refuges where young and old, sick and

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healthy, sane and defective, are herded together in undifferentiated misery and corruption.

It is now conceded by the Majority as clearly proved that "deterrence can be and has been pushed too far." They wish (1) to retain a qualified deterrence; (2) to make treatment curative and restorative; (3) but to do nothing which would extend the qualification for relief to individuals not now entitled to it. Relief is to be given to the destitute only, or, to use the new and *synonymous* term, the necessitous. It is important to remember that the new necessity is the old destitution, and that the Public Assistance Authority will deal with the necessitous, only after they reach that condition. The prevention of incipient destitution is entrusted directly to the voluntary agencies, and indirectly to State measures like the Labor Exchanges Act.

The Minority, on the other hand, place the greatest possible stress on the importance of searching out destitution, of striking at the sources and roots of pauperism as they show themselves in neglected infancy and childhood, ill-health and disease, feeble-mindedness and lunacy, old age and unemployment. They maintain that if this work of detection is vigorously and thoroughly done, largely and mainly by means of specialized authorities already in existence, a Public Assistance Authority will be superfluous.

In deciding between these rival methods, we must first ask who constitute the pauper host and ascertain the character of their destitution. In England and Wales

Children under 16 years of age form nearly one-third of the total number of persons in receipt of relief.

Upwards of 60 per cent. of the pauper children are orphans or are dependent on widows.

Nearly one-third of the persons in receipt of relief are under medical treatment.

We [the majority] estimate that at least one-half of the total cost of pauperism is swallowed up in direct dealing with sickness. To this burden we must add the indirect contributions of sickness, viz., the widows, children, and old people cast upon the rates through preventable deaths of bread-

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winners, and the host of degenerate, imbecile, maimed, and blind, with whom disease helps to populate our workhouses.

The number of persons over sixty in receipt of relief (on a given day) was 46.5 per cent. of the total number of persons relieved.

In Scotland the ratio of old-age pauperism to population is very much less than in England, but child pauperism is higher. Children under 14 form 40 per cent. of the pauperism of Scotland. The available figures for the proportions of sick poor are not comparable. But the broad facts are substantially the same. In England and Wales, then, the pauper host consists, as to one-third, of children under 16, as to another third, of the sick, as to nearly one-half, of the aged. To these should be added some tens of thousands of able-bodied widows with children. It is very necessary to break up the problem in this fashion and not to think vaguely of 'a mass of paupers' or of the 'poor in a lump.' Public opinion is strongly against applying to these four above-mentioned classes the principle of deterrence. It is widely felt that the small remaining sections—the able-bodied men and the vagrants—are in a different category.

The Minority urge with great force that the children should be "taken out of the poor law" altogether. Has not the poor law in the past succeeded with children in proportion as it removed them from all contact with poor law institutions, and paupers and officials, *e. g.*, by boarding them out? Would not the likelihood of 'hereditary pauperism' be less if the medical and educational care of the necessitous child was assimilated to that of the ordinary child? Has it not been proved by experience that a system which is deterrent in one part and educational in another, is apt to be neither the one nor the other efficiently, so long as it is controlled by the one set of guardians and officers? So long as destitution is the widow's qualification to out-relief, is it probable that the physically and mentally best will be done for pauper children by an authority concerned primarily with relieving the necessitous? Which is to be the decisive consideration,—the

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deterrence and chastening of the parent or the sound rearing of the child? For seventy-five years it has usually been the former. Hence "perhaps the most unexpected and terrible scandal revealed by the two reports,"—the treatment of the tens of thousands of children receiving out-relief. Hence also, in part, the reason why it is possible for the Majority to bewail the ineffectiveness of the expenditure on education and sanitation in reducing pauperism.

It is highly satisfactory to find that in their proposals for dealing with children the Majority have traveled far from the practice of past years. They emphatically urge that where out-relief is given it should be adequate and carefully adapted to the needs of the case. The total income, from whatever source, must be sufficient to afford proper food, clothing, and housing conditions for the whole family. The children must be properly nourished and medically supervised. They must be given a fair start on leaving school. A moment's reflection will convince anyone familiar with the lives of the poor, that if this policy of the Majority be fully carried out, it will automatically create thousands of cases which, relatively to these out-relief families, will be 'necessitous.'

If we consider next the case of the sick, we shall find that the Majority's hold on the principle of deterrence is very uncertain. So feeble is it that the one medical member of the commission declares, that their scheme appears to him to offer what amounts to a large measure of free medical relief, without adequate safeguard either to the medical profession or to the ratepayer. Nowhere are the anarchical results of *laissez faire* more marked than in the medical service of the country, as described in the reports of the commission. Hospitals are distributed over the land, not according to the incidence of disease, but according to the impulse of the charitable. There are almost as many beds in the London poor law infirmaries as in all the voluntary hospitals of England and Wales

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together. Such voluntary hospitals minister to the needs of persons of the same social *status* as those who apply to the poor law. No clear line can be drawn between the sphere of charity and that of the State. There is the greatest confusion and overlapping. Three rival agencies are at work,—the poor law authorities, the sanitary authorities, and the voluntary authorities. Each proceeds on its own lines with little or no coöperation. And in spite of all their efforts, the position of the man earning from £80 to £300 a year remains one of considerable hardship when serious illness invades his family. As Dr. Downes says, "a sudden requirement of costly and imperative surgery may be ruinous or even prohibitive to many who for the ordinary needs of life would be counted well-to-do." In Glasgow, according to Dr. Chalmers, the medical officer of health, "an artisan at present has nothing to choose between the complete charity of the general hospital or paying what, for him, is a prohibitive price for medical treatment if there is any operative treatment. There are always about a thousand persons waiting for admission to the three Glasgow hospitals. In that city over 150,000 outdoor patients are treated by the medical charities in a single year. In Edinburgh between one in three and one in four of the population receives free medical treatment every year. And so for the half dozen other large Scottish towns, containing in all 40 per cent. of the population of Scotland. Will anyone pretend that these 'medical charities' are less pauperizing than Poor Law Medical Relief? Some poor law cases are being charged as much as 15s. a week for medical aid. The result is, as put by one medical witness, that, by availing themselves of the benefits of the parish hospitals, patients are really more independent and less pauperized than by going to medical charities. And among the most potent pauperizing forces we must reckon the doctors themselves! Dr. Leslie Mackenzie, of the Scottish Local Government Board, stated in his evidence that the gratuitous treatment provided by private medical practitioners amounts in

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some cases to as much as 30 per cent. of their total practice.

If we leave the crowded towns of Scotland and pursue our study of pauperism and independence into the Highlands and Islands, we shall find a truly appalling condition of things, or rather of people, revealed by the Majority Report. 'Great need for a better provision of hospitals,' 'deplorably insufficient medical attendance,' 'paupers better off than the classes immediately above them,' 'an enormous percentage (50 to 70) of uncertified deaths,' 'grossly insanitary conditions of houses which are more worthy of Kaffirs than of Britishers,' 'infectious disease become endemic,' 'tuberculosis becoming general all over the island,'—such is the grave condition of whole districts within a day's journey of Edinburgh. The Minority's scheme of aggressive inspection would produce a race of morbid hypochondriacs, wrote the Majority in the English Report. The alternative policy of ignorance and neglect and independence has turned the inhabitants of the Highlands and Islands into a race of callous fatalists. "Centuries of poverty have induced in them a sort of blind fatalism, so that rebelling against their present condition would be, in their opinion, tantamount to rebelling against the decrees of Providence."

Confronted with these defects of quality and quantity in the medical service with the confusion and overlapping everywhere prevailing, what do the Majority propose? They are prepared to reduce 'deterrence' by various devices, *e. g.*, investigation into resources is to follow not precede treatment, but they will not make the restoration of the poor to health the first consideration. Those who pay are to obtain assistance on more eligible terms than those who do not. Medical service in England is to be organized on a provident basis by the establishment of a universal system of Provident Dispensaries. The poor will pay according to their means, and the very poor will not pay at all. But when the commissioners come to Scotland, they fail to find a single Provident Dispensary on which

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to rear their universal system. So they make a series of pious recommendations: that there should be a united effort to prevent the abuse of medical charities by the well-to-do; that there should be systematic coöperation between the existing authorities and the new ones which they propose to set up; and finally, they hand over the whole problem to a Joint Committee and to a Departmental Committee. These are the lame conclusions of those who have already told us that "relief should be associated with a continuous attempt to strike at the sources and roots of pauperism and destitution," and who have also said:

> It is probably little, if any, exaggeration to say that, to the extent to which we can eliminate or diminish sickness among the poor, we shall eliminate or diminish one-half the existing amount of pauperism.

The Majority justify their halting and nebulous policy by their desire that the working classes should preserve a spirit of independence instead of resorting to the poor law or charity in times of sickness. And they hold up to Scottish admiration the Leicester Provident Dispensary which has 50,000 members. But what independence can one member in 50,000 feel, which he could not equally feel towards a Municipal Medical Service to which he paid according to his ability, as both Majority and Minority propose he should do under their respective schemes? What are some of the great forces undermining the independence of the poor to-day? Bad housing, dangerous trades, casual occupations, and disease allowed to become chronic when it should have been sought out at the earliest possible moment; the confused and contradictory principles guiding competing authorities, State and voluntary; the premium placed on deceit by deterrent systems of help; the connivance at secret scourges which deteriorate town populations and which it is nobody's business to strike at. These are the sources and roots of much more than half of our pauperism, which, in obedience to an inadequate theory of the state and of freedom, we have allowed to spread and rankle. A man's power is due,

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Professor Tufts reminds us, (1) to physical heredity; (2) to social heredity; and (3) to his own efforts. "Individualism may properly claim this third factor. It is just to treat men unequally so far as their efforts are unequal. It is socially desirable to give as much incentive as possible to the full development of everyone's powers. But *the very same reason demands that in the first two respects we treat men as equally as possible.*"[2] In attempting this task in the sphere of health, the Minority urge that the State must take up a crusade against destitution caused by disease and by all that prevents any child being physically well-born. The Majority place the main emphasis on cure and restoration, the Minority on prevention. We submit that the latter is the policy on which the nation should concentrate its forces, and suggest briefly some reasons for this view. (1) It is in close accord with the whole preventive trend of modern medicine. It would arrest the stream of sick pauperism at its source. Early recognition of disease is all-important. The *British Medical Journal* has told us that the medical inspection of school children has revealed a condition of affairs quite as bad as that foretold by the greatest alarmists. (2) It would be cheaper to the community. "Sickness is always more costly than the means for preserving or restoring health." Had the thoroughgoing policy of the Minority been adopted, say at the foundation of the Local Government Board, many thousands of lives and many millions of money would have been saved to the nation and many undesirable births prevented. (3) It is desirable and practicable to entrust the work, as the Minority suggests, to the public health authority. "Sanitary authorities are already responsible for the treatment of a very high proportion of the total acute sickness among the poor. If lunacy be included under this head, sanitary authorities, including county councils, probably treat more than half of the total sickness institutionally treated at the expense of the rates and

[2] Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," pp. 548-549.

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taxes.'' Medical officers of great administrative experience favor the transference of the sick from the poor law. To do otherwise will be to duplicate services over the country which, it is certain, will not easily coöperate, and which will perpetuate that confusion of principles and methods which undermines independence. (4) The charitable public is too erratic to be relied on for the even and adequate provision and distribution of hospitals according to need; and to wait until the competing charities coöperate will be to continue the present chaos for another generation. Science is revolutionizing our power over bodily ills.

> Within the past few years the knowledge of the causes of disease has become so far advanced that it is matter of practical certainty that, by the unstinted application of known methods of investigation and consequent controlling action, all epidemic disease could be abolished within so short a period as fifty years. It is merely a question of the employment of the means at our command. . . . But why should we be content to wait long years, even centuries, for this control, when we can have it in a few years?[3]

(5) If we accept the Platonic conception of the State as an educational establishment and widen our conception of public education to embrace the training of the body as well as the training of the mind, then we shall join in the Minority's crusade against destitution due to sickness, even if we reject much else in their program. We shall strive to develop a health conscience in the community and put an end to much superfluous misery. We shall not weaken but strengthen moral responsibility, because we shall set up public standards of physical behavior and make positive demands upon house-owners and house-dwellers who now have vested rights in poverty and dirt. The family will not be deprived of the duty of personal ministration upon the sick in the home, but it will be instructed in the ways of service. Automatic tests will be applicable to much of the work of the Public Health Authority, but there will certainly be much malingering so long as weakness of character and the unattractive condi-

[3] Sir E. Ray Lankester, ''The Kingdom of Man,'' pp. 36-38.

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tions of much of modern industry combine to make men prefer to sham illness rather than go to work. But the positive gain in the increased happiness of children would outweigh the minus reaction of much deception, and, as health spreads, the hope and courage that normally go with it would prove as infectious as the disease and hopelessness of the slums and the callous fatalism of the Highlands and Islands.

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ETHICS AND LANGUAGE.

C. W. SUPER.

THE human psyche manifests itself outwardly in speech, in myth and legend, in handicrafts and in customs. Among the races which have made some advance from the most primitive stage, language becomes literature, myth and legend become religion, handicrafts are developed into arts, and customs into statute law. In the higher stages we find these manifestations still further developed. Literature and the handicrafts are joined in the production of instrumental music, myth and legend not only become religion but grow into a more or less elaborate cult, the handicrafts eventually produce works of art in sculpture, in painting, and in architecture, while customs are not only fixed by statute, but generate moral sentiments which rise above law and are obeyed even when there is no constraint. We are here concerned only with the relation of languages to ethics, and shall not pursue the interrelation of other phases of mental activity that have produced what we call civilization.[1]

[1] English unfortunately lacks a number of words, existing in German and other European languages, that express definite concepts in this domain of research. For example, we have no exact equivalent for the German *Kultur*, nor for *Kultus* (French, *le culte*), nor for *Sitte*, nor for *Wissenschaft*.



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It must be evident to every one who has reflected upon the genesis and growth of moral concepts, that we have no means by which to trace them except the intensive study of the terms by which they are expressed. Not much light can be got from the languages older than the Greek. Egypt and Mesopotamia had attained a fairly high degree of civilization. Their citizens must therefore have practised rules recognizing the claims of one individual upon another: in other words, there must have been a fairly definite recognition of reciprocal duties and obligations. But our information is of the most vague character. Even where we have before us a written code, we have no means of knowing to what extent it was observed and enforced. Why the ancient civilization in these regions persisted as long as it did and then perished completely, will probably always remain an unsolved enigma. When we come to a study of Hebrew we are upon somewhat firmer ground. Albeit, this language does not take us further back than the Homeric poems. Besides, the Jews did not investigate their language with the same assiduity as did the Greeks; consequently we are not in position to penetrate as deeply into its arcana. Neither is the Hebrew a primitive language in the sense in which the Greek is primitive.

It is illuminating for the growth of moral ideas that the Homeric poems contain a number of terms that have, in some cases, a slightly ethical tinge. We are here on the threshold of ethical ideas. But there is not one of which the meaning is unambiguous and definite. Buchholz, in his "Homerische Realien," devotes about one hundred and sixty-five pages to the consideration of Homeric ethics. His conclusion is that there is very little in the conduct of the Homeric characters that can be called ethical, and that there are no words which express clear-cut ethical ideas. Homer's men are estimated by their peers almost entirely according to their prowess, or their physical efficiency. Those who do things or get things done, no matter by what means, are represented as the favorites of the gods. An illuminating passage is found

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in the thirteenth Book of the "Odyssey." It purports to give the words of Athene to her favorite:

> Crafty must he be, and knavish, who would outdo thee in all manner of guile, even if it were a god encountered thee. Hardy man, subtle of wit, of guile insatiate, so thou wast not . . . to cease from thy sleights and knavish words, which thou lovest from the bottom of thy heart. But come, no more let us tell of these things, being both of us practised in deceits, for that thou art of all men far the first in counsel and in discourse, and I in the company of all the gods win renown for my wit and wile.

This translation of Messrs. Lang, Leaf, and Myers in poetic prose is probably as near an accurate rendering into English as can be made. But we are liable to be misled by its archaisms and by the definite meaning we are wont to attach to some of the words. We get the poetry of the original rather than its full meaning. Here the poet places the man and the goddess on the same moral level, and an extremely low level it is. It is within bounds to say that such a man would have no standing in reputable society. Yet the "Odyssey" already represents an advance over the "Iliad" in notions of right and wrong. It does not quite so much glorify slaughter and brute force; it shows a slight preference for the cunning man over the man whose chief glory is physical prowess. Although the nobler impulses do not appear frequently in either of the poems, they come to the surface occasionally. There are more words in the later poem that by implication betray ethical feeling, albeit somewhat vaguely. Among them are 'god-fearing' *(theoudēs)*, 'right-minded' *(noēmōn)*, 'just' *(dikaios)*, and 'holy' *(hagnē)*. None of these words occurs in the "Iliad." They have not the precision of meaning they attained later, but they mark the direction in which their subsequent development proceeded. Self-possession, fertility in resource, fortitude amid the most hopeless circumstances, nobility of birth, tenure of political power according to the narrow views of the age, insight and prudence, physical strength and beauty, attachment to friends and implacable hostility to enemies,—these are

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the primary virtues of Homer's heroes. Some of them were endowed with more of these attributes; others with less. So many words are employed to express them that we readily see how vague the meaning of each one must have been and how they overlap more or less. We have here plainly a groping after something which the poet or poets felt, by a sort of instinct, must exist; yet the language of the age was lacking in the terms needed. The man who thinks clearly can generally express himself clearly and to the point, while he whose ideas are vague usually talks and talks without getting near the heart of the matter. This is what we find in Homer.

Walter Bagehot, although he did not have the Homeric age specifically in mind, has some lucid remarks to offer on primitive conditions, which are appropriate in this connection. He says:

> I at least cannot call up to myself the loose conceptions (as they must have been) of morals which then existed. If we set aside all the elements derived from law and policy which run through our current moral notions, I hardly know what we shall have left. The residuum was somehow, and in some vague way, intelligible to the ante-political man, but it must have been uncertain, wavering, and unfit to be depended upon. In the best cases it existed much as the vague feeling of beauty exists in minds sensitive but untaught: a still small voice of uncertain meaning; an unknown something modifying everything else and higher than anything else, yet in form so indistinct that when you looked for it, it was gone,—or if this be thought the delicate fiction of a later fancy, then morality was at least to be found in the wild spasms of 'wild justice,' half punishment, half outrage,—but anyhow, being unmixed by steady law, it was intermittent, vague, and hard for us to imagine. . . . In these days, when we can not by any effort drive out of our minds the notion of law, we can not imagine the mind of one who could not by any effort have conceived it.[2]

The Homeric poet endeavors to place himself amid the scenes which he describes. He does not profess to be better than the men whose characters he portrays. We may, however, credit him with a little keener insight, a little closer sympathy with the moral virtues, a little more kindliness of feeling than we may expect to find

[2] "Physics and Politics," The Preliminary Age, Sect. II.

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among the rough and ready men of action whom he brings before us. Hence we find him now and then delaying his narrative, in order to expatiate on scenes and circumstances betokening a sympathy with the milder traits which were gradually developing among his countrymen. We may cite the parting of Hector and Andromache, the interview between the swineherd Eumæus and Ulysses, and the dire plight of the faithful hound Argos, which moved his master to tears. There are few more touching passages in all the range of poetry. When we compare his subsequent treatment of the suitors, it is hard for us to believe that the same man could be so tender and so truculent. Yet every one who reads knows that similar traits come into evidence almost every day. Mr. Bagehot says further:

> To sum up, law, rigid, definite, concise law, is the primary want of early mankind. But it is their greatest difficulty, as well as their first requisite; the thing most out of their reach, as well as that most beneficial to them if they reach it. . . . The Romans did half the work for above half of Europe. But where could the first ages find Romans or a conqueror?[1]

The Greeks, even of the Homeric age, had regard for what we call law. But our language has no words to express the poet's meaning accurately. He says of the Cyclops, ἀθεμίστια ἠδη, that is, he had no regard for divine ordinances, although his noun is a negative. Further on we learn that he knew neither judgment nor justice: οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θεμίστας. Here we have the positive counterpart of *athemistia* above. These 'themistes' were unwritten ordinances, which, from length of usage, had come to be regarded as sacred. The average Greek never learned to distinguish between moral conduct proper, conduct regulated by law, and conduct that follows custom. When we read that an act was performed *kata nomon,* we are often uncertain whether it was according to law or to usage. Moreover, the student of Greek affairs is constantly confronted with the faith which the

[1] Same reference.

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citizens had in law, and with their disregard of justice in the modern sense. The bane of the Athenians above all others was legislation and litigation. Everything had to be done according to law, even if a law enacted to-day had to be repealed to-morrow, or if a law had to be passed to suit a special case. Greek literature is filled with invectives against tyrants (or, as they had better be called, usurpers), no matter how benevolent and public spirited they might be, although the ecclesia was often guilty of the most flagrant acts of tyranny. The history of Athens is the record of an almost uninterrupted effort to create a moral sentiment by statute. Venality was the besetting sin of its citizens. In spite of the severe penalties imposed upon bribery and inflicted upon those who were found guilty of accepting bribes, the evil grew apace. The same mortal disease preyed upon the political vitals of Sparta, although its government was differently constituted. The failure to develop a sound ethnic and personal morality apart from law, ultimately led to the ruin of Greece. We find something of the same thing in Rome, but, for reasons that need not detain us here, the disease was slower in its operation. When the church eventually became the heir of the secular empire, its laws took the place of those of the state, until in the end what the hierarchy prescribed was regarded as the moral norm by almost everybody.

When we come to the Germanic nations, we find a different condition of affairs. *Sitte, Gesetz,* and *Satzung* were Nomos and Nomoi, but to act in conformity with them was not necessarily *sittlich.* Schiller makes the conspirators on the Ruetli appeal to the old *Satzungen* for their rights. Luther appealed from the church to the Scriptures, and by so doing paved the way for a personal morality, since his doctrine culminated in making every man the judge of his own actions in their ethical aspects. Feeble as the efforts were at first, the reformed church was based upon the right of private judgment. Says Hegel:

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In the Lutheran church the subjective feeling and the conviction of the individual is regarded as equally necessary with the objective side of truth. Truth with the Lutherans is not a finished and completed thing; the subject himself must be imbued with truth, surrendering his particular being in exchange for the substantial Truth and making that Truth his own.[4]

The religious reformers, in a sense, took up the problem of morals where the Greek thinkers had left it, with the result that the inward monitors have developed more and more apart from and independent of the hierarchy. No Protestant can say that an act is *sittlich* because it is *Sitte*. It may therefore be confidently affirmed that modern ethics rests upon the firmest possible basis. If our present civilization should ever pass away, as did that of ancient times, it will not be from lack of knowledge, but from weakness of will to put knowledge into practice.

It is probable that we have access to only a part of the vocabulary in use in the time of Homer. Most of the later commentators, it is true, tell us that in those days all persons spoke alike. Modern analogies are against such an hypothesis. Homeric Greek is the speech of an aristocratic class. The wide range of its vocabulary, with its multiplicity of forms, notwithstanding the narrow intellectual outlook of its *dramatis personæ*, may be taken as evidence that it was not the speech of the thrall and the peasant. These were rarely or never admitted to the festive occasions when the poems were recited. If we may judge from the limited vocabulary employed by the illiterate in our day, the common man in Homer's time would not have comprehended one-third of the fifteen thousand words in the poems. We have here the language which incorporates the morals of the aristocracy. In the fragments that have come down to us under the name of Theognis, we begin to see the differentiation of moral concepts into what we may call a higher and a lower stratum. Some of these fragments are at least as old as the sixth century B. C. They furnish instructive

[4] "Philosophy of History," Pt. IV, Sect. III, Sibree's translation.

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testimony of the transformation which many words had commenced to undergo. The plebeians were laying claim to patrician virtues, although all our testimony comes from the latter class. The former were learning to use the ethical vocabulary of the optimates; but not in the received sense. Many terms which in the course of time came to be used almost exclusively in an ethical sense, were formerly employed in a social and political signification. Grote, in the third volume of his "History of Greece," calls attention to this feature of Greek in the time of Theognis, and adds some interesting parallels from the later Greek and from the Latin. He might have cited examples from any modern language. If we trace the history of the word 'gentleman,' we find that it has been gradually extending the scope of its meaning. In "John Halifax, Gentleman," it has reached the domain of the waif and the outcast. Lecky says: "In the province of Ulster, Archbishop Synge assures us, that there were not in his time more than forty dissenters of the rank of *gentlemen.*"[5] Theognis would have written that there were not more than forty *kaloi kagathoi.* We can follow the course of this word in its different forms in the English and Romance languages back into the Latin. The gentleman is the man who belongs to a *gens,* and who has, therefore, a traceable ancestry. Our word 'noble' has gradually undergone a like amplification of meaning. A noble deed was originally one that was performed by a nobleman, or that was characteristic of the noble class, the nobility. The nobility was the judge. If the common man performed an act that excited admiration, it was simply because he did what a nobleman would have done. The world has, however, grown wiser by experience and has learned to distinguish between a noble man and a nobleman. The nobles and the notables are those who are known. Roman biographers sometimes inform us that So-and-So was born in an obscure place, that is,

[5] "History of England," Vol. II, p. 437. American edition.

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of obscure ancestry, in a class of society that was not known, a class that was careless about its progenitors. It was only by a sort of transferred merit that a menial could be credited with a noble deed: it was by doing as a nobleman would have done. We find exactly the same concept underlying the German. The *Edelmann* is the man who is a member of the *Adel*. *Eine edle Handlung* is one that is characteristic of the man who belongs to the *Adel*. The same root exists in the Anglo-Saxon; the Norman conquest, however, displaced it with a derivative from the Latin.[6] Dr. Bloomfield, in his note on a passage in Thucydides, where the *kaloi kagathoi* are spoken of as the so-called respectable people, shows a singular misapprehension of the real state of the case. The qualifying epithet is not added because the appellation was not yet "firmly established," but for the opposite reason. It was the common designation. A similar passage is found in Plato's "Republic." Whether the aristocracy embraces the best people is usually a matter of locality, or at least of country. Rome was during almost its entire existence as a state governed by an aristocratic class. According to the standard of the time, it was generally well governed. Both German and French writers are wont to characterize the English government as the best in Europe and to point to it as a model. Yet, until quite recently, it was almost entirely in the hands of the aristocracy. While therefore the same statement may be made of almost every country of Europe, the subject fared worse everywhere than in Great Britain. It is not probable that *Herrenmoral* "fell into desuetude in Greece through the Socratic philosophy": this was due to ethical progress; Socrates merely gave it a fixed place in literary discussion by emphasizing the intrinsic worth of man as man. It is a matter of common knowledge that Xenophon and Plato, and, in a scarcely less degree, Aristotle had little sympathy for Demos.

[6] We thus have *noble* for the Germanic *Adel* and *edel*.

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The terms, 'gentle' and 'virtue,' when traced back to their original signification, show a transition almost from one pole to the other. Virtue was originally masculine excellence, as the etymology of the word plainly indicates. In its present sense it is used chiefly of woman: one does not often hear of a virtuous man. 'Gentle' and *'gentler'* are now applied only to the female sex. Although woman counted for very little legally until within recent times, she was accounted the bearer of the *gens*. While 'genteel' has not any necessary connection with morality, gentle as a component part of gentleman is often associated with moral characteristics. Lowell speaks of Roger Williams as being a "gentle and good man." We need not go back to Theognis to ascertain what is meant by 'good society.' Every village can furnish practical examples of persons who, in common parlance, move in 'good society' or in the 'best society.' What the adjective connotes depends upon local conditions: one thing is certain,—it is never applied to those who labor with their hands. The very persons who are excluded use the phrases that have gained currency among those who employ them in disparagement. Of course, the Outs do not mean exactly the same thing as the Ins. We have the fact repeated *ad nauseam,* when disclosures of municipal rottenness are made, that some of the 'best citizens' are implicated. Moreover, every penitentiary in this and every other country shelters a colony of those 'best citizens.'

It is to be noted that in the Homeric age public opinion, as we may call it, already exercised a very strong influence. Then as now it was usually in favor of morality, or at least of social order, but not always. This mysterious force, which everybody fears and for which nobody is responsible, plays an important part in every society no matter how loosely organized. It has led to the lynching of many an innocent victim and to the acquittal of many a proved criminal. It has sustained many a man in his fight against corruption, and has condemned many a

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woman who was a sacrifice to man's perfidy. When not crystalized into statutes, any person is at liberty to discard it, while few have the courage to do so. Custom, which is but hereditary public opinion and differs from it only in that it changes slowly, while public opinion sometimes changes rapidly, is, according to Pindar, king of all. The Greeks, already in the time of Herodotus, had noted this, and had begun to distinguish between custom and nature. When Darius asked some Greeks for what they would be willing to eat the dead bodies of their parents, they cried out in horror that nothing could induce them to do so; when he called a tribe of Indians and asked what would induce them to burn the corpses of their parents, they were shocked at the bare thought of such a deed. The word chiefly used by Homer to designate public disapproval is *nemesis,* which was not yet a personification of retributive justice, a signification which it attained at a later period. Three other terms are likewise of frequent occurrence: *aidōs, aischos,* and *oneidos.* All are, however, regarded as deterrent and not hortatory. It may be remarked in this connection that law on the whole, whether moral or statutory, is chiefly prohibitory. Jurisprudence is mainly a system of restraints, except in so far as it embodies directions to the officers of administration. In the "Iliad" Phoinix says, when minded to slay his father: "Some immortal stayed mine anger, bringing to my mind the people's voice and all the reproaches of men (*oneidea*) lest I should be called a father-slayer amid the Achaians."[7] This passage, albeit of doubtful authenticity, is thoroughly Homeric in spirit. In another passage Helen wishes "that she had been mated with a better man that felt dishonor and the multitude of men's reproachings (Νέμεσίν τε καὶ αἰσχεα)." Elsewhere Nestor beseeches the Achaians to "set shame of other men's contempt in your hearts (αἰδῶ)."[8] In the

[7] Bk. IX, l. 460.
[8] Bk. XV, l. 661.

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"Odyssey" Telemachus says: "My mother will call down dire avengers as she departs from the house, and I shall have the blame of men *(nemesis)*."[9] In the twenty-second Book, Ulysses tells the wooers that they had no fear of the indignation of men hereafter *(nemesin)*.[10]

Oneidos occurs eight times in the "Iliad" and three times in the "Odyssey." *Aischos* occurs four times in each of the poems. *Aidōs* is found twenty-five times in the two poems, and the verb from the same root more than forty times, while *nemesis* with its verb is met with equally often. There is also manifest a solicitude for the good opinion of posterity. Penelope says:

> Man's life is brief enough. And if any be a hard man and hard at heart, all men cry evil on him for the time to come, while he yet lives, and all men mock him when he is dead. But if any be a blameless man and blameless at heart, his guests noise wide his fame abroad, and many call him excellent.[11]

The potency of public opinion is further illustrated by an anecdote found in Herodotus.[12] He tells us that Pantites, who purposely or unavoidably stayed away from the combat at Thermopylæ, found himself in such disgrace that he hanged himself.

The regular Greek word for virtue is *aretē*. But it includes a great many kinds of excellence; moral excellence hardly at all. When the spirit of Agamemnon meets Ulysses in Hades, he felicitates him on the devotion of his wife and exclaims: "Happy son of Laertes, in good sooth, with great steadfastness *(aretē)* thou didst win thy wife."[13] And a few lines farther on: "Therefore the glory of her fidelity *(aretē)* shall never perish, and the immortals shall make a precious song in the ears of men to the fame of constant Penelope." The term occurs nearly twenty times in the "Odyssey" and in the "Iliad"

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[9] Bk. II, l. 136.
[10] L. 40.
[11] Od. XIX, l. 329.
[12] Bk. VII, Ch. 232.
[13] Od. Bk. XXIV, l. 193.

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about half as often. Evidently the dominant motive was prudence, the desire to stand well with the members of the narrow circle to which the speaker belonged. This motive is surprisingly modern. It hardly needs to be mentioned that, in the long process of evolution, only here and there a man has been evolved whose actions and conduct are not greatly influenced by a narrower or wider public opinion, but solely by convictions. We must infer then that institutions, religious, political, and social, had to become in some measure fixed, before conduct was developed that involved at least the germs of morality, that is, conduct that had no regard to the opinion of others. It is probable that the notion of free agency was entirely foreign to the Homeric age. Man was the puppet of what Hegel calls the objective will, this intangible force that tosses him about in every direction, as the waves toss a frail bark on the ocean. This being the case, we cannot speak of ethical conduct in the proper sense of the term. There is probably not a single instance mentioned in either the "Iliad" or the "Odyssey," where a reason is given for an act, which is not attributed to some supernatural agency and therefore to an agency that is purely external. Even the word that may sometimes be translated 'to think,' means, rather, 'to say to one's self.' What a primitive stage this represents, and that all men at one time occupied the same stage, may be gleaned from a statement I read not long ago, in which the writer asserted that in one of the South African languages he found that the verb 'to think' really meant 'to talk in one's belly.'

The usual term for good is *agathos*. It is met with more than a hundred times in Homer, while its superlative is of still more frequent occurrence. Both words occur more frequently in the "Iliad" than in the "Odyssey," owing to the larger number of characters the former poem brings upon the scene of action, although, it may be remarked in passing, the feminine form is used twice as often in the later as in the earlier epic. When we speak of a 'good man,' nobody is in doubt as to what

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we mean; the good man in Homer is, however, his antipode in almost every respect. The man who was endowed with the largest measure of *aretē* was *agathos.* This *aretē* was *Tugend* in German and *virtus* in Latin. *Tugend* is clearly related to *taugen,* a verb of frequent use. (The *Taugenichts* is the ne'er-do-weel.) It was primarily applied to persons, with reference to the vigor that is characteristic of the prime of life. But its application in a literature is far wider: it is used of horses, of wine, of a sword, and so forth. Goethe speaks of *die Tugenden natürlicher Edelsteine.* English writers, until comparatively recent times, employed 'virtues' in the same sense. A thousand years after Homer, *aretē* still had a slight tinge of objectivity. Both in Plutarch and in the New Testament it is correlated with *doxa* and *epainos,* as we may see in the passage: "If there be any virtue," etc. (Philippians, iv, 8).

Let us examine the Latin a little farther. When Horace[14] writes: "Virtus, repulsæ nescia sordidæ," etc., Virtue that knows not the disgrace of defeat; and again: "Virtus recludens immeritis mori Cœlum," Virtue opening heaven wide to those who deserve not to die; he had in mind the modern conception of virtue as moral excellence. A little farther along, when glorifying the man who is bold in conscious worth, he informs us that it was by this course, that is, by virtue, that Pollux and roving Hercules and father Bacchus and Augustus and Quirinus gained the fiery heights. Here are two conceptions of virtue which present a singular mixture. To speak of it as one of the qualities that distinguished Hercules and Bacchus seems like a parody. We can suppress a smile only when we recall what the word meant to the author; for the context shows that he was in earnest. In modern Italy the etymological descendant of *virtus* appears in a still different garb. Dryden says: "The Italians call

[14] Odes, III, 2. The three Odes beginning the Third Book are really but one.

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a man a *virtuoso* who loves the noble arts and is a critic in them." Here the virtuous man, conformably to the national predilection for the fine arts, is he who possesses expert knowledge or skill. It is true, even in Italy this is not the sole meaning of virtuous, but it is the one that most impressed foreigners, and hence was transferred by them into their own tongue.

Bonus means *agathos*. In Latin discussion it appears most frequently in the phrase *summum bonum*. Its earliest use shows a strongly materialistic tinge; nor are its descendants and equivalents free from it. *Bona* meant the good things of this life, earthly possessions, a signification that is almost exactly covered by the French *biens*. In *hommes de bien* we still have the word, but the connection shows that its meaning has shifted. The German *Gut* is likewise a familiar designation of landed property, an estate. In the English 'goods' the word has a purely material signification. A careful examination of *honestus* makes it evident that if it ever meant 'honorable' or 'honest' in their subjective sense, the instances are rare and late compared with those in which it means honorable, that is, honored with a public office. Its Latin congeners have all more or less regard to outward appearance. In a state of society in which the good of the tribe was of prime importance, to be entrusted with an office, through which its interests could be most effectively guarded, was the highest mark of esteem. *Honor* and *honors* refer entirely to official dignities. Closely akin in meaning is the German *Ehre,* rank, dignity, magnificence, although its related root in the Anglo-Saxon has not passed into English. *Der Ehrwürdige* is covered by our 'honorable,' when applied as an official title; but it does not mean *der Ehrliche* any more than our 'honorable' means honest or upright. An honorable man is just as much the noblest work of God as an honest man; to be an 'Honorable' is something quite different. Evidently Mark Anthony, in the speech Shakespeare puts into his mouth, regarded the two terms as synonymous.

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One of the most important vocables that may be considered in this connection is 'conscience.' It is usually defined as that power or faculty of the human mind by which it discerns the moral quality of acts and feelings. But the Latin word *conscientia* by no means covers our word conscience, although it is its direct ancestor. It is plainly connected with cognition (*con-scientia*), and means a knowing along with something else, or perhaps with ourselves. The Greek *syneidesis* is compounded in precisely the same way. In speaking of conscience, a competent authority says: "Neither Greek nor Roman used it in our sense. It is unknown to the Old Testament, is never used by our Lord, nor by the New Testament writers except Paul and Peter."[15] This statement is perhaps a little stronger than the facts warrant, but there is no doubt that it is true in the main. As late as the time of Luther, the terms *wissen* (know) and *Gewissen* were sometimes employed as synonyms. In German a distinction has likewise arisen between *das Recht* and *das Rechte,* just as in English we make a difference between right and rights. It is well known that under the law a man may have rights that are clearly in contravention of right. Legal rights differ widely in different countries and in the same country at different times. Again, *rechtschaffen* means made or created according to what is right. It is *rechtgeschaffen. Der rechtschaffene Mann* was primarily the man who lived according to the right, as established by the community of which he formed a part. It has now risen to a higher plane. Here we come upon the straight man, the upright man, a being created by the human imagination and placed in a region where he still dwells, but towards which the hopes and aspirations and strivings of man are advancing by imperceptible gradations. The straight man, the upright man, the righteous man, is the highest type of the human species as pictured in speech by the consensus of the com-

[15] See Thayer's Lexicon of N. T. Greek.

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munity. But the underlying concept is purely materialistic. It has long been the fashion to talk glibly of 'rights' as if it were a term concerning the signification of which there could be no dispute. Men in general think, if they do not say, that 'all men are endowed with certain inalienable rights.' In practice these assumed inalienable rights are constantly alienated and circumscribed by the state. They must be defined before they can be defended; and definition is limitation.

A few words as to 'manners' and its etymological relations will not be out of place here. When the English translators wrote: "Evil communications corrupt good manners," they meant morals. Luther's German says: "*Boese Geschwaetze verderben gute Sitten.*" The Greek evidently means that evil associations corrupt good morals, a point which the English of three centuries ago does not bring out. When Cicero exclaimed: "*O tempora, O mores,*" he was calling attention to the perverted manners and morals of his day, but his hearers had to infer his meaning. 'Manners' no longer has any connection with morals; it is applied only to behavior. Hence a man may have bad manners and be thoroughly upright. The term is used several times in the Bible, while morals does not occur. The French progenitor of 'manners' is of frequent occurrence; from the French it passed into both German and English with scarcely a change of meaning. *Moral* is of late appearance in German; it seems to have been borrowed from the French by Wolff, for the purpose of avoiding the ambiguity to which *Sitte* might lead. The same ambiguity lurks in *Sittlichkeit:* hence the Germans often use *Moralität,* as morality of the heart, or conscience, and *Sittlichkeit,* as conventional moral conduct. Neither 'ethics' nor 'morals' seems to occur in Shakespeare, but he uses 'manners' a number of times to designate conduct. It is probable that the former of these words at least, was not naturalized in English until after his time.

There is a considerable number of other words that

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exhibit the growth of humaneness and even common honesty by the gradual strengthening of the objective will. The process was probably about as follows: Ten men, or any number, may be equally heartless; but under special provocation one of them makes himself guilty of an atrocious act. The indignation, or at least the disapproval, of the other nine who have not been under similar temptation is aroused and in one way and another the culprit is made to feel its effects. Under a legally organized government this indignation usually finds expression in a prohibitory statute. Such has often been the case. Corporate honesty, in the large sense, is often promoted by a flagrant breach of trust; the financial loss of a few becomes a safeguard for many in the future. Penalties for crimes are never imposed upon abstract principles, but only after specific acts.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

VALUATION: ITS NATURE AND LAWS. Being an Introduction to the General Theory of Value. By Wilbur Marshall Urban, Ph. D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1909. Pp. xviii, 432.

We have here for the first time a considerable work in English upon that subject of value which has engaged so much attention in Germany. It must be a difficult matter for the writer of such a book to decide how much knowledge he may suppose his readers to possess, and whether he ought to write a text-book for them or set forth advanced study and original research. I may perhaps be typical of a good many English readers of Professor Urban's book in that it has formed for me my first introduction to the subject, and to my mind he has made an excellent compromise. If I have found some of the sections rather difficult and a few of them a little easy, I have remembered how hard the compromise must be to make, and wondered that there were not more such parts. The matter of the book is that of a learned work in the best sense. It is written by one who obviously knows his subject, and even when the pages are difficult and seem obscure, the reader has strong reason to believe that there is clear and solid thought behind.

The ground seems to be covered very thoroughly. We have first to discuss what valuation consists of, and that involves an examination of the nature of feeling and its relation to will. The treatment of this subject strikes me as one of the best parts of the book. Professor Urban's special points are two. (1) Some writers say that valuation is a matter of feeling, and some that it is a matter of will, of 'intensity-less acts of preference,' the accompaniment of feeling being irrelevant (p. 76). But discussions of this point are misleading if they assume too hard a division between feeling and will. If we admit that feeling when it rises above the level of mere sensation-tone may have other qualities besides hedonic intensity,—may, for instance, have the attribute of restlessness or quiescence,—then there is no particular reason for separating it from conation-consciousness. In that case emotion will be only "a shortened form of desire and

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volition, in which organic largely takes the place of motor sensitivity" (pp. 103 *f.*). Valuation can then be taken to be a matter of feeling, without our falling into the great mistake of supposing it to vary with hedonic vividness. Hedonic resonance may become as insignificant in the developed feeling as imagery in the developed concept. (2) The whole matter cannot be explained in terms of conscious experience alone; we cannot describe it without bringing in the notion of dispositions. These may be called either conative or affective. "What distinguishes the phases which are predominately affective from those predominately conative is the degree of inhibition" of the tendency concerned (p. 94).

We arrive, then, at the description: "Worth experience is a concrete feeling-attitude, in which conation is always present and conative dispositions always presupposed" (p. 93). Such feelings will have a logic and development of their own. Hedonic excitement may shrink and fall into the background as imagery falls back in thought, till what is left is nothing but an 'affective sign.' Nevertheless this affective sign, this "relatively intensity-less appreciation" may have the full funded meaning of what went before (p. 112). Again, we have not only this liberation from hedonic excitement, but liberation from bondage to actual fact. Our valuation may rest on assumptions as well as on presuppositions and on judgment; we may assign values to what is not actually there.

Side by side with this development of value-feeling, we have the development of valued objects. On the lowest level we have the objects of simple appreciation, 'condition worths.' Above these come such qualities and dispositions as we value in persons; the transition presupposing an elaborate process of *Einfühlung,* of knowing others and so coming to know ourselves. Beginning from primitive organic sympathy with others, we rise to that power of intellectual construction which enables their dispositions and feelings to become objects to us; and thence, further, we rise to such intelligent participation of feeling as gives us our third level of value-objects, 'over-individual' worths.

In all these departments we have next to study the special laws which govern our valuation,—laws 'of the threshold,' 'of diminishing values,' 'of complementary values,' 'of contrast,' 'of the total series,' 'of end feelings.' [To find names for psychological facts is a difficult business, and no doubt the author

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is hampered by German nomenclature already established, but the constant introduction of technical terms will give some trouble to unpractised readers, here and throughout the book.] 'Value movements' are carefully studied. We are shown the way in which our affections transfer themselves from end to means and from means to end, and also to new objects or aspects which emerge in the course of the processes directed toward the primary object. We may begin by seeking an object, and end by aiming rather at the constant disposition to seek it, the activity of seeking it, or the hedonic accompaniments. A simple appreciation may deepen its reference to that larger system of meanings vaguely presupposed which constitutes its 'transgredient reference,' and may so become a sense of obligation, or instead it may deepen its 'immanental reference,' and so become æsthetic in nature. Chapters IX to XII are devoted to a very careful and detailed description of our ways of valuing personal and over-individual worths. The description is often fresh, thoughtful, and interesting, but sometimes the author seems to give overmuch space and care to explaining matters which are not particularly hard to understand.

The last chapter of the book, on the other hand, I have found extremely difficult. The author touches here on the question of the possibility of a coherent philosophy of values. As far as I understand it, his discussion seems to me to be convincing and good. The test of validity suggested is the "inner identity and continuity of the will with its objects or with itself."

Professor Urban is a useful guide because he refers so constantly to the chief writers on his subject. He manages these references admirably, making them full enough to show clearly what the author means, and seeming always to be fair-minded and non-partisan.

The book deserves sincere praise. It is, as I have said, learned, thoughtful, and fair, and a valuable addition to the English version of philosophy. Having said this with all my heart, I am bound to add that never did I meet a valuable book on an interesting subject which was so hard to read. I have constantly read sentences again and again without getting anything from them,—not because they were obscure, but because I failed entirely to keep my attention upon them. At intervals of some weeks I tried three times to read the first chapter, and three times gave it up. I find it hard to say what the exact

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reason is. As far as I can make out, the unusual length of most of the sentences, and their lack of rhythm, have something to do with it; perhaps also the great number of technical terms, and of long words and Latin forms. It will be a pity if these obstacles prevent students from getting through the book. If they do get through, they will be glad to have read it, even if they are also glad to have finished reading it.

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SIX RADICAL THINKERS. By J. MacCunn. London: Edward Arnold, 1907. Pp. 268.

Professor MacCunn's book consists of appreciations of Bentham, Mill, Cobden, Carlyle, Mazzini, and Green. To each of the six is given a study of some forty pages,—sympathetic, intimate, and only critical (when it is critical) with that immanent criticism, if it may be so called, which, applying no external hard canon, seeks to elicit the measure of truth contained in every view discussed, and never to prove an error without also proving that the error is an exaggeration of some truth. The study of Mill is a model of such criticism. Instead of taking Mill as a mere target of criticism,—a facile process in the case of a writer so honestly inconsistent, and one to which the logic of the schools is a little over-prone,—Professor MacCunn seeks always to "fashion his character from the heart outwards," and to enter first into Mill's thought, before he enters the lists against his errors. One thing only has struck the reviewer during a recent reading of Mill, which Professor MacCunn might perhaps have emphasized; and that is the sense of the spiritual foundations of society and its institutions which Mill, starting from a different point of view, nevertheless shares with T. H. Green. When Mill writes that "politically speaking, a great part of all power consists in will"; when he urges that the first element of good government is "the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community"; when he defends democracy for the intellectual and moral development of the individual which it brings; he is after all enforcing the lessons which Green afterwards enforced, when he too taught that will, not force, is the basis of the state;

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that national welfare must be concrete in "the greater worth" of "the individuals composing the nation"; and that democracy, which means the active energy of each individual, is the only proper means to the attainment of such welfare. However different Green's view of the individual,—as an organic member of society, and the manifestation of an eternal consciousness,—may be from Mill's own more atomistic and secularist conception, one cannot ignore these fundamental unities in the application of different conceptions.

Professor MacCunn's essays are written with a simplicity and lucidity of exposition and a vigor of style, which should carry them beyond the studies of philosophic scholars, and should give them a place on the desks of all who have to think or act on questions of politics and economics. Many will turn first to the essay on Cobden; and they will find in it enlightenment alike on the larger issues with which the doctrine of free trade was connected in Cobden's mind, and on the developments of thought which have brought that doctrine once more into question of late. Particularly interesting is what Professor MacCunn has to say of the influence of the idea of nationality on economic theory. The influence of that idea has perhaps an even wider ramification than Professor MacCunn allows. He speaks of the modern competition between nation and nation for external markets; but the doctrine of economic nationalism has its widest and finest range in its internal application. The economic *αὐτάρκεια* of the nation, sheltered by a system of protection, may be held to be essential to the richest and most evenly developed national life. Only a nation, it may be argued, which has developed its activities alike in agriculture and manufacture, alike in primary and secondary industries, in foreign exchange and in internal production, can really be said to have attained the full measure of its stature. And this may be urged not only in the economic sphere, but in regard to national life generally. A nation which has no agriculture is not only one-sided economically, it has lost the contribution of a class which has something to give to the political life and general welfare of the community,—a class which can renew the national physique, and give, in the hour of national deliberation, a sane and balanced vote (the vote of those "who draw the quiet air into their blood"), to counteract, or at any rate supplement, the fevered hurry and the radical

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agitation of the towns. Such a 'national economy' has had its advocates in Germany; and it gives protectionism a finer and more ideal aspect in which it has its attraction even for the modern Cobdenite.

Rousseau does not figure among the radical thinkers of Professor MacCunn's gallery; but one can hardly speak of democracy without mentioning the man who was, in many ways, its greatest apostle, and Professor MacCunn is led, in the course of his essay on Green, to refer to him more than once. In these references Rousseau is perhaps somewhat hardly treated. In one passage we read of Rousseau's "return to nature;" in another there is a reference to his "destructive sentimentalism." There is truth in such sayings; but there is another side of the matter. In the "Contrat Social," Nature and the State of Nature do not present themselves to Rousseau as things admirable, to which return is desirable or indeed possible. The State of Nature is for Rousseau a state without justice; and justice only comes with the institution of a political society. It is a state unstable and in the issue intolerable; and the necessity of better life drives men away from it into an organized state. That state, *un être moral collectif,* first makes possible a true and rational morality. Here there is no 'reversion,' such as did indeed appear in Rousseau's early prize essay; and there is little sentimentalism. There is, indeed, on the contrary, an insistence on reason as the constituent force in political organization. Rousseau, after all, had more of the elements of a 'thinker' in his composition than had, perhaps, Mazzini, and one would have been glad to see him in this gallery side by side with Bentham. For Rousseau and Bentham are after all the 'radical thinkers' who have had most influence on men and affairs. And Carlyle, it is worth noticing, has discernment enough to find room for both, if a little grudgingly, among his Heroes. "Benthamism," he tells us, "is an eyeless heroism" (the words come in a passage which shows that Carlyle *can,* after all, "argue," or at any rate sympathize, "with these individual hedonists," a little more than Professor MacCunn allows); and as for Rousseau, is he not of the Prophets, with "his ineradicable feeling and knowledge that this life of ours is *true;* not a Scepticism, Theorem, or Persiflage, but a Fact, an awful Reality"?

The style in which these essays are written,—if in conclusion we may speak of forms and appearances for a moment,—is

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vigorous, vivid, and trenchant. But there are certain recurrent mannerisms which the reader begins to notice as he reads. One is, that Professor MacCunn always finds *two* reasons for everything. As the son of Sirach writes: "All things are double, one against another." Perhaps there is a certain immanent Hegelianism in this 'duplicity'; but the device recurs too often; and it leads inevitably, in one of its applications, to an exaggeration of the trick of antithesis. A sentence like that on page 135 ("They would escape the certain cost and the costly uncertainties of war") reminds one of Gorgias.

E. BARKER.

St. John's College, Oxford.

THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION: Regarded as the Parallel Growth of Opposite Tendencies. By W. Benett. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1908. Pp. 220.

This is a very favorable example of the work of the amateur philosopher. The author, as he tells us himself, was attracted to philosophy in his student days, was compelled to lay it aside for the duties of a life of action, and now in retirement has returned to the study of problems long postponed, but never quite lost sight of. The purpose of the book cannot be better stated than in the author's own words. It is, firstly, "to enforce the view that the process of evolution, whether it be forward and in the direction of further development, or backward and degenerative, has never exhibited the isolated advance or decay of any single principle in the pairs of opposites, such as good and evil, pain and pleasure, ignorance and knowledge, and many others, which enter into the total complex of human nature; but that, on the contrary, when any one of the partners in any such a pair has either grown or decreased, the other partner too has shared the growth or decrease to an approximately equal extent. The other half of our purpose has been to trace the connection of this principle with ethics, or the systematic representation of our judgments on human conduct."

This principle leads Mr. Benett to a restatement of the ordinary formula of evolution. The common biological view is that evolution means an all-round advance: according to Herbert Spencer, as man evolves, he gets better altogether and

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more in harmony with his environment. Mr. Benett points out that only in one point does mankind go forward without any counterbalance, *i. e.*, in output of energy; but that in all other respects gain is counterbalanced by loss,—increase of pleasure by increase of pain, increase of knowledge by increase of ignorance, increase of goodness by increase of badness. We might put the whole matter briefly in a theological formula which Mr. Benett does not happen to use: "The stronger God grows, the stronger grows the Devil." If anyone asks, why then need men care about the progress of evolution? Mr. Benett replies that what men admire is just this evolutionary progress, this growth of energy and of contrary qualities. In other words, a world in which both God and Devil are very strong is more interesting and admirable than one in which both are comparatively weak.

The most valuable feature of Mr. Benett's book is the degree in which his theory reflects the experience of his active life. It is true that this experience is not obtruded; but it may be read plainly enough between the lines. His active life has been spent in helping to govern India, and in India everything human is on a lower scale than with us,—the race is less forcible, will is weaker, ambition lower; there are fewer striking virtues and fewer striking vices, less enjoyment and less suffering, fewer problems solved and fewer problems unsolved. It is the vantage-ground of this experience, so different from anything with which we are familiar in Europe, that enables Mr. Benett to point out the weakness of those optimistic formulas 'survival of the fittest' and 'perfectibility of the species.' He approves of Darwinism so far as that means descent of species now divergent from a common ancestry; but for such phrases as 'survival of the fittest,' he can find no warrant in the facts. Survival is one thing and fitness another; and the two have no necessary connection.

The later chapters of the book, where Mr. Benett gets further away from the main thesis, hardly maintain his earlier level: though not wanting in acute remarks on ethical questions, they seem to suffer somewhat from dispersion of interest. In future publications Mr. Benett will do well to consult his reader a little more by making his scheme more definite and comprehensive, and by adding a little sharpness to the detail.

HENRY STURT.

Oxford, England.

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LES CONDITIONS DU BONHEUR. By Paul Souriau, Professor at the University of Nancy. Paris: Armand Colin, 1908. Pp. 348.

In writing this book, the object of which he states to be the determination of the actual conditions of happiness, Professor Souriau seems to have been moved by a desire to make people happier. Not that he does not also attach a scientific value to his task. The question, What are the main causes of human happiness? can only be answered by an inquiry into facts; and he thinks this inquiry important from the point of view of the discovery of truth, quite apart from any didactic value that it may have. Still, its main interest for him evidently lies in the influence which, in his opinion, it is likely to have on our happiness. It is therefore unfortunate that he does not explain clearly what form this influence can take.

As to certain general conditions of happiness, such as bodily health and money, it seems superfluous to write a book urging the advantage of pursuing them, since nearly everybody desires to be rich and healthy. There are, however, other things, which are often regarded as essential to happiness, and for which it does seem useful to urge people to strive. The desire to do one's duty, for instance, is probably neither so strong nor so universal as the desire for health and money; so that,—since it may be argued that the world would be happier if more people did their duty,—some discussion of moral obligations may plausibly be held to fall within the scope of a treatise on the art of happiness. Accordingly we find that much of Professor Souriau's book is occupied with describing the general lines of conduct which various classes of people ought to pursue. Marriages, as a general rule, ought not to be based solely on considerations of fortune; husbands and wives ought to be mutually forbearing; married people ought not unduly to restrict the number of their children, though they ought not to have too many; parents ought to bring up their children well, and children ought to treat their parents with consideration; society ought to aim at a juster distribution of wealth; the rich ought to be public spirited and not to live in selfish luxury: these are samples of the views which Professor Souriau advocates at some length. These views, it will be seen, are neither new nor startling: and there can be little doubt that Professor Souriau

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is right in saying that people ought, as a rule, to act in the ways that he describes. His object, however, is not merely to encourage the observance of such rules by pointing them out: his hope seems rather to be that, by explaining their connection with happiness, he will persuade people to observe them more generally, and that thereby he will increase the total sum of happiness. Is this hope justified? In the first place, he indicates no way of deciding whether in particular cases the general rule ought to be followed or not; so that, even if increase of happiness and right conduct always coincided, no one could tell from this book whether in a particular case he ought to do what would at the same time make him most happy. Again, Professor Souriau says emphatically that happiness and duty do not universally coincide: the wicked, he thinks, do sometimes flourish; so that, if anyone already knows what he ought to do, the remarks about happiness contained in this book will not influence his action so long as there is no means of ascertaining whether the performance of his duty will cause an increase of happiness. It thus seems unlikely that Professor Souriau's determination of the conditions of happiness should have the effect which he expects.

The reason why he nevertheless regards his treatise as a guide to happiness is not far to seek. It lies in his constant tendency to identify 'true' happiness with morality. He does, it is true, begin by defining happiness as the excess of pleasures (mental and physical) over pains: when he speaks of a happy man, he is going to mean, he tells us, simply a man in whose life there is, on the whole, more pleasure than pain. But gradually, under the pressure of difficulties, he drifts into a different definition. Such questions, for instance, arise as whether a civilized man is generally more happy than a savage, or a savage than an animal,—questions which, if by 'happier' we mean simply 'enjoying more pleasure,' it certainly seems very difficult to answer in the absence of trustworthy data for comparing, in respect of amount and intensity of pleasure, the life (say) of the average savage with that of the average European. But if we give a wider meaning to the word 'happier,' it does seem plausible to suppose that these questions can be answered without collecting a mass of complicated facts. And this is what Professor Souriau does. He urges that there is some necessary connection between increase of pleasure and increase of activity.

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This connection (though not precisely defined) appears to be such that the more intense and the more varied an individual's activities, the greater (whether in quantity, or intensity, or both, is not clear) can be said to be his 'true' pleasure and his 'true' happiness. It follows that civilized men, who have developed moral activities over and above the physical and mental activities which they share with savages and animals, have a surplus of happiness over that enjoyed by creatures lower in the scale. Now it may be admitted that a definition of happiness as the full development of all normal activities, physical, mental and moral, might to some extent render probable this optimistic conclusion. If 'to be happy' *means* 'to develop moral and other activities in a high degree,' it might conceivably follow that people who are much concerned about morality are happier *(ceteris paribus)* than those who are not; and in that case Professor Souriau might be justified in thinking that by recommending morality he was showing the way to happiness. But, as it is, no inference from moral activity to happiness is open to him, because (to say nothing of his admission that the righteous are not always happy) his original definition of happiness as excess of pleasures over pains contradicts the premiss required for any such inference: if a happy life is *defined* as one in which pleasure predominates, it cannot also be *defined* as one of the greatest and most varied activity possible. The two definitions might be reconciled by proving a universal connection between pleasure and *all* forms of activity; but he does not attempt this proof, which indeed could not be effected without abandoning the view that duty is sometimes unpleasant.

It remains to say a word as to Professor Souriau's claim that his results are based on a laborious investigation of facts. His object is to 'determine the conditions' of human happiness,—an ambiguous phrase which would seem to include at least an enumeration of the principal things which are necessary to happiness, and some comparison of them in respect of the degree in which they are necessary. Here our main criticism must be that he obtains no definite results at all except such as are obvious truisms. He makes indeed some parade of scientific method; but it is only parade: he is not really put to any great pains to discover that much happiness is caused by bodily health, a well-balanced mind, marriage, family ties, sufficient money, belief in religion, and so forth. It is plain enough that these

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things are among the causes of most of the happiness in the world; and it is equally plain that some of them also cause some unhappiness. Professor Souriau makes no serious effort to estimate the proportion which the amount of happiness thus caused bears to that of the unhappiness, nor does he consider whether any one of these causes is more necessary as a condition of happiness than the others. To solve these or any other of the numerous problems which the phrase 'the conditions of happiness' at once suggests, it would be essential in the first place to obtain some clear idea as to the difference which different intensities of pleasure make to the total amounts of happiness in which they occur. But Professor Souriau scarcely notices the difficulties connected with intensity of pleasure, and is far from seeing how important is the place which those difficulties must occupy in any theory of happiness.

S. WATERLOW.

Rye, England.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: A Study of the Larger Mind. By Charles Horton Cooley. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909. Pp. xviii, 426.

Those whose estimate of sociology has been formed largely through their knowledge of Herbert Spencer and other writers of his school, will find a pleasant surprise in this book. The older sociology was physical and even materialistic. The new sociology is frankly dependent upon psychology. It is, indeed, frequently not to be distinguished from psychology except in its point of view, which is not that of individual consciousness, but that of the collective life. Among the leaders of this new or psychological sociology in this country is Professor Cooley, of the University of Michigan, whose "Human Nature and the Social Order," and the volume we are about to consider may be taken as fairly representative of the new school. Those who have learned to expect something worth while through reading his former work, will be in no way disappointed in this, his latest production.

The volume before us is in no sense a formal text on the

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psychological aspects of sociology. It is, rather, a series of essays on fundamental sociological problems, written in delightful literary style, and with keen and sound psychological insight. The book is divided into six parts, Part I treating "The Primary Aspects of Organization"; Part II, "Communication"; Part III, "The Democratic Mind"; Part IV, "Social Classes"; Part V, "Institutions"; Part VI, "Public Will." While all parts of the work contain sane and scholarly discussions of the problems with which they deal, Parts I and II are fundamental and contain the chief original contributions to sociological science. We shall, therefore, give them more extended notice.

In Part I Professor Cooley discusses the primary groups of society and their influence on the social life. By "primary groups" he means "those characterized by intimate, face-to-face association and coöperation," such as the family, the play-group of children, and the neighborhood group of elders. Such groups are universal, belonging to all times and all stages of social development, and are "clearly the nursery of human nature." In spite of the fact that many other forms of association exist in the complex social life of the present, "the fact that the family and neighborhood groups are ascendant in the open and plastic time of childhood makes them even now incomparably more influential than all the rest." These groups, then, are the springs of life, not only for the individual, but for social institutions. They especially give rise to our social ideals, which become the motive and test of social progress. Our notions of love, freedom, justice and the like are gotten very largely from life in these primary groups. Moreover, it is in them that we first get the idea of a moral unity, a 'we.' The family life, for example, is "the immemorial type of moral unity, and the source of its many terms,—such as brotherhood, kindness, and the like." "The ideal of moral unity" is, then, "the mother, as it were, of all social ideals." Democracy is an extension of the ideals from the playground and neighborhood group, while Christianity, as a social system, is based upon the family. The projection of these ideals into an ever more complex social organization, "the creation of a moral order on an ever-growing scale, is the great historical task of mankind."

It follows from all this that social knowledge is needed as

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the basis of morality. "We live in a system, and to achieve right ends, or any rational ends whatever, we must learn to understand that system."

In Part II Professor Cooley gives, for the first time in sociological literature, strange as it may seem, full and adequate recognition of "communication" as a fundamental fact in the social life. Through communication, or all forms of interstimulation and response by means of symbols, the moral and psychical unity of society is made possible. "By means of this structure (the social communicating apparatus), the individual is a member not only of a family and a class and a state, but of a larger whole reaching back to prehistoric men whose thought has gone to build it up. In this whole he lives as an element drawing from it the materials of his growth, and adding to it whatever constructive thought he may possess." From this point of view Professor Cooley discusses the enlargement and perfection of means of communication in modern life and the resulting effect upon government, religion, and culture. Also, he takes up the effect of this enlarged psychical life upon the consciousness of the individual, on the one hand, and upon the efficiency and organization of public opinion as a controlling agency in society, upon the other. The whole of this discussion, as well as his discussion regarding the growth of classes and of institutions, is extremely interesting and suggestive, but perhaps enough of the book has already been given to indicate its value to all who are interested in social and moral problems, whether on their theoretical or practical sides. To all such, the best service that the reviewer can do is heartily to commend to them the reading of the book itself.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

University of Missouri.

HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS. By Graham Wallas. London: Archibald Constable & Co., 1909. Pp. xvi, 302..

Political thinkers and workers alike should derive much instruction from the study of Mr. Wallas's stimulating little book. It is mainly an argument for the basing of political

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theory and practice on the more empirical study of human nature, or, briefly, on psychology. The revolution which the application of psychological knowledge and methods has created in criminology and education has, Mr. Wallas contends, hardly affected politics at all. Here we are generally content to operate with a few ancient maxims until, tiring of them, we too often lapse into despair for the political future of mankind, or into cynical acquiescence in the policy of the parties to which, by tradition, we belong. Very aptly, Mr. Wallas compares the equipment of the modern political theorist or practitioner with that of "the medical student trained by the study of Hippocrates or Galen. He is taught a few isolated, and therefore distorted, facts about the human type, about pleasure and pain, perhaps, and the association of ideas, or the influence of habit. He is told that these are selected from the other facts of human nature in order that he may think clearly on the hypothesis of there being no others. What the others may be he is left to discover for himself; but he is likely to assume that they cannot be the subject of effective scientific thought. He learns also a few empirical maxims about liberty and caution and the like, and, after he has read a little of the history of institutions, his political education is complete" (pp. 123, 124).

Disappointment with the working and the fruits of representative government is a very common condition, and has been in recent years the theme of many learned treatises. Mr. Wallas, as an active political worker, as a candidate and canvasser at elections, and as a member of elective bodies in London, has had many reasons for sharing in the prevailing despondency. In the first part of this work, "The Conditions of the Problem," he very effectively sets forth some of the reasons why the calculations of the reforming politician have gone astray. The principal error, of course, is the 'intellectualist' assumption that the adult human being is primarily a reasoning animal, who proceeds in politics to choose what he considers to be the best means of attaining certain rationally approved ends. Mr. Wallas is able, on the contrary, to demonstrate, with an inexhaustible wealth of illustration and suggestion, the enormous strength of mental factors other than rational choice and inference. First come the impulses and instincts of mankind, for example, the impulse of affection. Adroitly managed, this im-

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pulse will, as we know, reduce the political thinking of a constituency to a shadow. Nor, again, is it difficult to find in the operation of this and kindred impulses the preservative of institutions, which are, in many ways, manifestly pernicious, as, for example, the British monarchy and peerage.

Again, the springs of human action will be rightly appreciated only if we take account of the effects of habit and familiarity, and, conversely, of the unusual and the strange, and of the modes of cognition which most directly appeal to the emotions and the will. These facts are in their way well known to advertisers and presumably to the baser sort of politician, whom the better sort are apt to find so useful. The entity which in our country inspires the most intense and durable political emotion is *the party*, that bug-bear of the academic politician. In this connection, Mr. Wallas's words are worth quoting: "The party candidate is, at his first appearance, to most of his constituents merely a packet with the name of Liberal or Conservative upon it. That name has associations of color and music, of traditional habit and affection, which, when once formed, exist independently of the party policy. Unless he bears the party label,—unless he is, as the Americans say, a 'regular' candidate, —not only will those habits and affections be cut off from him, but he will find it extraordinarily difficult to present himself as a tangible entity to the electors at all" (p. 90).

Mr. Wallas suggests, with much ingenuity, the application of statistical methods to the human nature which is the material of politics. Facts relating to human beings should be collected under three main heads: "descriptive facts as to the human type; quantitative facts as to inherited variations from that type observed either in individuals or groups of individuals; and facts, both quantitative and descriptive, as to the environment into which men are born, and the observed effect of that environment upon their political actions and impulses" (p. 122).

This is a considerable task and Mr. Wallas seems to me to take it much too lightly. Recent incursions of mathematical statisticians into sociology are not very reassuring, and I am by no means disposed to concede to them the future of political science. On the other hand, nothing but approval can be given to Mr. Wallas's plea for a more quantitative treatment of certain practical and political problems. It is indeed a grievous

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reproach to representative government and a serious hindrance to political progress, that controversy should commonly be conducted on the system of wholesale denunciation and rejection. Thus Mr. Wallas writes: "For many socialists and individualists the mere attempt to think in such a [quantitative] way of their problem would be an extremely valuable exercise. If a socialist and an individualist were required even to ask themselves the question, 'How much socialism?' or 'How much individualism?' a basis of real discussion would be arrived at—even in the impossible case that one should answer, 'All individualism and no socialism,' and the other, 'All socialism and no individualism'" (p. 148). More attention to the obvious advantages of such a method would do something to mitigate some of the worst evils of our party system.

The second part of the book, "Possibilities of Progress," does not, I think, cohere very closely with the first part, though it is excellent in itself and falls appropriately enough under the general title of the book. Mr. Wallas is aware of the danger which must have haunted many in reading the scathing exposures which fill the first part. "At first sight, therefore, it might appear that the change in political science which is now going on will simply result in the abandonment by the younger politicians of all ethical traditions, and the adoption by them, as the result of their new book-learning, of those methods of exploiting the irrational elements of human nature which have hitherto been the trade secret of the elderly and the disillusioned" (pp. 176, 177).

Mr. Wallas emphatically abjures any anti-intellectualist conclusion. An impulse which is recognized and estimated, becomes capable of control and loses its bewildering potency. "Burke was sincerely convinced that men's power of political reasoning was so utterly inadequate to their task, that all his life long he urged the English nation to follow prescription, to obey, that is to say, on principle their habitual political impulses. But the deliberate following of prescription which Burke advocated was something different, because it was the result of choice, from the uncalculated loyalty of the past. Those who have eaten of the tree of knowledge cannot forget" (pp. 182, 183).

On the other hand, Mr. Wallas sees the futility of attempting to exclude emotion from political life; and his ideal is well

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represented by his choice of Plato's conception of a coördination between the powers of the soul, reason harmonizing and strengthening the emotions by subordinating them to its ends. Such a 'harmony,' he considers, has been notably attained by the Japanese nation, and displayed in the recent war with Russia.

The concluding chapters deal in a penetrating way with some important political questions, with the electoral system, the civil service, and so on. I should like to devote the rest of this review to the admirable closing chapter, "Nationality and Humanity." This chapter contains some luminous criticisms of the theories which dominated nineteenth century international politics, those, for example, of Mazzini, on the one hand, and of Bismarck and English imperialists, on the other. But the essential part of the discussion is the moving presentation of the way in which growing knowledge is abating the crude intolerant prejudices of an earlier age. Neither ideals nor methods 'emerge' with complete clearness from these inspiring pages; but one reads and rereads them without ever failing to draw from them new hopes for better days. I would fain quote the closing passage: "We all of us, plain folk and learned alike, now make a picture for ourselves of the globe with its hemispheres of light and shadow, from every point of which the telegraph brings us hourly news, and which may already be more real to us than the fields and houses past which we hurry in the train. We can all see it, hanging and turning in the monstrous emptiness of the skies, and obedient to forces whose action we can watch hundreds of light-years away and feel in the beating of our hearts. The sharp new evidence of the camera brings every year nearer to us its surface of ice and rock and plain, and the wondering eyes of alien peoples. It may be that we shall long continue to differ as to the full significance of the vision. But now that we can look at it without helpless pain it may stir the deepest impulses of our being. To some of us it may bring confidence in that Love that Dante saw, 'which moves the Sun and the other Stars.' To each of us it may suggest a kinder pity for all the bewildered beings who hand on from generation to generation the torch of conscious life."

W. J. ROBERTS.

University College, Cardiff, Wales.

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EVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM. By Eduard Bernstein. Translated by Edith C. Harvey. (Vol. VII of the "Socialist Library," edited by J. Ramsay Macdonald, M. P.) London: Independent Labor Party, 23 Bride Lane, E. C., 1909. Pp. xxiii, 224.

This work is a translation, with certain additions, of two essays published several years ago by the intellectual leader of what is called the revisionist tendency in the German Social Democratic movement. The revisionists are a minority within that party, which demands the right to criticize, in the light of increasing knowledge of human nature and economic and political facts, the traditional theories of socialism, more particularly, the theories associated with the name of Karl Marx. Those familiar with the history of sects and schools will not be surprised to find that Herr Bernstein is able to show, by quotations from Marx and Engels, that they were much less consistent Marxists than those who swear by their names. Certain theories which have become apparently essential parts of socialist tradition or orthodoxy, such as those of the unmitigated accumulation of capital in an ever diminishing number of hands, the ever growing misery and subjection of the proletariat, and the final issue of this development in a catastrophic expropriation of the exploiters, are declared by Herr Bernstein and his friends to be untenable. Statistics of occupation show that in all countries small industrial concerns are holding their own and in some instances increasing at the expense of the large; this is especially, but by no means solely, the case in agriculture, even in Great Britain. Again, returns of income and property tax do not display an increasing proletarization of the majority of the population, but a large increase in the number of persons enjoying moderate incomes. It is also clear that the amalgamation of businesses and the gains of large scale at the expense of small scale production, do not mean a diminution in the number of the proprietors of the concerns: a large concern may belong to thousands of small shareholders. Finally, the incomes of the workers are rising, on the whole, and, relatively to the whole population, there is no increase, but a decrease in the number of the homeless and helpless victims of misery, upon whom orthodox socialists are sometimes disposed to rest their hopes for the achievement of the social revolution.

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Other divergences from the orthodox tradition are ably enforced by Herr Bernstein; but the above suffice to prepare us for some very fundamental changes which the author desires to see in the attitude of his party to contemporary problems and issues. He repudiates emphatically the economic determinism which is, to many friends and foes of the socialist movement, its most characteristic feature. He objects wholly to the overshadowing of the practical tasks of the present by dreams of a distant future. For him the movement, or the grappling with the problems of the present and the immediate future in a democratic spirit, is everything, the exact details of a remote future nothing at all. Socialism should be, he contends, a democratic workers' movement, ready to learn from experience, and omitting no opportunity of securing the political rights and forming the social habits and sympathies by which the workers will be able to overthrow and replace the domination over their lives of the classes which now hold the reins of government and industry.

Herr Bernstein's thoughts represent fairly closely the policy of those British socialists who have joined with trade unions and coöperatist societies to form the British labor party. Like all political enterprises, the British comprehensive labor movement has its dangers; and, like Herr Bernstein's acute and thoughtful book, its progress is apt to irritate the lover of theory by a lack of solidity and consistency. At the same time, a political movement cannot thrive on enthusiasm and dogma alone; it must sooner or later face the problem of combining devotion to principle, with the investigation of detail and practical service in the devising of effective, even though temporary, expedients. It must at least be gratifying to find grounds for the hope that the workers will explicitly adopt justice and liberty as essential parts of their policy, and abandon the pretense of indifference to everything that is 'not socialism.' Socialism, at its best, is the application of the recognition of the rights of man to some very important issues of human life, and can be realized only as part of a polity in which the sense of justice and equality is adequately embodied. We may heartily welcome Herr Bernstein's book as a worthy attempt to set forth as theory, what British and other socialists are, though not always with assurance of theoretic consistency, striving to realize in practice.

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OXFORD LECTURES ON POETRY. By A. C. Bradley, LL.D., Litt. D. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1909. Pp. viii, 395.

The close connection between philosophy and the interpretation of poetry could not be better illustrated than it is by this inspiring book. All the essays, especially the first four, are bound together by a conception which derives from Hegel, and which may be roughly stated as follows: The universe, as it appears to us in time and space, is an embodiment, more or less adequate, from various aspects, of one supreme all-embracing perfection, which yet is not entirely embodied in any one of these, nor in all of them put together so far as they have yet appeared. Many of these aspects are, relatively to each other, ultimate, that is to say, they cannot be resolved into forms of one another, but they are all compatible: the absolute good is a harmony in all its parts. And with this Absolute man is connected in a peculiar sense: through his consciousness he is somehow in touch with its complete perfection, though exactly *how* he cannot say, and he measures everything that is presented to him by this standard, which is thus at once known and unknown.

Beauty in art is one unique, irreplaceable aspect of reality: the attempt to express it in terms of any other aspect, say, of the intellectually true, or the correct in conduct, or the fervent in religion, is doomed to failure: yet because they, like itself, are all distinct aspects of the Infinite and because the Infinite is a unity, the sense of a profound connection between itself and them haunts us, haunts and enraptures; or, if we mistake our experience, tempts us to believe we can translate one of them into the other. The poet (p. 26) "said what he meant, but his meaning seems to beckon away beyond itself or rather to expand into something boundless which is only focussed in it; something also which, we feel, would satisfy not only the imagination, but the whole of us; that something within us and without, which everywhere

> makes us seem
> To patch up fragments of a dream,
> Part of which comes true, and part
> Beats and trembles in the heart."

Now when we say that poetry is a unique aspect of the Infinite, we must, it would appear, mean more than that it is unique in

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the sense in which the taste of a delicate wine might be. That too might not be resolvable into anything else, and I suppose such pleasures too must have their place in the absolute Perfection. Only, we feel we should never want much of them, and that they are not inexhaustible in their value as poetry is. Poetry, then, it would appear, can hold the Infinite in a way that a strawberry-ice never could. But how hold it? *Ex hypothesi* it cannot hold the entire Infinite, because the other aspects,—truth, moral goodness, etc.,—press for their own irreplaceable shares. The answer in part perhaps is that there is no element in the universe that cannot show a side which could be represented in poetry, while there are many such with which physical taste could not deal at all, directly or indirectly, not at any rate as we know physical taste on this planet. It may be in virtue of this profound versatility of beauty,—if the expression can be allowed,—that art has tended more and more to claim more and more of life and reality for its province. And this leads to the question how far it is well for a poet to have other than poetic interests in his own life. Mr. Bradley deprecates (p. 5) "the consideration of ulterior ends, whether by the poet in the act of composing, or by the reader in the act of experiencing." For the nature of poetry "is to be not a part, nor yet a copy, of the real world (as we commonly understand that phrase), but to be a world by itself . . . ; and to possess it fully you must enter that world, conform to its laws, and ignore for the time the beliefs, aims, and particular conditions which belong to you in the other world of reality." This is true, and yet it might be true also,—and, if the wide sweep claimed for poetry and its underlying connection with all the rest of life be justified, it would seem likely to be true,—that if the poet when *not* composing, can fling himself into the other world of reality and master it, he will gain a wealth of material for his own world which he never could have gained otherwise.

As regards the relation of the poetic conception itself to the words which embody it, Mr. Bradley would say that it is essentially such that for its own working-out it needs words, and cannot be realized without them. Until it has found words it has not fully grasped itself: before that the germ of the poem may be said to exist, but only the germ. Proceeding further, and taking the poet's work as a whole in which the words and meaning are by some miracle vitally connected with each other, Mr. Bradley's

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treatment implies that the ultimate subject of poetry would be the ultimate subject of those other forms of contemplation which give satisfaction to the spirit. Now there are certain experiences in actual life which seem to give such satisfaction directly and at once: for instance, the experience of loving and being loved, or of discovering the true motions of the planets. Such experiences the ordinary individual calls beautiful, and the opposite, such as that of being betrayed or being deceived, he calls hideous. But to the supreme poetic genius all alike are material for poetry. "It has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen" (p. 238, quoted from Keats). Is there, none the less, some sense in the ordinary individual's judgment? Has he some justification for calling one kind beautiful and the other ugly? If he has, ought we to say that in the one case a real poetic value has become manifest in actuality, so much so that it only requires the attitude of disinterested contemplation for the lover, say, or the astronomer, to have at least the germ of a poem present to his consciousness; while in the other case, the poetic value is so sunk and hidden that the creative poet, who is also a discoverer, has to do much more to the theme to bring it out. And what is this much more that he does? It would seem to imply at any rate the power of tracking the beautiful through darker lurking-places than could be transparent to ordinary men. Perhaps something of this may have been in Shelley's mind when he asserted that Prometheus, the noblest type of manhood conceivable, was a more poetic subject than Satan.

In the essay on "The Sublime" the question is all but raised how far poetry is attempting to compass something that is beyond even itself, at least as we know it here. For in all poetry that expresses the sublime, we gain an impression of "something which is either *not* determined as finite or *is* determined as infinite," giving us an image of the boundlessness of the infinite and "its rejection of any pretension to independence or absoluteness on the part of its finite forms" (p. 62). Again, it is the essence of the sublime in all its varied forms, to represent immense and overwhelming force, manifested or held in reserve. It is not the *quality* of the attribute or element apart from its amount that gives us this impression; the sublime may be present in 'good' actions or it may be present in what from all other points of view are bad; it may be seen in Satan as

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in Socrates: the essential point is the greatness of the power implied. The significance of this power would appear to be bound up with the conception of some *activity*, actual or potential, present or to come. The sublime, that is to say, is not a matter of essence merely but of existence, the existence of activity; and the conclusion would seem to follow that our exultation in it depends on our intuition that it is better for a good thing to be than not to be: better, that is, for it to exist in the sense of subserving some activity than to remain as an unrealized ideal. Because, if this be so, power is an element absolutely indispensable for each and every step toward the right consummation of the world.

The basis for Hegel's Theory of Tragedy is given by the double conviction that there subsists, on the one hand, a fundamental unity in man's spirit and a fundamental sympathy between it and the ultimate order of the universe, and, on the other hand, that we are faced with the temporary emergence of inadequate embodiments which conflict with and torture each other. In essentials Mr. Bradley agrees with Hegel's theory, while he makes searching criticisms upon possible limitations in it. Hegel, he holds, was right in recognizing that tragedy lay in conflict, a conflict where the spirit was divided against itself so that on either hand there was positive good and not only wrong and negation; right too in recognizing that what prevented a one-sided manifestation from maintaining itself unchallenged and triumphant was the supreme perfection which was always pressing for embodiment; right also in holding that our sense of reconciliation in all great tragedy was bound up with this belief. But the formulas, at least, of Hegel appear deficient when he speaks as though each side in the conflict must represent some definite general ethical end, as Antigone represents the love of the family and Creon the organization of the State. There can be a tragic conflict wherever there is spiritual value of any kind on either side. There is such a conflict in "Macbeth," and yet Macbeth does not, as we say, stand for anything but 'himself.' Mr. Bradley does not add expressly, but he seems to imply, that in such cases as "Macbeth" there is ranged on the other side of the conflict, not a one-sided aspect, but the whole force of the universe seen and unseen: it is the total moral order that is opposed to Macbeth and that demands his death. And such seems to be the case in most tragedies

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from "Paradise Lost" to "Peer Gynt" where the theme is the temptation and fall of a nature that could be great. In such cases the sense of reconciliation usually takes the form of a recognition in the hero's own soul, a recognition tacit or expressed, of "the justice of his fall." For the conflict lay between what seemed to the man to be his good and what was really such; and once that division is healed, the worst is over. The strangest and the most interesting part of tragedy is this sense of reconciliation in the very catastrophe; of the pain being "mingled not merely with acquiescence, but with something like exultation" (p. 84). Mr. Bradley never writes more finely than when handling this. "If in such dramas we may be said to feel that the ultimate power is no mere fate, but a spiritual power, then we also feel that the hero was never so near to this power as in the moment when it required his life" (p. 84). "He dies, and our hearts die with him: and yet his death matters nothing to us, or we even exult. He is dead; and he has no more to do with death than the power which killed him, and with which he is one" (p. 91).

The essay on Wordsworth shows that Nature to Wordsworth was not only, not chiefly, a vision of endless loveliness: it was a symbol that troubled him with suggestions of "unknown modes of Being," hinting, though in the language of sense, at quite other ways of manifesting the endless stores of the Absolute than those that come to us through sense. And to Wordsworth the shock of this revelation, even more than the ecstatic delight in familiar beauty, was the supreme testimony to the Infinite itself and to the infinitude of a mind that could, with whatever misgivings and shudderings of the flesh, receive it.

Another aspect of the Infinite comes out in a character where some excellent persons would be astonished to find it, in the character of Falstaff. All through Mr. Bradley's delightful study, there runs the Hegelian conception that in humor, at its greatest and deepest, the infinite spirit of man can mock, and mock triumphantly, and afford to mock, at everything that is presented to it here; for all things here, law and morals and religion and all the aims of man, are inadequate compared to the ideal it holds in itself, and humor springs from the perception of inadequacy, and triumphant laughter from the sense of boundless power. Of course Falstaff is wrong in his scale of values and wrong in his utter rejection of things which,

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though partial embodiments and therefore from one point of view ridiculous, are yet necessary embodiments, so far as they go, of what is best to be desired. But none the less Falstaff's is a mind that has "received from Shakespeare's own the inexplicable touch of infinity which he bestowed on Hamlet and Macbeth and Cleopatra, but denied to Henry the Fifth" (p. 273). The whole relation between the erring Falstaff and the virtuous Henry is set out with wonderful fairness and penetration. It is very refreshing to come on such an unmasking of the elements of hardness and policy in the character of the man who "*always* succeeded," and who has even succeeded in making certain readers take him for Shakespeare's ideal hero, as perhaps Shakespeare himself, with a rueful smile, guessed they would be sure to do. And it is very refreshing in a book so instinct with noble ethical feeling to find such a whole-hearted sympathy with the Falstaffian point of view.

It is not for nothing that Mr. Bradley has studied for so long the most sympathetic of all geniuses; his affinity to Shakespeare's spirit emerges not only in his convincing study of "Shakespeare the Man," but in his own union of moral earnestness with freedom from moral pedantry, his power of entering as he enters into the most varied types: the soul of Keats and the soul of Shelley, the soul of Cleopatra and the soul of Hamlet.

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VOLTAIRE PHILOSOPHE. By Georges Pellissier. Paris: Armand Colin, 1908. Pp. iii, 304.

When M. Pellissier sums up his study of Voltaire by saying that that name symbolizes the work of the eighteenth century in the enfranchisement of human reason, and that therefore Voltaire is, even more than Rousseau, *the* great philosopher of his age, we must protest that the word "philosopher" is being used in a very inexact and popular sense. To be a great philosopher it is necessary that a man should, by reasoning about philosophical subjects, either make discoveries in them himself or enable others to do so; and that Voltaire achieved nothing of this kind the present essay most amply and candidly shows.

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We have but to look under any of the four heads into which it is divided—Metaphysics and Physics, Religion, Ethics, and Politics—to see how remote he was from the proper philosophical spirit in every department. A brilliant abbreviator and popularizer and a still more brilliant controversialist, his weapons were wit and common sense rather than any passion for truth; and indeed in the joy of battle, what room is left for consistency? Take, for example, his treatment of religion. He held the common view of his time that God must exist because a supreme cause is necessary for the explanation of the universe. But he did not believe in a God who rewards and punishes, nor in the immortality of the soul, nor in the freedom of the will. Sharing, however, as he did, the current dread of atheism, he constantly recommended all these beliefs as essential to the well-being of society. *Si Dieu n'existait pas, il faudrait l'inventer.* Yet in the "Traité de Métaphysique" (which was not written for publication) he argued that good conduct was quite possible without these beliefs. A curious spectacle this, of the apostle of reason preaching, on the ground that they are useful, beliefs which he thinks are false, and which, as it turns out, he does not even believe to be useful. The fact, of course, is that he never grappled seriously with any philosophical problem, but oscillated between various points of view according to the state of his emotions and the exigencies of controversy.

M. Pellisier's book has the merit of being full of long quotations from Voltaire which are excellent reading; but it would be better if it were less of a tabulation of doctrines generally recognized to be shallow, unoriginal, and inconsistent, and more of a psychological study. What is wanted is some picture of the extraordinary combination of qualities which gave Voltaire a more imposing place in history than his greater genius and sincerity could give, for instance, to Pascal. That picture would show us the man of the world, shrewd and versatile, with an equal abundance of talent whether in money affairs or in philosophy, capturing the love of the people as much by his gibes as by his generosities and enthusiasms and crusades against oppression,—his very defects of meanness and vanity helping his success by stamping him of the common mold. For the description of human character is always interesting, particularly when we have to do with one that makes a great figure in his-

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tory, and still more so when it combines the most entertaining opposites. The prophet of the French Revolution, who rejoiced in the decay of tyranny, yet toadied Frederick the Great and endured the unsavory entanglements of the court of Berlin; who hated the *canaille* and was smothered in roses by the mob of Paris; who spent most of his life in preaching *écrasez l'infâme* and always (so he said) had a fever on St. Bartholomew's Day, yet who went regularly to mass at Ferney and put up a gallows on his land to show that he was *seigneur:* here is a subject still awaiting final delineation by a brush that should be more subtle and painstaking, but should not be less vigorous than that of Carlyle.

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THE MEANING OF TRUTH: A SEQUEL TO "PRAGMATISM." By William James. London, Bombay and Calcutta: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. Pp. xxii, 298.

This volume is in large measure a reprint, with minor changes, of various articles which the author has published on the meaning of truth, and their dates range from 1884 to December 3, 1908. The only important new contributions are three papers on "Abstractionism," "Two English Critics," and "A Dialogue." I for one wish to thank Professor James for making it easier to get an all-round view of his position. I have for many years been endeavoring to ascertain Professor James's standpoint on the subject treated in this volume, and although I had read carefully everything that is here reprinted I confess that I was not able to get a satisfactory view of the position as a whole. Whether I have now attained to this achievement remains to be seen, but at least I am glad to acknowledge that what till now have seemed to me,—will Professor James pardon the confession?—random excursions into the field of the problem resulting in no consistent accomplishment, at last have shown that they have been conducted on a thoroughly systematic plan. The final outcome of the single engagements taken together is that the general commands a strategic position with his forces marshalled about him in a formidable array, and he cannot be ousted by those who decline to meet him on his own ground, that of

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appeal to actual experience. The reviewer thinks that the position has its weaknesses, but he purposes in this review first to give as objective account as he can of the position.

Professor James has made it abundantly clear that his view of truth in no wise commits him to subjectivism and that his opponents have entirely misunderstood him in charging him with this fault. This misunderstanding, he admits, had some excuse in the 'unguarded language' he had used in his "Pragmatism." There, he tells us, "I spoke of the truth of the belief of certain philosophers in the absolute. . . . I offered this as a conciliatory olive-branch to my enemies. But they, as is only too common with such offerings, trampled the gift under foot and turned and rent the giver . . . so all that I can do is to apologize, and take my offering back. The absolute is true in *no* way then, and least of all, by the verdict of the critics, in the way which I assigned!" (Pp. viii-x.) This undoubtedly clears the atmosphere, and while perhaps Professor James may not now sufficiently recognize that it invalidates the thesis of the chapter within which the retracted statements appeared, as that thesis was there stated, the retractation must of course by every fair reader be taken as throwing great light upon Professor James's present position. It seems as if Professor James's views had developed more than he suspects; but this is a question of history, and we are now engaged, not in tracing the development of Professor James's view of the meaning of truth, but in understanding what that view is now that it has developed. And, I repeat, it is unmistakable that the view is not subjectivistic. "The pragmatizing epistemologist posits there," *i. e.*, in the universe, "a reality and a mind with ideas" (p. 191). "If the reality assumed were cancelled from the pragmatist's universe of discourse, he would straightway give the name of falsehoods to the beliefs remaining, in spite of all their satisfactoriness. For him, as for his critic, there can be no truth if there is nothing to be true about. Ideas are so much flat psychological surface unless some mirrored matter gives them cognitive lustre. This is why as a pragmatist I have so carefully posited 'reality' *ab initio* and why, throughout my whole discussion, I remain an epistemological realist" (p. 195).

Now, just as an idea taken by itself is nothing "but a flat piece of substantive experience like any other, with no self-transcendency about it, and no mystery save the mystery of coming into existence and of being gradually followed by other pieces of

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substantive experience, with conjunctively transitional experiences between" (p. 107), and therefore is devoid of truth, so on the other hand the reality with which it stands in the truth-relation, is when taken by itself also devoid of truth. "Realities are not *true,* they *are;* and beliefs are true *of* them" (p. 196). The denial therefore of actual truth antecedent to idea is not a denial of reality. It remains unshaken by the denial. We have then two kinds of 'entities' or pieces of substantive experience, the existence of neither of which is imperilled by the absence of truth from either.

Where then can truth be found? It could not be found if all experience were of substantive character; but "the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves" (p. xii). The "parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure" (p. xiii). And truth is just one of these directly experienced relations; it is one of the continuities that obtain within experience. "Truth is essentially a relation between two things, an idea, on the one hand, and a reality outside of the idea, on the other" (p. 163). "The truth of the idea is one relation of it to the reality" (p. 234). Any scientific account of truth must identify this relation, pointing out just what kind of experienced continuity is designated by the term, and the great merit which Professor James claims for his account is that it alone lays its finger on an empirical fact and says, "There you have truth right in your experience and can see just what it is. You do not have to go outside of your experience to get it. You do not have to posit an absolute transcending your individual experience to make your definition of truth march." The justice of this exclusive claim I do not wish to discuss here; I mention it merely to show that at least Professor James's conception of truth means to be a thoroughly empirical conception. That this is a merit, it seems to me, is indisputable; and that a defect at this point is fatal to any conception of truth must be granted by anyone who bases his philosophy on experience.

Now just what is the empirical continuity that constitutes the essence of truth for our author? An idea is true when it knows

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its reality; when does this happen? An example will show. "Suppose me to be sitting here in my library at Cambridge, at ten minutes' walk from 'Memorial Hall,' and to be thinking truly of the latter object. My mind may have before it only the name, or it may have a clear image, or it may have a very dim image of the hall, but such an intrinsic difference in the image makes no difference in its cognitive function" (p. 104). This idea, at this stage of the experiential stream, is just an idea, neither actually true nor actually false. It is one of the entities whose experiential interrelation constitutes truth, but still this relation emerges in the living tissue of continuous experience; it simply *is*. "Certain *extrinsic* phenomena, special experiences of conjunction, are what impart to the image, be it what it may, its knowing office" (*ibid.*). As I understand this, the extrinsicality of the superadded phenomena is merely the fact that these phenomena are not yet there in the experience. It is not a logical but a temporal extrinsicality. The logical question of intrinsicality or extrinsicality, when taken up, carries us beyond the bare 'entity' of the initial idea. Logical intrinsicality is nothing but an abstract conception, having as its empirical basis the fact that the idea actually *does continue through intermediaries* into a terminating experience, and what makes logical intrinsicality an abstraction is that it ignores the intermediaries and seeks to connect the extremes in saltatory fashion (pp. 152-3). The denial of intrinsicality therefore is simply a denial, from the point of view of exact psychological description, of the presence of anything in this initial stage but just a mere flat piece of substantive experience; but this denial does not rest on a view of experience as disjointed. It is rather motived by the conviction that conjunctivity is not found in any one term but obtains as an experienced continuum between terms. This continuum, however, is not a Democritean void between atomistic elements. Not only is it a continuum, but it is a plenum; and its filling consists of just more pieces of substantive experience, no piece cut off from its predecessor. Logic ignores the intermediate filling and yet maintains the continuum, which is impossible without the filling. Both the continuity and what is continuous are facts of experience, and neither must be left out of account in a concrete statement of the whole process.

But the continuity which constitutes truth is not just temporal continuity, as will appear immediately. "For instance," to

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continue the quotation which we have interrupted to discuss the meaning of extrinsicality, "if you ask me what hall I mean by my image, and I can tell you nothing; or if I fail to point or lead you towards the Harvard Delta; or if, being led by you, I am uncertain whether the Hall I see be what I had in mind or not; you would rightly deny that I had 'meant' that particular hall at all, even though my mental image might to some degree have resembled it. The resemblance would count in that case as coincidental merely, for all sorts of things of a kind resemble one another in this world without being held for that reason to take cognizance of one another. On the other hand, if I can lead you to the hall, and tell you of its history and present uses; if in its presence I feel my idea, however imperfect it may have been, to have led hither and to be now terminated . . . why then my soul was prophetic, and my idea must be, and by common consent would be, called cognizant of reality. That percept was what I *meant,* for into it my idea has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness and *fulfilled intention*" (pp. 104-5; italics changed).

But what does 'fulfilled intention' mean, if the original idea was a flat piece of substantive experience with nothing but *ex post facto* prophetic insight? Does this not seem to imply that there was already in addition to flat substantivity an objective reference also? The word 'intention' has not slipped in here as an isolated case of Homeric nodding. We read farther on: "Some experiences simply abolish their predecessors without continuing them in any way. Others are felt to increase or to enlarge *their meaning,* to carry out *their purpose,* or to bring us nearer to *their goal.* They 'represent' them, and may fulfil their function better than they fulfilled it themselves" (p. 111; italics mine). What can be meant by a purpose or a meaning or a goal of an idea which was just itself, with no self-transcendence? This is the crucial question in Professor James's theory of truth. His answer seems to be given in these words: "Wherever certain intermediaries are given, such that, as they develop towards their terminus, there is experience from point to point *of one direction followed,* and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that their starting point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant or known" (p. 106). Again: "Pragmatists are unable to see what you can possibly mean by calling an idea true, unless you mean that between it as a *terminus a quo* in some one's mind and some particular reality as a *terminus ad quem,* such

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concrete workings do or may intervene. *Their direction constitutes the idea's reference to that reality,* their satisfactoriness constitutes its adaptation thereto, and the two things together constitute the 'truth' of the idea for its possessor." (Pp. 237-8; I have shifted the italics in these two quotations.) This 'direction' cannot be just the temporal direction in which the future stands to the past; for some future experiences abolish antecedent experiences instead of continuing them in the same direction. Nor does the direction consist in movement from next to next along a line of resembling intermediaries, for resemblance, "although a fundamental function in knowing truly, is often dispensed with " (p. 41). It is not movement along satisfactory lines; for satisfactoriness, according to the above quoted statement, does not constitute the idea's reference to reality, which is its "direction," but satisfactoriness is the adaptation of the intermediate 'concrete workings' to the idea's reference. Here then in the 'one direction followed' by a continuously developing experience which leads from idea to its object we have a factor which is integral to Professor James's view of truth, but for which I can find no empirical warrant, unless Professor James were to allow me to search for it in the idea's own pointing which characterizes the idea from the start. But of course it cannot do that if the idea at the start is nothing but a flat piece of substantive experience. At times Professor James seems disposed to grant explicitly such a pointing character to the initial experience: "Whosoever feels his experience to be something substitutional even while he has it, may be said to have an experience that reaches beyond itself" (p. 114). Once grant that the experience within which the initial idea occurs may be an experience *of* the substitutional character of that idea, and the whole thing becomes clear. But what then becomes of the flat piece of substantive experience which the idea at the outset is said to be?

If Professor James were to modify his position somewhat here and distinguish between an image, which possibly may be a self-contained 'entity' in the sense of not pointing toward anything, and an idea, which is such an image, or any symbol, *experienced as substitutional,* and therefore experienced as pointing, then some of us at least could find ourselves able to start with him. But we find it impossible to grant that a subsequent experience, however conjunctively tied it may be to a previous flat piece of substantive experience, can be regarded as fulfilling that flat

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piece's purpose when that piece was so flat that it could not have a purpose projected into a third dimension. Such a piece may be recognized subsequently as similar to subsequent pieces, but if it does not point, there can be nothing that is the goal of its direction. You might as well say that a village, because it lies in the direction pointed toward by a finger at a crossing, is what is meant by the uncharactered part of the sign-board lying behind the sleeve. It seems to some of us that the question of truth does not arise till ideas claiming significance appear, and that an *ex post facto* attribution of truth to what was absolutely innocent of any intention to be truthful or false, imports, not clearness, but confusion into logical discussions. In this respect, Dr. Schiller's account of truth, starting from claims to truth, however unsatisfactory it may be in its further progress, is in advance of the view presented in "The Meaning of Truth."

The book is characterized by Professor James's usual felicity of expression. The lack of an index is a serious drawback to its usefulness.

EVANDER BRADLEY MCGILVARY.

University of Wisconsin.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GASSENDI. By G. S. Brett. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1908. Pp. xlv, 310.

The aim of the author of this work is to give an account of the philosophy of Gassendi which will show the importance of that writer in philosophic thought. It is often said that Gassendi is unduly neglected, but Mr. Brett remarks that the statement is generally made without any clear indications of what is to be expected from the study of Gassendi's work. Mr. Brett seeks to justify closer attention to Gassendi by an able exposition of his teaching. He maintains that Gassendi is worthy of interest and endeavors to show wherein his importance lies. In the introduction a survey of ancient atomism is given and is followed by a slight sketch of Gassendi's life. The rest of the book falls into four parts, consisting of an exposition of Gassendi's views of logic, physics, and ethics, together with a general review which includes a discussion of Leibniz and Lotze. Mr. Brett's exposition follows closely the order of the "Syn-

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tagma Philosophicum," and the main portion of the book consists of analysis and summary.

Gassendi's contribution to logic is of the slightest importance. He steers a middle course between the empiricism and the rationalism of his time, and his position is really eclectic. His attitude to knowledge is naïve and atomistic. The subjectivity of Descartes did not touch him; he believed in the trustworthiness of the senses, and did not see the problem which, in Descartes's thought, took the form of the doctrine of representative perception. He endeavored to mediate between skepticism and dogmatism by saying that we do know some truth, and that our ignorance does not destroy the knowledge we have. Mr. Brett points out that for Gassendi "the system of truths . . . differs from the individual truths in respect of quantity" (p. 9). Gassendi holds the maxim: "Nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu," but he combines with it a view which allows understanding to go beyond sense and gives it a content of its own.

Gassendi's philosophy is to be found mainly in his physics. His thought is governed by a use of the conception of substance. He discusses and rejects the doctrine of a world-soul, and he holds that particular souls imply, not an underlying soul, but a relatively indefinite substance, which stands in the same relation to individual minds as matter in general does to particular forms of matter. To the conceptions of substance and accident, under which the traditional arrangement had classified reality, Gassendi adds two other conceptions, space and time. These latter elements are taken directly from experience, and their analysis is a compromise between the two fundamental conceptions. Space is a quantitative continuum, but it is not corporeal; it is a "quantitative reality independent of matter." The content of space, matter, becomes in Gassendi's analysis an underlying substance which is indifferent to its forms. It is conceived as physical, however, and has activity, which is identified with impenetrability, as its fundamental quality. Matter, of course, takes the form of atoms, and atoms have magnitude, figure, and weight. Gassendi explains nature, in so far as he explains it at all, in terms of matter and motion. But while he agrees with some more modern thinkers in assuming that all explanation must be given in terms of matter, quantity, and motion, Gassendi differs from them in that he

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does not try to reduce the whole world to these terms. Generally speaking, he does not reduce the higher to the lower, but rather separates the two, rendering each inexplicable. Qualitative differences are taken as absolute, and in the end Gassendi's view falls into an indefinite number of unconnected parts.

In his psychology Gassendi is again eclectic and atomistic. *Animus* and *anima* are separated from one another and are only united by a verbal compromise. The treatment of imagination is often naïvely materialistic, but Gassendi rightly refuses to separate phantasy from judgment. He cuts it off from intellect, however, and gives no account of the objective content of intellect. Gassendi's ethics are a milder Epicureanism, and have no great importance for subsequent thought. Freedom, in the sense of caprice, is defended, and Gassendi maintains against Epicurus that God has some share in the world. But God is represented merely as a first cause, and the whole conception is deistic. The step from nature to God, by means of the unexamined conception of causality, is due to the inadequacy of Gassendi's treatment of nature.

Mr. Brett's exposition of Gassendi follows Gassendi's own treatment very closely. This has the result that the terseness of statement required to cover all the ground makes it difficult to follow the meaning. Mr. Brett's method has a further disadvantage. No adequate transition is given to the modern reader into the atmosphere of Gassendi's thought. Any criticism of general principles that is given is held over to the general review at the end. A greater amount of criticism would have aided the exposition. But if we admit the method, Mr. Brett's work is well done and the analysis on the whole is clear and well proportioned. Some points, however, merit notice. Mr. Brett insists throughout on the importance of motion in Gassendi's system, but he does not make Gassendi's conception very clear, and the discussion in the fourth part of the book does not give a satisfactory treatment of motion. On page 60 the author makes a serious error. Surely Zeno's paradoxes were aimed, not at the view which made space and time continua, but against the Pythagorean doctrine which treated them as composita. Mr. Brett's statement of Gassendi's psychology is clear in itself, but suffers by not being related to the sources of Gassendi's thought and to the Cartesian view.

On the whole, the fourth section of the book,—the general

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review,—is of more interest than the other sections. Mr. Brett defends Gassendi from the charge of materialism, and he is right, but Gassendi is saved from it by eclecticism and empiricism. Mr. Brett apparently sympathizes with Gassendi in this. He seems satisfied neither with a monism nor with a definite pluralism, and perhaps his sense of Gassendi's importance is due to his own sympathy with an attempt to work out a middle course position. The latter part of this section is taken up with an examination of Leibniz and Lotze with a view to finding atomistic elements in their thought. But as these elements are not derived from Gassendi, this part seems somewhat irrelevant.

Mr. Brett cannot be said to make out his case for the importance of Gassendi. The book suffers from the limitation of the treatment,—a fuller account of the relation of Gassendi's thought is certainly required,—but if its limits are accepted, the book gives a clear and able analysis of Gassendi's philosophy.

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LIFE AND MINISTRY OF JESUS. By Rudolph Otto, Lic. Th. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1908. Pp. 85.

This is a translation of three lectures given by Privat-Docent Otto, of Göttingen. The first deals briefly with the sources. From the four genuine epistles of Paul he infers that it is an "incontestable fact" that Jesus claimed to be the Messiah. They suffice, in his opinion, "to give us a detailed image of the person of Jesus and of his ministry." But it is only possible to prove from these epistles that the disciples of Jesus proclaimed him as the Messiah, not that he claimed to be the Messiah himself; and it is one of the facts one never ceases to wonder at, that Paul should have maintained such an absolute silence concerning the life and teaching of Jesus. Not a single event from the birth to the death of Jesus, nor a single utterance of his, can be shown to have been recorded by Paul. The Fourth Gospel is rejected by the author as a historical source. Mark is accepted as the oldest of our present gospels; but "an ancient source" used in Matthew, "devoted almost entirely to the sayings of the Lord," "is probably still older than Mark."

According to this author, "Jesus was certain of his Messiah-

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ship ever since his calling''; ''the words 'Thou art my beloved Son' which he heard then, had the same meaning as 'Thou art my Anointed One'; after Peter's confession ''which appeared wonderful to Jesus,'' he openly proclaimed his Messiahship; he arranged his entrance into the city to correspond with the prophetic forecast in Zechariah; he ''founded a new passover for his community, the memorial supper of his death''; ''Pilate must have known that the terms 'Messiah' and 'king of the Jews' had another significance than that set forth against the prisoner''; and ''the circumstances that Jesus, who realized spiritual power to the full, both ethically and religiously, had an experience that lifted him above the perishable, will always be the foundation for the conviction that the spirit has no share in the decay of the flesh.'' In discussing the teachings of Jesus, he pays no attention at all to his characteristic views on retaliation, divorce, oath-taking, private property, compulsory support of religion, public prayer, alms-giving, and fasting. Statements like these: ''He was able to lead for the first time the ethical consciousness to its purity,'' and: ''We may say that he was the first to bring, in a general way, true piety into the world,'' are not considered too sweeping to be made. The style of these lectures is simple and dignified, the tone is reverent and worthy of the subject, but the criticism is not sufficiently searching, and the treatment lacks freshness and originality.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

Cornell University.

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During the Managing Editor's absence abroad for a year, editorial correspondence and manuscripts should be sent to Professor Frank Thilly, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.

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

THE INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS

APRIL, 1910.

THE REALITY OF THE TEMPORAL.*

JOSIAH ROYCE.

THERE remains somewhat vaguely and obscurely in my own memory a brief fragment of a story which I read in my childhood. I cannot recall the context of this fragment. I do not know who was the author of the story. I cannot tell why just this incident remains alone in my mind, while the rest of the tale is forgotten. But this was the chance bit that I recall: A bold bad elder boy tempted the too trustful little boy who was the hero of the story, to disobey the express commands of the hero's parents, or perhaps of his teachers, and to play truant in company with the elder boy. The enticement used by the tempter was substantially as follows: "Come with me into town, and I will show you something that nobody ever saw before, and that nobody will ever see again." The trustful hero wondered, and yielded, and went. But when once the expedition had started, the somewhat insolent leader, absorbed in his own affairs, and content with keeping his follower under his control, long delayed the expected exhibition of the promised marvel. The little boy grew impatient. He had a variety of experiences, indeed; but nothing seemed to him to fulfill his expectations. At length the triumphant seducer paused at a shop, bought some nuts, and, cracking one of them,

* A paper read before the American Philosophical Association, New Haven, December 29, 1909.

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held up the kernel and said: "Did anybody ever see that before?" The hero was obliged to respond, "No." Thereupon the bad boy, instead of offering this nut or any other of the nuts to his comrade, cruelly ate the kernel and said: "Will anybody ever see that again?" and the small boy sorrowfully answered with another "No," and returned through tribulations to the paths of virtue.

Perhaps it was the dialectical interest of the bad boy's unfeeling paradox that arrested my own comparatively innocent imagination, although I was a very small boy when I myself read the story. This paradox lay in the obvious fact that the tempter in this tale had in a way inverted what you and I now know as the logical position assumed by Epimenides the Cretan. Whatever the small boy's disappointment, namely, the tempter had been true to his own word. If the tempter had primarily deceived, he had secondarily told the truth. For if indeed he had not shown the notable wonder in the external world that his innocent dupe had been led to expect, he had taught the small boy a genuinely novel lesson in the danger of hasty anticipations and of over-confidence in deceivers. This teaching itself was a showing of something. This something was of deep importance to the younger boy. As they say, it was valuable experience. And since, for every individual, such lessons have indeed their unique personal rank in his own life, one could say that just this sad disillusionment had never occurred to anybody before. "*Es ist eine alte Geschichte, doch bleibt sie immer neu.*" Such is a fair comment whenever the seductive expectation finds its victim, whether in love or in finance or in the history of exploration,—whether amongst us older people or amongst the small boys.

The lessons of my story seem indeed manifold. I am a little reminded of this tale, for instance, when I hear that there is nowadays a form of the New Realism which has obtained a very novel insight into the nature of Time, and when I later discover that the new theory is that the time world is one wherein novel events are always occur-

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ring,—events that nobody ever saw before, and that nobody will ever see again. I watch such theories crack their nuts and produce the kernel, and then I sometimes wish that I were not so far from the home of sound reason as some of them want me to wander. To be sure, they have told me the truth, but in how disappointingly familiar and commonplace a fashion.

Let me say, however, at once that as to the main facts insisted upon in the most notable recent discussions of the time problem, I am in thorough agreement with the authors of these discussions. Our common philosophical interest lies in the interpretation of these facts. And so let me summarize at this point what I suppose to be the points in which I agree with most of you regarding the time problem. Let me thereafter, however, suggest why, like the little boy, I am sometimes disappointed with the interpretations of the nature of temporal novelty which I find in recent literature.

In time, reality passes through a series of changes which constitute the history of the world. These changes are exemplified in each one of us by the sequences of the events of his own personal experience. That change occurs, and really occurs, is therefore verifiable for each one of us at every moment. We have learned, however, to regard the conception of real change, or of real process, as a conception applicable to reality over a field infinitely more extended than is the range of the changes that we can personally verify. The physical and the mental realms are alike conceived by us in terms of the concept of real process. Whatever now is, is either itself undergoing change, or is taking part in processes, such as movements or activities, which involve change. If there are any permanent substances at all in the world, we still conceive that either their accidents or their relations are in some respects changing. These changes constitute the events of the time-order.

This realm of events we conceive as subject to certain notable general laws. In the first place, we conceive the

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events of the real world as ordered according to two relations,—relations which are, to be sure, of the same general logical type as those familiar ordinal relations which, in any realm of facts or of conceptions, enable us to conceive the objects of our thought as an ordered system. These two relations are: (1) The unsymmetrical and transitive relation of *predecessor of* and *successor to,*—the 'earlier-later' relation; (2) the symmetrical and transitive relation of *contemporaneous with,* the relation of simultaneity. Of any two events in the real world, such events for instance as a given minimum of the variable star Algol and the occurrence of a given snowstorm in this city, or the uttering of a word, or the thinking of a thought by a given man, we say (with suitable qualifications regarding the partial incidents of which total events seem to be made up), that one of these two events occurs either *earlier than,* or *later than,* or *simultaneously* with, the other. If events that occur in different regions of the world temporally 'overlap,' we then conceive that by suitable subdivision of the events into parts, all apparent ambiguities in our decisions as to the temporal order of the events could be corrected. In this way, conceiving the real events of the world as consisting of ideally simple events, sometimes called 'instantaneous events,' we conceive that the real processes of the world form an order that one could describe as a series of chronological levels,—any level being a set of the simultaneous events of the world at any supposed and not further divided instant, while the series of these levels constitutes the history of the world in time.

That this conception of the real time-order of the universe is no immediate datum of our personal experience, but is a construct, we can all easily see. But the motives that urge upon us such a construct certainly lie deep in our nature as reasonable beings. The majestic and, upon occasion, terrible universality that we ascribe to the temporal ordering of events, is certainly due to whatever motive leads us to regard the world as in any sense real.

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I do not doubt myself that in this respect we are conceiving genuine characters of the real world. So far we all go together in our account of the temporal order. But as time is conceived by the physical sciences, we all are aware that the temporal world has other characters in addition to the general ordinal ones so far defined. The series of the world's events is conceived by our physical sciences not merely as a series in general, but as a series having the special characteristics of the mathematical continuum. Its parts are viewed by these sciences as infinitely divisible; and its indivisible conceptual instants are supposed to form a series of points capable of one-one correspondence with the so-called real numbers. Now it is this conception of the time-order which Bergson views as an artificial product of certain special and more or less practical motives, and as no adequate conception of the time-order as it really is. Here again I agree. I suppose that the conceptual time of the mechanical sciences is no genuine representation of any final reality, but is an extremely useful, and within certain limits indeed verifiable artefact, suggested to us by well-known natural processes and metrical interests, illustrated by countless empirical facts, but not known to be anything more than a relatively successful hypothetical construction. I believe in this construction as an immensely useful guide, but not as a picture of absolute reality. And some sort of relative conceptual reality, verifiable for a wide range of experience, but not at all absolute, seems to me to belong to those other characters of temporal processes upon which our arts and sciences of time-measurement depend, when they define what Newton called the uniform flow of time, and use this conception to measure the laws of the duration of natural processes over against the real time-order of the world's actual history. We have thus a conceptual time-order, which is more or less fashioned after the human needs which our metrical time sciences embody. This conceptual time has a genuine and relatively but very widely verifiable relation to

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the real temporal history of the world; but life, as Bergson rightly says, does not need to be conceived as merely subordinated to this artificial construction, since life has invented this conceptual construction for its own use.

The real temporal order, however, which we ascribe to the events of the universe, has still another character, which Bergson, Boodin, Lovejoy, and others all regard as very genuine. And herein, too, I agree with my colleagues. Time, they all say, contains a series of events everywhere characterized by novelty, by the constant appearance of what never has happened before, and by the passing away of each event into the irrevocable past that never can happen again. To this conceived character of the temporal order they assign a reality that Boodin and Bergson agree in regarding expressly as something very real indeed, and as something far more certainly real than is the infinitely divisible and measurable conceptual time-order of the physical sciences. Boodin emphasizes the destructive aspect of this real passing away of every item of temporal reality. Lovejoy and Bergson lay more stress upon the evolutionary, the forward-looking aspect of the case. "Novelty comes," they tell us. "Life passes to the new." "Reality constantly gains new items." "All is fleeting," insists Boodin. "Time creeps in; all fades." These thinkers agree, however, in insisting upon novelty, and upon irrevocable individual reality, as belonging to each event of the time world. And herein, too, all of these writers seem to me to be telling us the truth about the temporal order, each in his own way.

When agreement extends so far, why do I still feel, after the analogy of the little boy of my story, that these accounts are disappointing, and that the new theories of time have not shown me the real novelty that they promise.

As a fact, there is a far deeper lesson than the one which my story of the little boy has thus far brought to our notice,—a lesson which the story and the present situa-

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tion in the time-controversy bring to my own mind. It is the lesson that, when one talks of novelties, and of novel individual facts, everything turns, for the interpretation of one's doctrine upon the question: Wherein does this novelty really consist? I take it that real novelty is a term which can be defined in no purely descriptive terms, but only in terms that are more or less appreciative. Herein, to be sure, I am still in some respect to agree with Bergson. What you describe is even thereby labeled with the name of the type to which it belongs. It is classified, or serialized, or leveled with other facts, or viewed as in correspondence with other facts, or is taken as the combination, or as the resultant, or as the effect of other facts. In so far, it seems to lose its uniqueness. It becomes a case of its type, a member of its collection,—a term in a serial order, a fact equal to its equals, or mated with its correspondents, or a fact consisting in its constituents, or a fact that is the outcome of the factors upon which it depends. When you thus describe it, you may of course add dogmatically that it is indeed unique, that it is different from all other facts, that it is numerically distinct from them, and so on. But you cannot and do not describe this uniqueness, this individuality. You so far merely presuppose it. Uniqueness, individuality, novelty,—these aspects of reality cannot be exhaustively described; because to describe means to treat as a particular instance of a general class, type, or form, and so tends to the ignoring of individuality.

But if uniqueness and novelty cannot be adequately described, still less can they be adequately presented to one's senses as immediate data. And herein, as I think, lies my ground for differing from Bergson. For how shall I immediately feel or see or otherwise sense the truth, if it be indeed a truth, that *this* fact of sense never was a fact for me, or for anybody else before. I can and do indeed presuppose this actual individuality, this uniqueness, and this novelty, of each and every fact of experience. That I thus presuppose uniqueness is one of

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the deepest characteristics of my whole interpretation of experience. But this presupposition is not an immediate datum of sense. It is precisely an interpretation. Not one of us ever immediately observes with his senses that this is so. We all are assured, however, of a truth that is here simply supersensual. The little boy of my story ruefully admits the assertion that nobody ever saw the kernel of just that nut before. He admits, with equal assurance and disappointment that, since you cannot have your kernel and eat it too, the once eaten kernel, as that individual kernel, will never be uneaten again. But I defy anyone to point out at what moment of his life the little boy ever gets these truths presented to his senses as merely immediate data. If you say that such opinions are mere generalizations, inductively pieced together from various bits of past experience, I must reply, in a Kantian spirit that is as familiar and as rational as it is nowadays persistently ignored. And my reply is: Nobody can say, "Experience teaches me and has taught me that only when a nut is cracked does anybody first see its kernel, and that the same nut cannot twice be eaten,"—nobody can say this, I repeat, unless he first interpret his experience as a temporal sequence of unique and individual experiences,—a sequence extending back into a past which is no longer immediately given to him. This interpretation, however, simply presupposes for all facts of experience the sort of uniqueness of which the individual nut-kernel is taken to be a special instance. If everything exists only as an individual fact of experience, or as a complex, or as an interweaving or even as a continuous stream of such facts, well then of course the nut as a complex of empirical data also has its own individuality, whatever that may be. And if the special facts of experience acknowledged by the thinker who interprets his own world of experience happen to include, as one believes, the invisibility of the kernel until the nut is cracked, and the irreversibility of the physical process that occurs when the nut is eaten, then indeed the ac-

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knowledged data of past experience render the little boy's admissions about the nut as probable as they are disappointing.

But these inductions from past experience, these admissions, are but special instances of what is everywhere the recognition that one has had a series of past experiences, each of which has taught its own lesson, each of which has its unique place in the whole, each of which presented an individual datum, and to view the matter thus, as we all do, is to *interpret* experience, and is not merely to accept data as they at present are immediately given. And every induction about nuts or about other facts presupposes such an interpretation of experience as an unique whole.

When one says, "This is novel," "This is unique," "This never happened before," "This is an individual thing or event or person," "I am an individual, I am unique,"—what does one mean? Does one mean simply: "This surprises me now?" "This thrills me just now?" "This interests, attracts, startles, pleases, pains, awakens me just now?" Does one mean anything that any instantaneous or immediate sense datum can now adequately present to me? No. When one asserts that such uniqueness, novelty, individuality, belongs to every person, thing, event, in the world, one interprets, and interprets most elaborately, data that can no more present to sense the truth that they are unique than the once so famous Tichborne claimant could identify himself as Roger Tichborne merely by showing his face in court.

You will observe, I hope, the relevancy of these considerations to our main problem. Some one, says Bergson, declares that time is very real. He is right. Time is just as real as it is indeed infinitely long and full of unique events. And this thinker himself adds: Time is real in so far as novelty, evolution, the occurrence of unique events, invention, life in all its wealth of individuality, are real. Again I agree with this thinker. He is right. He goes still further, and says: Hence no descrip-

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tion, no reduction of time sequences to types, to classes of events, to serial orders, no explanation in terms of a world formula can ever exhaustively conceptualize the time-world, or deprive its novelties of their individual significance. Still I agree with him. But nevertheless I insist: What constitutes this novelty, this individuality, this uniqueness, of all the temporal facts as they fly past? And Bergson's answer to this question puzzles me. He seems to suppose that one can just sense this reality of the time stream, this uniqueness of each event, this individuality of each stage of the evolution of the illimitable universe. Bergson puts his sugar in the glass of water, for (to adapt Clerk Maxwell's once famous lines), "for foreigners sweeten it so." "Lo," he seems to say, "I have it, I sense it; the time world is real; for I,—even I have to wait for this individual event to take place." For the sugar, it seems, dissolves too slowly. Time "coincides with my impatience;" and, as it seems, this impatience is an incident of evolution which never happened before,—"a little invention of Bergson's own," so to speak. As Bergson's reader I grieve for our philosopher's impatience while he waits for the sugar to dissolve. I concede the novelty of this event; I concede it sorrowfully,—as the little boy admitted the uniqueness of the vision of that kernel of the nut. But I insistently reply to the philosopher: When you wait and feel the impatience,—well, you feel—impatience. Impatience, however, is a *quale* of feeling, a sort of discomfort. As immediately felt, it does *not* present to you that character which you, the philosopher, regard as constituting the very essence of its temporal reality, viz., its character as this unique event in the endless life-striving that to your mind is the world.

Uniqueness, novelty, individuality,—these, I have said, cannot be described, and must be appreciated. But I have now added the reflection, just as true as the other: Uniqueness, novelty, individuality,—*these cannot be immediately* felt. They are no data of immediate experience. They are not given from moment to moment by life

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as it passes. In terms of these characters we all to be sure interpret our experience. Whatever is, is individual. Each event in time is novel. Each fact of the real world is unique. But that this is true is neither to be adequately expressed through any of our processes of classifying objects, nor yet is this truth to be adequately presented to us by any datum of sense or of feeling. For a sensory datum or an immediate feeling does not immediately show you that it is unique in its own kind.

How then can we appreciate uniqueness, individuality, novelty, whether in the sequence of temporal facts, or otherwise? I answer, as I have elsewhere repeatedly argued: Uniqueness, individuality, novelty, can be *willed* in case of our own deeds, and can be *acknowledged* in case of our interpretations of objects and of persons not ourselves. When I act, I *will* this one act. I will that it shall be this act and no other. I do not immediately observe, I cannot by any classification describe, I cannot by any causal law explain, that or how this act is mine, and is unique, and never was done and never will be done by anybody else, or at any other time. But I will that this act shall be mine, and shall be an act that nobody else ever did, and shall constitute a temporal novelty. To will thus is precisely what is most essential to having a will of one's own.

And precisely so, by that particular sort of will which constitutes my acknowledgment and interpretation of reality, I can and do acknowledge that every fact in the world is as unique in its own individuality as my own acts of will are by me intended to be unique. And this is what I mean by calling all events in time novel events, individual events, unique events. Why I have a right thus to interpret all facts in terms of my will is a question that belongs not to the present discussion. Last year, in a discussion of the problem of Realism and Idealism before this Association, I briefly stated my case for the right of each of us to interpret his world as his own, and also to interpret his world as a genuine and individual whole of

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reality,—to conceive reality as in its wholeness the expression of his rational will, and to conceive reality as for that very reason independent of his private caprices. However my realistic opponents may condemn this principle, each one of them when he states his case, as, for instance, Professor Spaulding or Professor Perry has done, gives us nothing whatever but his own interpretation of his own place in the system of facts, that he conceives thus and thus, and he conceives this system thus, because he finds the most rational expression of his own will in choosing to assert that the world is thus and thus, and in choosing to act accordingly. That this will to be one's self, and to have one's own world, and to live in the light of that world and in the acknowledgment of its fact, is no capricious individualism, but is simply the loyal will to conform to an absolute world will, and so to absolutely real standards: all this I have repeatedly maintained. And this is what the new Realism is trying, I think, to say. When our friends who state the case for any form of realism, new or old, insist that the real object is whatever my will, in so far as this will is merely the will to know, does not, must not now influence, they merely express the loyal will of any rational being first to conform his will to the absolute decision of the world will, and then only to find, through such conformity, the opportunity to discover what place in the rational system he yet in time and in his conduct can take. A man gives you in any case only his own interpretation of his world as he actively conceives that world; and this interpretation expresses his own will, so that every word that any realist ever utters inevitably tells you what he wills the world to be. If he says that his world is not the true expression of his rational will, he simply stultifies that will as he expresses it. But if he is a rational man, he wills the world to be the absolute decider for him as for all men, of whatever a rational being ought to accept as the objective truth. And so, of course, the realist expresses his will to be rational by renouncing his will to be personally and pri-

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vately capricious; and this appeal to what the absolute will decides is the only appeal that anybody can make to reality. The new realist ill expresses this, I take it, in saying that knowing does not influence its object. The question is not one of influence, but of decision. He decides to submit to the world will.

Now our acknowledgment of the time world is simply a special form of this will to be rational by means of finding for my individual will its place in the order of the individual deeds of the world will. And so a time sequence, viewed as it really is, that is, as a rational being really wills it to be, is viewed as a sequence of novel and individual events, each expressing somebody's present will to do something unique, and to find his own place in the world. That is my own theory of what constitutes the reality of the time world. Of course such a view of the temporal aspect of things is a part in my own mind, of a voluntaristic idealism, and nobody here present wants to be burdened with any more of my own idealism than is absolutely necessary to the exigencies of this discussion. But the resulting view of time and of its reality is at this point, I hope, fairly obvious. I agree with Bergson that the conceptual time of the time-measuring sciences is not any adequate expression of the temporal aspect of reality. I agree also that the reality of time is the reality of life and of action. I wholly disagree with this writer in so far as he supposes the genuine and deeper reality of time to be at all adequately present as an object of our immediate experience, whether that be an experience of a sensory succession, or of a feeling of impatience. It is not what a man merely feels that gets him into genuine touch with deeper reality. It is what a man wills to do. Now the temporal form of experience is to my mind primarily the form of the will. One wills that each new act *shall be* unique. One believes that the world really contains unique events. One believes this for a reason which is substantially identical with one's reason for acknowledging that, in dealing with the world, one is deal-

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ing with the decisive will of the world, and with the ordered series of deeds in terms of which the world's whole will is expressed. To say: "This event never happened before and can never happen again" is to say something that nobody can now verify, and that nobody can state in terms of an abstract conception of universal law. It is also to interpret the data of sense as in their totality the expressions of what Münsterberg well calls the will that there shall be a world. This expression of the will that there shall be a world is never given to us in its totality by any datum of sense. Whatever we merely find in life is an inadequate expression of the will to live, and demands from us further deeds of adjustment and of conquest. So far as these deeds are conceived by us to be expression of any coherent individual plan of life, they are viewed as such that each act of the will presupposes what is already done as its own irrevocable past, and passes on to its own real future, that is, to the deeds that are yet to be done. Hence the time order is conceived by us as a series whose ordinal relation is the relation of the deed already done to the deed yet to be done. We conceive all the wills of other individuals in terms of the same universal will to have a real world. And hence all the acts that are done are conceived as ordered in the same time order. The time order as a totality is the order in which the world will is conceived to live out the whole of its life, to do the totality of its deeds,—deeds whereof the acts of each individual, at any moment, are examples. Our right to this conception is our right to have any real world at all. We never merely find nor yet merely define the real world. We will that world. We have a right to do so.

To complete this outline sketch of a theory of the real time order, of its novelties, of its uniqueness, and of its significance, there is one aspect of the interpretation of the time order that still remains to be mentioned. I can here only mention it. I cannot dwell upon it. To conceive the time order as real, and its parts as really inter-

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related in the way that I have outlined, is inevitably to conceive that the world will actually has its total expression in the entire time process of deeds, and so of events, past, present, and to come. If an individual right hand glove is real, and if an individual left hand glove is also real, and if they are mates, then the pair of gloves whereof these two mates are the units, is itself real, and so, if the past of the time order is real, and if the future of the time order is real, and if past and future belong together, then the whole of the time order has its own reality as a whole. Since, however, the future time order is not just now temporally and transiently a present datum, but is precisely the totality of future events, and since an analogous proposition holds of the past, the whole time order is real not at any one temporal instant, but precisely as a time-inclusive totality. And that is precisely what I myself mean by an eternal reality. By the eternal I mean not in the least the timeless, but the totality of temporal events viewed precisely as a totality. That such an eternal is real, not at any one instant, but as an eternal, is as sure as that if the fingers of a living hand are real, the whole hand of which these are the fingers is itself a reality. The temporal not merely implies the eternal; in its wholeness it constitutes the eternal,—namely, the total decision of the world will, wherein the loyal will to be rational finds its own fulfillment.

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THE ETHICS OF PLATO.

R. G. BURY.

IN attempting within the limits of a short article to give an account of the ethical theory of a writer so voluminous as Plato, I am attempting, as I am well aware, a task of no ordinary difficulty. For the shortcomings in the

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execution of it I would crave the indulgence of the critical reader, pleading that I am here writing only as a plain man for plain men.

1. *Fifth-century Ethics.* To understand the genesis of Plato's views we must hark back to the half-century before his work began, the age of the Greek 'Aufklärung,' when Protagoras and Hippias, Gorgias and Socrates were the most prominent forces in the intellectual life of Greece. We must take some account of these predecessors because it is clear that in the wide sweep of Plato's mind all the main streams of pre-Platonic speculation converge to meet. As on the metaphysical side he is the successor of Heraclitus and Parmenides, so on the ethical side he receives his momentum from the Sophists and Socrates. In the hands of the Sophists the old nature-philosophy of the Ionian schools had been transformed into something more like *litteræ humaniores;* they had given form to the natural suspicion of their age that, after all, "the proper study of mankind" is not any senseless 'element,' but man himself; they, in a word,—the word of Cicero,—had brought down philosophy from heaven to the dwellings and cities of men. Roughly speaking, we may describe the Sophists as professional teachers of social and political 'excellence' (ἀρετή), meaning by 'excellence' not only moral virtue, in the strict sense, but the whole complex of arts and graces which go to make a successful life. In the city-state of that period, one of the conditions most necessary for social and political advancement was rhetorical skill; and accordingly we find that the teaching of rhetoric, the art of plausible speech, was one of the most lucrative branches of the Sophists' trade. As to morals, it does not appear that the Sophists taught on any scientific basis; they did not preach any doctrine of virtue for virtue's sake nor make any attempt to distinguish between principle and self-interest; such an argument as "Honesty is the best policy" represents, it would seem, the high water mark of their ethical theory. With the Sophists was classed by his Athenian judges and executioners

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Socrates,—Socrates whom Xenophon pictures as little better than a *bourgeois* moralist. The insight of Plato saw more truly than either Xenophon or the dikasts that the ultimate effect of the Socratic λόγοι was to confound the Sophists and to explode their views; and this veiled significance of the historical Socrates is made clearly explicit in the argumentations of the Platonic Socrates. But though the chief value of the work of Socrates was negative and lay in the sapping destructive criticism he applied to current dogmas, and in the inductive definition-seeking method of inquiry he employed, we have to notice also the positive positions which he laid down, which were these three: "Virtue is a unity"; "Virtue is knowledge"; "Vice is involuntary."

Having said thus much by way of indicating the atmosphere in which Plato's views of morality sprung up, it is now time to approach those views more closely.

2. *The Preliminary Dialogues.* Plato's earlier writings are commonly, and conveniently, divided into two main classes. In the first of these we count dialogues like the *Laches, Charmides, Lysis,* in which by the Socratic method of question-and-answer an attempt is made to arrive, in the Socratic manner, at definite notions of moral qualities such as piety, temperance, courage. Inasmuch as the conclusions reached are not of a satisfactory character, it may be said that the positive value of these dialogues,—which are little more than preliminary exercises in elementary dialectic,—consists mainly in the way in which current ethical opinion is convicted of inconsistency and futility. What Socrates had maintained with his dying breath, his disciple here reiterates: the men who talk most glibly on matters of politics and morals are precisely the men who *know* least about them: like people, like priest,—like doxo-sophist, like Demos.

In the second class of Plato's earlier works we find him coming to closer grips with the errors of the Sophistic schools. Thus the *Gorgias,* the *Euthydemus,* and the *Protagoras* have a definitely controversial tone, Socrates the

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true 'Sophist' being pitted against the pseudo-sophists of his own age. A favorite theme of controversy was the question, "Is virtue teachable?"—a question raised in the *Protagoras* and *Meno*. In the former of these, for example, Protagoras is represented as maintaining the teachability of virtue against the doubts of Socrates; and the trend of the argument is to show that the position of Protagoras is only tenable on condition that we admit the truth of the Socratic position, "Virtue is knowledge," an admission which the Sophist naturally is loath to make. It is, then, in the dialogues of this class, or period, that Plato develops most fully his attack on the vulgar conception of morality and on the Sophists who did little more, in Plato's eyes, than act as prophets of popular opinion, formulating and defending the least defensible elements in the vulgar conception. The main points of this attack we must content ourselves with summing up as briefly as possible. In the first place, what went by the name of 'virtue' in the view of the vulgar and their sophistic teachers was something of which they could give no consistent account, the effect of no assignable causes, a product the origin of which they were totally unable to explain. Hence, also, they could never guarantee either to produce it or reproduce it, or to insure its development and its permanence when produced. A virtuous man, on this showing, can be nothing else than a sport of nature, a whim of the gods, called into existence only by the rare fortuitous working of some 'divine dispensation' θεία μοῖρα. Secondly, in the popular view virtue was regarded as a plurality of four or more different qualities,—wisdom, justice, holiness, courage, etc.,—of which no two are alike and yet the mass of them lumped together is to be labeled 'virtue.' In opposition to this Plato sets the Socratic view, "Every virtue is (a form of) wisdom." Further, in respect of its contents, popular morality is seen to be often perverse, inasmuch as it tends to condone certain kinds of evil (such as injuring enemies), and to put the label of virtue on the products of vice. And lastly, the

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final end of action, the *summum bonum*, is usually conceived to lie in some material advantage, or some sensual pleasure, as if virtue were no adequate end in itself. These are the main points on which Plato touches in his critique of current ethics; but illuminating though it is in itself, the main value of that critique is to clear the ground for the establishment of the positive doctrine set forth in the *Republic*.

3. *The Developed Theory of Virtue, and Its Psychological Basis.* The ostensible theme of the *Republic*,—in the wide scope of which are included dissertations on religion and art as well as on ethics and politics,—is Justice (δικαιοσύνη): justice as a quality both of the state and of the individual. In the course of the search for justice the other virtues are found to emerge first,—namely, wisdom (σοφία), courage (ἀνδρεία), and temperance (σωφροσύνη). Of these, wisdom is seen to be the virtue peculiar to the ruling class in the state, the guardians, and courage to be similarly peculiar to the military class, the auxiliaries. And as in the state so in the individual,—who is assumed to be a 'micropolis,'—wisdom and courage attach to special divisions of the soul, to the 'rational' and 'spirited' element respectively. But when we come to the other two virtues, it is less easy to delimit their spheres. This is how Plato describes temperance:

> Temperance in its action is not like courage and wisdom. The wisdom and the courage which makes the city wise and courageous reside each in a particular part, but temperance is spread through the whole alike, setting in unison of the octave the weakest and the strongest and the middle class . . . so that we may most justly say that this unanimity is temperance, the concord of the naturally worse and the naturally better as to which should rule in the city or in the individual.[1] . . . We call the individual temperate by reason of the friendship and harmony of these elements, when the ruler and the two subjects are agreed that the rational element must rule and there is no rebellion against him.[2]

Next as to Justice: as exhibited in the state, it is de-

[1] *Republic*, 432 A., Mr. A. D. Lindsay's translation.
[2] *Ibid.*, 442.

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scribed (p. 433) as "the principle abiding in child and woman, in slave and freeman and artisan, in ruler and ruled, that each minded his own business, one man one work, and was not meddlesome." It is also "that virtue in a city which enabled all (the other virtues) to find a place in it, and after they have appeared, preserves them so long as at is present in the city." And as "the city was just by reason of the three classes within it each doing their own work," so "each one of us will be just and doing his own work if the parts within him are doing severally their own work."

> The just man does not allow the different principles within him to do other work than their own, nor the distinct classes in his soul to interfere with one another; but in the truest sense sets his house in order, gaining the mastery over himself; and becoming on good terms with himself through discipline, he joins in harmony those different elements like three terms in a musical scale . . . and binding together all these elements he moulds the many within him into one mass, temperate and harmonious.

It is clear from this that Plato's view of virtue as both one and fourfold, a complex unity, is based upon his view of the soul as a trinity in unity, a whole made up of three elements, the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational. It is this advance in psychological analysis which enables him to go beyond the simple Socratic assertion, "Virtue is one." What is not so clear is the precise distinction which he wishes to draw between temperance and justice, both of which are said to apply to the whole range of the soul rather than to any one part of it. Perhaps the distinction intended might be conveyed most simply by means of a short algebraic formula: suppose α to represent the rational, β the spirited, γ the appetitive element,—then temperance ('self-mastery') implies $\alpha : \beta :: \beta : \gamma$ or (in the proportion of "the octave") 4: 2:: 2: 1, while justice implies $\alpha = \alpha$, $\beta = \beta$, $\gamma = \gamma$. Professor Sidgwick expressed the distinction in these terms: "Temperance or orderliness is related to uprightness as the structure of an organism to its life,—the former expresses the due submission of the non-rational elements to reason, whereas

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the latter denotes the harmonious functioning of the duly related elements." Justice is not only a virtue; it is something more than a virtue. To quote Mr. R. L. Nettleship:

> Justice in Plato's sense is the power of individual concentration on duty. If a soldier is just in this sense, he is of course a brave man; if a man in a subordinate position is just, he of course accepts and maintains authority, or is 'self-controlled.' Justice therefore, though it has been spoken of as one among other virtues, and though it manifests itself in many particular actions which are called in a specific sense just, and to which the names of the other virtues are not applied, is really the condition of the existence of all the virtues; each of them is a particular manifestation of the spirit of justice, which takes different forms according to a man's function in the community. In modern phrase it is equivalent to a sense of duty.

Similarly Dr. J. Adam (on *Republic* 434 C) writes:

> Civic Justice is the soil out of which all the other virtues grow; its fruits are Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, of which the last appears in the Farmers and Artisans, the last two in the Auxiliaries, while the Rulers possess all three. Thus all the Virtues meet in Justice, and it is in Justice, not in σοφία (as the historical Socrates held), that the true unity of Virtue consists. Plato's Justice is in reality not so much a specific virtue, as Virtue or Righteousness in general.

Here then we have the clue to Plato's treatment of Justice: he seeks to expand and enlarge the notion so that from a specific it may be transformed into a generic notion, indicating Virtue at large rather than a mere fractional quarter of it. This, however, does not mean that δικαιοσύνη becomes a synonym of ἀρετή, since the latter term covers not only moral virtue but every possible kind of human excellence: what it means is rather that ἀρετή *qua* moral, or on its psychical side, is identical with the narrower term δικαιοσύνη. So the 'just' man is the morally good man, who "walks before God with a perfect heart" and "fulfills all righteousness,"—*integer vitae scelerisque purus.*

4. *The Good for Man, and Its Metaphysical Basis.* The child works and behaves himself in order to win a prize; and "the child is father of the man,"—of the man in the

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street, that is, and of the sophist who acts sponsor for him. They regard virtue as no more than a means to some desirable end external to itself,—an unprofitable servant. Plato on the contrary sees that means and end must be connected by a closer bond, and looks to the natural and logical results of virtue as supplying in themselves the desired end, because containing in themselves intrinsic value. As a concise statement of his general view it would be difficult to improve on the account given by Professor Sidgwick:[3]

> Since all rational activity is for some end, the different arts or functions into which human industry is divided are naturally defined by a statement of their ends or uses; and similarly, in giving an account of the different artists and functionaries, we necessarily state their end, 'what they are good for.' It is only in so far as they realize this end that they are what we call them. . . . It is easy to extend this view throughout the whole region of organized life; an eye that does not attain its end by seeing is without the essence of an eye. In short, we may say of all organs and instruments that they are what we think them in proportion as they fulfill their function and attain their end: if, then, we conceive the whole universe organically, as a complex arrangement of means to ends, we shall understand how Plato might hold that all things really *were*, or (as we say) 'realized their idea,' in proportion as they accomplished the special end or good for which they were adapted. But this special end, again, can only be really good so far as it is related to the ultimate end or good of the whole, as one of the means or particulars by or in which this is partially realized. If, then, the essence or reality of each part of the organized world is to be found in its particular end or good, the ultimate ground of all reality must be found in the ultimate end or good of the universe.

Thus Plato "identified the ultimate notions of ethics and ontology," and assumed in consequence that we cannot define the good for man unless we have a knowledge of the Good as Idea. Hence the only competent ethicist is the philosopher, and the guardians to qualify for rule in morals must study dialectic: knowledge is still, as with Socrates, the ruling factor in morals.

It thus appears that virtue is practically identical with the good for man, since the good is the end, and the end is

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[3] "History of Ethics," p. 38.

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'realization of the idea,' and such realization consists in the fulfillment of specific function. And this is precisely what virtue, construed as Justice, secures. But although it is true in the abstract that virtue alone is all-sufficient, it may still be argued that the good for man ought to contain some other elements; and pleasure especially is a clamorous claimant for admission into the desirable life. In the *Philebus* this question is argued out at length, and it is finally decided that neither reason alone nor pleasure alone is identical with the good for man, which is a complex whole, a mixture, of which the most important ingredients are Order and Measure and Reason. As to pleasure, only the purest kinds of it can be admitted, *viz.*, certain æsthetic pleasures and intellectual pleasures. Thus the practical result of the argument is that the Good Life is the virtuous life (the 'measure' and 'symmetry' of the *Philebus* representing the principle of 'justice' in the *Republic*), which is mainly composed of intellectual studies and rational action, and to which certain 'true' and painless pleasures naturally attach. This result is of the nature of a compromise between the extreme hedonism of the Cyrenaics and the anti-hedonism or rigid intellectualism of the Cynic and Megaric schools; and it is a result accordant with the doctrine of the *Republic*, in so far as that dialogue implies that real value does belong to certain forms of pleasure, and that 'the just life' is richer in such real pleasures than 'the unjust life.' Practical common sense may wring thus much of concession from the niggardly hand of metaphysic; but it still remains true that the ruling conception of Good in the man and in the state is simply the Idea of Good particularized and realized,—Good as the principle of order, intelligibility, reality.

5. *The Personal Ideal.* As an educational implement a bare theory of morals is sadly ineffective. Men require a living example, they need to see Goodness moving and speaking before their eyes, before they will believe and be saved. It is the Founder of Christianity, rather than

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the system, who "draws all men after him;" nor was it in blindness that the Cynics, for the edification of their disciples, whitewashed Heracles into a saint. In Socrates Plato found his moral type, his personal ideal, ready made. For the Platonic Socrates,—how far an idealized figure we dare not say,—is not only a preacher of virtue, he is also virtue personified. As the philosopher he is, in the first place, the lover and winner of wisdom, the primary virtue. But he is also the exemplar of courage and of temperance or self-control, the perfect master of his passions, in whom is actualized the supremacy of reason. Nowhere is this brought out more fully and vividly than in the *Symposium*,—a dialogue which, if only on this account, that it emphasizes so strongly the figure of Socrates as the personal ideal, deserves more attention than it has generally received.[4] From it, taken in conjunction with the *Phædo*, we learn how, in Plato's view, the righteous man, built 'four square' of virtues, conducts himself alike in the midst of life and in the face of death. The Socrates who argues in defense of morals is himself more eloquent than any argument: the compelling presence of that Silenus shape with its hidden heart of gold can draw tears of penitence from even the most hardened of 'the children of this world,' such as Alcibiades.

In his presentation of Socrates as the moral type Plato varies the tone and emphasis from dialogue to dialogue. It is the ascetic and other-worldly character which is most prominent in the *Phædo;* the philosopher prays that he may be 'saved out of the world'; he regards almost with abhorrence his material 'tomb-body' (σῶμα σῆμα), 'the body of this death'; and in his eyes the practice of philosophy appears to be little else than a 'cathartic' process in which the soul is purified from the defilements of the flesh, "continually mortifying all its evil and corrupt affections." But this negative aspect of philosophy, in which it appears as 'a rehearsal of death,' has for its

[4] See my ed. of the *Symp.*, pp. xiv, lxi, lxv.

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complement a positive side. The 'theoretic' life is in itself a life well worth living, and the man who loses his life for its sake does not truly find it; to be 'mortified' in this sense is to have achieved the freedom which truth bestows, a harmony unbroken by carnal discords, and a god-like-ness which is the veritable *eudaemonia*. Moreover, the philosopher,—who is at once 'the mortified man,' and the seer of life *sub specie æternitatis*, through his vision of Ideal Good,—is in duty bound to use his virtue and knowledge in the service of society. For himself the theoretic life is all-sufficient, but "no man liveth to himself" but rather to the *polis* and the cosmos of which he is a member; so that it behooves the philosopher to return from his specular mount of vision to 'the cave' of the darkness of this world, there to engage in the work of turning from darkness to light the prisoners of ignorance. In short, theory must be combined with praxis; the dialectician must turn educationist: the man who is 'converted' must 'strengthen the brethren.'

And this is precisely what the Platonic Socrates does. Morals with him is Art no less than Science: his whole energy is devoted to realizing upon earth amongst his fellows the type of virtue 'laid up in the heavens,' 'the pattern showed him in the mount.' By example even more than by precept he exhibits 'the beauty of holiness,' making actual once for all in the sphere of history the personal ideal as conceived by Plato.

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ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISON SCIENCE.

CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON.

I. The existence of a multitude of anti-social persons in a nation affects morality and character in varied ways. By physical inheritance from persons whose lives have

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usually been vicious and depraved the community must expect to suffer from disease and from all the burdens inevitable in carrying the support of defective and abnormal persons to the third, and even later generations. The intimate relations between physical conditions and character are so well understood in our day that they do not require special argument or illustration. Significant also is the fact, which it is difficult to reduce to figures, that the social income is so seriously reduced by crime that means are often lacking for the support of the agencies of culture. There are not enough rooms in our school houses, teachers are poorly paid, playgrounds are too narrow, and a thousand wants of vital interest are not satisfied because the financial resources of the state are exhausted in the conflict with crime. Mr. Eugene Smith, President of the New York Prison Association, has made a careful estimate of the cost of the criminal class in the United States. It pretends to be nothing more than an estimate, but it is probable that its vast figures fall below rather than rise above the real expense of the nation. The members of the criminal class are, as a rule, vicious, and their evil example tends to counteract all of the refining influences of orderly family life, educational institutions, church, and good literature. In wide districts of our cities hundreds of thousands of boys catch the enthusiasm of the adventurous spirit of the notorious criminals who live near them. The way in which the conduct of criminals is advertised, both in the newspapers and in the cheap and popular stories read by many children and youth, tends to enlarge the field of influence of this depraving example. It is incredible to refined persons and to honest workmen, who live habitually in another atmosphere, to learn for the first time how the very actions which are regarded by most of us with disgust and horror, seem admirable to the youth who live narrow lives and are not subject to the higher standards of the best society. We must further count among the malign effects of the existence of the criminal class, the evil education of children who are

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brought up under the influence of criminals and vicious persons. It is not at all surprising that our public schools, parental schools, and the reformatory institutions of the state should be crowded to overflowing with children and youth of this class.

Another factor is the temptation offered to ambitious politicians by the presence of the greedy class of voters in certain wards of all our cities. It is inevitable that policemen and their superior officers, councilmen, and even legislators and elective judges should at times come under the sway of these temptations. It is evident, therefore, that a policy of silence, ignorance, and neglect must be fatal to all the interests which are precious to men of the highest standards. If the criminal class were simply neutral, it might conceivably be left to itself, and to the inner causes of self-destruction; but so long as police stations, charity hospitals, jails and prisons bring together vast numbers of unclean men and women, every community keeps a breeding place of communicable diseases. Officers of the law are constantly exposed to this danger and no citizen can regard himself as entirely secure. Communicable diseases are samples of the contagious effects of criminal life in our cities. A vigorous, persistent, and rational policy must therefore be adopted and carried out by the city, state, and nation. The first condition of effecting any rational policy is to bring the whole question to the attention of scholarly men, who are competent to analyze situations, to weigh evidence, and to arrive at conclusions after all the essential factors have been duly considered.

II. The social problem in relation to the group of antisocial persons is complicated. First of all, the dangerous members of the criminal class must be restrained. People who are incapable of using freedom without damage to others must be shut up by themselves. This deprivation of that liberty which is so dear to almost every human being, is the method of society for intimidating the convict himself and of deterring those who are plotting

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crime from carrying out their egoistic purposes. But this power of punishment to intimidate has very narrow limits. It is well known by students of the subject that the danger of being caught and of serving time acts as a stimulant to many adventurous criminals, and since most of them are essentially gamblers, they regard the chance of being detected and convicted among the risks of the game which they are playing. The vital connection between gambling and crime is well established, and it has great significance in estimating the real value of the deterrent agencies of society. The criminal is also characterized by narrow views of life, by want of foresight, and certain groups of them, by slavery to passion. These characteristics explain the small deterrent influence of our penal machinery upon the criminal class. At any rate, most of the sentences are short and have no deterrent effect upon a vast number of very degraded and even dangerous men. They do have the effect, however, upon first offenders, of lowering the strength and vitality of the higher motives.

For these reasons practical men have long been turning their attention to better methods of reforming convicts. By reformation is not usually meant a spiritual transformation of character, which is very difficult to verify, but simply training in social habits, which will hold a man to his place in society and keep him from positively destructive action. The great majority of anti-social persons cannot in the nature of the case be held in prisons all the time. After conviction they serve from ten days to many months, but on the average, after three or four years they are as free to go where they please as men of the best character. Therefore, their conduct in liberty is the chief social interest, and even as early as Plato the desirability of training such men for good citizenship was distinctly seen. The doctrine of reformation by punishment is by no means a modern novelty, although distinguished contributions to method have been made, even within recent years.

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But the reformation of men of vicious habits is very difficult, and the result always in doubt. Therefore, the most far-seeing students are working at the problems of prevention. They would have society anticipate anti-social conduct and erect barriers in its way, or divert attention of the tempted from solicitations to the depraved and dangerous life. These means of prevention aim, first of all, at the elimination by various methods of segregation, isolation, and even asexualization of those who are manifestly unfit to remain free citizens or become parents. Furthermore, since disease is a cause of moral degeneration, emphasis is laid upon all of the improvements in housing and public hygiene which have recently enlisted very great, but not too great, interest in all civilized countries. Since many of the conditions of economic life render life uncertain and depressing, all of the forms of social legislation looking to improvement of income of the unskilled laborers have significance in relation to the prevention of crime and vice. But here we must not overlook the fact that crime on a scale hitherto unknown, if we exclude war, is a characteristic of the huge industrial and commercial organizations of recent years. Therefore, measures to prevent crime must be aimed quite as much at unscrupulous managers of capital as at the petty thief who steals because he is starving. We must also consider the preventive value of the agencies of education, the means of popular recreation, and the creation of higher interests which attract human beings away from the elementary and animal satisfactions of human beings. The movements for temperance reform and for dealing with abandoned men and women must be counted among the agencies of prevention.

But we are not at the end. It is not enough to assume a purely negative attitude toward the dangers arising from the existence of the anti-social class. Society has before it a vast task of constructive work, which will not merely diminish evil and avert disease, but will actually build up the physical, intellectual, and moral vitality of those

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groups of human beings who are most liable to fall into crime. We may then say in general that the order of historical development and the order of logical thought may be indicated in a very general way by these words: revenge, intimidation, reformation, positive effort to reform the actually criminal, prevention, and socially constructive effort.

III. A good starting point for the study of American thought on this subject is developed in a remarkable series of resolutions drawn up by the eminent Dr. E. C. Wines, first Commissioner of the International Prison Commission, and adopted by the National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline held at Cincinnati in October, 1870. Those resolutions have become an American classic and deserve still the study of every citizen. Some of his declarations of principles may therefore be repeated here in direct quotation or paraphrase. "The treatment of criminals by society is for the protection of society, but since such treatment is directed to the criminal rather than to the crime, its great object should be his moral regeneration; hence, the supreme aim of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals, not the infliction of vindictive suffering." From this fundamental idea we advance to the demand for the progressive classification of prisoners based on character; we are ready to expect more from hope than from fear; from reward than from punishment; the prisoner must be placed under a régime where he is induced to secure desirable liberty by good conduct. For such a system the highest qualities of mind and heart are required in the administrative officers. Definite sentences should be replaced by those of indeterminate length, and release should be determined, not in advance, but by the conduct of the convict. Great emphasis must be placed upon education taken in its largest sense, and upon religion. If administrative officers are to have success in reforming bad men, they must have belief that this is possible. The interests of society and the interest of the convict being identical, the man who has gone

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astray must be disciplined to discover this truth. Self-respect should not be destroyed, but cultivated as a means of holding a man to a good life. Industrial training is essential in any system of reform. The short sentences have a tendency to stimulate rather than repress transgression. Reformation is a work of time and cannot be effected under our system of short sentences for minor offenses. The declarations anticipate the development of industrial schools, which since 1870 have advanced very rapidly in effectiveness. They call for better methods of aiding discharged prisoners and their families. When the state has deprived an innocent citizen of liberty, and the mistake has been proved, it is a social duty to make reasonable indemnification for such wrongful imprisonment. Society is always responsible for improving conditions which inevitably cause criminal actions. The inequalities in the length of sentences should be reduced and a better principle found for determining the length of sentences. The improvement of prison statistics, architecture, organization, and management is emphasized. The responsibility of parents for the support and training of their children is mentioned,—a prophecy of the more recent legislation in Colorado,[1] Illinois, and elsewhere in regard to contributory neglect which is enforced by the juvenile courts. The declaration also insists upon the tendency which has, largely in consequence of this declaration, been forwarded in our most advanced states, the erection of central authority to guide, control, unify, and vitalize the system of each state. And, furthermore, the coöperation of good women in all such work is required.

By no means all these principles were originally discovered in America; many of their applications in administration were tested by European experience before they were introduced into American institutions. The story

[1] Reference is here made to the recent laws which authorize the creation of juvenile courts and define their powers and duties.

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of this development need not occupy us here.[2] These ideas, however, have had in general a field of bolder experiment and freer development in our country, especially in connection with our reformatories for young men, our women's prisons, and our juvenile courts. Elmira Reformatory in New York is the institution which stands as a type; but the essential principles have been applied in other states and institutions, for women as well as for men, with great variety in methods and sometimes with a high degree of inventiveness, originality, and pedagogic insight. The higher aims of modern reformatories attract a nobler type of officers, and as the merit system of appointment and tenure displaces the spoils system, such officers remain at their tasks long enough to learn their professional duties.

IV. *The International Prison Congress.* Under the inspiration and direction of Dr. E. C. Wines, but at the suggestion of a Russian representative of prison science, the principal governments of Europe and the United States established the International Prison Commission for the study of the general principles and problems relating to the social treatment of crime. This congress has never yet met in the country from which the first incentive came for its organization. The first International Prison Congress was held in London in 1872. At intervals of about five years other congresses have been held in Stockholm, Rome, St. Petersburg, Paris, Brussels, and Budapest. The congress is officially invited by the government of the country in which it is held, and the sessions are convened at the national capital; but the congress is not entirely official, for organizations of specialists, philanthropists, and representatives of the legal and medical professions are invited to become members. By a joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representa-

[2] The essential features of this subject are discussed in the book of Dr. F. H. Wines, "Punishment and Reformation" (second ed., 1910), and in the four volumes to be distributed among the members of the International Prison Congress, prepared under the generous patronage of the Russell Sage Foundation.

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tives of the United States, approved March 3, 1905, the President was authorized and requested to extend to the International Prison Congress an invitation to hold its eighth meeting on this side of the Atlantic. This invitation was accepted with expressions of genuine appreciation and cordiality at Budapest in 1905. The eighth session, therefore, will be held in Washington, D. C., October 2-8, 1910.

While this organization is called a prison congress, we must consider its program in order to have a correct conception of its real purpose and scope. From the official statement drawn up by the late Dr. Samuel J. Barrows, I quote this description of its regular plan of discussions:

The congress is divided into four sections:

Section I relates to criminal law. In this section are some of the most eminent jurists in Europe. The discussions here are not merely academic. They relate to the fundamental principles of penal law and their practical application. They include the organization and administration of courts, the structure of penal codes, questions of criminal procedure, the classification of offenses, and application of penalties. Questions of extradition, the relation of nations to each other in the suppression of crime naturally fall under this section.

Section II relates to prison administration. It is naturally made up of those who have had experience as directors, superintendents, or wardens of prisons or correctional institutions. Everything relating to prison structure, hygiene, prison industries, the classification, organization, and education of offenders, to dietaries, medical treatment, the prevention and care of tuberculosis, and other prison diseases, the study of the criminal, and many other practical questions come under this section.

Section III relates to preventive means. This covers a wide field of sociological inquiry as to the causes and the prevention of crime.

Section IV relates to children and minors. Child saving is one of the most important and absorbing questions of our time. Neglected childhood, whether from neglected homes, neglected schools, or neglected factories, means an increase of crime. This section has given a new impetus to the subject of children's courts and the legal treatment of children accused of crime. Though the congress has done much to indicate better methods of prison discipline and improvement in criminal codes, it is destined to have a still greater influence in the reduction of crime through the serious study and attention which it is now giving to all preventive influences.

The International Prison Commission acts as the executive committee of the congress, and it meets every other

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year. It is composed of one member of each of the nations that have formally joined the commission and annually subscribe to its funds. This commission prepares and secures reports and conducts investigations in various countries in relation to crime and its treatment. The proceedings and reports of the congresses are published and circulated in the various nations. The commissioners of the United States have also published various reports of great value. The questions which will be discussed in 1910 in the First Section on *Penal Legislation* are the following:

Question 1. Assuming that a rational relation exists between the principle of the indeterminate sentence and the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence, (a) What class of delinquents should be submitted to, and what class excluded from its application? (b) How may a sentence of this kind without minimum or maximum limits be applied without danger to individual liberty?

If it is not admitted that there is a relation between the principle of the indeterminate sentence and the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence, is there ground for adding to the definite sentence with respect to a particular individual a restriction in the form of a supplemental penalty; and if so, in what cases, and how is it to be applied?

Question 2. How and in what manner may effect be given to penal sentences pronounced by foreign tribunals, especially with reference to habitual criminality and legal incapacity?

Question 3. To resist the tendency of criminals to band themselves together is it not desirable to make participation in criminal acts or agreements a distinct crime, or at least to make all such complicity a legal aggravation?

Question 4. What part does the death penalty play in the penal system of the different countries?

In Section II on *Prison Administration* the following questions will be discussed:

Question 1. What are the essential principles of a modern reformatory system, and upon what rational methods should it be based? Should its application be limited by age, or other classification? If so, under what limitations?

Must we not admit the necessity of special treatment for youthful criminals and even recidivists from sixteen to twenty-one or twenty-three years, recognizing the plasticity of that age and the possibility of curing by special methods physical, moral and intellectual, the perverted instincts of young offenders? In that case is it not desirable to give to the courts

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the power of imposing a special penalty: (a) sufficiently long to permit the full application of all means of reformation? (b) permitting the free application of conditional liberation?

Question 2. What improvements may be made in the parole system or the system of conditional liberation already existing in certain countries?

Question 3. What are the best means for assuring productive work for prisoners in small prisons?

Methods for prevention will be discussed in Section III under the following topics:

Question 1. What is the effect upon criminality of the legal measures taken in different states in the form of probation or suspension of sentence, etc., to avoid the necessity of imprisonment, especially at the time of first conviction, taking account of the age, character, and antecedents of the person? And is it desirable that these and similar laws should be extended?

Question 2. What measures should be taken for the suppression of mendicity and vagabondage, especially in view of modern criminal tendencies? What rules should be adopted for the organization of workhouses for mendicants and vagabonds?

Question 3. How is it possible, while paying due attention to the correction of the offender, to lighten the heavy economic burden falling upon families owing to the imprisonment of those upon whom they are dependent?

Question 4. Have the experiments of the last ten years made in certain countries providing special establishments for the detention of inebriate criminals, even recidivists, for long periods (two or three years) been successful or not? Is it necessary to complete the penitentiary discipline of these establishments by special medical treatment?

One of the most interesting problems, that of treatment of juvenile offenders and morally imperiled children, will be discussed in Section IV:

Question 1. Should young delinquents be subjected to the penal procedure applicable to adults? If not, what principles should guide the procedure applied to children and youthful offenders?

Question 2. Should special establishments be maintained for abnormal, backward, and feeble-minded children showing dangerous moral tendencies?

Question 3. What measures should be taken to correct the idleness and vagabondage of children in large cities?

Question 4. Is it desirable to take special measures for the protection of children born outside of wedlock; and if so, what measures? Owing to the neglect or abandonment due to irresponsible parents, are such children sufficiently protected by existing laws and institutions, or is special legislation and provision desirable?

A question for investigation. Without placing it on the program of the discussion for the next congress, the commission has deemed it desirable

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to collect information in answer to the following question: How should local prisons, jails, and lockups be constructed and organized?

These questions were carefully selected by the International Prison Commission out of a large number suggested by specialists in all countries. The topics were sent to many persons known to be thoroughly competent to treat them on the basis of their study and experience. The papers are all sent to Berne, Switzerland, in the early part of the year in which the congress is held, are there translated into French, printed, and sent to all of the members of the congress who have paid the required sum,—twenty-five francs. Only members of the congress are permitted to attend the section meetings and the meetings of the General Assembly, and to receive copies of the publications of the congress and commission. After the topics have been formulated as resolutions, they are debated in the sections, and the decisions of the sections are considered for the second time in a meeting of all the members of the congress in a general assembly, where they take their final form for publication as the decisions of the congress.

More important than the votes of the congress are the reasons for the judgments of the experts, which are published in full in the various papers or "rapports." The topics for this year, while they are of very general interest, were drawn up with special reference to the conditions in the United States. Almost all the questions look distinctly to social protection rather than to some scholastic theory of retribution.

V. It is very natural that the institutions and methods of the United States should be placed in a conspicuous position before the world in connection with the international meeting. For that very reason it is very desirable that we should refrain from boastfulness and revelations of our insular position. We are in a world current; we have more to learn than to teach; our statistics are very inadequate to prove our claims of superiority, even when these are in fact well founded. In the excursion of the invited delegates from European and other countries during

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the fortnight preceding the congress, we shall be able to show, indeed, some of the best institutions in the world,—best in structure and best in administration. On the other hand, we shall be obliged to show institutions where the simplest requirements of hygiene are neglected, where there are some actual barbarities, horrors, and abuses. The specific trade mark of America,—graft,—cannot be hidden from our visitors. It is not desirable that we should follow a policy of concealment. We need criticism, just that clear and intelligent and sympathetic criticism which our visitors will express. They are all prepared to appreciate the best features in our methods and laws, but they are too competent as experts to be blind to the defects which we regret and are trying our best to conquer. One of the most important illustrations of our defects is found in the county jail, the average city lockup, and the treatment of offenders sentenced to short terms in local establishments of punishment.

Yet we are doing some things worthy of note which our distinguished visitors will generously estimate at their proper worth. No one questions that our juvenile courts, although not absolutely new in idea, have had a development in this country which is entirely to our credit. Competent European writers have called attention to them and their essential principles are regarded as sound wherever they have been adequately discussed.

We have made a very fair beginning with the probation of occasional and hopeful offenders. This is by no means entirely a novelty. It has been employed with success on the other side of the Atlantic, and the principle on which it rests, that of preserving young persons from the moral contagion of criminal society into which imprisonment inevitably plunges them, is well established. The congress will, without doubt, help us to clarify our ideas and secure wider public attention for a measure which has a great future but which needs to be applied with extreme care and full information.

Our parole system, again, is not entirely original in the

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United States. It is borrowed in many features from European methods, but we have improved and developed it in a few states of the Union with very encouraging results. In certain circles we are confusing the parole system with the so-called 'indeterminate sentence.' As a matter of fact there is no law in any one of our states based upon the principle of the entirely indeterminate sentence, not even the law drawn for the Elmira Reformatory, where a maximum term is fixed by law. The indeterminate sentence is by no means universally accepted by the legal profession, and it is positively opposed by many prosecutors, policemen, and judges on various grounds. We should, therefore, carefully avoid confusing our parole system, in our discussions, with the indeterminate sentence. Many of us confidently believe that much greater flexibility ought to be given in the administration of the sentences of our criminal courts, and that much more ought to be made of the conduct of the prisoner, both in the prison itself and in the conditional liberty which he enjoys on parole, in fixing the period of his punishment. But we have by no means yet worked out the proper administrative and judicial machinery for making this principle effective in the highest degree. Of the value of the parole system, when limited to prisoners of the proper category and vigorously carried out by an adequate corps of competent parole officers, there can be no question.

The section which is to discuss a general policy of prevention will not find so much material in the social legislation of the United States as in the older countries of European civilization. We have a great many hopeful and honorable schemes for improving the conditions of the tempted and the weak, but they are generally fragmentary, isolated, voluntary plans which have no basis in law and government, and therefore break down under the forces of competition and the lack of powerful central supervision and control. For example, we have no law which requires a state to provide for the support of a prisoner who has, in the ordinary work of the factory in the

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prison, received injuries which render him permanently incapable of earning a living. This is one of the forms of injustice which has hardly even been considered in this country. We have been looking too much to deterrents, to appeals to fear for social protection. Only of late has the parental idea of government, the moral responsibility of the city, state, and nation, become a subject of general discussion. We have no national system of social education such as is found in the policy of the German Empire. Our intense individualism, which is often only a fine name for savage selfishness, needs the correction of an international congress,[3] where the failures of egoism are made apparent in the tragical story of crime.

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THE APPEAL TO NATURE IN MORALS AND POLITICS.*

W. J. ROBERTS.

I WISH this evening to treat the vast subject which I have chosen in a descriptive rather than in an analytic or critical spirit: to exhibit a very ancient, and yet in our own day vigorous and flourishing, mode of regarding moral and political questions, in its concrete manifestation or in its 'working' rather than to subject it to the demands which contemporary philosophical fashion would impose

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[3] Further information about the International Prison Congress will be furnished to any person interested, if request is sent to the writer of this article, care of the University of Chicago. Full reports in French are furnished to members of the Congress; abstracts of papers are furnished in English to members of the American Prison Association, whose secretary is Mr. Joseph P. Byers, Randall's Island, New York.

* An address to the Philosophical Society of the University College, Cardiff, South Wales.

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upon it. From another point of view, my object is not logical but pragmatist: it is to show that the appeal to nature has 'worked' or has issued in tangible practical results, and that the same appeal works very diversely in diverse hands. This very striking and paradoxical diversity may well awaken in the minds of my hearers a demand for explanation; this demand I cannot, however, to-night hope to satisfy. A result which I should not regret would be that my hearers should be induced to study carefully and critically some such analysis of the notion of Natural Rights as is contained in the volume which the late Professor Ritchie devoted to the subject. That this brilliant writer failed to do complete justice to his fascinating theme is only what might have been expected. We need not be surprised that a notion which appears to be one of the abiding possessions of the human spirit should resist and evade the critical weapons of any individual critic. The fact remains, that a notion is capable of being used with effect, of issuing in consequences of the utmost theoretical and practical importance, while it contains in itself many unsolved difficulties and apparent contradictions. This can be illustrated easily and adequately by the conceptions of Space, Time, Force, Infinity, and the like. We may, for the present, treat the conceptions of natural law and right as notions which have not yet been adequately analyzed and defined, and our survey as preliminary to such definition.

When manners and customs, laws and political institutions are critically discussed, nothing is more usual than to hear the object of discussion approved as natural or condemned as unnatural. I do not mean to exclude cases in which condemnation or approval, as the case may be, is bestowed with reference to 'human nature' as its standard. We are, in these days, especially familiar with the argument that certain political and economic proposals are to be condemned because they are against human nature, or because human nature will not submit to them. The detailed objections which are made in Parliament and else-

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where to the enfranchisement of women are very commonly allowed to possess very small value at the best, and, at the worst, to be merely ridiculous. The really strong argument, if we measure the strength of an argument by the force and intimacy of the appeal which it makes to a large number of men and even of women, is the vague but often passionate conviction that the political equality of the sexes is unnatural. Other arguments can be dealt with in detail and demolished with comparative ease. This conviction, however, seems to envelop those who enjoy it in triple bronze, and advocates of women's enfranchisement discover sooner or later that the best argument to use against such people is to leave them alone.

I am afraid that the first illustration which I have chosen will not predispose many of my hearers to view the appeal to nature in morals and politics with much favor. The next instance may strike some of you as no less satisfying than the first. Many men who have devoted themselves to what are called the 'natural' sciences, consider themselves thereby qualified to pronounce judgment on moral and political issues from the standpoint of what is natural. It is mainly upon biological facts and theories, such as those conveyed under the terms 'evolution,' 'natural selection,' and 'struggle for existence' that such scientists explicitly rely. But it is not necessary to be eminent as a biologist, or even to have studied biology at all, in order to win the assurance that one is qualified to apply the standard of what is biologically natural to the practices and ideals of the non-scientific mob. A superficial acquaintance with these biological commonplaces, added to the proud consciousness of being a 'scientist' is all that one needs. As a scientist, one tends to indorse without question or criticism the theories which appear to prevail in scientific circles. This loyalty of scientific men to what appears to them the cause of science can be accounted for with little difficulty, and within due limits may be recognized as excusable and even laudable. But this is clearly a case in which the students and practitioners of the science and art

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of right living and of government, who may also claim to be scientists in their kind and degree, must feel that those limits have been flagrantly transgressed. I shall dwell no longer for the present on this instance of the appeal to nature except to mention that the response is, generally speaking, adverse to the claims of sympathy and to aspirations for social and national equality.

The answer is not always, however, to this effect. Men who have devoted the best years of their lives to the natural sciences are sometimes eminent in advancing what is ordinarily supposed to be the cause of human progress. Critical thinkers may detect some violence in the transitions which some of these scientists profess to effect from one sphere to another; and it may be allowed that it is not a small matter to exhibit in due logical relation the processes of non-human nature on the one hand, and the workings and aspirations of the human mind on the other. A more reverent attitude is imposed upon us in the presence of a man like the Roman poet, Lucretius, who was at once an inspired natural philosopher, and a passionate teacher of humane ideals of conduct. We find in him not merely a juxtaposition but an intimate combination of the offices of scientist and moral teacher. While he is rapturously pursuing the contemplation of the immense processes of nature, the stately ordering of causes and effects, he is, at the same time, directly inculcating or irresistibly inspiring such moral doctrines as the following: the vanity of luxury, riches, and power; the folly of fearing death; the pity of human suffering and wrong; the beauty of modesty, contentment, and fortitude; the noble joys of unpretentious rural life; the possession by animals of some of the most exquisite human qualities, and the vileness of man's cruelty towards them. We may see from this instance what the character and the result of a morally inspired appeal to nature may be, though it be made by a scientific thinker, whom we might justly call a materialist. I must now pass on to notice the explicit repudiation by certain poets and scientists of the appeal to nature

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as the basis of a philosophy of man and the state. Like the appeal to nature itself, its repudiation is in various instances very different in spirit and result.

The name of Tennyson readily occurs to us, as of one who expressed in exquisite and memorable phrases the contrast between the cruelty of nature and the gentler affections and aspirations of mankind. That nature is 'red in tooth and claw' has become one of the commonplaces of contemporary moralizing. For Tennyson the name of nature represented the processes, so stupendous and so pitiless, with which the biologizing imagination of the nineteenth century filled the remote recesses of historic and prehistoric time. To them were added, trivial indeed in comparative magnitude, but of the utmost moral significance, the too palpably uneradicated instincts of human cruelty and greed which seemed to dominate the larger destinies of men and peoples: to the glorification of these instincts, we must add, the favorite poet of English educated society rarely refused to dedicate the service of his song.

Somewhat different in method, though not devoid of almost poetic passion, was the celebrated Romanes lecture of Professor Huxley, who, towards the end of a career devoted to the defense of Darwinism, startled his audience by inviting them to abandon the attempt to solve the problems of society by the help of the analogies of non-human nature. Man must look upon nature as his enemy, which it had been and must be his high prerogative to oppose and finally to subdue. Only by violating the apparent dictates of nature had man succeeded in achieving anything definitely human. Nature and Man, Evolution and Ethics were now irreconcilably opposed to each other. Nature and Man have been likewise opposed, but in a very different spirit, in a more recent Romanes lecture by Sir Ray Lankester. Man appears here as destined to become king and lord of nature, not by his superiority as a moral being, but by his intellectual preëminence, which will betray to him the most bewildering stratagems of his



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dreaded antagonist. The attitude toward nature inculcated by this scientist resembles very closely the passion of a hunter for his sport. The ruthless pursuit of natural, especially of bacteriological, science, should on his principles speedily depose the humanities from their place in our schemes of education, and the state should endow unstintingly the labors of those who occupy themselves with 'scientific research.'

We shall now pass to a very long and very important period in the history of the Western world, the period which extends from the beginnings of recorded Greek speculation to the end of the eighteenth century.[1] During these many centuries, 'nature,' 'the law of nature,' 'the natural rights of man' and the like phrases were the watchwords and commonplaces of the philosophical discussion of morals and politics. With very few exceptions, the Greek philosophers, the philosophers and jurists of the Græco-Roman world, and of Christian mediæval Europe, all handled these conceptions, with variations, indeed, in methods and conclusions, but seldom if ever with any doubt as to their validity, and their necessity for the comprehension of moral and political problems. And in the centuries which followed the downfall of scholastic philosophy in Europe, the old phrases remained, and proved a light unto the path of some of the most important political thinkers of modern times. Both in Europe and the American colonies, the political discussions of the eighteenth century were filled with references to the natural rights of mankind. Many prejudices beset the path of the student of eighteenth century political thought. The absurd notion that the natural rights of man were a peculiar invention of the perniciously 'logical' French mind, and wholly alien to the 'positive' Anglo-Saxon spirit is dealt with as it deserves in the first chapter of Professor Ritchie's "Natural Rights." I should wish espe-

[1] The second date at least can only be approximate. Bentham, as is well known, attacked the notion of 'natural law' from the first.

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cially to insist, not only with regard to eighteenth century political philosophy, but to the whole of modern philosophy, that the ignoring of the immediate source of its conceptions in the philosophy of the middle ages is an error no less mischievous, from the point of view of theory, than it is perverse historically. The full meaning and value of the doctrine of natural rights, the irresistible attraction which it possessed in the past, the mighty changes which have come to pass under its inspiration, can be rightly understood only if we acquaint ourselves with the various expressions which it assumed in the course of its long history, and particularly with the way in which it presented itself to its noblest exponents. If we think of a law which is externally valid and unchangeable, standing alone and perpetually challenging the various and fluctuating institutions of mankind: a law which is harmonious not only with the constitution of man, but with the constitution of the universe in which he lives; we shall, in my opinion, at once recognize that it is in the highest degree attractive and congenial to our nature at our best moments. So much so that I am disposed to be impatient of our practice of tracing the development of doctrines merely by the aid of fragments from the writings of one reputed philosopher after another. The best history of philosophical doctrines would be a history which exhibited some permanent demand of human nature which such doctrines are only an imperfect attempt to embody. Mankind does not learn even all its philosophy from the philosophers: on the contrary, the philosopher's work is often a very infirm endeavor to analyze and dissect thoughts which are living and 'working,' to use the language of the 'pragmatists,' in the world around him. That the popular mind has its infirmities, and that it displays them in its use of this conception of nature, I have already hinted, and hope later on to enforce. But I should be glad if we could approach the beautiful passage, which I am about to quote, with the reverence of the common man, and without too eager a desire to rend it into philosophic

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morsels. This fragment from a lost work of Cicero has been preserved for us by one of the Christian fathers. Its citation by Lactantius is significant; and the passage represents very faithfully the attitude of the philosophic Roman jurist and the attitude at a later time of the philosophic Christian moralist to the Law of Nature.

> There is indeed a veritable law, a true rule of reason, in harmony with nature, unchanging and eternal, which by its command should summon us to our duty, and by its prohibition warn us from doing wrong; but though it does not command or dissuade good men in vain, it fails to move the wicked by command or prohibition. This law may not be counteracted, nor repealed as to any part, nor wholly annulled. Nor again can we by senate or people be exempted from this law. And we need seek none other to explain to us or to interpret this law; nor will it be one law at Rome, another at Athens, one law in our time and another law in time to come; but one law, eternal and imperishable, it will bind all peoples in every age. And God, the author, the judge and the enactor of this law, will be thus in a manner the common governor and commander of all men: and he who will not obey this law will become an alien to his very self; and by this fact, he will pay the uttermost penalties, though he escape all else that is reputed punishment.

This noble passage will I trust awaken our admiration for its author and our interest in the doctrine which he so eloquently expounds.

We may now inquire what may be understood or implied in the thought of a law of nature as here expounded. It regards man as a member not only of some particular state or nation, but of a vast society embracing not only all existing humanity but humanity past, present, and future. He is also a member of a still wider society, of the whole order of nature, and his ultimate standard of right and wrong is the harmony of his activities with this mighty order. To set impulse or habit or the practices of our small society, or again the supposed iron necessities of our own state, above the claims of universal humanity, or the just claims of beings physically in our power, is to do violence to this great harmony and to ourselves: by so doing we become, in Cicero's graphic phrase, exiles from ourselves. Such a conception of right conduct is at once cosmical and humanistic, neither setting non-human nature

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above man, nor man above nature. It was under the influence of ideas such as these that Roman law from being the capricious and largely irrational code of a petty municipality became the law of civilized Europe and the model of later jurisprudence. It was such a conception likewise that was used by the men who voiced most effectively the demand of the modern world for more humanity and more fairness in the conduct of government and in the relations of states to each other. It is still, I believe, the most attractive embodiment of the demand for equality between one man and another, and for the recognition of the rights of animals to our protection and fellowship.

It is quite consistent with this doctrine of a Law of Nature, to recognize that man has on the whole advanced and is still advancing in the knowledge of nature as here understood, and of himself. Indeed I would insist very strongly that if the conception of a Law of Nature is to flourish in the future, it must, as it was in its best days, be combined with aspirations for the improvement of human life, with a willingness to recognize new conditions and problems, and to learn new commandments, positive and negative. It would indeed be deplorable if the notion continued to be used, as it is now used by its chief professional adherents, mainly to buttress traditional beliefs and practices. A believer in the law of nature may maintain that it is an ideal by which human life is consciously and unconsciously guided, and to the attainment of which past and existing institutions have been increasingly adequate means. It is important, however, to mention a belief which has been very widespread, which was held by Plato and by the Apostle Paul, and which appears in the speculations of many poets and thinkers as well as in many religions and myths. This is the belief in a past Golden Age, in which men lived in harmony with nature and with each other. It is not now very commonly found among thinkers of repute, and, as I have said, it is not essential to a belief in the Law of Nature. But a remarkable and very interesting exception may be mentioned, namely, Sir

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William Ramsay, who, in an article in *The Contemporary Review* for September, 1907, argues on historical grounds in favor of the view of St. Paul. He points to the prehistoric civilization of the Mediterranean basin, and to the wonderful heritage handed down to the people who inhabited that region in the historic period: for example, what are we to think of the people who planted the olive, a tree which requires the most assiduous care, and which does not bear fruit for fifty years? In respect of the arts and humanities of life, the story of these peoples does for many centuries present the impression of progressive degradation and loss; and the tradition of a better time in the past may well have rested on something more than fantastic aspiration. Mr. Alfred Benn, Professor Julius Beloch, and others have noted an improvement in Greek life and manners from the sixth century B. C. onwards; and it is interesting to notice with them, that this was the time in which philosophy was active, and in which the conception of nature as the standard of right and wrong was inculcated.

Without committing myself to Sir William Ramsay's views, I should like to mention a thought which has often occurred to myself: namely, that we are apt greatly to underestimate the debt which we owe to our primitive forefathers in respect of the simpler and more fundamental arts of life. Such men cannot, I should think, have spent their lives in a series of blundering experiments; they must have possessed some such sure instincts as we admire in some of the animals and in some rare instances among our own contemporaries. I would suggest that the greatest contributions to the fabric of human knowledge and culture have been made and will in the future be made by men of pure and reverent mind, sympathetic and responsive to the moral and physical harmonies of the world. The great biologists of the future, like their great predecessors in the past, will be naturalists, students of life in the full sense, and not theorists of the laboratory. This leads me to mention a matter which has often been discussed

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with much heat and mutual satisfaction to the disputants in connection with this very subject of natural rights, namely, the treatment by man of the lower animals. In recent times there has been much improvement in the opinions and practices of our societies in respect of the animals. There can, however, be no doubt that man's relations to the animals underwent in the past a grievous change for the worse. Among other proofs of this may be cited the success of primitive man in taming diverse species of animals, and making of them not so much his servants as his friends. Professor Gilbert Murray finds traces of this decline in the early Greek epic; and he very suggestively explains the habitual and, as we call it, otiose application of characteristic epithets to the domestic animals. We are apt to glide over and finally to 'skip' such epithets as 'crumple-horned' which Homer applies to cattle; the intuitive genius of Professor Murray sees in it a survival of the happy time when the Greek husbandman greeted his cow with words importing 'Good-morning, Crumple!' However this may be, I should like to express my conviction that an essential condition to the harmony of man with himself and his fellows is that he should strive towards peace and understanding with nature, and especially with his so-called 'dumb' fellow-animals, admitting them to share, as far as they are able and progressively become able to share, in the rights and privileges of members in the great community of nature. Herein lies a surer hope for human dignity and progress than in the cultivation of a spirit of proud dominion, which becomes, as experience daily teaches, by easy gradations the spirit of lust and ruthlessness, blunting all moral sensibility and perverting every noble instinct. May we not hope that as human life becomes more responsive to the life which surrounds it, a life in some ways better ordered than our own, we shall develop sure intuitions and noble instincts which will put our petty and baffled calculations to shame?

I must also refer to another belief which has been from

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time to time associated with the appeal to nature in morals and politics: that is the belief that the right ordering of human life demands simplicity in our normal wants and surroundings, and that in particular, the laboring people are, through the greater naturalness of their lives, more accessible than other classes to moral appeal and richer in moral insight and virtue. Such a belief was held and very persuasively enforced by a great moral and political teacher, Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose remarkable gifts and experience of life, I may add, made him especially well qualified to judge of what he was saying. We must, of course, admit the great diversity of moral endowment as between the members of any particular section of the community. We must admit, further, the enormous strength of brute habit and convention in all classes including the manual workers; and in recent times, in particular, forces have been at work no less adverse to what we might expect to be the special virtues of the workers than to the virtues of us all. At the same time many close observers of life have been found to indorse this judgment of Rousseau's; and it is pretty generally recognized by thoughtful people that luxury and dominion, the consciousness of being able to claim the services of others for every irksome business, are very powerful adversaries of moral sensibility and effective good will. Again, the inherent moral perversity of living wholly on the labor of others is being recognized no less eagerly than its economic and social mischievousness. We may notice further the greater honor which is now paid in theory, and, to a less extent, in practice, to bodily labor and skill: the recognition by many not only of the physical but of the intellectual and moral profit which they derive from the practice of some manual occupation, and especially from such practice as a means of livelihood. And finally the gross injustice, the clumsy and offensive patronage, which is characteristic of persons who have lived apart from the hardships and joys of common humanity, are phenomena so palpable and so painful that

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I am fain for both reasons to dwell no longer in this connection upon them.

Certain perversions of the conception of the Law of Nature demand our attention. That they are perversions of a worthy impulse is a hypothesis which I would invite you not from the outset to close your minds to; for I am aware how strong the tendency is to explain our moral beliefs and ideals as developments or products of non-moral feelings, associations, and the like. We will first take the most popular perversion. We tend very commonly to treat as natural those beliefs or practices or institutions to which we have been accustomed, and those which are to us strange as unnatural. In this matter, as in others, habit is shown as elevated into 'a second nature.'

To the unreflective, that which is to him established and customary appears natural, that which is strange, unnatural, inspiring the appropriate emotions of amusement or annoyance, or acute resentment. We may not individually have experienced anything quite so terrifying in this way as the visitor to a 'black' country, who was greeted with the cry, " 'Ere's a stranger: let's 'eave 'arf a brick at 'im"; but a little reflection on what has happened to ourselves or even on what we on certain occasions have felt, will satisfy us that such an event does not violate human analogies; and that, extreme though it is, it belongs to what Aristotle, speaking of the imaginative license of poets, called οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. If we are strangers, we are at once, to those unfamiliar with a variety of persons, incongruous and disquieting. If our appearance or dress or habits are unusual, we may excite any degree of emotion ranging from mild wonder or annoyance to awe or consternation. Among genial people we may escape with the rather humiliating satisfaction of being accounted 'funny.' In any case, we are reckoned as not natural.

I may cite an instance or two which will illustrate this tendency. The monoglot Englishman is apt to find a divergence from the singularly inconsistent English pro-

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nunciation of written characters not only surprising,—for that the foreigner might forgive him,—but grotesque. If he fails in his first unguided attempt to pronounce a foreign word, which he sees in print, he may and often does give up for ever the attempt to pronounce it, even though the sounds required are extremely easy and used by him every day of his life. Even this is not all: he finds the foreign pronunciation absurd and sometimes ludicrous,—in any case, not natural. If the grammar of a strange language exhibits some divergence from English usage, he is quite likely to wonder whether the strange language is properly a language at all: at all events, I do not know how otherwise to explain a question asked of me by a patronizing Englishman in the train,—whether Welsh really was a language, and whether it had any grammar! I cite this experience not because of the manifold ignorance which it illustrates, but because it shows in what grooves our intellectual no less than our moral and political reactions tend to run. The more ignorant or indolent we are, the readier we are to adjudicate upon what is new with reference to what we conceive as the natural, which is in that case nothing other than that to which we are accustomed. Certain other perversions have already been illustrated. The supremacy of the selfish instincts of the individual or of the particular society have been proclaimed to be the only lessons which 'nature' has to teach the human race. On the other hand, the tendency to consider the moral nature of man from a cosmical point of view has given to certain moral philosophies a fatalist or quietist direction, which finds its extreme perhaps in what is said to be the dominant character of certain Indian religions. In modern philosophy the name of nature is apt to convey a fatalist or monistic implication; it suggests to us a system of inexorable causes and effects, in which human history, morality, institutions and laws are absorbed. Nature meant for earlier ages, and often means in our own use of the term, the ideal or the normal, and it is only if this second use of the term can be maintained

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that we can continue as philosophers to work with the conception of a law of nature. It is well known how Kant enforced the contrast between these two senses; in fact, the extreme opposition which Kant set up between science and morals, and between logic and ethics, may be very effectively exhibited as an expression of this conflict between possible senses of the term nature.[2] This point of view is set forth in his usual forcible manner by the late Professor Ritchie ("Natural Rights," p. 75):

> I should distinguish as a fourth sense of the term 'Nature'—the sense in which Nature represents our ideal of what ought to be, whether it actually exists as a fact or not. . . . Now it is in this fourth sense that Nature is properly and intelligibly used when a Law of Nature (*Jus Naturale* or *Lex Naturalis*) and Natural Rights are spoken of. And here, also, in the use of the term 'law' we have passed from the scientific sense of generalization, formula, statement of causal connection, etc., to the legal and ethical sense of the term, as command or expectation of some observance. If the term 'natural rights' were always confessedly used in this sense, and in this sense only, no objection could be taken to it, except that it was an ambiguous way of saying what might be less ambiguously expressed by a direct use of the term 'ought.'

How Professor Ritchie uses the term 'ought' I will try presently to explain. But I would suggest here that such analyses as the above of ancient and historic conceptions are apt to become a kind of mental vivisection in which the genuinely vital processes are distorted and finally destroyed, the result appearing as an ingenious tabulation from which the life and the spirit have departed. The various senses of the term nature, the diverse functions which it discharges may, I say, stand to each other in

[2] This is very clearly argued by an amazingly erudite Italian scholar, Professor Giorgio del Vecchio, in several works published in recent years in defense of the conception of Natural Law. I may refer more particularly to "Il Concetto della Natura e il Principio del Diritto" (1908). His main contention in this work is that the ambiguity of the term Nature has been resolved by the *critical*,—i. e., the Kantian,—philosophy: by bearing in mind Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and the transcendental, or the natural as phenomenal and the natural as ideal we may avoid the ancient errors of the advocates of natural law, and set our use of the conception on a sound basis. While I recognize the acuteness and suggestiveness of Kant's distinctions, I could not attribute to them anything so nearly approaching finality as is apparently attributed by del Vecchio.

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some more vital relation than the tabulations of the philosophers suggest.

This survey of ours demands some fuller discussion of the characteristic doctrines of the powerful work which I have just quoted, which not only has peculiar merits of its own, but represents, with that degree of variation which might be expected from a very fresh and individual mind, the leading principles of what was and perhaps is the main tendency in the British philosophy of our time. Its author seems to have been by nature much more a publicist and social critic than an original and penetrating philosopher. His metaphysical doctrines are in great measure borrowed and only partially assimilated; nor are they, it seems to me, brought into any very vital relation with his political doctrines. Mr. Ritchie's doctrine of rights and the relation of rights to Nature or the Universe may be summed up as follows:

(1) He holds that human actions, beliefs, institutions, etc., are parts of the natural order, that they are linked together with each other and with the rest of the universe by an inexorable progression of causes and effects.[3] In this sense, all human institutions, past, present, and future, have been, are, and will be alike natural.

(2) It follows from this that whatever has been was right, or as right as could be,—from the 'ultimate' perfection of the universe it must have been perfectly right,—in its time and place; and the future which we hope will be different from the present will certainly be different, but only as may comport with the order of Nature: the future, like the past, will be what it must be.

(3) That 'ought' can in these circumstances mean anything of importance is difficult to understand. Professor Ritchie's explanation of 'ought' differs in substance from

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[3] Professor Ritchie does not believe in the 'ultimate' reality of time, which denial would if kept continually in mind greatly embarrass his argument. I need not dwell upon this, as Professor Ritchie makes no special or even serious contribution to the question.

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hedonistic and some other 'naturalist' explanations of moral ideas, but its form and logical articulation is as 'naturalistic' as could be. He starts not from the individual on the one hand or from the universe on the other, and not even from the human race, but from the particular state to which an individual belongs. Human beings possess no rights except as members of a society, and a right which is not socially recognized is a contradiction in terms.[4]

(4) It appears, however, that a choice or apparent choice may be presented to society between laws which tend to preserve and laws which tend to destroy it. The former laws may, if we forget our fatalist view of history, be treated as the laws which ought to be established. Similarly an individual may violate the established laws of his state if there is sufficient social sanction for such violation, and if his action tends to the preservation of his state.

(5) In providing for the future, states and individuals must submit to the guidance of historians and scientists. Historians can exhibit the successes and failures of states in the past in securing their own preservation. Science can provide the practical means for preserving societies in the future. This extreme deference on the part of a moral philosopher to historians and scientists, seems to me, as indeed it must seem to many of the men thus honored, very ill-founded. One need not be especially cynical or sceptical to recognize: (1) that our data for the investigation of historical problems, and for the application of the 'lessons' of history to our own day are slight,

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[4] This contention of the historical school of law and right is opposed not only to the old doctrines of a law of nature, but to the fundamental moral convictions of mankind. As we have seen, the distinction of what ought to be from what is does not really comport with Professor Ritchie's philosophy. The making of 'ought' and right dependent on the recognition of society, instead of claiming the recognition of society for what is right is a perversion so grotesque that it amounts to a *reductio ad absurdum* of Professor Ritchie's political philosophy.

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and likely to yield conclusions which vary according to the moral and political predilections of the investigator; (2) that without moral ideals we shall not in general seek for or discern in historical records the facts which bear upon our own moral problems; (3) that the same holds of the investigation of facts open to contemporary inspection in so far as these facts have any direct bearing upon conduct; for it is only to the person who possesses some standard of moral valuation that it will occur to derive conclusions respecting conduct from what he observes,—and if his standard is defective, his conclusions will reflect the defects of his standard. To the facts ascertained by historian or scientist we shall apply our own moral standard, and we shall consider ourselves justified in doing so, as well as in making allowance for the sources of self-deception which especially beset the professional worker in any department of knowledge.

(6) Non-human nature, for example, the other animals, can be allowed no rights against man, nor has man any duties towards the animals; for animals are not members of human societies. In making allowance, as indeed he was bound to do, if his system of political thought was not to be many centuries behind the time, for our actual recognition of the rights of persons who are not members of our own states, and of states other than our own, Professor Ritchie submits that this is because we recognize a larger human society of which these are 'potential' members. In like manner, many of his readers will claim that our recognition of the rights of animals, of the existence of which, as a fact, there can be no question whatever, in spite of the arguments of scientists and philosophers, is based on the conception of a wider society than the narrow human society to which we politically belong. Professor Ritchie's extreme attitude towards the animals is, in fact, exceptional among any thoughtful people; but it resembles that of Sir Ray Lankester, to whom likewise the animals appear as mere objects for human use, wholly subservient to the supposed good of man.

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The inferiority of these opinions in an ethical and even in an intellectually satisfying sense to the conception of a Law of Nature as expounded by Cicero, for example, is so manifest that I need not now dwell much longer upon them. We may note especially the fatalist view of history, the narrow utilitarianism, the elevation of man above his non-human environment, only to subject him to the university professor, the scientist, and to the current opinions of 'respectable' society. Professor Ritchie's philosophy requires him to approve of every wrong committed in the name of the state in the past; for example, of the slavery of the Græco-Roman world, and he duly pays the tribute demanded. He implies that slavery will again become right if the interests of society demand it. It is clear that such a philosophy could be used to argue away every human claim to justice and right. That he did not on the whole so use it, I gladly recognize. But I must be allowed to say that it was not under the inspiration of philosophies such as his that any of the victories of humanity have been won.

In conclusion I would urge my hearers as philosophers to keep a close watch on the use and abuse by themselves or others of the appeal to nature in ethics and politics, and not to suppose that philosophic criticism has as yet banished it to the dust heap of terminological curiosities. On the contrary, it is alive in the popular, the scientific, and the philosophic thought of our day, and according to the mind which employs it is the response which it evokes. I have tried to show that its right use has been associated with some of the noblest thoughts and movements in the history of mankind; and I now conclude with expressing my hope that our philosophers will use it aright and thus rescue it from those who would debase the currency on which the commerce of human thought depends.

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL BASIS OF ETHICS.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

THE thesis of this paper is, to use the language of a recent writer, that "we live in a system, and to achieve right ends, or any rational ends whatever, we must learn to understand that system."[1] That is to say, conduct, being activity of social importance, must, so far as it is thought out, be based upon social knowledge, knowledge of the interrelations of men; a science of the right or wrong of conduct, accordingly, must be based upon sociological knowledge.

In undertaking the discussion of our subject, it will be well to define, perhaps rather carefully, what we mean by ethics and sociology. By sociology the writer means the general science which deals with the laws or principles of social organization, on the one hand, and of social evolution on the other.[2] More narrowly defined, it is the science which deals with the origin and development, structure and function of the forms of association. Inasmuch as sociology is a positive science, it depends for its principles of interpretation upon the two antecedent sciences of biology and psychology. It is, therefore, approximately correct to say that sociology is the biology and psychology of the social life. Its problems are, on the one hand, as we have already indicated, those of the order or organization of society, including both structural and functional aspects; on the other, those of social origin and development, that is, of social evolution in the broad sense of the orderly changes in the social life. This is sociology in the narrow sense, its chief problem being, as has just been indicated, that of social evolution. Sociology is, however, sometimes used in a broad sense as a

[1] Cooley "Social Organization," p. 21.

[2] See the writer's paper on "Sociology: Its Problems and Its Relations," in the *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1907.

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collective name for all of the social sciences,—the sciences that have directly to do in any way with the phenomena of man's collective life, such as economics and politics, for example. It is believed that it will lead to no confusion if in the discussion of our topic 'sociology' or 'sociological' is sometimes used in this broader sense as referring to the entire body of organized knowledge about human society.

By ethics the writer understands the science of right and wrong conduct, whether for the individual or for a group of individuals. Ethics, according to this view, would be, of course, a science of moral values, of moral norms and ideals. It might, therefore, be properly called, as it often has been, 'a normative science,' since it seeks to establish norms or standards for human conduct. This is not, of course, denying that ethics has descriptive portions, but these descriptive portions are strictly subordinated to its normative aspects, because the real problems of ethics are normative. Ethics, as a science, may be properly considered to include a discussion of the origin and development of moral ideas and ideals, but such a descriptive ethics is but one of the many social sciences which deal with man's collective life. Beyond these descriptive portions of ethics, then, are the questions of the nature and validity of moral ideals, the ends of action, the norms by which conduct is to be judged, and the like. These normative problems are usually considered to be the central problems of ethics; and ethics in this sense is evidently not dealing with a special aspect or phase of man's collective life, but rather with the ideal for individual and social life generally. Ethics, in its normative aspect, presents itself, therefore, not so much as a special social or historical science, but as a science lying beyond all of the positive sciences of human society, and to which all of them lead up.

The writer is well aware that there are those who declare that there can be no such thing as a normative science; that this involves a contradiction in terms, for all

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norms and standards, or ideals, rest upon the arbitrary appreciations of the individual, or, as Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson would say, upon 'the dogma of personality.' Of course, if this is true, philosophical thinkers of every sort should renounce the attempt to establish a science of ethics. It seems, however, to the writer, that such a position as this is essentially at variance with all that we know of human nature and of human knowledge. All knowledge, in a certain sense, as we shall endeavor to show later, is busy establishing norms or standards by which processes may be measured or judged. It would be strange if the norms set up upon the basis of our knowledge of human nature and human society should be so much less trustworthy than the norms obtained by the physical sciences. It is true that such norms established through scientific knowledge afford no adequate sanction for conduct; for sanction must ever be primarily a subjective and individual matter, resting upon feeling.[3] Because a scientific norm fails to furnish a particular individual with an adequate sanction or imperative for his action is, therefore, no indication that scientific norms and normative science are impossible. A man may drink water containing typhoid germs because the germ theory of disease has appealed to him as nonsense, yet the standards established by the normative science of hygiene retain their scientific validity in spite of that particular individual's rejection of them. So, too, a man may decide that because alcoholic beverages do him no harm he sees no reason why their use should be discountenanced in the mass of men. Nevertheless, a standard of scientific validity for the relation of the mass of men to alcohol may be reached regardless of whether any particular individual accepts it or not. An individual may even commit suicide or murder and argue that from his point of view his act is justifiable, but the judgment of such an individual in no way impairs the val-

[3] It is the wrong use of this psychological fact which particularly vitiates many of the arguments used against an ethics based upon the positive sciences.

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idity of a scientific judgment as to the danger of such acts to society, any more than the arbitrary judgment of a man concerning impure water will invalidate the judgment of scientific hygiene as to the relation between bodily health and pure water. The various arguments that are used, therefore, to deny the existence of scientific norms or standards in all aspects of the life process would destroy the possibility of all scientific knowledge. While normative sciences are not concerned with establishing laws of a mechanical character, they are concerned with establishing principles and standards by which activity may be judged and controlled. The normative sciences are, therefore, indispensable links between the pure sciences, the sciences of pure theory on the one hand, and the applied sciences, the sciences immediately connected with practical arts, on the other.

Now, if ethics, the normative science of human conduct, is not to base itself upon metaphysics primarily, then the question becomes, upon which of the pure sciences will it base itself? No one would contend that ethics can find any adequate basis in chemistry or physics. The question, therefore, reduces itself to whether ethics as a science of moral values should be based upon biology, psychology, or sociology, using all of these terms in their broad sense.

Scientific ethics must, indeed, rest to some extent upon biology. A part of our ethical valuations are unquestionably closely connected with those which are furnished by personal, public, and racial hygiene. All that would be claimed in this paper is that biology does not furnish an adequate basis for ethics, and that in so far as it furnishes the basis at all, it is on the side of the biology of the collective life process, not biology in its individual aspects. The inadequacy of biology as a basis for establishing norms of conduct is so generally recognized that the point need not be argued at length. The consideration of such simple elementary immoral acts as lying, stealing, disloyalty, all show that the ground for the reprobation of these acts is only remotely, if it is at all, biological.

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Psychology has, of recent years, been brought forward as the chief claimant to be the basis of the scientific theory of morals, and if psychology were used in a broad enough sense, perhaps there would be little reason to object to the claim; but psychology as it has come to be defined by the professional psychologists, means the science of the forms and processes of consciousness; that is, psychology is the science of *immediate* experience, and as such necessarily becomes in practice a science of individual human nature in its conscious aspects. The problems of psychology are, in other words, problems of the individual mind, or of consciousness. It is not concerned, primarily at least, with the interrelations of individuals. As the science of consciousness, psychology, of course, can throw light upon the origin and development of moral ideas and ideals and especially upon the immediate sense of oughtness or obligation which frequently accompanies moral acts. The instincts, moreover, as has often been insisted, are without doubt sources of crude moral judgments. Much is said about the essentially 'inner nature' of morality; but this cannot mean that morality is wholly subjective in its nature, or that moral ideals are genetically developed by purely individual processes. If morality has an 'inner' nature, it has equally a 'social' nature. Psychology cannot possibly explain the grounds upon which ideals are evaluated without reference to the collective life. It is only when psychology turns from the individual to the mass of individuals and attempts to explain the collective life process that it becomes capable of explaining the origin of concrete moral values; but such psychology is sociology.

Sociology, then, as the psychology and biology of the collective life, must furnish the immediate positive foundation for a science of ethics. As has just been implied, moral values no more than other values, are a creation of the individual consciousness. All values that are socially recognized are undoubtedly products of the collective consciousness, that is, they are products of the

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interaction of many individual consciousnesses. Just as economic values are formed, not upon the basis of individual utility, but upon the basis of collective utilities, so moral values are formed not upon the basis of innate tendencies or intuitions of the individual, but upon the basis of the conditions of collective life generally. We cannot explain our system of moral values, in other words, without going over from individual psychology to social psychology. All values, then, that are generally accepted are an outcome of collective life processes, not merely of individual life processes.

This is shown in another way through the fact that it is impossible to study those collective processes without perceiving the immanent values. It is impossible, for example, to study social organization without perceiving social maladjustments or possible economies not realized. It is impossible to study social changes without seeing advantageous and disadvantageous adjustments. It is impossible also to study the various types of social organization without indicating the superiority and inferiority of the various types, or to formulate a theory of social progress without implications of social obligation. This is not saying that it is mere social knowledge itself which leads to perceiving social maladjustments or economies not realized, but it is saying that, given the constitution of the human mind as it is, there immediately spring from our knowledge of social conditions certain perceptions of betterment, amelioration, or ideals; and these perceptions of improvement are not different in character from the perceptions of improvement which a physical scientist may get when he is studying a machine like a steam engine. Given, in other words, the ordinarily accepted ends of activity such as survival, harmony, and efficiency, which the common sense view of the world leads practically all men to accept, then there springs spontaneously from social knowledge a perception of ethical truth; that is, a system of ethics grows spontaneously out of a system of sociology. The human mind being constructed as it is,

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the attempt to exclude ethical implications from sociology is, therefore, futile and childish, and in the writer's opinion, undesirable. It is the business of sociology to furnish the foundation for ethics, and on the other hand, it is the business of ethics to take the ethical implications which sociology affords, develop them, criticise and harmonize them. An ethics worked out upon the basis of the knowledge furnished by the natural sciences will make a larger use, therefore, of sociological knowledge than of any other form of scientific knowledge.

It is evident from what has been said that the present writer does not believe that judgments of fact and judgments of value can be separated in any such way as some writers have maintained. Knowledge of values grows directly out of knowledge of facts, and all generally accepted valuations, as has just been said, are collective processes having reference to the totality of life conditions. It is impossible to have knowledge of facts without judgments of value becoming more or less attached to those facts. In other words, judgments of value inevitably mediate between action, on the one hand, and pure or theoretical knowledge, on the other. The normative sciences, as we have just said, are necessary links between the pure and the applied sciences. Judgments of moral values are not so distinct, either, from judgments of other sorts of value. A judgment that expresses social maladjustment with reference to a certain type of social organization is not clearly separable from a judgment of moral evil. The social and the moral are, indeed, so closely related that they cannot be separated. The moral springs not only directly out of the social, that is, out of the interrelations between individuals, but it has reference to the social in that the moral functions to bring about a new and higher type of the social. The moral is, therefore, inseparable from the social, and moral values and norms cannot be understood except as they are understood as social values and norms. Moral values, therefore, mediate between social knowledge and social activity, and ethics

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as a science is midway between the practical social sciences and the pure, or theoretical social sciences.

All science, as we have already asserted, is busy establishing implicit norms; thus the biological sciences are continually establishing norms with reference to survival; physical anthropology, for example, shows certain limits of stature for man beyond which he cannot vary and survive. It has been established inductively that individuals under four feet and over six feet seven inches are incapable of surviving as types because they are sterile. If some one says that adult individuals of three feet six inches are normal, the biologists will simply laugh at him. And if again some one declared that his ideal was individuals seven feet in height, the biologists might well regard him as either lacking in knowledge or in common sense. The limits of normality as regards heights for adult individuals are then, between four feet and six feet seven inches. Variations beyond these limits the biologist does not hesitate to call abnormal, but within the limits of four feet, on the one hand, and six feet seven inches on the other, judgments might well differ as to what the ideal height of an individual should be. Some might say six feet, some five and one-half feet, and biology probably could not decide between these ideals, although it might exclude, possibly, certain statures which approach the limits of normality on either side. Therefore, the ideal must lie within the limits of the normal, so far as normality is measured by the test of species survival, and this is the test which the biological sciences are coming more and more to apply in determining the normal.

Now, the bearing of all of these things upon the science of ethics is manifestly this, that the natural sciences, whether we like it or not, are establishing certain standards of normality for their own purposes; especially are biology, psychology, and sociology doing this; but these implied norms do not themselves constitute a science of ethics. They must rather be taken and worked over, criticised, and harmonized by a distinct discipline, an in-

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dependent science, ethics. But one can see at once that the norms and ideals which ethics finally works out cannot be something entirely different from those which the natural sciences have furnished it as its raw material to work over. The moral ideal must lie, as has been well said, within the limits of the socially possible;[4] moreover, it must also lie within the limits of social normality, for the advance of social knowledge is continually showing that certain social types can survive only under certain conditions and that under other conditions they are distinctly abnormal. With reference to the test of ultimate social survival, then, sociology conceivably can deliver judgments as unquestionable as any now delivered by the biological sciences. The moral ideal must fall somewhere within the limits which sociology determines as conducive to ultimate social survival. In practice no one rejects this. The age is gone by when we can argue for the morality of things which evidently conduce to social deterioration and extinction, but it may well be that within the limits of the socially normal there are possible several ideals, and if this is possible, then it is the function of ethics to evaluate these several ideals. The socially normal may not, therefore, exactly coincide with the socially ideal, although we are still so far even from the socially normal that there are not wanting those to whom the normal seems to be the ideal.

Ethics, therefore, presents itself as a normative discipline lying beyond all of the social sciences. Inasmuch as all knowledge exists for the sake of activity, then all social knowledge exists for the sake of social action, but between social action and social knowledge must come an evaluating process which we call ethics. Ethics is not, therefore, as a science, simply one of the social sciences or subordinated in any way to the social sciences in general. On the contrary, in the writer's view, the social sciences exist for the sake of furnishing the raw material

[4] Höffding, *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1905.

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for ethics. They all lead up to, and are in a sense subordinate to, ethics, though this is not saying that ethics should dictate their methods or state their problems, for we know that pure science in order to obtain knowledge of facts and their relations, must be untrammeled in practical considerations. This, however, does not mean that the knowledge of facts and their relations when once discovered, will not be of the highest practical value.

This view of ethics makes the connection between the social and moral life simple and explicit. The moral, indeed, becomes simply the normative aspect of the social; and the moral virtues become, not abstract personal qualities, but concrete social values. The virtues, according to this view, are intimately associated with social and even with institutional life. They are what fit and bind men together in harmonious relations. Accordingly, each form of association, and especially each institution, has its appropriate virtues, and these virtues, as we have said, are not mere abstractions, but are concrete realities in the social life. Thus, the family for example, has its appropriate virtues. We cannot conceive such a virtue as chastity existing apart from such an institution as the family. While this virtue may have certain metaphysical implications, yet practically, chastity exists for the sake of the family and not merely as an abstract virtue in itself. Of course all the virtues are projections into the ideal, of actual concrete relationships as we find them in the social life, and their full content and implications cannot be made out without the criticism of ethics.

When we say that the business of ethics is to develop, criticise, and harmonize the normative implications of the social sciences, the metaphysician may reply at once that such a task could not be carried out except upon the basis of metaphysics. We have not denied, at any time, that metaphysics must be the court of last resort for ethics as for all the sciences, and the very statement that ethics

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must criticise the normative implications of other sciences implies, of course, that there is a work for metaphysics to do in ethics; but criticism need not be upon the basis of an absolute logic, and accordingly the critical work of ethics need not be necessarily of an ultimate or absolute character. It would seem, indeed, that the wisest course in the development of scientific ethics would be to develop and criticise the ethical implications of other sciences without appeal to metaphysical principles until the resources of other methods had been exhausted. The critical method which is used more or less by all sciences that attempt to establish standards is not necessarily, then, metaphysical, although it becomes such, of course, when pushed to its final outcome. It is, then, not because ethics does not naturally lead into metaphysics that one would counsel the development of a non-metaphysical ethics, but because absolutistic or metaphysical ethics is, apparently, a final development in the construction of the science of ethics, which is naturally preceded by the construction of a relative ethics based upon the natural sciences of biology, psychology, and sociology.

We have spoken a moment ago of the tendency of all sciences, especially of the social sciences, to establish norms, or standards, which it is the business of ethics to develop, criticise, and harmonize. What standards, then, have the social sciences developed which can be of use to ethics? While these standards are perhaps numerous and more or less conflicting at the present time, it may be said that the general trend of the development of the scientific knowledge of human society is to establish three standards or norms, all of which have ethical implications; social survival, social efficiency, and social harmony. Of these three, social survival is, perhaps, the more important in the social sciences, just as species survival is the more important in the biological sciences. The sociologists generally tend more and more to judge a social type, or a species of social organization, high or low in the scale of social development according as it conduces to ultimate

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survival or not. Thus the sociologist is busy making out a scale of social forms, some of which are ill adapted to survival under certain circumstances, and some of which are conceivably better adapted. However incomplete this work may be at the present time, it is certainly conceivably possible that sociological research will be able to show limits of survival for different types under certain circumstances. While some social forms survive and are conducive to survival under conditions of savagery, these same social forms, of course, may be but poorly adapted to the more complex conditions of life. Thus the sociologists are busy working out the by no means impossible problem of what types of social relationship, or forms of association, will conduce to the survival of a people in the long run. Certainly the ideals which ethics establishes must be within the limits of what sociology determines as conducive to ultimate survival. When any form of association can be shown to be ill adapted to the survival of the group that accepts it, then certainly that form of association cannot be accepted as the ethical ideal. Thus celibacy as a type of social relationship, no matter whether it be shown to be in accord with certain abstract metaphysical concepts or not, cannot be accepted as a moral ideal for the mass of mankind, or even for any national group, because celibacy is a form of association which dooms those who practice it to extinction. Celibacy is socially possible for any particular generation, but it is not within the limits of social survival and cannot, therefore, possibly be accepted by ethics.

It is conceivably possible, then, that sociological investigation will even in the near future mark out with a distinctness and clearness that cannot be dismissed, the conditions of social survival, of social efficiency, and of social harmony; but it would be a mistake, in the writer's opinion, to consider that these determinations would of themselves constitute a science of ethics. No doubt, moral ideals may be tested by these standards of social normality, but the moral ideals which ethics seeks to set forth

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are evidently not necessarily identical with the conditions of social survival, efficiency, and harmony.

In pointing out the conditions of social survival, social efficiency, and social harmony, sociology, of course, has nothing to say about these as obligations. Its point of view remains purely the natural science point of view, and if these are accepted as obligations, it must be because they appear naturally desirable. However, speaking from the standpoint of ethics, one might well contend that ethical ideals could certainly not be at variance with such natural social norms. Our ethical ideals must lie within the limits of the social survival, social efficiency, and social harmony of humanity, and not outside of them, if ethics is to be a science of the good for man. Ethical ideals, as has already been shown, are derived genetically from the social life and they must fall, moreover, within certain limits which natural science knowledge of human society imposes. Therefore, it is not too much to say that ethical ideals are to be derived by a process of criticism from social knowledge. This criticism, as we have already pointed out, may become metaphysical if pushed to its ultimate limits, or it may be simply a relative criticism. In any case, if sociology, as the biology and psychology of the collective life, is the missing key for the development of the special social sciences, then it is also the missing key for the development of ethics as a science of social ideals. Ethics from this view, we repeat, presents itself as a great normative science lying beyond the pure or theoretical social sciences, and to which they all lead up. Ethics is, indeed, not so much the handmaid of these sciences as these sciences are handmaids of ethics.

In this view there would seem to be but little to which the most enthusiastic champion of the position of ethics among the sciences could object to. Yet it is strange that we have even at the present time certain ethical thinkers who strenuously object to basing ethics in any sense upon sociology or the social sciences. Thus, Professor Adler, for example, in his address before the International Con-

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gress of Arts and Science at St. Louis, in 1904,[5] took the position not only that the social sciences cannot furnish ethical imperatives, but also that ethics should remain essentially independent of the social sciences. He argued, in other words, for the development of a subjectivistic ethics, an ethics resting primarily upon the criticism of the moral judgments of the individual. While what he says does not show clearly whether he would make this criticism a metaphysical one, there can be no question but that he argued for the essentially 'inner' nature of morality and denied that moral theories might be in any degree safely rested upon objective social knowledge. Nevertheless, in his excellent little book on "Marriage and Divorce," Professor Adler accepts very clearly the sociological basis of morality. His argument in defense of the family and against free divorce is very manifestly a social argument. The criterion which he lays down when he says that "the highest end of marriage is to perpetuate, promote and enhance the spiritual life of the world," is manifestly a social criterion. Indeed, it is very difficult to distinguish this criterion from the criterion of social survival as used by the best sociologists of to-day. Professor Adler might reply that this 'highest end' is not derived from the social sciences, but is simply an arbitrary *a priori* principle which he accepts as an individual but which any individual has likewise a right to reject. If this is true in a totally unconditional sense, then there is manifestly no place for a science of ethics. Professor Adler, however, is not the only moral individualist who has been inconsistent in insisting upon a subjective criterion for morality and then later adopting practically an objective one. It is notorious that Kant, the greatest of all the moral individualists, did the same thing, insisting, on the one hand, on the inner nature of morality, while in his maxim of the Practical Reason[6] he set up as a moral criterion a social principle.

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[5] *Proceedings Congress of Arts and Science*, Vol. VII.

[6] Kant's "Critique of Practical Reason," Abbott's edition, p. 119.

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Indeed, every moral individualist who attempts to base ethics entirely upon purely subjective factors finds himself in the same difficulty. Thus no one can discuss a practical moral question without reference, as we have already seen, to social criteria. If one argues for the existence of the family as an institution to-day, he can scarcely do so in terms of abstract principles and concepts, but finds himself forced to argue in social terms. Indeed, the existence of the family as an institution must first find social justification before it finds metaphysical justification. Unless we can show, in other words, that the family is necessary for the survival of our present complex societies, and all types more complex, our metaphysical arguments for the continuance of the family as an institution will avail but little. If, on the other hand, those who are in favor of the abolition of the private family can show that the family is not necessary but a hindrance to the survival and efficiency of complex societies, then the argument for the abolition of the family in the minds of many would be practically validated. This is not denying, of course, that there remains to metaphysics a question of determining why we should prefer the survival of one sort of social type, such as the complex society of the present, to another sort of social type, such as the simple societies of primitive savagery.

It is hardly necessary to say that a large and growing school of ethical writers take substantially the position adhered to in this paper. More and more, indeed, moral individualism as the basis of scientific ethics is being given up; and this implies that more largely than ever before the intimate relations of the social and moral are recognized and that social knowledge is perceived to be requisite for a scientific discussion of ethical problems. The personal interest, however, of most ethicists in furthering the development of the social sciences and particularly of sociology seems to the writer lamentably small. If the development of ethics as a science depends upon the development of sociology, then the scientific ethicist and

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the scientific sociologist should work hand in hand, for they are both ultimately working at the same problem,—human welfare; the ethicist directly, the sociologist indirectly.

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POST-KANTIAN IDEALISM AND THE QUESTION OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.

J. W. SCOTT.

THE Idealistic thought of the early nineteenth century undertook the vindication of the spiritual rights of man, intellectual, moral, æsthetic, and religious. Yet the Idealism directly descended from it is accused, on all sides, of having neglected man's higher interests, especially his religious and moral interests. I wish here to treat one aspect of this general charge. It was accentuated by Professor James so long ago as 1899, and has rather gained than lessened in popularity since. It is to the effect that *the idealistic account of human freedom does not satisfy the moral consciousness.*

The charge arises, really, from the large grace which idealism has shown towards the scientific demand for law and uniformity. It may be put thus: If the universe be what idealism allows that it is, an unbroken manifestation of law throughout, can any justification be given to the ordinary man for assuming any longer that he is a free and responsible being?

To put the issue in this sharp way brings into view one of the first conditions of an answer. It depends on what exactly the common man assumes. To decide this is our first task. We are apt to forget that there is any preliminary question of this kind. We are apt to think that all we need is the common man's report of what his own assumption is,—that that is bound to be correct. If

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we do, we may very well find ourselves trying to justify an assumption which has no meaning in it, and, in fact, a good deal of confusion has got into the subject from this source. We require first to formulate in an intelligible way that which the ordinary moral consciousness contains on this matter; having done so, we can ask whether or not it is true, or consistent with an idealistic view of the world.

If we ask the ordinary man what he means by being free and responsible, he may not be able easily to say. But if we put before him the view that 'responsibility implies the possibility of real choice,' he could almost certainly be got to subscribe to it. He would admit without much hesitation that he was responsible for an action only if he had a choice in the doing of it; and, negatively, that he was not responsible for a thing if he verily couldn't help it. His criterion seems to be, "Could I, on such and such an occasion, have done anything else than I did? If so, I am responsible for what I chose to do; if not, I am not responsible."

Such a deposition seems to be all we require; and the testing of the adequacy of the idealistic account of it, to be a matter of plain sailing. We have only to ask whether it is possible for any theory which maintains that the universe is an orderly whole, to maintain also that a human agent 'could have helped' any of his doings. Is it possible for him to say truthfully at the end of any action whatsoever, "I could have done otherwise?" It is commonly believed that an affirmative answer to this is possible on a pluralistic view of the world, but on no other. For real choice to be possible, there must be a certain looseness in the constitution of things. Events must not follow rigidly a predestined course. They must admit of accidental deviations of which the agent may take advantage, in order to turn them according to his will; otherwise he goes simply with the stream.

I am confident that if the matter be thought out, this 'possibility of real choice' will be found to be admissible

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neither on a pluralistic scheme of the universe nor on any other, but to be an inherent absurdity which cannot even be clearly *supposed* to be true. The hypothesis only requires to be strictly taken. It rests on an imagined experiment. Suppose, it is said that a moral agent is set back for a second time into the critical moment of choice,—say, *e. g.,* that Eve is placed again in Paradise and given another chance,—in that case, even if the circumstances are exactly repeated, it will be possible for her to resist the temptation, instead of yielding to it. Not, I submit, if we are thorough with the experiment. Do but really repeat the circumstances; make it the same day and hour, the same scene and the same tempter. Above all, let it be the same Eve. Let just those innate proclivities which operated before operate again; let them be played upon by solicitations which exactly repeat the previous ones,—the same in number and hue, the same in intensity and power and degree of prevalence,—and the action will be the same, inevitably. Inevitably, because by the time the 'circumstances,' outward and inward, are fully repeated, the act is already done. That the issue should be different in the two instances is unthinkable. It splits itself on an impossibility, the impossibility of drawing any line between the mind and the act which comes out of it. The nature of mind does not permit of such a thing. Mind is what it does, and is nothing else. The being and the doing are inseparable. To do a different thing is to be so far a different person. To say with Professor James,[1] that the ego which elected to follow one path could, *under an exact repetition of the situation,* choose to follow another, means that the same ego could be two different beings at once. Freedom which depends on this is not merely contradictory to the faith of Science; it is incompatible with the very conditions of thought.

The ordinary man's assertion, then, that in the same circumstances he 'could have done other than he did'

[1] "Will to Believe," p. 155.

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crumbles away when we try to think it. What, then, is the inference? That the moral assumption which this statement tries to express is devoid of basis? That is possible. It is possible also, however, that the statement in question does not tell us what the common man's assumption was, but only what he thought it was. And before we write him down as deluded in believing his conscience, we shall do well to recognize that his interpretation of his own mind is as liable to error as his interpretation of anything else; and to try to read, if we can, not only his statements but his actions and his life, and see on what intelligible assumption, if any, his moral conduct seems to be really based. We may find at the root of it a conviction which really has a meaning, of which we can ask whether it is true or false, and whether it is consistent with an idealistic scheme of thought. There is plenty of material for such an investigation. Every day the ordinary individual recognizes merit and demerit, passes judgment on thoughts and actions, his own and those of others. We have to find the criterion which, whether quite consciously or not, he really uses in distinguishing what deserves praise or blame from what does not. We must seek the common mark attaching to all those actions for which the naïve moral consciousness holds the doer accountable.

If we keep to straightforward cases, I believe the answer to this question to be simple. The naïve mind holds a man responsible for what he himself did; it relieves him of responsibility (or of credit) for whatever some other person or agent did. To take an example or two at hazard: a person would not ordinarily credit a lazy pupil with being very industrious if work was only extracted from him by terror of the master's ferrule. He would assign the credit of such work to the person who really did it; that is, if to anybody, to the master. To the boy would go the credit of having dodged the punishment. The reveling young swell, in Dr. Johnson's story, takes to amusing himself pelting an old beggar on the head with

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missiles; running short of ammunition he continues the process with crown-pieces of which he has too many. The beggar afterwards picks them up. That man, according to the apostle of common sense, was to have no credit for relieving the poor man's necessities. Naturally. What the youth did was to amuse himself after a certain fashion, and for that he must have credit or blame. The relief to the beggar came not from him, but from the kind Heaven which put such missiles so luckily in his way. Or, to take Sir Leslie Stephen's lucid example: if I am induced to sign a malicious libel by having a pistol pointed at my head, I am not responsible. Why? Because the act was strictly not mine, but that of the desperado who threatened me. What I did was to save my life, at the cost of a certain sacrifice of principle. For that alone I am responsible. So it is, I am persuaded, in all clear cases. Infinite complications can, of course, be made by varying the strength of the inducement to do wrong and the gravity of the wrong. And in real life it might be sufficiently difficult to determine truly the amount of responsibility implied. But even under such complications, I think that though the application of the principle may be difficult, the principle itself is clear. I am responsible for an act if I did it, and where other forces came in, for as much of it as I did.

This way of looking at the matter, which I believe to be just to the moral consciousness, has the great advantage that it stakes the case for freedom upon a simple and intelligible question. When I am held responsible for an act, it is assumed that I was really the doer of it. Is this, then, ever true? Or to put the question as we have it before us in this paper: If the scientific assumption of law be granted, is it possible to maintain, in the last resort, that 'I' ever really do anything?

There is one way of understanding the postulate of science, which shuts out the possibility of genuine conscious agency from the beginning. That is the view which denies the reality of the conscious or spiritual

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world,—the view conveniently designated as naturalism or materialism. To see precisely where idealism parts company with this view, is to see what its conception of a freedom consistent with natural law at bottom is.

Materialism is in essence the premature apotheosis of a special method of inquiry. It is the momentary delusion of science as it emerges triumphant from its long war with anthropomorphism, and drunk with its own success. A long conflict between the assumption of science and a rival assumption has issued in favor of the former. The long cherished idea that there was room in the universe here and there for an active principle or power or force over which the laws of the natural order had no dominion, has been forced again and again to yield to the opposite view, namely, that the laws of the universe admit of no exceptions anywhere. The last point where such an independence of the natural order was supposed to be surely visible, was in the conscious will of man. But by taking sufficient account of his physical nature, nurture, and environment, it had seemed possible to reduce even him to a mere manifestation of natural forces. His so-called free spirit is but nature's own power flowing through a marvelously complex channel. Her laws become here infinitely subtle and difficult to trace. But there is no evidence to prove that they are ever anywhere broken. And not only is the universality of order emphasized by this doctrine, but also the kind of order. With all its infinite complexity, the law which nature follows is mechanical. Whatever variety of aspect we may seem to see in nature or in ourselves, there is nothing real except the orderly movement of material atoms. An emotion or purpose is only the physical process out of which it comes,—the process which we could see, could we see the complete physical being of the person whose purpose it is. Similarly, the action in which such a purpose issues is a strictly physical change. It is the physical condition in which the foregoing physical conditions issued, according to the same laws which govern mechanical movement

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everywhere. On such a view it cannot be true that man does anything. He himself *is not* anything. He disappears. In his place, there is a body mechanically moved. The universe, again, is equally impoverished. It is but the infinitely larger mechanism of which man's body is a part. On such a view there is no human agency. All that is ever done is to give the atoms a new distribution. All that ever does it is the distribution which went before.

Now, what is there in this familiar story that idealism, notwithstanding its interest in freedom, has accepted and welcomed? This, I think: that in the end, nothing is ever done in the universe but the universe itself does it, and does it by working in accordance with its own laws. And what, in the materialistic scheme, does idealism controvert? The seemingly necessary inference, that therefore man does *not* really do any of his own actions. How is it possible to reconcile the second of these positions with the first? Is it possible at all?

There is no way of getting an answer except by facing all the intricacies of an epistemological inquiry. For this is the kind of problem to which we have come. But if we do it, we shall probably find the answer both unambiguous and sufficient. For in the end, the idealism which regards the universe as an ultimate order finds the evidence for freedom in this; not that the natural order leaves room for it merely, but that the order itself depends on it. Without it there could be no natural order. We must now try to make good this statement.

We are almost surprised that modern idealism, with the interests of the higher life at heart, should dare to be so generous to science as it is. Our surprise would lessen, did we recollect that that idealism was itself in the first instance an attempt to defend science. Kant, as is well known, wanted to defend the moral postulate of freedom, with its correlatives, God and immortality. But he had other threads to his metaphysical web. He wished, and in the first place, to defend the validity of scientific thought.

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It is an integral part of his undertaking to show that the laws of nature which science seeks, really prevail in nature. But he did it in such a way as to emancipate mind at the same stroke. He did it by pointing out for the first time clearly, that laws of nature are the character of mind; and the reason why they must prevail in nature is, that a nature which mind can know must bear the character of mind on its face. Laws, then, are at root mind's essence. At first glance, of course, they seem to have nothing to do with mind. They are characteristics of the natural order. They are the great binding uniformities whereby the world is the world and without which it would all fall loose. But essentially they are also the binding conceptions whereby the mind is the mind and without which *it* would fall asunder. They must, therefore, characterize everything which the mind can know. Their universal validity is proved by their source. Their derivation from mind makes them universal for all objects of mind.

The fact that this spells freedom for the spirit of man appears when we ask a further question. In what precise sense are those laws the 'essence' or 'character' of mind? Why do we say that they are the expression of mind at all? The answer (and on it the whole idealistic conception of freedom turns) is that they are something which mind *does;* a labor which it undertakes and executes; and in executing that labor it is free. The free activity of mind is what makes the natural order possible.

This assumption has at first sight something contradictory in it. If we take it as a defense of science (which it is) but as nothing more, then its result, instead of being to emancipate man, is apparently to imprison him. For what is it, to be caught in the vortex of natural necessity? Simply to be one of the things that fall within the category of necessitated phenomena; that is, to have nothing about us better or greater than the phenomena which fall under that category. To be necessitated is to be borne down the stream of change along with these, as one of them-

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selves. It is to act like the falling stone or the running water; to be linked up with all other events in the mechanical-causal system of the world. Now, the causal system, if the doctrine of Kant have any truth, must be all-embracing. It is one expression of that law-abiding character of the universe which makes the latter an object of knowledge. Hence the causal system stretches as far as the knowability of the universe does; and that means all the way. For where the universe ceases to be knowable, there (at least, if we follow the post-Kantian interpretation of Kant) it ceases to be. And with this result the possibility of freedom seems to vanish. Man is a denizen of this universe. Everything which is in the universe at all, every act and event and object, must conform to the conditions of knowability; and to be causally construable is one of these.

But the emancipation of the spirit of man is none the less a fact. There is a way out of the contradiction. The causal system, truly, has been made applicable to every act or process within the knowable universe. But by the same dialectic any activity which should happen *not* to fall within that universe has been raised above the causal category. Now, there is such an activity. We are driven to assume it whenever we try to track the causal series to its source. That source is not, of course, in time. We cannot go back in time to some initial push which set it all agoing. Its source is to be sought rather where time itself has its source, namely, in that 'whole' which must be and which yet, without the causal order, could not be; a whole which we take to be spirit because it appears in us as *our* spirit. This is the source of the order in the world. De-spiritualized the world would be mere chaos, a confused, spongy, mass of vacant, dull sense-appearance. But as it is, the world appears in knowledge as perpetually rising above its own confusion, thus revealing the rational order latent in it. It assumes articulation and character by stages. Of these stages the causal order is one, just as the space order and

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the time order are others; and all together make up the connected objective system of things and events. This self-transcendence of the world, then, is an activity which cannot fall *within* the universe of which it is itself the producer. It cannot itself be one of the events which, through it, are set into causal order. You cannot take it as a mere member within a series, if the whole of the series exists only as its activity. We are thus driven to assume an act or process which is above necessity. Moreover, this process or activity is not one of which we are mere detached spectators, or with which we have nothing to do. This rise of the whole into its true being through the emergence in it of time order, space order, causal order, and the rest, is a process in which *we are concerned.* For what is active here is the very spirit which is our spirit. The self-articulation of the universe into order takes place in us, or rather as us. It is a thing which we do. Nay, it is *the* thing which we do; it is that awakening of spirit in which alone we are truly ourselves. It is the rising out of a characterless continuum of experience into one which is organized; or it is the transcendence of one degree of organization by a higher. This activity is at once the human mind and the veritable process whereby the universe sustains itself. It is not of course the latter in its complete detail. There is much more of the universe than becomes conscious of itself in any one of us. But it is the principle of the whole universe. Up to its own degree it is sustaining the whole; or rather, up to that degree it is the self-sustaining whole.

The act of constitutive intelligence, then, through which spirit rises into determinateness, cannot be linked up within the causal system, because the causal system is its own creation. The labor of reason in building up the real world is the original, of which the characteristics of the real world,—the causal system amongst them,—are the derivative. There is a difference of agent and product between the intelligent activity which is the source of the natural order and all action which falls within that order.

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This difference is what the idealist expresses by saying that intelligent action is free, while natural changes are not. It is a freedom which is not simply permitted by the phenomenal order; it is a freedom which that order implies as the indispensable condition of its own being.

But, it will be asked, is it really 'freedom'? Is it what the moral consciousness is looking for, and demands should be? If our earlier account be correct, we are bound, I think, to say that it is. We found there what the freedom of an act meant. It means originality,—ownership of its own consequences, if we might say so. And intelligent action is this. The ultimate source of all actions as idealism concedes to the materialist, is the whole; but that system-constituting function which is our intelligent activity *is* the whole. It is the whole functioning as our spirit. Up to the little extent of our rational culture and intelligence, we *are* the ultimate whole. Hence to that extent, we, being that which does our actions, are the real and original doers of them; and therefore we are free.

Of course, idealism has given no answer to the freedom problem, unless what it has shown to be free be the right thing, namely, human activity. Now, we have been dealing here with the constitutive activity of reason in knowledge, and we might be asked what connection that has with the practical activities of a human being? It is impossible to deal fully with this question here, but it really amounts to a demand for what idealism has already effected; namely, an advance beyond the hard distinctions of the Kantian system. What is required is that we should show every rational act which we perform to imply at bottom the same synthesizing function as is present in that free activity through which the order of knowledge comes to be. We want to do, in fact, what Fichte did, when he telescoped Kant's 'I ought' into his 'I think,' translated both into the spiritual activity, 'I am,' and placed that at the root of knowledge and practice alike. This, taken thoroughly and seriously, confers originality upon the rational agent in all his activity; and it confines originality

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to him. It makes him free, and makes him the only being who is free. His intelligent and rational self is made unique in that it is identified with that which really did his act, namely, the universe. In so far as I am a human being I am the author of what issues from me, even though it also came from the world; for I am identified with the world. To the view that the sum of the conditions which have made me what I am, do all my deeds, the answer is: so they do; but it is not as so many 'conditions' that they act. The conditions "gather themselves up into a person before they do such things, and that person is I."

Of course the old querulous question will still come up: "Could my antecedents, united in me as my personality, have conditioned any other act than this? Could I have helped this act, which it seems, was in my antecedent being and had to come out?" This question will never cease to come up; for we shall never cease, in our trivial moods, to fall below the level of clear thinking. But no amount of repetition can ever put meaning into a meaningless phrase. The old alternatives remain. The question either means 'was I the doer'? or it is self-contradictory. In the latter case it needs no answer, because it asks nothing. In the former case, when we once grasp what idealism has to say about the meaning of 'I,' the answer to the question is in the affirmative.

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A STUDY OF THE POPULAR ATTITUDE TOWARDS RETRIBUTIVE PUNISHMENT.

F. C. SHARP AND M. C. OTTO.

THE popular attitude towards retribution as a ground of punishment by the state, and as a motive for the infliction of loss or suffering by the individual, is a matter about which both the moralist and the student of political and of social life need definite knowledge. Yet at present we have nothing better at our disposal, as far as contemporary civilized society is concerned, than abstract and contradictory statements, the outcome apparently of mere impressions. It was in view of this situation that the study here described was undertaken. Its method is the use of casuistry questions; its material, two groups of students in the University of Wisconsin, the first consisting of members of the College of Letters and Science, the second of members of the Short Course in Agriculture. The results of the latter investigation are presented in the report that follows.

The Short Course in Agriculture in this university consists of two terms of fourteen weeks each, running from December to March. Instruction is confined to the most concrete and immediately practical phases of farming. There are no entrance requirements. The group of young men selected for study was obtained by restricting the investigation to (1) members of the first-year class; (2) those whose education had not been carried beyond the first half of a country high school (two-thirds of them had never studied in a high school at all); (3) those whose registration blanks showed that they had spent their lives on a Wisconsin farm. The number thus rendered eligible was about two hundred. A little over half of them placed themselves at our disposal, and of these we examined just one hundred. They were of course se-

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lected by chance. Their average age was twenty years, with, as it happened, practically no large variations from this mean.

The method by which the data were obtained was as follows: We appeared before the students assembled in class, and requested their assistance in our undertaking. Mimeographed questions were then distributed, to which those who cared to help us returned answers in written form. The written work, however, was a mere device adopted in order to discover who were willing to coöperate with us, and in order to start their minds working in preparation for the real investigation that was to follow. Indeed, half the questions on the paper had nothing to do with the subject matter of the study and were inserted as a blind. The actual data were obtained in every case from an interview, sometimes from two interviews, averaging about an hour in length. It is the answers obtained in this way that form the subject matter of our report. The interview made it possible to protect investigator and student alike from mutual misunderstanding. What is equally important, it made it possible to put each fundamental question in a number of different forms, so that the precise attitude of the student could be determined in all its concrete individuality.

The method of procedure in these interviews was as follows: We began by putting one of the fundamental casuistry questions. In the case of I, II, and IV (see below), the student had already attempted to answer them in writing. When the oral answers had been obtained, the various possible misunderstandings of the question were pointed out in order and cleared from the way. Then the variations upon the fundamental question were introduced. The formulation in the interview was somewhat more colloquial and a little more detailed than is here reported, but no feature that could in any way whatever influence the answer has been omitted. The order in which the questions were taken up was I, IV, II, and (where it was given) III.

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The first question the students were called upon to deal with was the following:

I (a). About a hundred years ago a shipload of emigrants was wrecked upon an uninhabited island in the Pacific Ocean, far from all trade routes. There they and their descendants lived for many years, unvisited by other men, until finally a ship appeared and carried them back to England. At the time of the arrival of this ship there was in their prison a man who had just been sentenced to be hanged for murder. Is the community, before breaking up, its members to scatter to different parts of the world, bound to hang this murderer, or is it at liberty to set him free? It being understood that while the murder was in every respect unjustifiable, it was committed under circumstances which gave no grounds for the fear that the murderer, if freed, would ever commit another similar crime.

The circumstances which justify the belief that this criminal would, if freed, never commit a second murder were described as follows. They were adapted from a famous Massachusetts case of fifty or sixty years ago. While they do not altogether fit into the conditions which must have obtained on our island, our auditors were kind enough to overlook this little defect in the machinery. A certain man in middle life, hot-tempered, but otherwise of irreproachable character, owed to a neighbor a considerable sum of money which he was for the time unable to pay. Within a short period following the date at which the note fell due, the creditor called several times and demanded payment of the debt. His manner in doing this was undoubtedly very irritating, nevertheless he was throughout unquestionably well within his legal rights. Finally, upon a third repetition of the demand, the debtor, allowing his temper to get control of him, seized a heavy cane, felled his importunate visitor to the ground with a single blow, and then, with full intent to kill, struck him a second and a third time and killed him. Now when a man of the character of this murderer comes to himself, he will be overwhelmed with horror, shame, and remorse. His repentance will be genuine, deep, and, since he is well past the instability of youth, lasting. In fact, after the horrors of an experience of this kind he is less liable to commit a second crime of the same sort than the average

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man you meet on the street. The truth of this assertion was admitted by all except three or four, and these agreed to accept it for the purposes of the investigation.

These, then, were the circumstances under which the deed was supposed to have been committed. As to the punishment, where there was any objection to capital punishment as such, it was changed from hanging to imprisonment in England.

In determining the number of the friends of the principle of retributive justice revealed through the replies to this question, it must be noted that approbation of the punishment of this murderer may have two very different sources. It may, on the one hand, be due to the demand for suffering for suffering's sake. On the other hand, it may be due to the idea that a failure on the part of the islanders to punish the crime will create a precedent which will lead to future murders by other persons. Of course, this is not the case. This community is about to be dissolved, and what it does or leaves undone under such circumstances will therefore create no presumption as to the treatment of murderers by the various governments of which its members are to become subjects in the future. When this was pointed out, a number of the respondents forthwith changed their answers. After excluding these there remained, as adherents of retaliation in this instance, thirty-six persons.

In the story as told above the man was described as repentant, and in consequence as having been already subjected to severe punishment from remorse. Obviously, then, the demand for additional punishment at the hands of his fellow-men will be made only by the more uncompromising partisans of retribution. To discover how many additional persons will demand punishment in the absence of remorse, the following modification of the question was presented. We shall refer to it hereafter as

I (b). The crime remains as before. But in this instance the criminal feels no compunction or sorrow of any kind at the deed; in fact, if he

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escapes punishment, he will feel genuine satisfaction at having committed it. The circumstance that now removes the danger of the commission of a second similar crime is an accident, or an attack of paralysis, which will render him a helpless invalid for the remainder of his days.

Under these conditions the infliction of the penalty for murder is demanded by thirty-five more persons. Of these, however, there are eleven that cannot be credited to the account of the retributive ideal. Two of them demand punishment on grounds of equality. You must treat all murderers in the same class alike. If, therefore, you are to punish other murderers,—and this they believed you must do in order to protect society,—justice demands that you punish this one also. The other nine would exact the penalty with a view to reformation, and nothing else. This came out in the replies to the following question: Suppose the murderer last described had been known to be incorrigible, a man whom no punishment could reform or even awaken temporarily to a sense of the enormity of his deed (the latter alternative being introduced with the Hegelian justification of punishment in view), should he still be punished? After subtracting those who answer in the negative and our two representatives of equality, there remain twenty-four who approve of the punishment of this man on what can only be grounds of retribution. The correctness of this conclusion was verified by their explicit assertion that having inflicted loss and suffering upon another or others, he ought to be subjected to loss and suffering himself, as a just return. These two questions accordingly reveal among these hundred students sixty persons who are prepared to demand the punishment of the wicked for no other reason than the infliction of the loss or suffering itself.

However, these figures are far from exhibiting the entire range of this moral ideal. For even in I (b) there has been punishment. The murderer has gone through the agony of the trial, and, at its close, has heard the sentence pronounced. These considerations do not con-

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sciously affect the decisions of any of the respondents, but they may well have an unconscious influence. What is more certain is that the disease or accident which renders the man harmless for the future is regarded by several as in itself a sufficient punishment, even though it was explicitly described as having no causal connection with the crime. Furthermore, the demand for retribution oftentimes does not appear till the wrong action reaches a pitch of wickedness where it 'gets on the man's nerves;' and in the case of some persons this point is attained only by the most atrocious crimes. But to some of our respondents the crime of I does not appeal as the acme of wickedness. Accordingly, if our survey is to be complete, a second situation must be presented. This was so chosen as, at the same time, to throw light upon the attitude towards individual revenge. It was described as follows:

II (a). A certain boy came to New York from the country without money and without friends. He was soon befriended by a prosperous business man who took him into his employment and into his home, and, in the end, made him his partner. The new partner took advantage of his position to cheat his benefactor out of all his money, deprived him of his share in the business, and turned him out of both factory and home penniless. The manner in which this was done can be guessed from the fact that years afterwards he openly boasted of it to a certain person in such a way as to show that he considered it not only a clever trick, but also a good joke. Suppose the benefactor, having no prospect before him of obtaining restitution by means of the courts, had found himself able to secure the aid of powerful influences that by withdrawing loans at a critical time could have ruined the business of the younger man, would he have been morally justified in attempting to do so? This story of ingratitude, it may be added, is true in every detail.

When this question is examined in the concrete, a number of considerations tend to enter which obscure the real issue. Thus some were led to an affirmative answer by the idea that the ruining of his business might bring about the young man's reformation; others thought it might have a good effect upon the standards of the business men of the city. Again, certain negative answers turned on the supposition that if the young man was

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forced into bankruptcy, innocent parties might have to suffer; still others, on the conviction that if the benefactor refrained from himself ruining his former partner, the latter would suffer none the less in this world, or at all events he would get no happiness from his ill-gotten wealth. These and other similar considerations were met by appropriate additions to the original relation, so that the final answer in every case squarely met the point at issue. Under these conditions, eleven men who do not appear among the partisans of retribution in I come out unequivocally in favor of revenge.

In the preceding the benefactor himself is represented as having sought revenge. He has thus constituted himself plaintiff and judge in his own case. But there may be those who for one of several different reasons reprobate this confusion of functions, who will nevertheless approve of revenge when it is executed by an impartial spectator. In order to discover how many of this class there might be, the story was now modified at one point. In the question, as first presented, the method by which the old man might have ruined his former partner was described as follows: Soon after he was driven from his business a panic arose. Ordinarily in a panic business men are as considerate as possible in pressing claims, for reasons of self-interest if for no other. The old man knew that the firm of which he had till recently been the senior member owed three or four men large sums of money, all of which were now due, and the immediate demand for which would mean shipwreck. These men were able and willing to renew the notes and were doing it for others. But since they had been life-long business associates of his, he could go to them, tell them his story, and beg them to press every claim to the uttermost. Assumptions whereby these friends would themselves lose nothing by this operation were added when necessary. The modified form of the question was as follows:

II (b). We shall suppose that the old man, soon after having been driven out of his business, died. When the panic came on, the work of persuading

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the younger man's creditors to take advantage of his financial embarrassment to unite and ruin him was done by a third party, who knew of the entire affair, and who, filled with moral indignation at its baseness, wished its perpetrator to suffer for it. Would it have been right for him to do this?

When the problem was put in this way, three persons who had up to this point reprobated every form of retribution justified it, bringing up the total of new recruits for this question to fourteen.

However, even yet we are not at the end of our list of those who approve of retribution in principle. When we asked II (c) what should be done if there were no punishment reserved for this evildoer in a future life, or what should be done by those who believe in no such punishment, thirteen more of our respondents changed their allegiance. They had rejected the demands of retributive justice up to this point for one reason or another, evidently comforting themselves with the thought that the sinner would have to pay for his wickedness in the end. But the prospect of his getting off *entirely* was more than they could bear, so they either pocketed their previously expressed objections or decided they didn't apply to this case. The latter alternative was the one more frequently adopted. The majority of these thirteen students had rejected retribution in II (a) and (b) because of the authority of the Bible. They now decided at once that in a world different from that which it describes, its commands do not apply. In the College of Letters and Science, I may add in parenthesis, the reason mainly assigned by the corresponding group for their previous position was that God alone is capable of meting out retributive punishment justly, for he alone can know all the outer circumstances and inner conditions of the deed. Punishment on the part of the state they considered a measure of protection against crime, and its inevitable imperfections justified by counterbalancing good.

Finally, II (d), three more men approved of retribution in principle, but disapproved so completely of its

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employment by man that, even if there were no future life, they would rather see wrong go unpunished than have it punished on this ground. Punishment by God they demanded, however, even where no reason was left for its infliction save retribution. The reason they alleged for reprobating human vengeance was again the authority of the Bible, which, they felt, applied even in an atheistic world. One student in the College of Letters and Science had an interesting reason for assuming the same attitude. Human retribution of every form is excluded, he said, because all men are at bottom on the same moral plane; and He alone can presume to visit it upon a sinner who is raised above all possibility of a countercharge of guilt.

The incident selected to bring out a full representation of those who admit the demand for retribution into their moral ideal, seemed to be about as well adapted to this purpose as anything that could be found. Nevertheless, in order to discover whether the principles of the small group,—ten in number,—who had not yet capitulated, were proof against attack from every quarter, they were tested by two more questions. The first was based upon an event that happened a few years ago.

III. The scene is laid in the mountains of eastern Kentucky. A physician, widely beloved and trusted, who had lived his whole life in that region, had been called in to attend some men who had been seriously wounded in a blood feud. Soon after he was met on a lonely road by one of the feudists. The latter informed the physician that, in revenge for the services rendered to his enemies, he was about to kill him. The doctor pleaded for his life, not for his own sake, for he was over sixty, and, in any event, had not many more years to live, but for his wife and family. His wife was much younger than he, and his children,—all daughters,— were not yet grown. In reply the murderer only laughed at him, and, after rendering escape impossible with a single shot, proceeded in leisurely fashion to shoot him to pieces, making the less vital parts of the body his first target in order to lengthen his victim's agony as much as possible, jeering at him the while between the shots. Provided that conviction by a court of law was impossible, would one of his relatives be justified in avenging this death? It being distinctly understood that the return of like for like would do nothing to prevent such deeds from recurring, and, indeed, was the rather liable to call forth new ones by way of reprisal.

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At this recital two of our group surrendered absolutely. What one of them actually said was:

"The electricity chair would be too easy for him. I would give him the same as he done and a little worse."

The others, however, stood firm. And when we thereupon told them the story of a seduction by means of a mock marriage and of the abandonment of the woman, leaving her without money, help, or friends, with the most terrible ordeal of her life immediately before her, and when they were asked to think of this woman as their sister, they still unequivocally condemned all retribution of whatever form; and that, whether exercised by man as an individual, by the state, or by God.

We are at length in a position to summarize our results. Ninety-two of our young men, out of a total of one hundred, approve, under one condition or another, of the infliction of suffering or loss upon the wrongdoer merely for the sake of producing suffering. Of these, seventy-six justified revenge on the part of man, either in his collective capacity or as an individual, before the question of punishment after death was raised. When ultimate impunity for the sinner was assumed, the number rose to eighty-nine. Three justify God in punishment that is purely retributive, though they refuse to permit this weapon to be placed in the hands of man under any circumstances.

Of the seventy-four who accept the principle of retribution in I (a), I (b), II (a), and II (b), exactly one half believe in the rightfulness of private revenge in II (a). A small amount of inquiry sufficed to show that many more of them,—probably the great majority,—would have demanded it in III had they been given a chance to pass upon it. Thus the traditional view, which has obtained the endorsement even of Professor Sidgwick,[1] that contemporary Christian society

[1] "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. III, Ch. V, Sec. 5; Seventh Edition, p. 281.

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condemns the requital by individuals of personal wrongs, turns out to contain about the same measure of truth as most other views that are traditional only because unexamined.

The exact number of those who approve of vengeance inflicted by the hands of the 'impartial spectator' (II b) can, unfortunately, not be stated. Ten persons changed their answers from rejection to acceptance when the problem was formulated in this way. On the other hand, there are some, and their exact number is not known, who permit revenge to the victim, but forbid it to the 'impartial spectator' on the ground that 'it is none of his business.' For such persons, evidently, revenge is a matter of personal satisfaction, in which the evil that is inflicted by the aggressor gives his victim, and no one else, the right to indulge.

In interpreting the above results, it must not be forgotten that our aim has been to discover the maximum number that can be induced to approve of retribution, so that the incidents chosen to call forth a reaction have been selected with that end in view. Had they been examples of less flagrant crimes, the number of those found on that side would have been much smaller. It was because the culprit *laughed* about his deceit and ingratitude that two of the students permit the injured benefactor to revenge himself. Some reserve retribution for murder only. Two, as we have seen, were proof against all calls for vengeance except in the extreme case described in III. It was interesting to observe, however, that when the last-mentioned young men finally changed to the other side, they demanded the imposition of the penalty with the same vehemence, and they demanded the same amount of it, as anyone else.

Among those who repudiate retribution, two main types of reasons for so doing appear. They correspond to the two great classes of moral judgments, those based on the extrinsic, and those based on the intrinsic value of purposes and character. The first is that it will do no good.

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"In a world full of suffering," said one student, "why increase its amount, even for the wicked?" The other is that it is lowering to the avenger. Indeed, according to several respondents, it lowers him to the very same level as the original offender.

But the influence of the spirit of retribution shows itself in the moral judgments of the majority of even the little group whom we have seen denying *in toto* its varied claims. When its members were asked on what grounds they justified the punishment of the criminal by the state, they answered, without exception, deterrence. These declarations were not made in answer to the abstract question: On what grounds do you approve of punishment by the state? The answer to such a question is of little value. They appeared in the course of a judgment upon a concrete situation. These eight students had, of course, all held in I (a) that the murderer on the island should be freed upon the dispersion of the community of which he had been a member. Asked what should have been done had the murder occurred in the United States, they with one accord replied: It would have been necessary to hang (or otherwise punish) him for the sake of 'the example to others.'

Now, according to the principle of deterrence, the criminal is made to suffer solely for the sake of the general good. He is a victim laid upon the altar of public safety. Whoever really and thoroughly accepts this principle must accordingly be prepared to assert that, where necessary, anyone,—regardless of what he may have done or not done,—may be sacrificed without his consent and indeed against his will, for the sake of more important or comprehensive interests; that, for instance, the life of one man may be justly demanded where it is beyond question the only possible means of saving the lives of many. What will our eight students think of this principle in its nakedness? We shall attack this new problem by means of a question that reads as follows:

IV (a). Long ago, when Green Bay [Wisconsin] was a little community

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of two or three hundred people, situated in the midst of vast forests, an Indian chief, accompanied by a formidable band of warriors, one day suddenly made his appearance before the stockade and demanded the surrender of a certain one of its citizens. This citizen, the chief believed, on what he regarded as the best of evidence, had, a few days before this, killed a member of his tribe. The murderer, he accordingly declared, must be turned over to him for punishment. The citizens, however, pointed out to the chief,—what was the truth,—that the man in question had been busy with a piece of work for the past two weeks, and had not left the settlement in all that time, so that it was impossible he should be the guilty person. The chief, however, believed they were all lying and threatened that he would attack the town and kill every soul in it if they did not comply with his demand inside of twenty-four hours. The whites knew that the chief was a man of his word; that, accordingly, if he promised to withdraw and molest them no further upon the surrender of their fellow-citizen, he would do so; that, in like manner, if he threatened an attack in case of their refusal, he would certainly carry out his threat. In deliberating over the matter, they concluded that the chances were good that they could hold out until help could be obtained from a distance. But they recognized at the same time that, in the event of an attack, a large loss of life was inevitable, amounting, perhaps, to fifty or more of their number. On the other hand, they also recognized that to give up their fellow-citizen meant for him certain death. The man in question was unwilling to surrender himself. What ought they to do?

In the following discussion of the answers to this question it is to be understood that,—for reasons too easily imagined to be worth elaborating,—the surrender of the citizen would not be imprudent as creating a dangerous precedent, or exhibiting a real or apparent weakness of which advantage might be taken in various ways. The conditions, then, being as described, how many of our champions of deterrence will justify the sacrifice of the one for the many in the case before us? As the question reads above, one, and only one. For all their lip service, seven out of our eight *soi-disant* worshipers of the *salus populi* appear to have recanted in the presence of an unambiguous application of their principle to a concrete situation.

Such a conclusion follows, however, only on condition that the alternative is clearly recognized as being simply and without qualification the life of one *versus* the lives of many. A number of considerations, however, enter to obscure this fact from the eyes of our respondents. It

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will not be necessary to enumerate all of them. The most important one is the following: It would be selfishness on the part of the citizens to surrender one of their own number in order to save themselves. Here, as a little inquiry showed, the settlement is thought of as a democracy. The demand of the chief therefore comes before the assembly of the citizens. And each person present is imagined as putting the matter to himself thus: Can I vote to sacrifice one of my fellow-citizens in order to save my own life? This, it seems hardly necessary to say, looks at the situation in an artificially narrow way. The actual problem before each good citizen was, of course, in reality this: Shall I vote to save this one man or to save,—not merely myself, but also my family, and my fellow-citizens and their families? The other fallacies it seemed impossible to eliminate by any modification of the question, but this particular piece of mental confusion we were able to get rid of (largely, at any rate) by reformulating the question as follows:

IV (b). At the time of this incident Green Bay belonged to France and France was ruled by an absolute monarch. The king had placed a governor over the settlement, and he, in turn, was its absolute ruler. Consequently when the demand of the chief was presented to him, as it would be, he and he alone had the decision in his hands. Now we shall suppose our governor to be a man of the highest honor, courage, and patriotism, raised at this moment to their highest potency by the responsibility of his present position. He therefore looks at the alternatives forced upon him without considering for an instant his own safety, and solely from the point of view of his subjects. In so doing he is merely acting the part of the average captain of a sinking ship, who gives his orders without a thought of how they will affect his own chances for escape. What, then, ought the governor to do?

In this formulation one member of the group we are studying changed his answer to approval of the surrender.[2]

Thus there remain six who refuse to accept in its nakedness the principle that the greater interest has the moral

[2] A third test was given to eliminate the remaining fallacies, but it did not affect the returns for this particular group.

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right, when necessity arises, to force the lesser interest to give way in its favor. Why then do we find them affirming this principle for the repentant murderer of I (a) in case the murder takes place in the United States (see above, page 352)? The answer cannot be doubtful. Retribution, by itself, is repugnant to them. They therefore condemn all punishment whose sole purpose is to inflict harm. On the other hand, as we have just seen, they do not approve of the enforced sacrifice of the one for the many as such. Their acceptance of deterrence as a proper ground for inflicting punishment upon the evil-doer can therefore be due only to a union of the two considerations, since neither alone will account for the result. In them the deed of the guilty man arouses sufficient indignation to make them approve of *his* being sacrificed for the sake of the greater good. This conclusion, taken in connection with our study of I, II, and III, justifies us in summarizing the results of our investigation thus far as follows: Out of one hundred students there are only two whose moral judgments show no traces whatever of an approval of retribution.

A final problem remains to be considered, viz.: Is the personal retribution of II regarded as merely a right, or rather as a duty? This is a matter of great theoretical importance. A right is a privilege; its exercise presupposes an end that promises to satisfy some desire of the possessor. A duty, on the other hand, represents something which I am bound to pursue, whether I desire its realization or not. The affirmation of revenge as nothing more than a right is therefore simply an application of the standard of welfare,—or what is commonly called the utilitarian standard. The aggrieved party is permitted to satisfy his desire to see his enemy down. To be sure, this satisfaction means suffering for the victim; but the latter, by his own evil deeds, has lost his claims to consideration from the avenger. If, however, revenge is regarded as a duty, there lies at its basis the demand for harm,—not for the sake of the feelings of the avenger,

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but in order that harm may exist for its own sake. The judger's moral ideal demands that a person who commits certain wrongs shall suffer in consequence, whether his victim obtains any satisfaction from the contemplation of the spectacle or not.

The question which of these two alternatives is fact was carried only far enough to determine beyond the shadow of a doubt, the existence of both types of judgment. That the former was found will occasion no surprise, especially after what was said above (page 351) about the advocates of vengeance in II (a) who would forbid it in II (b). On the other hand, most of those who approve of retribution in I, and all who approve of it in II (b) and in II (d) (vengeance at the hands of God), appeared not to have in view the satisfaction of any of the *dramatis personæ* of the problem; their point of view was that he who does wrong deserves to suffer for it. To a number of our students the question was put directly whether retribution is a right or a duty. A right was defined for them as that which no one can blame you for doing, but which you do not have to do unless you want to. Thus (it was explained) a man has (at least ordinarily) a right to spend his own money for this or that, as he wills. Where an act is a duty, on the other hand, you are bound to do it, whether you want to or not, as paying your debts. The majority of those questioned regarded retribution by the individual as a right and not a duty, in the sense defined. But a few were found who asserted emphatically that it was a duty. And indeed there were three uncompromising young men who declared it, in such a case as that described in II, to be a duty in another sense of that somewhat slippery term, as something for which a person could be censured for neglecting, as distinguished from the so-called acts of supererogation, which we praise the agent for doing but do not blame him for omitting. These results prove the existence, by the side of a standard demanding that good be aimed at and evil avoided, of another standard, applied of course only to particular

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parties under particular circumstances, requiring that harm be sought. The latter standard may be called the dysdæmonistic, as distinguished from its antithesis, which may be called the eudæmonistic.

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* Mr. Sharp is responsible for the general plan of the investigation. Mr. Otto contributed questions II (b) and III, besides numerous and important suggestions at other points. The actual examination of the agricultural students was divided equally between the two writers.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE MORAL ECONOMY. By Ralph Barton Perry. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909. Pp. xvi, 267.

The purpose of this clearly written and attractively printed book is, in the author's words, "to study morality directly, to derive its conception and laws from an analysis of life." The author believes that theoretical ethics "is seriously embarrassed by its present emphasis on the history and criticism of doctrines, by its failure to resort to experience where without more ado it may solve problems on their merits." And in the second place the author hopes to "connect ethical theory with everyday reflection on practical matters." It is in harmony with the above purposes that with the exception of Plato and Aristotle the classical ethical writers are scarcely mentioned. Kant and Spinoza appear in the index once each; Adam Smith, Mill, Spencer, and Green not at all. Instead are frequent references to Nietzsche, Matthew Arnold, and Chesterton.

The title suggests the standpoint from which the moral experience is to be viewed,—that of an "economy," an ordered system, a community of interests. Goodness, the first topic, is treated under the heading: "Morality as the Organization of Life." "Morality is the massing of interests against a reluctant cosmos." "The fulfillment of an organization of interests is morally good." "Morality is natural if life is natural . . . It is related to life as a later to an earlier phase of one development. The organization of life answers the self-preservative impulse with which life begins; the deliberate fulfillment of a human purpose is only life grown strong enough through organization to conduct a larger, more adventurous enterprise." War between man and man is an obsolescent form of heroism, but there is one campaign in which all interests are engaged; "the war of life upon the routine of the mechanical cosmos and its forces of dissolution."

Duty is treated under "The Logic of the Moral Appeal." Following the general idea, the aim is to show that a progressive adoption of new interests marks the ascending path of morality on from 'prudence' through 'preference,' 'impartiality, and jus-

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tice,' to 'good will,'—the determination of action with reference to all affected interests. Obviously the two crucial steps are from prudence to the adoption of new, 'higher' interests which do not now appeal to me, and from 'my' interests to those of 'others.' The logic of the first,—the preference for higher interests,—Professor Perry finds in the conception of 'higher' as being the more liberal or comprehensive. The "quantitative basis of preference" is the only rational justification. But the way is cleared for this by the "principle of the objective validity of interests,"—that an interest is none the less an interest because it does not coincide with an individual's momentary inclination. For the second step, the reason why we should treat every other person as "end, not as means only" is found in the implication of all reasoning or discourse. If you are willing to reason with one about it, you really grant the point. For in any discussion if both parties claim candidly to represent the truth, they are in so far equal. "Neither can do more than appeal to the object. Neither has any authority; there is no authority in matters of truth, but only evidence." "Discussion involves mutual respect in which each party acknowledges the finality of the other as a vehicle of truth" (pp. 65, 66).

The logic of the first of the above appeals does not appear to the present writer to escape the difficulty with which Plato struggled in proving the reasonableness of goodness. For it is open to grave doubt whether we can say that the 'higher' can be reduced to 'more,' or that the great moral decisions can be justified by a mathematical reason. To the 'philosopher' or 'the expert' his choice seems 'reasonable'; to the man who has adopted the new interest it may appear more comprehensive. But to the man who has not yet adopted the new interest, it may not appear that 'width of representation' is coincident with 'weight of incentive,' or is worth the sacrifice of intense and vivid interests already present. For him in short, it is a 'synthetic proposition.' It is 'reasonable' only if we define reason in terms of faith. Professor Perry's suggestion for the logic of the second step really implies a synthetic conception. I shall recognize the interests of another if I am already minded to recognize him as belonging to the same social world of truth seekers with myself. That is, we get a 'reason' for a social act because we start with a social system and proceed to analyze its implications. Carrying this suggestion of method back into

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the preceding case of adopting new interests, is it not probable that we can get a reasonable ground for the appeal of the new only when we postulate a self of forward reaching imagination and creative power to '*take* an interest'? This active, creative, compelling aspect of the moral self, which in crises becomes a 'categorical imperative,' does not in my judgment get sufficient recognition in the author's treatment. The 'organization of interests' interprets more readily the reflections of a 'cool hour' than the sterner moments of duty when some son of man sets his face steadfastly toward Jerusalem.

Chapters follow on The Order of Virtue, The Moral Test of Progress, The Moral Criticism of Fine Art, and The Moral Justification of Religion, which we cannot take space to analyze in detail. Of the many fine and true things well said we would call attention especially to the characterization of the radical (p. 147), to the interpretation and defense of democracy (pp. 163 *ff.*), to the definition of the moral values and limitations of art, (Chap. V, *passim*), and to the brief presentation of moral idealism (pp. 249-251).

In considering an attempt to read the moral experience anew and directly, we inevitably compare it with other interpretations. Most of the classical versions have been evoked by some new social or individual problems, or perhaps a general method is carried into this specific field. Historical criticism shows the relevancy of their interpretations and at the same time their limitations. Probably most who should attempt to read the moral experience of to-day, searching for what is most distinctive and original, would fix upon the economic and industrial phases of justice, the conflicting interests of social classes, the individualism in family life, the control of politics by economic interests, the ideals of imperialism, the efficiency of science in protecting and rendering happier human life. In the present work the influence of science is reflected in the view of morality as the "massing of interests against a reluctant cosmos." And perhaps it is commercial life that suggests the conception of economy as a community of interests. But we certainly breathe on the whole the atmosphere of letters and art rather than that of industry, trade, or politics. The argument is addressed, it would seem, to the youth who is in the university rather than to the statesman or the man of affairs, not to say the trade unionist. The moral experience analyzed is prevailingly that

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of the man of culture, looking with sympathetic eye upon the progress of democracy; it is hardly that of those engaged most intimately in the struggles.

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L'IDÉAL MODERNE. La question morale. La question sociale. La question religieuse. Par Paul Gaultier. Paris: Hachette et Cie., 1908. Pp. 358.

It is generally admitted by Frenchmen that their country is morally in a pretty 'bad way.' Occasionally this is vigorously denied, as President Jordan can testify; but the most vigorous denial does not change the facts. What the French themselves think of the conditions can be best learned from a perusal of the books and the numerous periodicals that have appeared within the last two decades dealing with the general problem of public morality. Professor Fouillée in his "Psychologie du peuple français" admits that his country has been rapidly losing prestige, but he finds some consolation in the circumstance that the decreasing birth-rate to which attention has so often been called, is not confined to France. M. Gaultier tells his readers that whether we rejoice or grieve, the fact is patent that the contemporary conscience is rapidly loosing its moorings and that morality in conduct is becoming a thing of the past. Hence there has come into existence an abundant literature the aim of which is to establish a system of morals outside of metaphysics and of every creed. He asks what we are to think of these efforts. Is it possible to establish a system of morals without God and without a revelation? How can biology explain the duty of self-sacrifice, which has influenced and continues to influence the actions of many men? He does not believe with the sociologists that an act is criminal because it hurts the social conscience, but that it hurts the social conscience because it is criminal. There is some truth in the contention of the sociologists, but it is not the whole truth. It is the mission of history to explain; it cannot discover motives except in so far as they are expressed in acts. Morality cannot be interpreted by a study of the social group alone, independent of the personal, the psychic, and, consequently, the rational factor. Mo-

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rality is not a matter of convention having no roots in our moral nature. If men were not born with an innate moral germ, it could not be developed by any *milieu* however favorable.

Science cannot construct a system of morals, because it is concerned with externals only, whereas morality is internal, psychical, the work and the object of consciousness. The physician who tells his patient how to get well does not tell him that he is under obligations to get well. There are no longer any moral problems that are not also physical and physiological. Morality acts; science observes and investigates. A science cannot become moral without losing its character as science, and morals can become scientific only on the condition of ceasing to be moral. Science knows nothing of ends. Morality is a fact given in the experience of mankind, anterior to all systems; it precedes the science of which it constitutes the object. To say that manners and customs generate morals is to put the effect for the cause; it makes of men mere passive entities, products of a force which they do not understand and of which they are but dimly conscious, if at all. The end of nature is neither pleasure nor happiness, but perfection, the complete accomplishment of its functions. By virtue of the power men have to reflect and to transform their reflections into deeds, each one of us is invited to realize perfection by the ideal which is present to his mind before he acts. The moral law cannot be deduced solely from the study of conditions because it is innate. The study of conditions, however, helps us to formulate the rules more clearly. They are the test of practice. The most important of all sciences is the science of ethics. From it all the other sciences borrow their right to exist and in a measure their necessity. The real creator in morals is not the philosopher, but the saint. The moral ideal does not proceed out of practice nor is it developed by practice, but is designed to enter into it. A Socrates, a Jesus were content to live their thoughts.

The certitude with which ethics deals is neither sensuous nor logical; it is moral. It rests neither on rational evidence nor on the evidence of the senses; it is purely internal. It is only by doing our duty that we learn to believe in duty. Morality rests not only on a psychic reality, but also on a physiological, a social, and therefore on a cosmic physical reality. Science often teaches us what is moral, but only the ethical consciousness impels us to do it. Science demonstrates the harm that comes from

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the use of alcohol, but it is the science of ethics that makes clear to us the obligation to abstain from its use ourselves and also to endeavor to keep others from using it. Science furnishes the positive and firm foundation on which rest a great number of the applications of the principles of morality. The Christian ideal is the law of sacrifice only because it is the law of life. It is a profound truth that he who loses his own life finds it a hundredfold. The ultimate unit in the world is not the social unit, but the individual, the person. Society rests on the individual, not the individual on society. It is not society that gives us the consciousness of our existence. "I think, therefore I am," not because somebody else is, but because I am conscious of my own existence. It is not because man is a social being that he is a conscious entity; it is because he is conscious and reasonable that he is eminently social. Whence comes progress if it is not due to innumerable individual contributions? Science advances solely by the accumulation of the labors of individuals. History is nothing more than a tissue of personal deeds. Individualism is neither particularism nor egoism. The latter is a radical vice which seeks to get as much as possible and to give as little as possible. He who considers himself the center of the world and the world as his property is the farthest possible remove from a moral man. Coöperation, in order to be efficient, must be free. What does the coöperation of a troop of mercenaries or of a gang of galley-slaves amount to? He who would be greatest among you will be your servant, but his service will be voluntary service. Morality is individual not only in its principles, but in its prescriptions also. Morality while commanding us to consecrate ourselves to others, bids us also to develop ourselves. What is the highest perfection if it is not an invitation to the most complete felicity? The salvation of society depends on individualism properly understood. The social question is not a question of morals, because the latter is a thing apart. Socrates taught that there are unwritten laws higher than statutes. So did Antigone. Juvenal assures us that it is sometimes necessary for us to lose our lives in order to establish a reason for living. If moral laws are engendered by society, it can also change them; what is moral to-day may be immoral to-morrow.

Religion leads us to morality, and morality postulates a supreme Being who is the source of all existence and of all perfec-

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tion. Morality does not lead us to God as a mere abstraction, but as a perfect ideal in which are reflected and embodied our highest aspirations. On the other hand, religion is the ferment of morality. It is the completion, not only of morality, but of life in its entirety. The true religious sentiment is implicit in morality, not only as a means but also as an end. If it leads to fanaticism, it is because there is a lack of equilibrium in the faculties of the fanatic. Religion does not merely sustain morality: it gives to life a meaning and a value which nothing else can give. Religion does not teach us to regard the world as of slight moment; just the reverse. It provides us with many reasons for exalting, for admiring the world. Religion discerns a meaning in progress: it would have none if it could not be continued indefinitely. Religion gives to ethics the assurance that the reign of ends is capable of realization; that it will one day be realized. There is nothing in science which should lead us to believe that faith is not an instrument of cognition, a method of getting into communication with reality of a different kind, or rather with another phase of reality than that which is the object of the savant's investigation.

Metaphysics and theology can very well coexist by the side of experimental science. Religion, philosophy, and science are three modes of solving the same problem. The references to the scientific order which the Scriptures contain, are nothing more than envelopes of moral, metaphysical, and religious truths, which believers held to be revelations from God. If inspiration is a fact, it is not only a physical, but a supernatural reality, which the moral and religious consciousness can discern, which, however, does not fall under the observation of the historian. It is in this light that the stories of Noah, of Jonah, and others are to be understood. The Bible is in no sense a manual of chronology. To regard it as a historical work in the ordinary sense of the term is unjust both to history and to the Bible. History is not mere fact; it is also interpretation. This statement is true not only of profane but also of biblical history.

The book is a strong one. The author is probably a Roman Catholic; but his creed is very little in evidence. His position with regard to the independence of morality is as nearly impregnable as it can be made, it seems to me. Whether his apologetic attitude is to be commended is not easy to determine. To judge from the recently expressed views of the papal

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hierarchy on matters scientific it is very doubtful if M. Gaultier's method of defense will be found acceptable.

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MORAL EDUCATION IN EIGHTEEN COUNTRIES. Report on Moral Instruction (General and Denominational) and on Moral Training. By Gustav Spiller. London: Watts & Co., 1909. Pp. xv, 362.

There is sure to be a ready welcome for this book on Moral Instruction by Mr. Gustav Spiller, who is well known, not only as an author, but also as one whose untiring energy and able organization made the International Congress on Moral Instruction possible. In the preface Mr. Spiller states that the present work was prepared in answer to the need of a volume describing what is being done in respect of moral education all over the world. The second part of the book is accordingly devoted to a report on moral training in the schools of Austria, Belgium, the British Empire, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. Nine countries had already been reported upon in "Moral Instruction and Training in Schools," edited by Mr. Sadler, and concerning these the present volume has not added much to the information given in the earlier work. Its importance lies in the valuable accounts of countries which were not treated by Mr. Sadler and his coöperators. Nevertheless one cannot help feeling that more interest and comment will be directed to Part I which, in 86 pages, gives a statement of many of the most controversial points which have arisen in connection with moral education. Mr. Spiller very emphatically states his opinion concerning religious and moral education, and perhaps what he has to say would have been more fruitful had it been possible to combine his admirable sincerity with greater reticence, in particular, had the criticisms of the ethical value of certain religious convictions been omitted. In his Presidential Address to the Moral Instruction League in February last, Professor Mackenzie also argued the possibility of teaching morality without reference to religion, but his masterly discussion could cause no offense

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even to those who remained unconvinced. In this great movement it is imperative that nothing should be said to alienate the sympathy of any Church. The second controversial point with which Mr. Spiller deals is his conviction of the value and vital necessity of direct and systematic moral instruction, and in this connection he replies briefly, and somewhat summarily, to various objections which have been raised against it.

The author is on safer ground when he commences to discuss different schemes for moral instruction. The latter half of the second chapter is by far the most interesting part of the book, and it contains what we regard as its most lasting and valuable contribution to the literature of the subject. After criticising certain schemes already in existence Mr. Spiller outlines a plan for the construction of an ideal syllabus; for this alone the volume would deserve a place in the library of all who are interested in education. His plan is based upon the view, that since the virtues alone are abstract and disconnected, the systematic treatment of the relations of life, in reference to which the virtues become concrete and significant, is the only foundation which meets the needs of the case. He therefore advocates a combination of the syllabuses of the Moral Instruction League with those of the French State Schools, the four cardinal virtues to be systematically applied to the twelve categories or relations of the French plan. The scheme is thus based upon the situations in which a man finds himself and the virtues he should exhibit in them. It is a general ideal but, as such, it seems to be greatly in advance of any scheme at present elaborated in this country. Mr. Spiller very rightly urges that the syllabus in its final form should be the product of many men and should represent interests as various and comprehensive as possible. If the book leads to the construction of such a syllabus, it will have achieved a mighty purpose.

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A Pluralistic Universe. By William James. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. Pp. 404.

It is a little difficult to give an account of pragmatist ethics from Professor James's "Pluralistic Universe" because in the

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course of the book he makes scarcely any definite ethical valuations in the formal style. We find here no elaborate analysis of the word 'good,' no careful distinction between its use with regard to 'means' and its use with regards to 'ends.' "And this is scarcely odd," some one may say, "because the book is really about metaphysics." As a matter of fact, for Professor James the two subjects are not exclusive. His metaphysics are so full of ethical feeling that for him to write on the one subject without implicitly dealing with the other is almost unthinkable. And just in this point lies the main difference between Professor James and other pragmatists on the one hand, and those realists who still cling to intellectualism, on the other.

The ethics of Mr. G. E. Moore, for instance, are beautifully clear and simple, and partly at least for this reason, that they stand eternally unrelated and incapable of relation to any metaphysical beliefs which their author may hold. Neither can metaphysics alter them nor they alter metaphysics. This predominantly intellectual analysis of the whole question of ethics serves admirably to illustrate Professor James's point about the 'usefulness' (relative truth) as opposed to the 'truth' (absolute) of the ideas to which the intellect is capable of giving birth. Mr. Moore's isolation of the whole of ethics, his steadfast refusal to relate questions as to what ought to be to questions as to what things *are,* may be eminently useful toward a rational ordering of conduct within a strictly limited sphere. But in its simplicity and abstraction surely Mr. Moore's system cannot be held to represent the whole truth. We are conscious of what Professor James might call a certain 'thinness,' even a certain sterility, in these 'unrelated' ethics of the intellectualist.

The trouble for those of us who do not find satisfaction in Mr. Moore comes, I think, from this failure to relate two equally real portions of experience, our experience of the actual world and our beliefs about what ought to exist. And here Professor James may help us. For the realists of Mr. Moore's school it is positively immoral to hold that what we believe ought to exist, can in any way affect what now we believe to exist, and it is almost worse to hold that what we believe does exist can or ought to affect our beliefs as to what ought to exist. Professor James takes an entirely contrary position. That which we believe does exist, he would say, does most certainly help to determine that which we believe ought to exist, nor is there anything illogical

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in this. My belief that I live in a society certainly helps to form my belief as to what my relations to that society ought to be. Again, the effect of our beliefs about what does exist on our beliefs as to what ought to exist is only limited by the reaction of this second class of beliefs upon the first. Ethics and metaphysics are for the pragmatist bound up in a series of actions and reactions apparently endless. For the pragmatist the discussion of what does exist *is* relevant to the discussion of what we think ought to exist, for the simple reason that an understanding of the first point may throw some light on the question why we so conceive the second. For pragmatists psychology is relevant to logic, and rightly, for the study of how men actually do think has in Professor James's own case clearly helped to determine in him a more definite belief as to how he, at least, ought to think. For the pragmatist as for the intellectualist the feeling implied in the proposition, "A is good," is unanalyzable, but the pragmatist, unlike the intellectualist, does not on that account dismiss the processes which have led to that feeling as irrelevant.

Practically, so far as we can analyze and trace these processes, we find in them the whole meaning of the proposition. A savage's belief in a certain kind of god inevitably determines part at least of his ethical beliefs. Convert him and he will probably change his ethical belief. It is of little use for the intellectualists to argue that our beliefs about the unseen ought not to affect our ethical beliefs; their own attempt so to banish metaphysics does most naturally affect their own ethical beliefs in that it tends to limit their ethical valuations to human and æsthetic relations. This is not to say that it is undesirable to limit the ethical point of view; for particular purposes it may be most desirable so to do. At the same time intellectualist ethics are most certainly influenced by this particular metaphysical belief in the non-existence of any relation between what may exist and what ought to exist.

Further, for the pragmatist his beliefs as to what ought to exist *do* naturally affect what he believes does exist, if only by being added to it as existing now and here. Intellectualists would admit as much. But it is surely irrational to deny that such beliefs may not seriously alter what shall exist in the future. Pragmatists are not content to remain inside the intellectualist camp of determinism. They prefer to regard their wills as no

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less real facts of experience than are the facts of the earth and sky, and they actually are led to suppose that their will to believe certain things not obviously contradicted by the rest of their experience may actually help to determine the existence of those very things. The will to believe in fairies revived Tinker Bell, the will to believe in ourselves or our friends may obviously revive ourselves or them. If we believe in any god short always of the absolute, who can say that our will to believe in that god may not also affect him? Pragmatists have to banish the bogey of the 'pure intellect,' they have to assert the equal dominion of will with understanding, or rather, the unintelligibility of either term taken entirely apart. Finally since their appeal is always to the individual concrete experience, all their ethical valuations as all their truth valuations must be relative. Judgments as to what is good will be as relative for them as all others, and will only be held for true in so far as they find it more possible to live by them than by others. Consequently we cannot and do not expect Professor James to lay down the law as to what we ought to hold as particular ethical truths. In his pluralist universe which is like Plato's loathed democracy ποικίλον καὶ παντοδαπόν all claims may jostle each other, and have ultimately to fight the matter out. He can only show us that what is *does* affect what ought to be, and that if we will it strongly enough, what we hold ought to be may affect what is.

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The Eternal Values. By Hugo Münsterberg. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. Pp. 436.

This work is, as the author tells us in the preface, not a mere translation of his German work, "Philosophie der Werte," although its scope and substance are the same. Much in the English version has been altered from the German work in the way of expansion and contraction. "Many side issues, especially such as connected the work with particular German movements are left out, and not a few additions refer to recent American discussion." Like the German work, "The Eternal

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Values" is the comprehensive statement of a philosophical system, in terms of an elaborately wrought-out Neo-Fichtean idealism. Inasmuch as the German work was reviewed at length in this JOURNAL (Vol. xix, pp. 495-504) by Mr. G. E. Moore, I shall do no more here than briefly compare the two volumes. To avoid any misunderstanding, however, I must first say that Mr. Moore's review is written so wholly from the outside, and is to such an extent of a piecemeal character which fails to grasp, and to state, the fundamental tendency of the work, that it seems to me to do great injustice to the interest and importance of Professor Münsterberg's volume. The real significance of Professor Münsterberg's work is undoubtedly obscured, in part, by his own method, because he stretches his very suggestive and stimulating discussions of the various types of intrinsic valuation on the Procrustean bed of an abstract and artificial schematism. Notwithstanding this defect, however, I think the book is a very significant contribution to a Philosophy of Spirit. And I am inclined to the opinion that, not simply with regard to the English reader, but absolutely, the English work is an improvement on its German brother.

The German work contains 481 pages of text, the English 430 pages with a somewhat smaller printed page. In the introductory part the chief difference is that the German chapter on "Die Werte und die Natur" is broken up into two chapters, "Physical Nature" and "Psychical Nature." In the next part, "The Logical Values," the chief differences that I have noticed are a shortening of the discussions on Logic of Nature and Logic of History by a partial omission of the discussions of German views (such as, for example, those of Windelband and Rickert) on these matters. In the German work the "Values of Unity," namely, "Harmony," "Love," "Happiness," constitute the seventh division of the second and main part of the work, "The World of Values." In the English work the treatment of the Values of Unity is somewhat condensed and they are grouped together with the Values of Beauty, as "The Æsthetic Values," *i. e.*, in general the values of sentiment and emotion. In the treatment of "The Values of Beauty," the discussion of music has been expanded. In a parallel fashion the "Values of Development" ("Growth" in Nature, "Progress" in History, and "Self Development") and the "Values of Achievement" ("Industry," "Law," and "Morality"), which are separated di-

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visions in the German work, are grouped together in the English under the heading "Ethical Values." The treatment here is in general somewhat condensed.

Part V of the Eternal Values is called the "Metaphysical Values." It includes as its two main subdivisions, "The Values of Holiness" ("Gotteswerte" in the German work), namely, "Creation," "Revelation" and "Salvation," and the culminating "Values of Absoluteness" ("Grundwerte"), namely, "The World," "Mankind" and "The Overself." The "Overself" is the final unifying ground of values.

I have not found any essential departure from the principles of the "Philosophie der Werte," and I shall not take the space to note the minor differences in the various divisions. The style of the work has Professor Münsterberg's usual swing and vigor. There are a few Germanic idioms such as "the own self."

J. A. LEIGHTON.

Hobart College.

LETTERS, LECTURES, AND ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EDWARD GARMAN. A Memorial Volume. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. Pp. x, 616.

This volume has been "prepared with the coöperation of the class of 1884, Amherst College, by Eliza Miner Garman" as a memorial to Charles Edward Garman, who was connected with the faculty of Amherst College for twenty-five years. It comprises, as the title indicates, a selected collection of letters, lectures, and addresses. In an appendix may be found a number of tributes offered by former students who had felt the charm and power of this singularly attractive man and devoted teacher. At the close of the volume are 'appreciations' written by some of the leading American teachers of philosophy.

"Although Professor Garman," says one of his pupils, "did not contribute to the literature of philosophy, and although he did not create a school whose members should champion his opinions, he was none the less widely known as a profound teacher who made philosophy a matter of vital interest to young men. Students of the subject came to recognize that the Amherst course in philosophy, which could pride itself on no signi-

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ficant publication, was yet a definite contribution to philosophical progress in America. Nor was the significant influence of the course illustrated only in those Amherst graduates who made the study of philosophy, or psychology, their life's work. It was illustrated in Professor Garman's students generally, binding them together in a kind of intellectual fellowship, and at times moral seriousness which indicated that the course itself was an educational experience of the highest order."

Other tributes speak the same spirit: they tell of a man high-minded, serious, lovable,—of a philosopher earnest, devoted, and filled with a divine enthusiasm for awakening the mental and moral forces of young men; passing by, as James says, the opportunity "to publish, to pursue original investigation, . . . unswervedly devoting all his energies to being an inspiring teacher." And taking this volume as our guide, we can easily picture him as the ideal teacher, the genuine 'guide, philosopher, and friend,' the exceptional pedagogical genius lifting the teaching of a college out of mechanical routine and academic time-serving, elevating it into a genuine spiritual function, breathing new life and energy into weary and worn ideals and kindling afresh the fires of hope and love.

Garman's attitude was an incarnate protest against the overworked notion that "original investigation and research, often of a very shallow and specious kind," should be the final touchstone by which professional work with undergraduates should be tested (p. 599). "Professor Garman has deliberately chosen to follow an older and less spectacular ideal. He has resolutely set before himself the true teacher's office,—the inspiration and guidance of those committed to his charge. To this task he has dedicated his every energy, and his research has been amidst the mysteries of human nature as the sympathetic and scholarly teacher meets this in his students" (p. 599).

One of the noteworthy and unique features of Garman's method was his 'pamphlet system' (p. 41). This was his laboratory method for the study of philosophy and a reaction against the use of the formal lecture as the chief medium of undergraduate instruction. These pamphlets were "partly extracts from authors, partly his own statements, criticism, and outlines. Any pamphlet was cast aside the moment a better one could be substituted, or when change in the focus of interest made another statement desirable." The seriousness with

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which he conceived this system may be learned from his interesting letter to President Hall (pp. 57-71). The amount of labor its successful prosecution entailed must have been enormous. But this was no obstacle to Garman as soon as he became convinced that the end justified the means. And anyone who knows the unwarranted dignity which the ordinary professorial lecture has assumed in the American undergraduate college and how successfully it has debauched the undergraduate mind, must read with admiration of the seriousness with which Garman interpreted *his* professorial duty. In his hands, the lecture was subordinated to its true function (p. 58). He did not use it, as it is so generally used, as a means of self-exaltation, or as a piece of time-saving academic machinery reducing his responsibility for the real quickening of the student's mind and affording a line of least resistance for his own personal interests.

The printed 'pamphlets,' lectures, and addresses are so sane, so earnest, so charged with intellectual and moral enthusiasm, so devoted to the task of rationalizing and ennobling life that it is small wonder that Garman wrought such remarkable pedagogical results. And the intellect and conscience of Amherst,—its teachers, its students, and alumni,—should be commended for giving him, even in life, such whole-souled appreciation as it seems to have given.

It is evident, however, to one who reads these papers of his dispassionately, that his real power was due to his personality,—to his moral and spiritual passion. His attitude, in spite of the constant emphasis laid on the necessity of 'weighing evidence' was essentially that of the teacher and preacher, rather than of the pure philosopher. For this reason, it cannot be justly said that to a public educated and mature, the content of these lectures and addresses would be particularly enlightening. Indeed, it is doubtful if Garman's fame would have been enhanced in any appreciable degree by his 'neglecting his class-room' (p. 25) to embark on the sea of production with a view to publication. "I do not feel that I can neglect the class-room for the public, yet I do hope to publish" (p. 25).

The volume is divided into three parts. Part I contains the philosophical papers, Part II the miscellaneous papers and addresses on education and life, and Part III the letters.

Among the philosophical papers we find such titles as the fol-

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lowing: Automatism, Hume on the Limits of Knowledge, Kant on Dating and Locating, Science and Theism, The Will and the Sentiments, Pleasure or Righteousness, Authority and Punishment, The Right of Property, etc.

"To those who did not know him in life" these papers "may at least have the human interest which always attends upon considering in common with a sincere and broadminded fellowman themes which lie very near the heart of things."

ROGER B. C. JOHNSON.

Princeton University.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: HIS LIFE AND WORK. By M. A. Mügge, Ph. D. London and Leipzig: Fisher Unwin, 1908. Pp. xi, 442.

In 1868 a young scholar who had worked under Ritschl at Bonn and Leipzig, and who, though only 26 years old, had deserved the respect of the learned world by an essay (published in the *Rheinisches Museum*) on the history of the gnomes of Theognis, and by a dissertation, which was crowned with a university prize, on the sources of Diogenes Laertius, was appointed Professor of Classical Philology in the University of Bâle. His duties included the teaching of Greek to the boys in the upper forms of the Bâle Pädagogium. He was a small man, of frail build, with large convex spectacles, prominent cheekbones and a heavy drooping moustache. Carefully dressed, with some regard to artistic effect and harmonious color, his little feet always neatly shod, he must have presented, as he moved across his lecture-room, an appearance rather startlingly different from that of most of his colleagues. Once he was installed behind his desk, nothing but his head was visible. His tenure of his chair, which lasted until 1879, when ill health compelled him to resign, was not marked by any contribution to knowledge commensurate with his early promise; nor does he seem to have been a particularly successful teacher. There was even a period when, in consequence of the scandal caused by his publication of a book on the origin of Greek tragedy (violently attacked by Wilamowitz-Möllendorf and defended with equal violence by Erwin Rohde), his lectures had to be suspended for lack of an audience.

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But the university must on the whole have been satisfied with him, for he was allowed a retiring pension equal to three-quarters of his salary. Ten years later his writings were setting up among the educated youth of Europe an emotional ferment which profoundly influenced the literature of many civilized countries. To-day this stir is subsiding. But it seems that there still exists a journal,—*The Good European*, edited by a Mr. Thomas Common,—which is devoted to the propagation of Nietzsche's doctrines.

There is probably no other instance in modern times of a man, who began life with so distinguished an academic record, breaking with his career and then attaining literary eminence of the first rank. How exceptional, even fantastic, is Nietzsche's career in this respect has not been sufficiently noticed, because of the assumption which runs through most of the literature about him (Dr. Mügge's 36 pages of 'Bibliography and Iconography' give some idea of its volume) that his philosophical work is of scientific importance. We are apt to think of him as a Professor exchanging one subject for another. Most readers who can catch the subtly blended light that flashes from the many facets of his aphorisms like to think that their pleasure comes from systematic thinking; and so it comes about that this rare, incoherent, rhapsodical genius is too often tediously misrepresented. Dr. Mügge, for instance, thinks poorly of his prose style; yet surely, since Heine died, no more memorable music has been extorted from the reluctant German language. Of the poems he has little to say: he quotes a few inferior specimens in an execrable English translation. He gives us much loose talk as to Nietzsche's relation to philosophical tendencies past, present, and future, and evidently does not realize that the author of *O Mensch, gib Acht* is among the greatest lyric poets. It is not indeed easy to find much to praise in Dr. Mügge's book. Perhaps the best that can be said about it is that it states the facts of Nietzsche's life in a careful, if not very illuminating way, so that a diligent reader has here the material for forming some picture of this heroic, bitter spirit, intoxicated with beauty, wearing out body and mind in rebellion against the insignificance of life, and snatching, in a crescendo that culminated in madness, a sharper bliss from ever deeper abysses of despair.

S. Waterlow.

Rye, England.

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THE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM: AN ENQUIRY INTO EARNED AND UNEARNED INCOME. By J. A. Hobson. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. Pp. xx, 328.

For the task to which he has addressed himself in this volume, Mr. J. A. Hobson has proved himself by his previous works to be eminently, and, in Great Britain at least, uniquely qualified. To the highest powers of vigorous and patient economic analysis he adds the insight of the profound political philosopher. The present work does not belie, but perhaps even surpasses, the promise of his earliest contributions to economic and political thought. The central interest of this book is of course economic, and it aims more particularly at setting forth the results of the mechanism of distribution which our half-competitive, half-coöperative industrial system has evolved. A really adequate execution of this task needs, however, an explanation of the working of the whole industrial organism. Few writers have done so much to impress upon our minds the mutual interdependence of all economic processes as Mr. Hobson; and his vivid realization of the whole economic world, so to speak, does not fail to stamp itself on every part and detail of his work, and to inspire his readers with something of the enthusiasm and assurance of the synoptic view to which the true philosopher aspires. In spite of the limited scope which the title might suggest, the book does not fall short of being a treatise on Political Economy or the Wealth of Nations in the fullest sense of the terms. Not only is the organic nature of the industrial system recognized and most luminously set forth, but the dependence of economic values upon the more comprehensive interests of mankind is not merely maintained or admitted but intelligibly and clearly explained. The last chapter of the work, "The Human Interpretation of Industry," is explicitly devoted to this purpose; but throughout the work, no less than in this chapter, the impression is irresistibly conveyed that Mr. Hobson is not an 'economist' with a benevolent interest in fields of thought which are not his own, but a philosophic thinker, who can illumine, what might and does appear to many the most dismal of investigations, with the radiance of unwearied meditation on the supreme interests of the human race.

Adopting the division of incomes into Wages, Interest, Rent, and Profit corresponding to Labor, Capital, Land, and Ability, Mr. Hobson distinguishes two parts into which the products of

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industry must fall. First, there are payments which are economically necessary for the maintenance and due expansion and improvement of the industrial system as such; and to the discharge of these payments a sufficient part of the industrial product must be devoted. From the economic point of view our present system does with some irregularity and imperfection fulfill this demand. The rest is surplus, and is distributed, if we set aside the disturbances effected by taxation, among the owners of the various instruments of production, according to their relative powers as bargainers; scarcity relatively to effective demand being a prime factor in the 'pull,'—a disagreeable word,—which this or that agent is able to exercise. Mr. Hobson exhibits skillfully the fallacies which have led various economists to set up this or that agent of production,—now labor, now capital, and, in the classical English economy, usually land,—as the residual claimant to the surplus, showing that any one of these agents may, according to circumstances, be in a position to obtain an advantage over the others. Similarly, he demolishes, in my opinion at least, the theories which the 'classical' political economy has built upon the notion of 'rent,' in the first instance the rent of land. The extension, by the economists themselves, of the notion 'rent' to payments other than payments for the use of land was obviously a step towards the disintegration of the whole theory. The close parallelism between payments for land and other payments, which the traditional economics seemed only just to fail to recognize, is now fully developed by Mr. Hobson. He shows moreover, in this connection, that the old theory that rent (the rent of land) did not enter into price is true,—and false,—in precisely the same way in respect of all economic payments whatever.

Mr. Hobson had already prepared us for the treatment of taxation by his discussion of the subject in his "Economics of Distribution." He exhibits here more fully the tendency of all taxation to fall in the last resort on 'surplus' or 'unearned income' just as the superfluity of the surplus for the purpose of industrial efficiency constitutes an economic justification for the appropriation of a portion of it at least to public objects. That the tendency of taxation to fix on surplus and to leave necessary payments to that extent intact is not always to be depended upon to avoid injustice and economic injury, is, however, amply enforced; and the art of taxation has still to exercise a wise choice

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in the methods by which it shall obtain its proper share of the surplus for public uses.

I would particularly call attention to Mr. Hobson's lucid account of the mechanism of banking, the treatment of which, however accurate in respect of various details, is usually marred by lack of economic perspective and, as in the case of Mr. Macleod, by much pedantic perversity. The turning to more effective social use and profit a lucrative, and in the worst sense state-aided, monopoly is an aim well deserving the best attention of social reformers; and such discussions as that of Mr. Hobson in this book, should prove a most valuable aid towards such a consummation.

W. J. ROBERTS.

University College, Cardiff, Wales.

WILLIAM CLARKE. A COLLECTION OF HIS WRITINGS WITH A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. Edited by Herbert Burrows and John A. Hobson. Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London, 1908. Pp. 450.

If Carlyle had known William Clarke, he might have added to his gallery of heroic types that of the Hero as Journalist. None who had the privilege of meeting Clarke could fail to be struck by the heroic note in him,—by the austere cheerfulness which, under the burden of an ever-present consciousness of mortality, could still 'bear up and steer right onward.' Of that noble Miltonic patriotism which inspired Wordsworth's sonnet, William Clarke had a large share. Like Milton he was haunted by the vision of a time when "all the Lord's people should be prophets," and if he had not the genius which enabled Milton to give supreme literary expression to this aspiration, he possessed the power which the poet lacked of making his idealism an immediate factor in the moral education of the people.

This selection of his contributions to the periodical press is therefore not only the most appropriate memorial of him that his friends could have devised, but serves also as an admirable record of the best influences that were moulding public opinion in England during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. If William Clarke can be called a journalist, he was so in an

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ideal sense. In the nature of things there can be few such journalists, but it is of vital importance to the higher life of democracy that those few should arise and persist. On the common thought of his own generation the philosopher who silently matures his wisdom and calmly 'lays his finger on the place' has scarcely more moral effect than the journalist who daily exploits his flow of paradox or reflects half cynically the banality of the public mind. The ideal journalist is one who keeps in sympathetic daily touch with the thought of his contemporaries, whose mind grows with its growth and who dedicates himself to the task of compelling that thought to see its own drift clearly and to take its best self seriously. It is the constant growth of Clarke's ideas and the transparent sincerity with which he gave expression to them as they grew, that gave him his impressiveness as a teacher and that makes his writings of peculiar value as a social record. Between the Fabian Essay of 1888 on the "Industrial Basis of Socialism," with its eager outlook on a near future of social reconstruction, and the subdued and almost pessimistic tone of the article written in 1899 on the "Social Future of England," the reader cannot but feel that he has traversed a great distance, but when he turns to the article of 1893 on the "Limits of Collectivism" he will find that the distance has not been covered *per saltum,* but by the steady march of a natural development of ideas. The course of that development is clearly enough indicated in other articles here reprinted,—to some extent in that on "Political Defects of the Old Radicalism," and still more fundamentally, though less directly, in those on "Bismarck" and "Emerson."

It begins in a revolt against a narrow mechanical view of the state. The state is an organic being whose functions,—the product of thirty centuries of evolution,—cannot suddenly be restricted within the limits of a rationalistic individualism. If they are not directly and consciously controlled in the interests of the community as a whole, they will be indirectly and half-consciously exploited in the interests of the class that possesses for the time the strongest organization. "Pitt," says Clarke in his Fabian Essay, "was essentially the great capitalist statesman. . . . He saw that . . . if England's chief rival were struck down, the English commercial class might gain control of the world's commerce. To secure that end he skillfully welded together all the moneyed interests, the contractors, landlords,

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financiers, and shopkeepers; and he tried to persuade the simpler portion of the country that he was fighting for the sacred cause of religion and morality. . . . The triumph of Free Trade therefore signifies economically the decay of the old landlord class . . . and the victory of capitalism."

This passage might be an extract from Karl Marx, from one of the numerous professorial exponents of *Machtpolitik* in Berlin, or from a Fabian of the present day whose mind has not moved from the standpoint of 1888. There is a sad amount of truth in it, and it is a truth that still needs pondering. If it were the whole truth, the prospect for the future would be as dark as the latest phase of Teutonic pessimism or the most lurid forecast of diplomatic prophecy in our own monthly reviews could make it. If the state is the supreme embodiment of social progress and if in the past the state has been entirely dominated by a succession of selfish interests, what hope dare the sober believer in continuity entertain of the future of European civilization.

But neither of these suppositions is justified by history. No doubt the action of the state must always be determined by organized social forces rather than by the principles of abstract justice. But the continually widening social organization, without which the modern state would have been impossible, has involved a silent victory over successive forms of social selfishness. Self-interest is never enlightened enough to produce progress; and to attribute the emancipation of the slaves, the enactment of the factory acts, or the abolition of the corn laws to enlightened selfishness or to the struggle of class interests is to mistake conditions for a cause.

Neither is the state the final end of social progress. If we must use biological metaphors to describe what transcends biology, the state is merely the organ and society is the organism. But to speak of society as an organism is to call up a material image,—of an aggregate of perishing mortals like the army that Xerxes wept over,—whilst that mysterious incorporation of the human race which dominated the imaginations of Burke and Newman is immortal and spiritual,—a *civitas Dei* whose authority is not a realizable asset of any mundane empire or Utopia. The latest of Mr. Wells's Republics, however fully equipped with inquisitorial wisdom, will still have a frontier for the soul of man to cross.

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It is the suggestion and tentative development of this line of thought in the essays already mentioned and in those on the "Genesis of Jingoism" and "Aristotle's Politics" that gives this book its main interest for the students of ethical philosophy. Such emphatic questioning of some of the ultimate claims now put forward on behalf of the state comes all the more impressively from one who began his teaching by insisting on the immediate necessity of enlarging the state's practical functions.

Of the biographical "Appreciations" included in the volume those of Stopford Brooke, Leonard Courtney, and W. D. Howells are of special value as being based on close personal knowledge. For the biographical sketch of Clarke himself, which is mainly the work of his friend, Mr. Herbert Burrows, all those who knew the subject of it will feel grateful.

GEORGE UNWIN.

Edinburgh University.

JESUS AND MODERN RELIGION. By Edwin A. Rumball. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1908. Pp. xi, 155.

In his journey from orthodox Christianity to radical Unitarianism Mr. Rumball has passed through inner experiences that have left their marks upon his spirit. He has become free from the bondage of external authority, and rejoices in his freedom. But he is still in the image-storming period. It seems a pity that he should have deemed it necessary to indulge in language needlessly offensive to the lover and admirer of the great Galilean prophet, simply to bring home to his readers the perfectly obvious facts that Jesus was influenced by the age in which he lived, that he was subject to the ordinary limitations of human life, and that we should allow ourselves to be led by other men and women who can guide us in the paths of truth and righteousness as well as by him. Thoughtful men of to-day, such as would be interested in perusing Mr. Rumball's book, are not asking themselves, whether Jesus was 'God,' or 'omniscient,' or 'sinless,' or 'the ideal man.' These terms as applied to a human individual have no meaning to them. But they are deeply interested in the question as to what kind of man he was, what he thought and felt, what his ideals were, what permanent

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value may attach to his ethical ideas and his religious attitude. They need not be told that he was a mortal man, "of like passions with ourselves." They wish to see, as clearly as it is possible for us to see, what his life and teaching were, what help we may derive from his spirit and his thought in the solution of our own problems, and what is the spiritual significance, the immortal worth, of his personality.

We are ourselves, in this twentieth century, deeply interested in such ethical questions as those involved in war, retributive justice, divorce, oath-taking, private wealth, public almsgiving, compulsory support of religion, fasting, festivals, prayer, wages, merit, autocracy. Now, on all of these questions Jesus has suggestions to offer that are worthy of all consideration. It is well worth while to do our utmost to find out what his real position was. What he thought about himself makes a tremendous difference in our estimate of him and his ideals. When he spoke his disapproval of a condition of society in which there were men exercising authority and lording it over their fellows, and declared that the only true greatness came from service, did he except himself and silently entertain a wish that they might submit to his authority and crown him lord of all? Did he teach that man was the lord of his institutions which existed for his welfare, or did he proclaim himself a lord who had the right to break the sabbath and dispense his followers from obedience to the law? Did he cherish a wish to become in this life, or after death, a king ruling over men, a spiritual lord, having their destiny in his hand, or did he conceive of himself simply as a prophet? What he may have thought about Adam or Eve, or about Moses, is of little consequence compared with these questions.

It has been the contention of the reviewer, set forth in a pamphlet fourteen years ago, more recently in the *Encyclopædia Biblica,* and finally in "The Prophet of Nazareth," that, if the sayings attributed to Jesus in the Synoptic gospels are critically sifted and translated back into the Aramaic dialect Jesus spoke, it becomes evident that he never claimed to be, or showed any desire to become, the Messiah, but that he included himself among the sons of men whom he looked upon as the sons of God, applying to himself all the laws he laid down for their life, only regarding himself as a prophet, a sower of the good seed in the world's great field. Mr. Rumball says that these works have

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not convinced him, that they simply show how some "writers of critical lives of Jesus" "allow their historical sense to be forfeited to the poetical."

Mr. Rumball is certainly to be commended for his unwillingness to sacrifice his historical sense, though it is not of the kind that drives its possessor to years of painstaking philological and exegetical investigation of the documents. He does not deem it necessary to answer either the arguments derived from literary criticism or those drawn from the probable form of the sayings of Jesus in his own language, nor does he even refer to the fundamental question whether Jesus, in that language, could have called himself 'The Son of Man.' All scholars agree that the only Aramaic term used by Jesus which could have been translated by the Greek equivalent for 'The Son of Man' is *bar nasha;* and nowhere in all extant Aramaic literature does this term have any other than the generic meaning of 'man,' 'the man.' *The Independent*, in an editorial, some time ago (October 29, 1908), raised the objection that *enash* was used for 'man' seven times in Daniel, and therefore, no doubt, was used for 'man' in the time of Jesus. Unquestionably. But the point is that the original of the Greek expression employed in the gospels can only be the Aramaic *bar nasha,* and that this term invariably is used in Aramaic as a synonym of the other, often in the same sentence. Since this is the only term by which it has been supposed that Jesus expressed his Messianic self-consciousness, no man can affirm that he claimed to be the Messiah, without meeting, fairly and squarely, this philological difficulty.

But Mr. Rumball's 'historical sense' leads him away from all such lines of investigation that promise a recovery of the original sayings of Jesus. He takes the gospels as they stand, in utter disregard of the literary criticism that would sever later accretions from the earlier elements and go behind the Greek form to the Aramaic. Even the Synoptics, so read, present a personality whose self-assertion is repellent, and whose 'religious extravagances' can only be called 'fanaticism' (p. 17). He gives him up as 'a by-gone leader' (p. 12). "Gone is gone and dead is dead" (p. 57). And he advises modern religion to turn from him to "the invisible Leader, our God and Father." In the following discussion of certain phases of modern life, many suggestive and valuable thoughts find expression, but no ideas or ideals of the lost leader are considered, nor

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is there any clear indication of the character of the Invisible Leader or the nature of his leadership. But faith lives on, in God, a regenerated society, and a deathless life.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

Cornell University.

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THE INTERNATIONAL
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THE MORAL IDEAL.

FELIX ADLER.

THE purpose of this paper is to state why, in the writer's opinion, the moral ideal should be conceived of as a supreme society rather than as a supreme individual.

The term 'ideal' may be taken in two senses: It may mean the idea of a non-existent thing, or state of being, or mode of conduct, regarded as worthy of being realized. In this sense we speak of the ideal human form, the ideal of happiness, the ideal of scientific accuracy, and the like. Or we may think of the ideal as an object in which the desired perfection, whatever it be, is realized already. The two senses tend to glide into one another. The perfect, or the adumbration of the perfect, already achieved, becomes exemplary. A great epic, like the Iliad, becomes the model, the excellence of which Virgil aims to reproduce in the Æneid, Goethe in Hermann und Dorothea. Bayard is the ideal which the younger chivalry accept as their prototype. The method of Darwin exercises its influence as a standard upon scientific investigators the world over. On the other hand, we seek to embody whatever conceit or vision of perfection we may entertain in an object, and thereby give it that permanence and definiteness of which, as a purely subjective product of the mind, it would be destitute.

The ideal may thus be said to subserve two ends: that

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of repose and that of stimulation; the former, in furnishing to the mind an object in the contemplation of which its desires are quieted, its quest of completeness terminated,—the other, in supplying a spur to the active side of human nature toward continued exertion in the direction of its highest good.

The topic to be here treated is, whether, in view of the stage of ethical development actually reached, the idea of God as a supreme individual is capable of expressing the moral ideal, using the latter designation both in its objective and in its exemplary meaning.

The following statement may serve to prepare the way for the conclusion to be reached later on. The theistic idea pure and simple is void of content, and cannot, therefore, as such, be an object of contemplation. We are capable of attaching a definite significance to knowledge, but not to omniscience; to power, but not to omnipotence; to goodness, but not to all-holiness. The great religious thinkers have agreed that God in his essential being is inscrutable. Nevertheless theism has afforded a distinct object to the imagination of its followers. It has succeeded in doing so: (*a*) By the negation of limits: God is the Infinite. Imagine any portion of space, however extended,—it is unable to inclose him; imagine any sequence of time, however prolonged,—it is unable to bound him. (*b*) By the method of analogy,—"a thousand years are in his sight as a day." Continue to add other thousands of years to the first, and there will arise, by analogy, an indistinct image of endless duration. (*c*) By the method of contrast. "Canst thou bind Leviathan?" Leviathan defies man's puny strength, yet it is subject to the power of God. (*d*) By various metaphors. Among those most commonly employed are the military metaphor, the royalist metaphor, the pastoral metaphor, the domestic or patriarchal metaphor. It goes without saying that none of these cover, or can cover, the metaphysical ideas of omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect righteousness.

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But the most effective means of suggesting the divine individual as an object, is to expatiate upon the supposed effects derivative from him as their cause, and to transfer the feeling which these effects excite to their author. The distinctness in this case is on the side of the phenomena under review. The author in his own person remains behind the scene, vague and uncertain in outline; but the sense of definiteness with respect to him is produced by the firmness with which the phenomenal effects are grasped. God as creator, and God as providence; God as the author of the order of nature, and God as moral ruler, are the two capital concepts of theism to which I refer.

Modern philosophy has relinquished as insoluble the problem of origins. The evolutionary theory has loosened the foundations of the doctrine of providential supervision in its traditional sense. It is possible that creation and regulative supervision may be restated in some altered sense. What it behooves us here to consider is that both these ways of looking upon the world have lost their usefulness as means of imparting definiteness to the idea of a supreme individual as an object presented to the imagination. We can no longer think of God as of a *mécanicien céleste,* nor, save in poetic moods, as of a pilot steering the ship of human destiny.

But our interest centers on the moral ideal in its exemplary aspect. Can an individual, assumed to be supreme,—can any individual serve as a universal pattern upon which all human beings may fashion their conduct?

This question may, indeed, be answered affirmatively with respect to a certain stage in the moral progress of the race. An individual can serve as an example of perfect morality as long as the moral code is restricted to, or at any rate chiefly has in view, those rules of conduct which may be imposed upon all alike, irrespective of the differences of age, sex, calling, temperament, etc. At a time when it is held that all individuals are moral

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in the same fashion, it is practicable to set up one individual as completely moral, *i. e.*, as performing in an entirely adequate way those acts which all others are required to perform in a similar way. The theistic stage is that in which uniformity is the hall mark of morality, in which the fundamental likeness of human beings to one another is the lesson still to be learned; in which the virtues to be taught are those prescribed toward all persons and in all relations. These virtues are chiefly justice, mercy, and purity; and accordingly we find in the theistic scriptures, whenever the deity is represented as a model, that these virtues stand out preëminent. God acts justly: "Shall not the Judge of all the world deal righteously?" He is the prototype of justice which men are to copy.

God is merciful: "He is long-suffering and patient, showing mercy to thousands of them that love him." Men are to be merciful as he is: "For what does Jahveh exact of thee but to act justly and to deal mercifully?" And the supreme individual is also called 'holy,' a term of many subtle connotations, of which I hold purity to be the determining one. "And holy shall ye be, for I, Jahveh, your God, am holy." It must, however, be noted that the supreme individual, in so far as he embodies the ideal, represents the virtues mentioned, not as separate, piecemeal items of goodness, but as constituents of perfection; and man likewise is expected to aspire toward realizing in himself the unity of these virtues: "Be ye therefore perfect." Moreover, God being the ideal, man is expected to bear in mind the distance which separates him from his ideal; and hence, in the classical passage from Micah, which I have quoted, summing up the whole duty of man, the climax describing the ethico-religious attitude, the final perfection, is "to walk humbly with thy God."

The position taken is that monotheism is the appropriate religious counterpart of that period in moral history in which the ethical code consists of virtues that

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are to be practiced in the same way by all individuals. When this period of development has been passed, the moral scene changes. In consequence of the increased differentiation of human society, what is called the organic nature of human relations now comes into view. The organic idea lays the same stress on multiplicity as on unity, on diversity as on likeness. The organic idea is that of a system of parts, each of which is charged with some specific function unlike that of its associates. To speak of common ends in such a system were misleading. The end in view is unitary rather than common, and it is achieved by a diversity of procedures which mutually stimulate, and in this sense supplement, each other. The perfect organ is that which enhances the specific action of its correlates, and receives from them in its own accelerated processes the retroactive influence of their stimulation.

Applying this conception to human society, we perceive the profound changes in the idea of morality which necessarily follow from it. Instead of uniformity of action in the pursuit of common ends, functional differences in reciprocal adjustment supply the index of what is moral. Among the actual human differences are those of sex, age, of specific mental, emotional, æsthetic, and volitional endowment, etc., and the play of the influences due to these differences constitutes the text of the moral life and development of human society.

The effect this changed conception, this new emphasis on the differences, must have on the moral ideal is obvious. The moral excellence, for instance, of a woman is unlike that of a man, and no masculine God can serve as the pattern upon which she shall model her conduct. Men have a decided voice in determining what is fine in woman. But an example must serve to instruct the person using it in the way in which the desired results are to be reached, and the example of a man or a man-God cannot serve to this end. Again, the excellence of the adolescent is different from that of the ripe, experi-

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enced man; and the youth cannot take the patriarchal God as his exemplar.

A certain general law of morality, indeed, may be stated on the basis of the organic principle, namely, the very law of reciprocity or interaction: the law that every function must be so fulfilled as to speed the rest. But the value of this law lies in its specific applications, and these must be left to the persons who are conversant with the problems which any particular species of functional activity presents. The outcome of what has been said is, that an act is moral not in proportion as it is standardized, but as it is individualized, in the degree to which it is unlike other moral acts, though based on the same fundamental principle, not in the degree to which it resembles them.

No single supreme individual, then, can, under these terms, embody the moral ideal. The Godhead conceived of as a single being may be designated as infinite, but infinite in such connection means a certain type, or, as we shall now say, the discharge of a certain social function raised to the nth degree. The bearer of that function is represented as performing it in the most perfect manner possible. But he cannot be the true embodiment of perfection, because other functions, equally indispensable, are excluded from the conception of him. It may be that he is represented as the divine father. In that case, the function of fatherhood is idealized or raised to the nth degree; but motherhood, sisterhood, brotherhood, etc., are omitted.

It may be that he is represented as the friend, the brother, the equal of other spirits, in the fashion in which Christ is presented in the New Testament; but then it is not possible to conceive of him simultaneously from the parental and the other points of view. The doctrine of the Trinity, as formulated in the Christian Church, is perhaps the logical outcome of this felt defect; and the writer admits, in view of these considerations, that in the controversy between trinitarianism and

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unitarianism, his sympathies would incline to the side of the former rather than of the latter.

Shall we then say that the moral ideal is to be regarded as dispersed into an endless number of perfections, rather than as combined in a unit of perfection? Do we reach the conclusion that hereafter we are to have many moral ideals instead of one: an ethical ideal of marriage, an ideal of parenthood, of friendship, of citizenship, of the cosmopolitan relation? And if this is to be so, will not the coherence, the unity of the moral ideal be abolished? The answer to this objection is that the unity of the moral ideal is guaranteed by the unity of the principle which underlies all the subordinate ethical ideals, namely, the organic principle of enhancing correlative functions and thereby perfecting one's own. Further, consciousness of the ideal as unitary is produced by the circumstance that in proportion as we advance in life the moral ideals open out in a series. We pass from the home group into the school, from the school or schools into the calling, thence consciously into membership of the nation, and so on. The circle at the center, with a short radius, expands into wider circles, sending forth, moreover, numerous epicycles, in the process of expansion, and at the same time we become aware of the single controlling idea which determines the whole process: an idea which gains in richness of content, but which none the less remains identical amid the diversity of its utterances and effects. The unity of the moral ideal is thus maintained even if we look upon the moral field only from the static point of view, recognizing the same principle in the many subordinate ideals,—still more if we regard our moral experience from the dynamic point of view, as a product ever changing, ever being made over, yet as the work or works of one and the same fundamental creative impulse.

It may be serviceable briefly to summarize results stated or implicit in what has preceded.

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I. General result. Instead of a perfect individual, the moral ideal is to be described as a perfect society.

II. The abstract definition of perfection. Instead of omniscience, omnipotence, and entire goodness realized in a single being, infinite organism, *i. e.*, perfection, realized in a numerically and qualitatively infinite community of beings, each fulfilling its eternally distinctive function in such a manner as not only to agree with, but to make possible, the completely adequate fulfillment of distinctive function by its correlates.

III. Actual human society, the concrete basis upon which this ideal structure is to be superimposed, supplies meaning to the abstract relations stated, while conversely, the abstract ideal furnishes a margin of infinitely possible extension to the system of human relationships upon which it operates.

IV. The creative endeavor to realize, or approximate to the realization of, the infinite organic scheme in terms of actual social progress replaces worship in the older sense as homage toward a single being regarded as embodying in himself the totality of moral excellence. Union with the infinite is the experience within oneself of the compelling impulse that issues from the idea of infinite organism and the sense that the worth of life consists, despite the tragical shortcomings, in unremitting effort to yield obedience to the impulse. In this sense the words of Faust may be accepted as true:

> Im Weiterschreiten find' er Qual und Gluck,
> Er, unbefriedigt jeden Augenblick.[1]

FELIX ADLER.

NEW YORK.

[1] The difference between the modification of theism, known as the doctrine of immanence, and the ethical idealism outlined in the above, is to be found in the circumstance that from the former point of view the element of unity is still regarded as superior in rank and reality to plurality. It is the One who works and manifests himself in all the various disguises. From the latter point of view, the two notions of unity and plurality, of identity and difference, are treated as equal in rank.

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CHARITY ORGANIZATION AND THE MAJORITY REPORT.

B. BOSANQUET.

I DO not at all recognize the portrait of the Charity Organization movement in its relation to the Poor Law as drawn by Professor Thomas Jones in the January issue of this JOURNAL under the title "Pauperism: Facts and Theories. I should like to say straightforwardly how the matters to which he refers appear to one who believes in the movement which is commonly called the Charity Organization movement, viewing it as the growth of a new and higher social enthusiasm in a great part of the civilized world. I shall have a word to say on the Majority and Minority Reports. But on that subject plenty is being said elsewhere. My main object at this moment is to explain how the social vision and enthusiasm of the Charity Organization movement, in the estimation of one who shares them, justify themselves in its attitude to the poor law problem, and in the Majority Report.

Shortly put, what I understand Professor Jones to maintain comes to this. The Charity Organization people's theory of pauperism was pretty much that of the 1834 Report, and both it and that Report may be fairly judged by the nineteenth century Poor Law practice. Those members of the late Poor Law Commission, who might be held to represent Charity Organization views, therefore stultified themselves and their movement in so far as they helped to produce the Majority Report. And yet that Report, more especially by adopting the restriction of Public Assistance to the necessitous, is tainted with antiquated prejudices, and gives promise of no such effectiveness as the Minority's proposals, alleged to have a monopoly of the policy of thorough-going Prevention.

I will begin with a general and positive statement, from

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which detailed points in dispute can afterwards be easily read off. This method is perhaps not quite so telling in controversy as discussion of points each to each, but it is a far better means of conveying a genuine understanding of what a certain theory or practice means, and intends, and aspires to. And without this understanding single points cannot but be misunderstood.

The critic began by noticing that the charity organization movement (I take leave to substitute this much truer phrase for "the Charity Organization Society"[1]) had the monopoly of the theory of pauperism in the nineteenth century. The fact is beyond a doubt. Under many focused influences, a new phase of social attentiveness and a new social inspiration had seized on a large number of men and women. The economists contributed something, but hardly, I think the distinctive things.[2] The collectivists, as Professor Jones affirms, contributed nothing. And I add, in this dissenting from him, that it was impossible they should contribute anything. They had no conception of the citizen mind, and their theory was in a great measure that of an obsolete individualism. They had no practical touch with the work of social life. And insight and enthusiasm of the kind required come only by hard labor both in action and in thinking. Professor Jones's phrases quaintly suggest that the subject was left to the Charity Organization as a sort of odd job to an odd man. It does not strike him as at least an interesting historical phenomenon that a new social passion should rapidly fix attention on a neg-

[1] One could not, *e. g.*, claim Miss Octavia Hill as merely a representative of the London C. O. S. But no one has done more and with greater authority, to make us see what pauperism means. And much of our best thought comes from Germany or from the U. S. A.

[2] I do not know what Professor Jones means by the traditional text-books which he supposes to have misled us. We had some instructive controversy with Professor Marshall, who criticised us sharply with regard to certain details, but sympathized, I think, with our position in general. See *Economic Journal*, 1892, and Mr. Loch in "Aspects of the Social Problem," 1895.

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lected social problem, and make it the question of the day.

What then was this Charity Organization theory of pauperism? Is it not strange that the critic nowhere tells us? He mentions incidental views on matters of current policy, or opinion about special lines of causation. But the theory of pauperism, the only serious theory of it in the later nineteenth century, as he truly says, he never gives his readers the chance of estimating.

I will do my best to rectify the omission in a brief and plain description. The points referred to by our critic will then explain themselves with comparatively few words of comment.

We start from the idea of democratic citizenship.[3] In the modern State all are citizens. In this respect all are equal. In the widest sense all depend on each other and on the whole; but there is no presumption of special dependence between class and class or person and person, except within the family. Obligations and liabilities are innumerable; but they are reciprocal and voluntary. Within the conditions prescribed in general by the social whole, the citizen is independent.

Now this independence is not negative, but positive. It is not a fact, but an act. To sustain it, demands inwardly a certain completeness of will and ideas, and outwardly a certain degree of success in the control of circumstances. It is obvious that you cannot have the outward success without some degree of the mental attitude. How far you can have the mental attitude without the external success is arguable.[4] It is certain that prosperity cannot be utilized nor adversity resisted without such a mental attitude. That not even it can resist every-

[3] See, *e. g.*, Loch in "Charity Organization," 1890.

[4] I am confident that the current moral view, that results do not count in judging morality, is false in principle. I hold it a merit of the movement we are describing, to have driven home in practice the principle which the truest philosophy maintains, that a powerless will or idea must be defective *as* will or idea.

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thing, who would attempt to deny? Yet the power of mind to turn disadvantage into advantage seems greater to us the more experience we possess.

Now we can state a theory of pauperism. The spirit of pauperism may be found in all social classes, and means a weakness of the citizen mind which prevents it from being equal to the situation. In other words, it is a defective participation in the social mind, on which the adjustment of life to social standards depends. The external fact of pauperism means a failure to control circumstances in the degree which the social standard demands. Wealth and dependence on the wealthy may disguise this inability. But when you have it, you have a potential pauper.[5]

Pauperism then, as an external fact, is a failure to maintain oneself and dependents up to the social standard. It is connected in principle, and in the vast majority of cases, with a failure of the citizen mind, and where it does not begin with this, it is extremely likely to end in it, unless great skill and care are devoted to its treatment. Wealth, as we saw, may allow the pauper spirit to exist without external pauperism. Misfortune may produce external pauperism, without the pauper spirit. Special pleading gets hold of these limiting cases and uses them to deny the connection of principle. It rides off on the pretext that in appealing to spiritual forces you are passing moral judgments. But all that is irrelevant. We are speaking of powers and capacities, not of praise or blame. We ask what power is lacking in the pauper mind, with the view of preventing its loss or aiding its recovery. It is not enough to say that the social body is one. The social mind is one also, and can be communicated by wise arrangements and disintegrated by unwise ones. It is not to the point to tell me that a man had no chance and is not blamable. What I want

[5] Plato pointed this out; but I doubt if it was thoroughly popularized till the movement we are discussing made it a commonplace.

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to know is how he, being now obviously weak in the citizen or social mind (it is the same thing), may be made strong, and how others may be prevented from weakening. This is what needs all the resources of civilization; all its powers of adjustment, of contrivance, of self-restraint. One may add, that sheer misfortune, attacking a thoroughly well-found citizen, is not only much rarer than some mixture of misfortune and incapacity, but is much more easy to deal with. The Lancashire cotton famine was a great deal easier to handle than the conditions of chronic semi-employment and the ins-and-outs.

The Charity Organization movement, inspired by such a theory as this, has, and is proud of having, no rules, but only a principle. This principle is the support or restoration of the citizen (or social) mind. All methods are good, that are conducive to this end.

In dealing with institutions and influences which act on the normal citizen, this principle, as the support of the citizen mind, naturally becomes a preventive policy. And this, in contrast to the detailed work of relief, has always been held the primary aim and function of the movement. Its work in this sphere, as we shall see below, has been of the very greatest fertility in preventive measures. There are hardly any of the preventive contrivances on which, for example, the Minority report insists, which do not owe either their whole initiation, or at least their most effective support in early stages, to the Charity Organization movement or its close allies. Many able and devoted workers, for instance, have contributed to make possible the recommendations of the Report on the Feebleminded. But it was the London Charity Organization Society that seventeen years ago had 50,000 children examined at its own expense, had a special treatise written on the subject, drafted the petition and originated the deputation which led to the appointment of the Commission, and, finally, lent the services of that member of the Commission on whom, if

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rumor can be trusted, fell the principal burden of drafting the Report.

And then the adoption of its recommendations is credited to the preventive policy of the Minority (Prof. Jones's article, p. 191), and the reader is left to suppose that the Majority (which, of course, adopted the recommendations) made no reference to it, and that the Charity Organization movement had in it no activity of the kind!

I repeat that the main and primary purpose of the Charity Organization movement is the prevention of pauperism by every possible arrangement, adjustment, and contrivance, positive or negative, which can be shown to make for the strengthening of the citizen mind, and the improvement of the condition of the poor, which it counts as the material equivalent of the former. If in certain provinces it prefers information and suggestion to legal regulation and compulsion, it is because it believes that a far greater preventive force is generated by this method.

In dealing with cases of distress, the same principle necessarily becomes a policy of individual and adequate treatment. This means the formation and execution of a plan which enlists on its side the mind of the distressed person, and gradually evokes and restores in him that capacity for control of circumstances without which social function and social independence are impossible. Thus the ultimate principle in relief work is the restoration of the citizen mind by adequate treatment, as that in general policy and social arrangements is the prevention of its weakening.

I think that this explanation has been worth while. We can see from it directly how the Charity Organization movement contained in it the ideas of the Majority Report, and how both were connected with the great success of 1834 in restoring a measure of social independence by a bold appeal to the strength of the citizen mind.

We can now deal with details; briefly, considering

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their number. The C. O. S. has argued, we are told, that all Poor Law Relief should be institutional, has upheld the workhouse test, and on several grounds has condemned out-relief. Therefore, its diagnosis of social ills was self-proved and self-admitted to be misleading, so far as representatives of it were responsible for the Majority report. For that Report recommends the continuance of out-relief, and disputes (especially in Scotland) some of the bad consequences ascribed to it.

This we can now see to be a very simple matter. I quote from Mr. Loch:[6]

> If the area (of Poor Law districts) be large, and the number of officers insufficient for purposes of stringent enquiry, it follows that 'tests' must in a great measure take the place of enquiry. Further, it must be added, that in some poor districts, and in a shifting population, thorough enquiry is very difficult, and produces less result in the way of definite information than might be expected. Tests, such as the workhouse test, have thus in fact become one of the means of dealing with applications for Poor Law relief in England. But they afford no absolute substitute for enquiry; and when by good administration the number of applications is reduced, it becomes more and more easy to make thorough investigation, the good results of which are speedily manifest.

The restriction of out-relief which the Society desired, it will be seen, was a restriction of its indiscriminate bestowal (the average amount being often about one shilling per pauper per week.) Actually *the same* propaganda was in favor of its adequacy, *i. e.*, its being given, if at all, in quantities and under conditions which would constitute a restorative treatment of the case. Obviously, if one became able to believe in the competence of the Poor Law system to do constructive work, and, in the full spirit of Public Assistance, to pursue a constructive aim, the policy demanded was to free it from restrictions as the Majority Report proposes.

Nor could the pronouncements of the Scottish Report on the effects of out-relief surprise anyone acquainted with the Society's views and experience. The effect of

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[6] "Charity Organization," Sonnenschein, 1890, p. 67.

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out-relief on wages and in (economic) demoralization of the people are matters of degree, and less likely to be traceable in Scotland than in England, and that they could not be definitely affirmed is nothing strange. That out-relief, carelessly administered, was in Scotland helping to maintain "dirt, disease and criminality" was only too horribly demonstrated. (Majority Report for Scotland, III, 9, 22.) The grounds for being on the whole hopeful of a new departure are the same for Scotland as for England.

The same kind of self-contradiction is ascribed to the Society because of the Majority's recommendation that the prohibition of relief to the able-bodied in Scotland should be discontinued. This, we are told, has been often praised to us by the Society, as the cause of the Scottish strength of character. (So I understand the passage in Professor Jones's article.) I do not think that the inspiration, which we certainly did draw from Scotland, was drawn from this prohibition, which was pretty well known to be a sham before the Commission pronounced it one. We drew it from Chalmers's work, or from such a fact as the report of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1818.[7] But the facts which these appealed to presupposed a united, national, democratic church, which in England we have not, and in Scotland less than formerly. It was only from their spirit that we could learn.

Now about 'deterrence.' The Majority, the critic contends, "turned their backs on the principles of '34"; out of these principles that of 'deterrence' is selected for examination. Giving a meager credit to this principle of '34 for its effect on the agricultural laborer, Professor Jones sets down to its discredit all the evil effects of the Poor Law system from '34 to the end of

[7] For this and other lessons drawn from Scotland, see "Aspects of the Social Problem," Macmillan, 1895, p. 246.

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the nineteenth century. And, as I understand, he treats not only the Commission of '34 as author of these evils, but the Charity Organization Society's view of pauperism as an accomplice in them. I infer this from the contrast drawn between the Majority Report and the principles of '34, which has no point if it is not meant that these, as the critic understands them, were the principles held by the Society.

Here are three points which seem to me sheer blunders of fact.

1. The Majority "turned their backs on the principle of '34." This was not their own view, which is distinctly expressed in Part IV, Introduction. Elsewhere they observe that the policy of '34 was negative and their own was positive. But it is quite clear that they held themselves to be continuing the same work and resting on the same faith in the citizen will. There is no inconsistency in this. Deterrence, we must bear in mind, changes its form as the standard of comfort and the resources of administration improve. And its chief modern shape is in the insistence that all relief is conditional. You cannot give public aid, and allow its purpose to be frustrated by the recipient's conduct. Thus, so far from the Majority having turned their back on the principle of deterrence, or being antiquated in their adherence to it, the Minority themselves emphatically adopt and insist on it, and not in the case of the able-bodied only, but especially and most strikingly in the case of domiciliary relief.[8] Whoever accepts public relief, accepts it under the conditions essential to its utility. No sane man, indeed, could think otherwise. A clear understanding on this head,—that one cannot have public relief and yet go on living just as one pleases,—is the main requirement of general deterrence as it survives under a system of adequate individual treatment. I shall refer below to the question of 'searching out' destitution.

[8] Minority Report, Orig. Edition, pp. 754, 1205, 1217 *ff.*

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2. The '34 Commissioners are not responsible for the many disgraceful features of Poor Law administration throughout the nineteenth century. Their views were not on the whole carried out; and the evils were those of incompetence in the authority and inadequacy of treatment.

3. The system prevalent on the whole between '34 and 1900 did not represent the Charity Organization policy, which, except in comparatively few districts, was engaged in fierce revolt against it, leading up obviously and directly to the Majority Report. When the critic ascribes the "half-feeding of children under out-relief," or the paralysis of people in the workhouse, or the misery of the aged out of it, to the principle of deterrence, I really do not know whether he is referring to the current poor-law practice, which was 'lax' and cruel, or to the reformers' campaign against it, which aimed at strictness and adequacy. I cannot but suspect that he is identifying them, though no two things could be more opposite. The cruelty and vice of the current system of out-relief and workhouse management were due to unintelligence and incompetence. I do not believe that deterrence had anything to do with it. The reformers' campaign was hot against these evils. It must always be remembered that the improvement of conditions, both in the institutions and out of them, was the aim and policy of the party popularly dubbed 'stern,' as opposed to the party popularly dubbed 'lenient.' I have come across an old note of my own (*Economic Journal,* 1892, p. 369, footnote) which illustrates the temper in which we worked in those days.

> It is almost impossible not to write too hotly, as I wait for the result of a guardians' election (not of myself, but of a friend) at which the so-called 'stern' school have fought under all kinds of obloquy from the extreme 'lenient' school, chiefly because the former, with the more moderate 'lenients,' desire to make proper provision for the Infirmary nurses, in order that a high class of attendant may be available for the sick.

That was the sort of battle we were fighting twenty

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years ago. If the reforming movement of the Charity Organizationists could have had its way, every family in contact with the Poor Law, in the institutions and out, would have been under constant careful and friendly scrutiny with a view to its restoration to independent citizenship. In the Majority Report they have had their way.

I have explained above the relation of the workhouse test to adequate treatment. Some able and practical men still adhere to the former policy. It is a difference of opinion as to what is practicable. I have shown that as early as 1890 the workhouse test was being pronounced a *pis aller*.

There is, therefore, a wholly unwarranted suggestion in the remark that "the Majority have traveled far from the position of past years." The position which the critic appears to be speaking of,—that in virtue of which the evils he describes were rife,—is one which such people as the Majority had been fighting tooth and nail for a generation.

And finally, a word on the famous contrast which the Minority's advocates state as that of 'searching out' and prevention *versus* self-restriction and cure. To us, of course, this seems a mere failure to apprehend the problem. We think that for every preventive instrument the Minority can employ, there is one as good and better under the Majority's proposals. But the difference is, that the preventive system of the Majority, while covering all the details which the other can suggest, is also so adjusted and adapted as to appeal to a preventive force which the Minority have never contemplated at all.[9] The whole scheme of social institutions and influences, if arranged as the Majority's sympathizers would have them, are preventive agencies addressed to supporting the citizen mind. But for this prevention to be effective, the limitation of maintenance relief to those who have be-

[9] I think that Professor Muirhead, "By what Authority," 2nd edition, postscript, sees a difficulty of this kind in the Minority's proposals, though he would very likely not assent to my statement of it.

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come necessitous is essential. When the State has once become *in loco parentis* to the man (including woman), it must be prepared to take the whole responsibility for him and his dependents. This is what the Minority themselves insist upon in contending, quite rightly, that all relief is conditional. It was the neglect of this principle that directly, and of course, produced the disastrous state of the out-relief children. But when this is admitted, the whole case for searching out *destitution* is given away, and 'incipient *destitution*' is seen to be an inaccurate phrase. The line is between self-management, including management of dependents, and having the State *in loco parentis*. Everything in the way of prevention depends on keeping this line clear. To try for a half and half position, State maintenance without State responsibility, is to court the disasters of the old out-relief. Incipient *occasions of* destitution there are by the hundred. To these the preventive agencies which support the normal citizen mind address themselves. And they draw their greatest force from their free appeal to such a mind, helping to complete it and to reinforce its control of circumstance. But when the State steps in with maintenance relief, that control is, and must be, transferred to the State, and the greatest of all preventive stimuli is gone so far as that case is concerned.

"What independence can one man in fifty thousand feel in a Provident Dispensary, which he would not feel in a municipal medical service, seeing that he pays in either case?" The question is characteristic, and the answer simple. In the former case it is his choice to join, and he chooses his own doctor; in the latter case he has no choice, and he does not choose his own doctor. Not choosing one's own doctor is the source of the dislike which the poor have to the poor law medical system. How should we like it ourselves? The friendship and confidence which we feel toward the family doctor is the root of preventive work in the home. Inspection at the school, and the health visitor's influence are good things.

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But nothing can compensate for the absence of the family doctor whom the head of the household chooses, trusts, and pays.

I said above, and it affords a most striking comment on this talk of preventive campaigns, that the preventive agencies on which the Minority rely, and which they describe in such attractive language, were either actually originated by the Charity Organization movement, or have developed in the closest touch and reciprocal helpfulness with it. Such are especially "Case-papers of the most approved type,"[10] "Friendly Visiting,"[11] "Care Committees,"[12] the proposals of the "Report on the Feebleminded."[13]

The Mansion House Council on the Dwellings of the Poor had its origin in a paper read to a C. O. S. meeting, and was warmly supported by the C. O. S.; The Health Visiting movement was started by a private society at Manchester and warmly supported by the London C. O. S. And everyone in London knows that if you want help for any preventive work, voluntary or municipal, of this kind, either the Charity Organization Society's Council or the nearest Committee of the Society is a sure place to find it.

The relation then is this. For everything preventive that can be done under the Minority's proposals the same thing or a better can be done under the Majority's. But the best thing that can be done under the Majority's proposals cannot be done under the Minority's; because the conditions of effective prevention are excluded by them. The State can effectively inform and advise; and maintain a standard by insisting on conditions necessary to the general wellbeing. But it cannot give money's worth

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[10] The result of many years hard work and experiment in the London C. O. S.

[11] The name and idea borrowed from the Boston Associated Charities.

[12] See Miss Frere's account of the Tower Street School, cited in my pamphlet "The Majority Report."

[13] See my account in the earlier part of this paper.

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to selected individuals, as distinguished from imposing conditions upon all citizens alike in the public interest, without taking over their responsibilities; and then the primary preventive force is enfeebled or destroyed.

The contrast between the single authority and the breaking up of the Poor Law is at bottom the same. The latter policy fails to recognize the general nature of civic failure, and substitutes occasions for causes. Even here its most attractive phrase is clearly borrowed from the Charity Organization movement. It professes to treat destitution 'according to its causes,'—the special phrase of the Charity Organizationist. But when we look for the causes, a diagnosis of them is wanting. We find instead occasions and emergencies which often result in destitution, but, obviously, and of course, just as often do not; so that to call them causes is plainly fallacious.

One word as to what can be done at once. It is not quite everything on which the two Reports are agreed; because some things on which they are agreed (*e. g.*, abolishing the general workhouse) involve other things on which they are not agreed, in this case the new authority.

But upon legislation on the lines of the Report of the Commission on the Feebleminded, there is agreement between the two Reports. Its adoption would enormously lighten the task of any new authority, and is most urgent because of the evils which are increasing day by day. Could it not be done at once?

B. Bosanquet.

Oxshott, Surrey.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF ETHICAL THEORIES.

JAY WILLIAM HUDSON.

AS I write, I happen to have before me the ethical treatises of Wundt, Sidgwick, J. Clark Murray, Ladd, Fite, Lecky, Paulsen, Mackenzie, Seth, Muirhead, Thilly, Martineau, and Dewey and Tufts. This is a col-

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lection haphazard and numerous enough to be fairly representative of modern authorities in ethics. I have the right to suppose that these men will give me some insight with regard to what are the types of ethical theory appearing in the history of the science. Furthermore, since they all are dealing with the same historical data, I have reason to suppose that there will be some degree of unanimity with regard to just how these historic schools differentiate themselves. And this is what I obtain: I am told by Wundt that history affords us the following four types of theory: politically heteronomous theories, religiously heteronomous theories, eudæmonistic autonomous theories, and evolutionistic autonomous theories,—these four and no more. I rest content with my newly acquired lore until I happen to consult Sidgwick and find that history affords us the following three types of theory; egoism, utilitarianism, and intuitionism. I become curious and open Murray's book and discover that history affords us the following two types of theory: Epicurean theories and Stoical theories. A restless unsatisfied longing seizes me, and I consult the remainder of my authorities. The historical theories according to Ladd are intuitionism, hedonism, and rigorism; according to Fite, hedonism, idealism, and the synthesis of the two; according to Lecky, intuitionism and utilitarianism; according to Paulsen, teleological and formalistic, or hedonistic and energistic; according to Thilly, theological, commonsense, and teleological; according to Martineau, psychological and unpsychological; according to Mackenzie, Muirhead, and Seth, reason types, sensibility types, and types synthesizing both; according to Dewey and Tufts, empirical, rational, and transcendental theories; or, desire-satisfaction theories and anti-desire-satisfaction theories; or, teleological and jural theories; or, individual and institutional theories; or, motive and consequence theories; —one may take his choice, according to the purpose in hand.

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Perhaps one of these classifications of historic systems is right; if so, which is it? The characteristically modern answer is that any one of these classifications is natural enough, depending upon one's purpose. But the main trouble with this view is that precisely that inquiry which makes ethics ethics is not defined. Of course, any classification is legitimate enough in so far as it serves a purpose: it might serve a purpose to classify men according to the color of their hair. But, presumably, ethics has a definite purpose, a definite search of its own, a search under which all other searches, derivatively called ethical, subordinate themselves; and if a classification is to be made in terms of purpose, it is in terms of this one purpose and no other; assuredly no other, where one chooses to present only one classification to show the essential relations between types of theory.

Furthermore,—and here's the rub,—if classifications differ from each other only according to differences of purpose in making them, why is it that our authorities present classifications varying so widely, when they all substantially agree in their main purpose, namely, to show the essential, in contradistinction to the accidental, relations of historic systems to each other? Surely the aim of a classification in an ethics text-book is and should be exactly this.

Let us, then, proceed upon this supposition,—the supposition which most ethical theorists will admit,—namely, that a valid classification of ethical theories will show how these theories essentially relate themselves to each other, will reveal essential identities and differences. The question then arises: What principle of classification will subserve this particular purpose?

What is meant by an essential difference between two ethical theories? Evidently a difference born of difference in the solution of some problem which is essentially ethical. What sort of classification would exhibit the most important of the essential resemblances and dif-

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ferences among ethical theories? Evidently, again, that classification based upon differences in the solution of the most important problem in ethics, the most fundamental and logically prior problem; the one problem of all problems which makes ethics ethics,—which constitutes the ethical search as such. I do not, at this point, pretend to say what that problem is. But to say that there is no such problem is to say that there is no such thing as a distinctive science, called ethics. For a science has as its only excuse for being, as a special science, the presence of a unique problem which defines its field. For instance, geology is geology just because the geological search is different from any other search under heaven.

But all this has not been sufficiently recognized by ethical theorists. In the first place, instead of basing their classifications upon differences in the treatment of the fundamental problem, some have taken as principles of division relatively superficial or accidental characteristics, which, indeed, enable one to distinguish ethical theories, but which do not enable one to discover important relations between them. For instance, such a superficial principle of division is adopted when one classifies ethical theories as religious and non-religious. Some are influenced by historical accidents such as that theories have been called by certain names, or by the psychological accident of the manner of emphasis or form of expression; and they classify ethical theories accordingly, instead of conforming to a principle logically derived.

In the second place, the majority, who indeed have seemed to recognize in a general way that the principle of classification must be generated by the fundamental problem of ethics, differ widely as to what that problem is,—in other words, as to what ethics is, for, as I insist, ethics can be rationally defined only in terms of its fundamental search. As a matter of fact, there is not so much variance in the definition of ethics as there is in

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the implications of its most important problem resident in the principles of classification adopted. This is an inconsistency; for the variance in one should be the direct indication of the variance in the other, since one depends upon the other. But, for the moment, taking the principle of division as revealing what in the theorist's mind is the most important problem in ethics, we obtain the following results. According to Wundt, this problem is whether one gets his moral ideals from without or from within,—heteronomously or autonomously; according to Sidgwick, it is whether the moral criterion is teleological or ateleological; according to Murray, it is whether one should seek pleasure alone as a goal; according to Ladd, it is whether one gets his ethical principles by intuitionism, empiricism, or apriorism; according to Paulsen, it is whether the moral criterion is an end or a law; or, if an end, whether that end is perfection or happiness; according to Thilly, it is whether that which makes an act right or wrong is the will of God, conscience, or the effects of the act; according to Martineau, it is whether ethical doctrine is derived from objective or subjective sources,—from nature or from God; according to others, it is whether one should be egoistic or altruistic; according to others still, it is to determine what is the object of the moral judgment; according to others still, it is whether ethics is based upon metaphysics.

Of course, all this reveals at least two things: first, that these problems, as implied by the different principles of classification, could not, at least in some cases, have been considered by the authors quoted as the one fundamental problem of ethics; second, if they did so consider them, at least they could not have considered that ethics is defined by its fundamental problem,—*e. g.*, one could not say that ethics is the search to find out whether ethics is metaphysical. Yet a failure of an ethical writer in these two regards is a failure to recognize the relatively self-evident.

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Enough has been said to show the deplorable state of the classification of ethical theories at the present time. There seems to have been little or no deliberation on the subject. Most frequently it has been treated as a very incidental problem; or, the solution has been assumed without any sufficiently explicit statement and argument of principles. In the indices of the philosophical journals to which I have access, I have looked in vain for an article directly bearing upon the subject. Often an author, frankly or otherwise, uses two or more principles of classification, giving rise to cross-divisions. Some authors announce one principle and straightway use another: Wundt, for instance, announces that he will classify ethical theories according to motives and ends. He proceeds to adopt as his principle the sources of motives and ends.

A valid classification of ethical theories should exhibit three things, and therein would reside its value. It should exhibit, first, by its very principle of classification, what is the fundamental problem of ethics,—that is, what ethics is. Second, it should show, by virtue of this very principle of classification, the essential relations of historic systems to each other. The place of any system in such a classification would of itself enable one at a glance to derive the most important predicates belonging to it; this would be invaluable for historic exposition. Furthermore, since the classification shall have been made upon a principle logically, not historically, derived, we would not expect neatly to pigeon-hole any system of history in one place and one only of the classification. In other words, historic systems do not happen to be entirely consistent, and this fact should be revealed even in the classification of them. Too often a school 'as such' is set over against another school as such,—as in the case of Epicureanism and Stoicism; when, as a matter of fact, consistently or inconsistently, there are important identities to be indicated. To classify systems in this way is to substitute historical differences of name,

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of temporal appearance, of accidental form, and of emphasis psychologically explicable, for essential differences of a strictly logical nature.

Third, a valid classification of ethical theories should, by virtue of the nature of its principle of classification, find place not only for all historic theories, but for all logically possible theories, whether or not represented in history. In other words, the classification should be exhaustive, and thus would be of value not merely for historic exposition. It should exemplify the logical possibilities of all theories that have emerged or shall emerge, the nature of ethics being once assumed. Not that such a classification would imply a final verdict on the face of it, but it would be of indispensable value in making such a verdict possible.

Thus far I have contented myself with indicating what to my mind are the general conditions to which a legitimate classification of theories must conform. I now address myself to the task of tentatively indicating the outlines of such a classification, chiefly as a matter of illustration.

I assume that all moral judgments imply an ought, and that an ought implies a norm in the light of which, as a criterion, any particular oughtness as well as oughtness in general is ultimately derived. And I assume that since it is the norm which makes a normal science normative, the most fundamental problem in such a science is with regard to the nature of that particular kind of norm which makes it the particular normative science it is. So, in order to derive our principle of classification we have to ask, first, What sort of a norm is an ethical norm? And, second, the norm being what it is, What in its very nature makes possible a diversity of theories about it? This 'what' will generate the fundamental problem of ethics, and thus the principle which I shall adopt.

The principle of classification as thus defined excludes, so far as their ultimacy is concerned, certain principles

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which have been in common use; which, indeed, have been adopted by some of the most influential of ethical theorists. In the first place, it excludes as being secondary that principle of classification which proceeds from the problem of what is the object of the moral judgment; and insists that more fundamental than this is the question with regard to the nature of that which makes the moral judgment possible at all,—whatever its object may turn out to be. This excludes the classifications which differentiate theories according as to whether that which is morally judged is the agent or his action or his motive or his intent or the consequences of his act or any or all of these in combination. Such a classification serves a very important purpose, but is not based upon the most fundamental problem. Again, if the principle of classification is to be derived from the problem of the nature of the ethical norm as such, another favorite, indeed the most favorite mode of classifying ethical schools must be excluded: namely, that based upon differences in the theory of knowledge held by ethical theorists. Ethics as such already assumes that there *is* a norm which is called the ethical norm. Of course, every ethical theorist is profoundly interested in the epistemological question concerning the source of that norm,—but only as an epistemologist, and not as an ethical theorist. What fundamentally interests an epistemologist about the ethical norm is the noetic source of it; but what fundamentally interests the ethical theorist is, granted that one has it,—and one does have it, or one would not have a science of ethics,—what is its nature? Ethical schools as such should not be classified according to a principle of division used in classifying epistemological schools as such; any more than schools of economic theory should be classified according to the epistemology of their authors. Ethics, as does any science, assumes that one can know. Again, this is not to say that such a classification would not be fundamentally valuable; but it would not proceed upon the question

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concerning the nature of the ethical norm as such, although, of course, it would throw valuable light upon it. I cheerfully admit the contention of the author of a brief pamphlet on the subject (Professor A. O. Lovejoy), that the epistemological question is logically prior and more fundamental than the definition of the ethical criterion. The epistemological question is, indeed, prior to any rational inquiry whatsoever; but I insist that while the epistemological question is logically prior to the ethical question, it is not the ethical question itself. And I insist further upon agreeing with this writer, that it is not necessarily the case that a difference in method of verification, will result in a difference in the statement of the moral standard. I therefore reject, as not ethically fundamental, the division of schools into empirical, rational, and the like. I should thus reject in whole or part the classifications of Wundt, G. E. Moore, Martineau, Ladd, and Sidgwick; and that of Sorley and Sidgwick in Baldwin's Dictionary;—although my rejection of some of these classifications is qualified by the fact that their authors themselves do not consider them absolutely fundamental.

I think it could be shown that the ethical norm reduces itself in the last resort to the form of an end which all acts accounted as moral, in the sense of right, seek to attain. This would be readily granted, I conceive, by all those who, as Dewey and Tufts, for instance, regard the distinctively moral situation as arising only where there is a conflict of ends. But the ethical ought itself surely implies something that is not yet in contrast to that which is; and if that which is not yet, but should be, is the norm, it surely appears as an end to be achieved. In other words, the ought and the time-process and teleology are inseparable. Now I am perfectly well aware that there are ethical schools which pronounce single acts, motives, and what not as valuable in and for themselves without reference to a goal,—that is, there are theories which claim to be ateleological

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in some sense or other. But never in the absolute sense which makes it possible to say of two ethical systems that their fundamental difference is that one holds that the norm is an end and the other not. For after all, in the case of an act which is regarded as an act which in and for itself ought to be performed, it is the act itself which is the end,—an end which is not yet achieved, or all men would be moral and the ethical ought would disappear. Or, if this is not convincing, I should be ready to maintain that, in the case of an intuitionist who eschews ends and insists that one should do right for its own sake, an end is none the less present as a norm: namely, in the form of the sort of an ideal self that does do right for its own sake.

The real distinction between ateleological and teleological schools is not that one deals with ends and the other not; but that, with reference, say, to a particular action, the end is one to be mediately or immediately attained. The moral consciousness is in its very nature, as an ought-consciousness, teleological. And, in the sense in which I develop this, I am confident that any ateleologist, so-called, will concur, without abdicating in one whit the real distinction which there certainly is between schools that have unfortunately been set over against each other as teleological and ateleological.

Further, I think it could be shown without great difficulty that the end or norm of ethics is always some form of a self: an ideal self contrasted with the self that is and the source of all oughts mandatory upon the self that is. I think it does no violence whatever to any ethical system of history to interpret its norm as a form of an ideal self; in fact, I think that it can be interpreted fundamentally in no other way. Whether this is so will appear in a measure with the success or failure of my attempt to classify historic systems in the light of this interpretation. The goal of the hedonist is not merely abstract happiness, but a happy self. The ideal of the altruist is not that abstract thing called altruism, but

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a self that acts and thinks altruistically. And, once more, the ideal of an ateleologist who advocates right for right's sake is not righteousness in the abstract, but the sort of a self that acts that way. This is no new thing in ethics, of course, although its application to the present problem has not been duly emphasized. The absurdity of abstracting the actions of an agent from the agent himself and of making them the restricted object of moral regard is gradually being relegated to the psychological rubbish heap where lie the equally absurd abstractions of faculty psychology. That a correct analysis reveals all ethical theories to be fundamentally what might be called 'self-realization' theories is maintained by such text-books as those of Muirhead and Seth. It is strikingly maintained by Bradley in his "Ethical Studies," where the author rightly insists that "in desire what we want, so far as we want it, is ourselves in some form, or is some state of ourselves;" and "our wanting anything else would be psychologically inexplicable" (Essay II). Truly, our science deals not with some ghostly and elusive abstraction called ethics, but with the ethical person. Ethics is not primarily the doctrine of human conduct; but, in the words of Martineau, "the doctrine of human character." Men may differ as they please as to what is the end or criterion of action, but they have one generic agreement,—that end, whatever else it is, is some form of the self.

Thus far the argument leads us to the following conclusions. The fundamental principle of the classification of theories within any science must take its genesis from the fundamentally different solutions of the fundamental problem which makes that science a science. The fundamental problem of ethics, the problem which makes ethics ethics, is the ethical norm. That which is problematical about the norm is not whether there is a norm: that is assumed whenever you assume a science called ethics,—or, eliminate the ethical norm and you eliminate ethics. The fundamental problem about the norm is:

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Assuming there is one, how shall it be defined? The ethical norm, whatever else it is, always appears as an end in the form of a kind of self to be realized. And now, to be quite precise, the fundamental problem of ethics is, *What sort of ideal self is to be regarded as the end, the norm, the criterion, of all moral judgments?* According to the logically possible solutions (not merely according to the historically actual solutions) of this question, should the classification of ethical theories proceed.

The character and number of the fundamentally possible views of the nature of the ideal self will of necessity depend upon what are the fundamentally distinguishable aspects of a self as such. For two men can have different views of the nature of the ideal self only as they differently evaluate and organize the different aspects which constitute an everyday total self. What the fundamental aspects of a self are we must ask the psychologist. Current psychology is fairly well agreed, in spite of differences in nomenclature, in naming as the fundamental aspects of conscious states the ideational, the affective, and the volitional. I do not insist upon these names; everybody knows in general what is meant by these aspects. Of course, we are all aware that these are abstracted aspects, that any concrete state of consciousness can exhibit no one of these aspects without the other two. We are no longer faculty psychologists. But in conceiving the ideal self which is to be the norm of ethics, one may evaluate one or the other of these aspects as primary, and by the primariness of an aspect I mean its evaluation as being of unquestioned worth in and for itself, either (a) in contradistinction to other aspects which are regarded of worth precisely in proportion to their contribution toward the realization of the aspect selected as primary; or (b) in contradiction to other aspects, which are regarded as worthless and to be subdued or annihilated. Thus there emerge three fundamentally different views of the ideal self,

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and thus a classification of ethical theories into three essentially different schools: I. Schools which conceive the ideal self in terms of the ideational aspect as primary. II. Schools which conceive the ideal self in terms of the affective aspect as primary. III. Schools which conceive the ideal self in terms of the volitional aspect as primary.

Schools of the first type are represented in history by those theories which emphasize the realization of the rational self and the subordination thereto of the regions of mere feeling and unrationalized desire. To give an instance or two of individual thinkers: Plato should be classed with this school, for though he insisted upon the perfect proportionality incident to the development of the total self, his constant emphasis was upon reason as primary, as clearly appears in *The Republic*. Aristotle undoubtedly belongs here, and, in a manner, based his ethics upon a conception of the human self as such, as I have suggested any theorist really does. I should say that Kant, in the main, belongs to this school, for reasons which I shall suggest in excluding him from what might be called the volitional school. Of course, it is not necessary to add that to affirm that Plato, Aristotle, and Kant belong to the same general class is not to deny that they belong to widely different subdivisions of that class.

Schools which emphasize the affective aspect of the self are conspicuously represented in history by the hedonistic schools. Reason and desire become the servants of the supreme goal, the attainment of the happy self. To this school obviously belong such theorists as Aristippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Hobbes, and Bentham; and Mill, in so far as he is a hedonist. In so far as he is not a consistent hedonist, he enrolls himself in the school of rational self-realization.

As for the schools of the third type, it easily might be objected that all ethical schools equally emphasize volition; that, indeed, this is inevitable, since ethics is precisely the doctrine about the criterion of human volitions.

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I reply, first of all, that ethics is primarily the doctrine of human character, and that the self has in its volitional aspect an aspect just as distinguishable from ideation and feeling as these two are from volition; and that this aspect may be regarded as primary, in the two senses of primariness defined, just as truly as the two other aspects, and just as truly may give rise to a genuinely distinct ethical school. For instance, all externalistic jural theories which regard the ideal self as conforming its will to a law even in spite of reason and feelings, and so involving their subjugation, belong to this type. The theocratic rigorism of the ancient Hebrew, subjugating all desire instigated by feeling or sanctioned by mere reason, is an instance. On the other hand, an autonomous rigorism, in so far as it pretends to be rational, really allies itself with the ideational type, although, of course, within a special subdivision of it. Kant, for instance, for all his emphasis upon the Good Will, does not belong to the volitional school, for his emphasis is upon the rational will as over against mere will as such and versus all desire instigated by mere feeling. On the other hand, to this volitional type would belong all those schools which emphasize the absolute value of single volitions as such; thus, many so-called ateleological and moral-sense theories epistemologically classed as intuitionism. Of course, intuitionism as such has no place in this classification; for at bottom intuitionism is an epistemological term and strictly belongs to an epistemological classification, which has its own place and value. In the classification I propose, so-called ateleological theories are not chaotically jumbled together under what is after all a misnomer, but are carefully separated according to a fundamental differentiation. It might, indeed, appear that there is room for a fourth general type not mentioned, namely, one which emphasizes no one aspect of the self over the other two, but insists upon their harmonious and equal development. It might be held that only under this head could

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the schools called perfectionistic or energistic be classified. But this is to labor under a misapprehension. As a matter of fact, most theories possess in some degree the conception of a harmonized self. Few types, even if emphasizing one aspect, intend wholly to eliminate the other aspects,—only, their conception of harmony requires the emphasis of one or the other of the aspects as primary. In other words, extreme types of theory exemplifying the second meaning of primariness as defined are extremely rare or non-existent for the simple reason that, while logically conceivable, they are psychologically impossible Thus, all ethical theorists are perfectionists, strictly speaking; this is so in the very nature of the norm as such, and of the ethical norm in particular as an ideal, perfect self. Those particular theorists who have appropriated the name perfectionism do for the most part emphasize one aspect of the self over the others, namely, the rational aspect, and thus they belong to the first group of schools. Of course, there is logically room for a fourth school which shall assert no aspect as primary, but shall insist upon the absolutely equal realization of all. But after all, this would mean a relating of aspects in an organic whole, and this would probably involve the emphasis upon one aspect or another in the cause of harmonious organization.

I have tried to give a hint as to how some historic systems would be classified according to the principle offered. But the actual systems of history are not all the systems that would appear in this classification. Every possible type of theory should appear as well. Of course, it would be futile to do more than remotely to suggest a few of these. Clearly, the realization of the ideational aspect as primary is not necessarily the realization of rationality; for this is only one aspect of ideation. There are ideational activities that are not primarily rational, and the realization of some one or all of these aspects might be considered fundamentally

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desirable, *e. g.*, the activity of the reproductive or of the constructive imagination. The ethical ideal of mankind might easily be an imaginative dramatist instead of a philosopher: a Shakespeare rather than an Aristotle.

The text-book classifications which, on the face of them, approach nearest to that which I suggest, are those of Seth, Mackenzie, and Muirhead. Mackenzie, for instance, divides theories into three types: first, types emphasizing Reason; second, types emphasizing Passion; third, types reconciling both in the total person. But the tendency of these theorists is to interpret 'emphasis' in too exclusive and dualistic a way, in only the second sense of primariness as I have defined it, and thus to do violence to the actual historic systems which are pigeon-holed under these emphases. Thus, failing to see that a system belonging to a type that emphasizes reason as primary may be a perfectionism, and not at all a dualism, they are led to put such schools under perfectionism as a separate type. As has been said, there may, indeed, be logical place for a fourth general type to be called perfectionism *par excellence*, although I much doubt it; but Plato and Aristotle surely do not belong there. In the second place, none of these theorists finds a place for what I have roughly called the volitional type of school; yet, on the basis of the psychological analysis adopted by them, apart from a consideration of history, they ought to recognize such a type. In the third place, these theorists seem guided by tradition and historical obtrusions in supposing that there is only one type of intellectionist school, namely, the rational. And, likewise, history alone is the cue for what schools shall receive recognition as affective,—and even this history is merely the circumscribed history of technical doctrine. Again, according to Mackenzie, the 'Reason' schools are primarily ateleological and the 'Passion' schools teleological; and he proceeds to treat of the historic schools on this time-honored but fundamentally incorrect basis. Nevertheless, the spirit of the classifi-

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cations of these writers, as well as of those of several others, *e. g.*, Murray, Fite, and Lecky, have a general affiliation with the principle put forward by the present writer.

I submit that the growing interest in the psychological basis of ethics represents a tendency toward the mode of regard I have been urging. The classification proposed is merely a tentative illustration of the sort of thing that ought to be done, and must stand or fall according to the truth or falsity of the logical principles from which it is derived and according to its rigorous consistency with those principles. Strangely neglected as this problem has been, its solution appears absolutely necessary to the clear exposition and secure progress of ethics as a science.

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SPENCER AS AN ETHICAL TEACHER.

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A PHILOSOPHICAL treatment of ethics, and especially one which, like Spencer's, rests on a purely naturalistic basis, starts with the postulate of the unity of knowledge. The widest truths of ethics, like those of other sciences, cannot fully be realized except by reference to other branches of philosophy. No modern writer has shown the interdependence more clearly than Spencer, whose ethical theories are inextricably entangled with other parts of his work. We find this characteristic strikingly illustrated at the outset by his definition of conduct as action intelligently adapted to ends. Simple as the definition may be, its peculiar interest is found in its relation to his conception of life, the essential aspect of which he briefly describes as the "continuous adjust-

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ment of internal relations to external relations." This conception, when the factor of intelligence is introduced, becomes practically identical with the adaptation of means to ends, and conduct becomes identical with all vital actions in so far as they imply purpose and intelligence.

The biological reference of Spencer's ethics also appears in his view of the basis of moral purpose. By him, morality is not regarded as something separate and distinct from other natural processes, but as a factor in the life of man, who is himself a part of the greater cosmic unity. As a living organism, man's first and supreme end is survival, of himself as an individual, of his family, of the society of which he forms a part. Where these motives clash, we find the thorny problems of ethics; but, before we consider these, we must note the fundamental truth that morality, being a faculty of man, is concerned with survival. In its primary aspect, good conduct is that which tends to survival, which points to life rather than to death, which helps to the fullest enjoyment of life, in ourselves and in others.

Such a treatment leads at once to the problem of hedonism, a problem which previous thinkers had treated on purely empirical lines. It is interesting to note the manner in which evolutionary philosophy, as represented by Spencer's work, confirms or modifies the conclusions that would be drawn from ordinary empirical reasoning. Spencer's contribution to the discussion consists of an emphatic decision in favor of hedonism, using the term in its widest possible significance. He points out that, in the light of evolution, pleasure is the indication nature gives us that our actions are beneficial, pain is nature's warning that something is wrong. Any species which, as a rule, found pleasure in actions leading to death rather than to life, would perish in competition with others better fitted to their environment.

It must, however, be noted that Spencer's interpretation of the term pleasure is wider than that of the opponents of hedonism, who often quote the well-known phrase:

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"It is better to be a man dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." Phrases of this kind show how the terms happiness and pleasure are often used as if they referred only to the lower sensual feelings. If by the pursuit of happiness we mean (which no hedonistic philosopher ever did mean) the search for the lower personal gratifications independent of the well-being of others, needless to say the hedonistic ideal is false; but, from the broadest standpoint, to assert that pleasure, happiness, well-being,—call it what you will,—is the rightful end of conduct, is to state what is almost a truism.

This general truth is subject to important exceptions, which are, indeed, so obvious that many thinkers have lost sight of the fact that they are exceptions. A species, which, for many eras, has existed under stationary conditions, will probably be so adapted to its environment that all pleasurable actions will be beneficial, and all painful actions harmful. But man, who, in a few generations compared with the eras that have preceded him, has advanced from a nomadic, hunting, solitary life to a complex and settled civilization, is not so constituted. With him it is not surprising that, in many ways, the modification of his desires has not kept pace with the needs of his changing conditions. The power of continuous and settled work, the consideration of the rights and feelings of others, the renunciation of temporary and doubtful gratifications for future and certain benefits, are all qualities not sufficiently developed in the average man.

Here arises the necessity for the sense of duty, which is specially concerned with the exceptions to the law on which hedonism is based. Concerning the necessity and the vital importance of the sense of duty, in our present stage of civilization, no doubt is possible. Nevertheless, we must note that this sense represents an exception to the general law of life, and its meaning is misunderstood if it is interpreted in any other way. When we say that it is often imperative to sacrifice immediate

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pleasure to future happiness, we express an undoubted fact of experience. If we assert that it is often praiseworthy for the individual to sacrifice himself for the benefit of others, whether those immediately surrounding him or society at large, we enunciate a truth, the practice of which is essential to human survival and to social stability. If we advance from this to infer that discomfort, privation, and suffering are in themselves praiseworthy, we confuse means with ends and cast discredit on the maxims of social well-being by associating them with great and dangerous falsehoods.

Spencer's interpretation of the meaning of the sense of duty, epitomized in the preceding paragraphs, suggests a further deduction from the same line of thought. Although there are occasions when duty impels us to do what is unpleasant both to ourselves and to others, we may infer that this necessity, in the history of the race, is but temporary. With further evolution, the breach between man's inclinations and the actions which duty impels him to perform will diminish. As civilization progresses, what is now duty will become happiness.[1]

The sound philosophical interpretation of ethics, which we have briefly outlined, is the basis upon which Spencer proceeds to treat more special problems in his own scientific way. His tripartite division of conduct as conducive to self-preservation, preservation of offspring, and of society, calls for no comment here. We can also pass by his interesting and logical division of the problems of ethics in relation to physics, biology, psychology, and sociology. Embedded in this scientific classification, there are to be found many interesting discussions. To mention two only, Spencer's treatment of the ethical value of sympathy and of the relation between egoism and altruism deserve careful study and attention. The greater part of his opinions on these matters, however, will probably be generally accepted, and so we will pro-

[1] "Data of Ethics," pp. 126-131.

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ceed to criticise those views in the advocacy of which he differed from his contemporaries, and from the great empiricists who preceded him.

Of these points of difference one of the most important is his own caste of utilitarianism. Though, in some respects, as utilitarian as Bentham, he repeatedly asserts that the aspect of causation did not, in the work of the other utilitarians, receive its due meed of attention. He considered that rules of right conduct should not only be obtained by induction, but by deduction from the nature of man and of the conditions under which he lives. The following extract illustrates his 'rational utilitarianism,' which is entirely distinct from the empirical utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill.

> The view for which I contend is that Morality properly so called,—the science of right conduct,—has for its object to determine how and why certain modes of conduct are detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things; and I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery ("Data of Ethics," p. 57).

The problem resolves itself into one that is practical rather than theoretical, and the critic will naturally ask himself how far it is practically possible, by deduction from the constitution of things, to obtain authoritative ethical principles. The *a priori* method is undoubtedly possible in theory, but it is doubtful to what extent it is allowable in practice. In Spencer's ethics, the method is used, so far as I am aware, in only one important instance. His formula of Justice, Spencer ruthlessly carried out to what appeared to be its logical conclusion. Very few, even of his warmest admirers, consider this application successful. The failure to make greater use of this method, and to convince others of the validity of his one application, will incline most critics to decide

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that, while the aspect of causation is a necessary addition to utilitarian theory, on the plane of practical life Mill's view is somewhat nearer the truth. The most philosophical attitude would appear to be, to recognize the theoretical possibility of the *a priori* method, but to criticise with great care any attempt to put it into practice.

The difference between various types of thinkers is one of degree rather than of kind. All will agree that a number of well established moral principles, such as those forbidding murder and theft, are binding even if their observance temporarily necessitates a balance of misery; but, even in this extreme instance, few would award severe condemnation to the starving man who steals bread. It may be possible to state moral injunctions in such a way as to allow for exceptional circumstances. Any philosopher who does this will bring the science one stage nearer Spencer's ideal. But, under present conditions, we are accustomed to say that the spirit rather than the letter should be observed, and in so doing we imply that the latter is not absolute. When we travel outside a few simple cases, the exceptions become more numerous and the validity of moral principles less absolute. This practical point of view Spencer fully recognized in his distinction between absolute and relative ethics, but he did not seem fully to realize how theoretical the distinction between rational and empirical utilitarianism would thereby become. His treatment has the credit of affiliating moral principles to evolutionary theory; but otherwise he has not greatly affected ethical thought.

Another problem, which bears some relation to the last, is that of the value of moral intuition, or conscience, as a guide to conduct. On this point Spencer's ethical work seems to speak with a somewhat uncertain voice, as the following quotations will show:

I also hold that just as the space intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of Geometry and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them; so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of Moral Science, and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by

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them. . . . The doctrine of innate powers of moral perception becomes congruous with the utilitarian doctrine when it is seen that preferences and aversions are rendered organic by inheritance of the effects of pleasurable and painful experience in progenitors (pp. 123-4).

Here is a powerful argument in favor of the authority of conscience. On the other hand, as no one points out more clearly than Spencer, the deliverances of conscience vary greatly with the individuals, and with time and space.

By the hypothesis (of the intuitionist) the wrongness of murder is known by an intuition which the human mind was originally constituted to yield. . . . But if you ask an adherent of this doctrine to contrast his intuition with that of a Fijian, who, considering murder an honorable action, is restless till he has distinguished himself by killing someone; no course is open save that of showing how conformity to the one conduces to well-being, while conformity to the other entails suffering, individual and general (p. 39).

On this question his final opinion is best expressed by the following passage: "The facts cited, chapter after chapter, unite in proving that the sentiments and ideas current in each society become adjusted to the kinds of activity predominating in it." ("Principles of Ethics," p. 471.)

But even here our ground is hardly bed-rock. The condition of societies is continually changing, and the consciences and sentiments of the individuals are also variable. The life of a society comprises but a small number of generations in the history of the race; so an inherited conscience, dependent on the constitution of society, can never attain to the reliability which accrues to our fundamental intuitions of space and time. The latter are formed, not only during the whole history of the human race, but, in their cruder forms, in the immeasurable vista of preceding ancestral organisms. Once again we seem to be thrown back on the empirical position. While the dictates of conscience have, from their very existence, a high degree of authority, and, as a rough and ready guide, should never be ignored; yet, when we remem-

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ber the number of factors such as inheritance, environment, education, which go to make up the complex known as conscience, we can hardly give to it absolute validity or pay to it superstitious reverence.

Once again, evolutionary philosophy holds out a hope for the future. As civilization becomes more settled and the nature of man better adapted to the conditions under which he lives, we may expect that human moral intuitions will become better and more trustworthy guides. Possibly the intuition of conscience is but the first step by which the feelings of man and the actions which the welfare of society demands, will ultimately be harmonized.

Another doctrine of Spencer's ethics, which has occasioned some controversy and misunderstanding in academic circles, is his exposition of the relation between what he calls absolute and relative ethics. The term absolute is somewhat ambiguous. In this connection it has no reference to metaphysical controversy, nor does it, as some critics very inaccurately inform us,[2] imply that it is now possible to say what the ultimate state of society may be, and what morality will be fitted for it. The meaning will be best understood if for absolute we substitute the simpler word ideal. To Spencer, ethics was not merely a theoretical study for academic students, but a means of determining what actions we should accomplish here and now. It must therefore be practical. At the same time, it is clear that many of our acts, the best that opportunity and circumstances allow, can only be defended because of the imperfect state of man and of society. We need some criterion more stable and more absolute. This criterion Spencer found in his postulate of hedonism. Adopting, as he does, the utilitarian standpoint, and basing his ethics on the assumption that happiness is the rightful end of conduct, a policy would be absolutely right, would satisfy the requirements of ab-

[2] See, for example, *Encyclopædia Brittanica*, Vol. 32, Article: Herbert Spencer.

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solute ethics, if, and only if, it conduced to the benefit of all and occasioned harm and injury to none. In short, to express the idea in plain common-sense language, if an act does harm to anyone, it is to that extent wrong.

Spencer's conception is open to some objections. The term absolute ethics is misleading. It is also possible to remark that actions which are pleasurable and beneficial to all concerned would spontaneously be performed and would require no ethical sanction. Ethics would thus be obsolescent. The paradox, however, is perhaps more apparent than real. Is it not possible to say that the object of ethics may be to produce a state of society in which it would no longer be required? Indeed, whatever the future may disclose, is it not probable that some such ideal may be accomplished?

In a world where man has unraveled some of the entanglements in which poor humans are involved, it may even be possible to act so that none would suffer pain. But ideals are diverse. The State and the individual may become related to each other in many ways. We may, like the ants, attain a condition where the individual is nothing and the community everything. We may find that social control will obsolesce and that untrammeled individuals will live their lives neither wronging their neighbors nor wishing to do so. Whatever may be the changes that the future will bring us, the confusion of the present day must ultimately cease. In one way or in another, the relation between man and man must be more settled, and the individual must become adapted to the conditions in which he lives. If he cannot adapt the environment to himself, he must adapt himself to his environment. When he does so, in whatever way this change takes place, the desires of mankind must ultimately identify themselves with what it is possible to accomplish. Private wishes and public good must, in the end, be more in harmony.

Unfortunately, in this imperfect world, it often happens that absolutely right conduct, in the Spencerian

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sense of the word, is not attainable by any conceivable line of action. Every possible alternative involves harm to some one somewhere. In such cases, the principles of relative ethics impel us to choose the course which, to the best of our judgment, will ultimately accomplish the maximum of benefit and the minimum of harm. In so choosing, we shall obtain most valuable assistance by noting, and so far as possible following, "those fundamental moral intuitions which have been and are developing in the race." There is nothing very striking or original in this view of conduct. Though it is improbable that any previous writer has handled the question precisely on these lines, the maxims will appear to most simply an organized common-sense view. Yet, as so explicitly stated, it has the advantage of acting as a check on those who, by setting up impossible and entirely impracticable standards of conduct, discredit ethical principles which can in practice be observed. An admission, or even an emphatic assertion, of the inapplicability of an ideal code of ethics to all the circumstances of human life is not only consistent with a very high standard of conduct, but the very first step toward showing in a practical way that ethical principles have an actual bearing on everyday life.

It is particularly noteworthy that Spencer, who is commonly accused of using the *a priori* method excessively, in this discussion concerning absolute and relative ethics, where his teaching touches practical life, is so commendably free from dogmatism and preconceived opinion. Here, as in other parts of his work, he admirably illustrates the truth that often the teachings of philosophy coincide with the dictates of an enlightened common sense.

The last of the special questions which arises from a study of Spencer's ethics is perhaps the most fundamental of all. It may shortly be stated as the problem of motive. As his system of ethics is founded on an evolutionary basis, the question naturally arises what, in such a system, is the meaning of 'ought.' Nature, they say,

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is non-moral. Survival of the fittest implies no survival of the most moral. Some might therefore be doubtful of the meaning and consistency of the evolutionist when he uses the ethical imperative.

On this matter, it is easy to point out that much of the current talk concerning the non-morality of nature is based on one or two patent fallacies. When the preacher discourses on the distinction between the natural and the spiritual man, we know fairly well what he means; but, in the philosophical sense, it is necessary to demur that the term nature includes both sides of our being. It is also a mistake to assume that only with mankind is co-operation and mutual help to be found. The animal world supplies countless instances of this kind, less highly developed than ours as are all their activities, but existent none the less. Those very attractive and striking phrases, "Nature red in tooth and claw," and "The ape and the tiger are with us yet," though they have a real and legitimate meaning, are liable to lead the unthinking astray. It is easy and obvious to point out that even so unsocial an animal as the tiger does not, as a rule, prey on its own kind, but on other species. If, for purposes of illustration, we may endow a sheep or a bullock with a knowledge of its own lot and destiny, we can well imagine that it would, from its own standpoint, make small distinction between the man and the tiger.

Like all other sides of our being, we shall find the roots of our moral sentiments in the animal world, and it is as little allowable for us to imagine that these are new or special to man, as it is to say that our wars and barbaric instincts are non-natural, because the animal world can supply no parallel to the organized and useless slaughter of thousands by their own kind, which we find in the battles of modern history. The motives for moral action, in a world such as ours, are patent and obvious. The evolutionist, when he uses the ethical imperative, means very much the same thing as others who use the same terms. All in varying degrees possess a moral

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sense. All in varying degrees desire the good opinion of those with whom they are thrown in contact. Which motive is most potent, is an individual problem concerning which it is impossible to formulate general rules.

Indeed, it is impossible to compare ethical and mystical motives. The two are incommensurable. Nor are they necessarily inconsistent. There can be little doubt that, to the mystic who believes himself to have received personal revelation of the Divine, the effect on life may be intense. But, unless we can place the ground of action on a more general foundation, we are without a criterion of right and wrong. The deliverances of the religiously inspired must still be tried at the bar of reason, and must be rejected unless they can in the end justify themselves at that tribunal. Otherwise we are open to the anarchy of a host of individual Brigham Youngs and Dowies. It is a necessary assumption of human life that reason, in the end, will not lead us astray. The problem of the validity of other sanctions it would not be relevant to discuss. Evolutionary philosophy, as such, is neither theistic nor antitheistic; but it is a function of such a philosophy to show that morality is a part of, and not apart from, the greater cosmic unity, the existence of which each may interpret in his own way. Meanwhile, the study of ethics points out and classifies reasons for that which the consensus of civilized mankind has universally termed the right. Whether or not the code is inspired or divinely given, we can by patient study find out, in the main, what is right here and now. To those who possess a highly developed moral sense this is sufficient. But ethics can do more than that. To those who have not that instinctive feeling, it can point out motives to which none can be indifferent. An entire absence of, or an abnormal deficiency in, moral sense is found with very few, and such cases present difficulties to moral teachers whatever the sanctions of their code; but, even here, ethics can offer the whole gamut of motives, from the terrors of the law for the worst cases of antisocial

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conduct to the good or bad opinion of those with whom the offender comes in contact,—an influence to which all are subject. Once again, it is not possible to make general rules. Those motives are best which are most operative. When the decision concerning what is right or wrong has been made in the light of reason, let each find his own reasons for doing the right and avoiding the wrong.[3]

It will be best to estimate Spencer's place as an ethical teacher apart from the very controversial doctrines of his social ethics. His warmest admirer cannot but admit that, considered as an ethical treatise, the work is not without faults both of commission and of omission. One of the most obvious omissions is the absence of the emotional factor. Spencer's cold rationality, which so enhances the value of his sociology, is a drawback in a work on ethics. The mass of mankind is more often swayed by emotion than by reason, and the best courses and most rational causes will seldom prevail against serious opposition if emotion and enthusiasm be not evoked. Not only is the emotional element almost entirely absent from his ethical treatise,—this is perhaps not very surprising in a philosophical work,—but Spencer makes no attempt to deal with the question how, and when, and to what extent, emotion and enthusiasm should be and can be enlisted in favor of those lines of action which, our reason assures us, are in accordance with our own best interests and with the welfare of the community. This omission is liable to give the very false impression that evolutionary ethics is, of necessity, unemotional.

Again, Spencer's own peculiar faults of manner and style are more accentuated here than in other parts of

[3] See also on this point "Principles of Ethics," Appendix C. It seems to me, however, that Spencer does not do himself justice in ignoring entirely the religious motive. In the concluding paragraphs of the *Unknowable* he states a principle which we may well imagine to be the explanation of his own life, and of his devotion to the ideas he did so much to advocate.

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his philosophy. This is possibly due to the fact that the greater part of the "Principles of Ethics" was written at the end of his days, in failing health and under other serious disadvantages. When every admission has been made, few of those competent to judge would be rash enough to deny that Spencer's ethics is a great and valuable work. If his ethical conclusions are not of such revolutionary importance as his additions to other branches of knowledge, this is not surprising. A new and fertile conception like Spencer's idea of universal evolution is not likely to revolutionize ethics,—a branch of human faculty which has for many centuries received so much attention from philosophers and from ordinary men, and in which so much has been worked out empirically,—to the same extent as it has affected the newer sciences of biology, psychology, and sociology.

Nevertheless, considered as a philosophical treatise on fundamental principles, rather than a popular and detailed work, which indeed it was not intended to be, there can be no doubt that it contains much that is both original and true. To mention one conception only, his view of the future evolution of the race ultimately harmonizing the feelings and emotions of the individual with the needs of the community is a contribution of great value. Again, his analysis of the roots of true conduct, as viewed under their various aspects, is a masterly piece of work, well worthy of a place in the philosophy.

Although, in the opinion of many, Spencer's additions to ethics will not rank so high as other parts of his philosophy, it would be difficult to find any modern thinker whose ethical work is more original, and more likely to be of permanent value, than that of our great evolutionary philosopher.

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RETRIBUTION AND DETERRENCE IN THE MORAL JUDGMENTS OF COMMON SENSE.

F. C. SHARP AND M. C. OTTO.

"YES, in despite of sophistry, and in the face of sentimentalism," writes Mr. Bradley,[1] "with well-nigh the whole body of our self-styled enlightenment against them, our people believe to this day that *punishment is inflicted for the sake of punishment.*" The paper entitled "A Study of the Popular Attitude Toward Retributive Punishment," in the preceding issue of this JOURNAL, presents results which, on a superficial reading may seem to confirm this assertion,—provided, of course, that "our people" are fairly represented by the members of the Short Course in Agriculture in the University of Wisconsin. Out of one hundred of these students seventy-six could be induced to demand suffering for suffering's sake as the just requital of wrongdoing in some one of the situations that were placed before them. When, through the assumption of the non-existence of a life after death, the ultimate impunity of the sinner was assured, the number rose to eighty-nine. Three more believed that vengeance belonged only to God, but they believed *vengeance* belonged to him. Of the small remaining number, all of whom professed to find in deterrence the *rationale* of punishment, we found that only two accepted the principle in its purity, and that the remainder would permit the individual to be sacrificed for the public good only when he had first aroused their moral indignation by wrongdoing.

But the above-quoted assertion is not the only statement that Mr. Bradley considers himself justified in making about the creed of common sense in the matter of punishment. "The great and ancient names," he says

[1] "Ethical Studies," p. 26. Italics as in the original.

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(*Ibid.*, page 28), "which in punishment saw nothing but a means to the good of the State or the individual, demand that we treat that view with respect. . . . But, whatever else it may be, it is at least *not* the opinion of the vulgar." As appears unequivocally from the entire passage, Mr. Bradley believes the second of his here-quoted statements follows directly from the first. The correctness of this inference may be worthy of investigation for several reasons.

As is obvious, the justification of deterrence as the object of punishment rests upon the principle that the less comprehensive system of interests may, if necessary, be forced by the State to give way to the more comprehensive, even when this will require the infliction of actual suffering or loss against the will of the sufferer. In other words, it involves the denial of the unconditional validity of the maxim formulated by Kant, and lying at the foundation of the doctrine of natural rights: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only." The attitude of our students in this matter may be tested by an examination of Question IV of the preceding paper, which, in somewhat abridged form, was as follows:

IV. Long ago, when Green Bay was a frontier settlement, an Indian chief, accompanied by a formidable band of warriors, one day suddenly made his appearance before the stockade and demanded the surrender of a certain one of its citizens. This citizen the chief believed had killed a member of his tribe, and he was accordingly determined to punish him. The whites, however, were able to offer the best of evidence that their fellow-citizen could not possibly be guilty of the crime with which he was charged. The chief, however, believed they were all lying, and threatened to attack the town and kill every soul in it if they did not comply with his demand inside of twenty-four hours. The chances were good that they could hold out against the enemy till help came, but, of course, in the event of an attack, a large loss of life was inevitable. The man in question was unwilling to surrender himself. What ought they to do?

The question as thus stated, however, did not, as may be remembered, bring to light all those who accept the

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primacy of the greater good. For some of them saw the alternatives, presented to each man who is called upon to decide, to be merely his own safety *versus* that of his fellow-citizen. This view of the situation is, of course, too narrow. In order, therefore, to get the real problem fairly before the students, the fate of the citizen was, in a second formulation of the question, placed in the hands of a governor with absolute power to act, and he was represented as, like the normal captain of a sinking ship, ignoring absolutely his own personal interests and deciding solely in accordance with what he believed to be his duty. It is the answers to this form of the question that are alone significant for our purpose, and that will alone be referred to hereafter.

But quite apart from the misunderstanding just described, there are a number of other fallacies that may be committed in the attempt to answer this question, and these it seemed impossible to eliminate by any reformulation. Accordingly, the attempt to get before the students the real issue,—the claims of the greater good as against those of the less,—was continued by presenting for consideration an entirely new question. This was in some respects not so satisfactory as the preceding one, chiefly because the rival values are not so easily compared; nevertheless it unquestionably rescues us from the special difficulties of IV. And there is independent evidence that the number of those who slip through the meshes of both questions must, at the highest estimate, be very small.

The new question was based upon a portion of "Les Miserables." The material thus supplied was, however, handled with some freedom in order to meet the purpose for which it was used.

V. Jean Valjean was an honest and industrious young workman, brought to absolute penury, during a period of commercial depression, by inability to find employment. Under these circumstances he stole some loaves of bread from a baker's shop in order to save from starvation the children of his widowed sister, dependent upon him. In accordance with the harsh

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customs of the times, he was sentenced for this act to five years in the galleys. Before the expiration of his term he escaped, but was captured, whereupon the original sentence was lengthened. This happened several times with precisely the same results, till finally, after an imprisonment of twelve years, he made a successful escape and found refuge in a small city in an obscure, poverty-stricken corner of France. Here in a few years, by means of a fortunate invention, he built up a great manufacturing business which gave employment to hundreds of workmen and thereby brought comfort and prosperity where hitherto there had been nothing but a struggle with want. This business he managed primarily in the interest of his workingmen. He went as far as possible in the introduction of the shorter working hours that are universal to-day; he paid liberal wages; he, almost alone in France, had a factory that was comfortable, hygienic and sufficiently well-lighted to prevent the blindness that not infrequently followed years of straining to see the work. These innovations benefited not merely his employés. Other manufacturers who had prophesied his ruin as the result of such extravagances were just beginning to wonder whether, after all, he had not been making a profitable investment. In consequence, the continued existence of this factory as an object-lesson for a few more years might be expected to bring about a general reform of the factory system in that part of France. In recognition of his business success and of his services he was appointed by the king mayor of the city, and in this capacity he carried to still greater numbers the benefits of a philanthropic and wise spirit. After the lapse of eight years, a police official who had known him when he was in the galleys discovered an honest and inoffensive laborer in another part of France who bore a striking resemblance to the escaped convict. He procured the man's arrest, found corroborative evidence, and, as a result, the unfortunate wretch was condemned to the galleys for fifteen years. A few miles from the home of Jean Valjean there was living a man whom we shall call Monsieur A., who, though not particularly well acquainted with Jean, had known, for some time, his true history. He had, however, kept his knowledge to himself. He learned one day what had happened to the workman. He saw at once that the latter could be saved only by the apprehension of the real Jean. He realized equally well that the ex-convict was carrying on a work of almost incalculable value to the people he was serving, that there was no one to take his place, and that if he was removed the great enterprise would at once collapse, and all that it and its master had meant to that community would be as if it had never been. In view of these facts what was it the duty of Monsieur A. to do?

All respondents who are counted as deciding this question in favor of the workman consider that Monsieur A. was justified in withholding his knowledge about Jean Valjean from the police as long as the fate of an innocent man was not involved. Those who are counted as deciding in favor of the greater good hold

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he was justified in maintaining his silence when he learned of the mistake of the police, only because Jean Valjean's services to the world were greater than those of his unfortunate double could ever be. With these things definitely understood, there seems no room for misinterpreting the replies.

The results obtained from Questions IV and V are as follows: Seven of the young men could not be classified, either because V was not put to them for lack of time, or because their answers were, for one reason or another, ambiguous. Of the remaining ninety-three, forty-two come out either in IV or V in favor of the claims of the greater good. The figures for each problem are, for IV, twenty-eight; for V, fourteen who had decided against the interests of the many in IV. But this is far from being the entire story. To get the rest of it, however, we must turn back to Question I.[2] Of the remaining fifty-one respondents, twenty-five declare that whereas the murderer in I (*a*) should be freed under the circumstances, he must have been punished for the sake of the "example to others," had the crime taken place in the United States. This, as was pointed out in the latter part of the preceding paper, is the effect of the combined action of two ideals. For since these persons have, in IV and V, repudiated the principle upon which deterrence rests, we must suppose their approval of the punishment of the murderer in the United States

[2] This question, in its two forms, read, with the omission of a few unessentials, as follows: (*a*) About a hundred years ago a shipload of emigrants was wrecked upon an uninhabited island in the Pacific Ocean, where they lived for many years until finally a ship appeared and carried them to England. At that time there was in their prison a man who had just been sentenced to be hanged for murder. Is the community bound to hang the murderer before it breaks up, or is it at liberty to set him free? It being understood that in this case there are no grounds for fearing that, if freed, he would ever commit another similar crime. (*b*) The crime is as before. But in this instance the criminal feels no compunction or sorrow of any kind at the deed. What now removes the danger of the commission of a second similar crime is an accident or an attack of paralysis which will render him a helpless invalid for the rest of his days.

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is due to a fusion of the demand for retaliation with concern for the public safety. Furthermore, seven respondents, though in the end they demand the punishment of the murderer in I (*a*) on retributive grounds, began by demanding it for the sake of the example to others, maintaining this position till they were shown that, in this instance, no dangerous precedent was created by setting the condemned man free. Finally a few who had expressed their approbation of retribution in I (*a*), and who, as the sequel showed, approved of it equally in I (*b*), forgot, in proceeding to the second form of the question, the premise upon which everything rests (the break-up of the community), and demanded the punishment of the crippled murderer on grounds of social deterrence. These persons were four in number. Thus out of a total of ninety-three, seventy-eight,—or eighty-four per cent. of the whole,—have either accepted, in the presence of a concrete situation, the principle upon which the justification of punishment for reasons of deterrence rests, or have at least based a moral judgment concerning punishment wholly or in part upon that principle. Of the remaining fifteen, the majority in all probability feel in precisely the same way. We have not, indeed, been able to test them, because they demand retribution in I from the outset. But, as we have just seen, there is nothing in this fact incompatible with a friendly attitude toward punishment for deterrence. Hence, there is a strong presumption of the existence of such an attitude in a considerable number of the members of this group.

Viewing our results, then, in their entirety, we are justified in concluding that, however paradoxical it may seem in view of the attitude of many of their number toward retribution, all of our students, or all except a very small fraction, will approve of the punishment of wrongdoers on grounds of social deterrence. And that whereas there are many of our respondents in whom, though they themselves may not realize it, the willingness to sacrifice the

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one for the many is due to the fact that moral indignation against him has first been aroused, nevertheless there is a large number, amounting to almost fifty per cent. of the whole, who accept the fundamental principle involved in deterrent punishment in its purity and without reservation. It may be added that out of fifty-three students who in I (*a*) approved of freeing the murderer on the island and punishing a person who had committed the same crime under the same conditions in the United States, thirty-four themselves suggested deterrence as the proper basis of punishment in a perfectly unambiguous way, and without the slightest suggestion from us. These figures are very conservative, and the actual number is, in all probability, considerably larger.

The general results of our investigation show that the fundamental mistake of Mr. Bradley,—in which he is very far, indeed, from being alone,—lies in the assumption that any one consistently maintained standard forms the basis of the judgments of 'our people' in the matter of punishment, or, indeed, of anything else. Most of them will, indeed, demand retribution under one or another condition. But the majority demonstrably, and all probably, do not demand it until the deed, including the attitude of the doer toward the deed, reaches a certain degree of repulsiveness. This point will not be at precisely the same place in the scale for any two persons. Furthermore, their acceptance of retribution as a proper end of punishment does not interfere in the least,—regardless of whether it ought to or not,—with their acceptance of deterrence. In descriptive ethics, then,—and this principle is of the widest application,—the use of a standard by common sense cannot be denied, either because it is not applied consistently or,—what, of course, is the same thing,—because of the demonstrable existence in the same mind of some other standard or standards logically incompatible with it.

Retribution and deterrence are for the overwhelming majority of our students the only grounds that are

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capable of affording in themselves a sufficient justification for punishment. It would be of interest to describe the attitude displayed toward the other possible ends, represented by the reformative and the Hegelian theories of punishment, respectively. But the total number of those who accept at any point either the one or the other is less than ten per cent. of the whole, and they all accept also the principle of deterrence as equally valid and fundamental. In view, therefore, of the relative insignificance of the *rôle* they play, the account of their distribution and the conditions of their appearance must be excluded from our presentation in order to give place to other matters.

The picture that has been drawn obviously gives a very incomplete and therefore, almost necessarily, more or less misleading representation of the attitude toward punishment of the society about us as a whole. To put in the proper perspective would require a large number of special investigations. These it was impossible to undertake. One, however, dealing with the judgments of the more educated members of the community, seemed absolutely indispensable and was accordingly incorporated into the program. As representatives of this class one hundred members of the College of Letters and Science in the University of Wisconsin were chosen for study, fifty men and fifty women. They belonged to the three higher classes, the Juniors forming a bare majority, the remainder being divided about equally between Sophomores and Seniors. All persons who had ever attended a class in ethics in either this or any other institution, or had discussed ethical problems with members of such classes, or knew anything about certain casuistry questions given out here in the past, were excluded from participation in the work.

After the long description of methods which has preceded, the most important of the results obtained can be exhibited by means of tables. As in the account of the investigation of the agricultural students, the figures

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under each question denote the number of persons who range themselves under the principle in question for the first time. Their presence in a given place, it must be understood, does not necessarily presuppose anything with regard to their attitude toward the questions that follow. Thus, many who approve of retribution in I repudiate it in II, and some who demand vengeance in II (*a*), where the victim is the avenger, reprobate it in II (*b*), where vengeance is exacted by the 'impartial spectator,' on the ground that it is none of his business. We simply enumerate under each question and sub-question the new recruits which it brings, without any reference to how long they maintain their allegiance. For purposes of comparison, the results obtained from the students in the Short Course in Agriculture are included in the table. For the same reasons all results are given in percentages.

TABLE I. APPROVAL OF RETRIBUTION.[3]

	I (*a*)	I (*b*)	II (*a*)	II (*b*)	II (*c*)	II (*d*)	Total
L. and S., Women.....	18	30	6	8	8	10	80
L. and S., Men.....	16	6	8	8	14	12	64
Agr.	36	24	11	3	13	3	90

The total number of those who approve of private revenge by the victim—II (*a*)—is: Women, eighteen per

[3] Question I will be found above, page 442. Question II in its various forms, with the omission of all unessentials, is as follows: (*a*) A young boy coming to New York from the country was befriended by a prosperous manufacturer, who took him into his business and his home, and, in the end, made him his partner. He thereupon took advantage of his position to cheat his benefactor out of all his property, and turned him out of both factory and home penniless. Suppose the benefactor had found himself able to ruin the business of the younger man in turn, would he have been morally justified in doing so? (*b*) We here suppose that the old man, soon after having been ruined in business, died. When the panic —presupposed in (*a*)—came on, the work of persuading the creditors of the younger man to unite and force him into bankruptcy was done by a third party, out of moral indignation. Would it have been right for him to do this? (*c*) Would it be right to ruin the young man if there were no punishment reserved for him in another life? (*d*) Can we think of God as punishing the sinner on retributive grounds?

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cent.; men, eighteen per cent. The corresponding figures for the agricultural students were thirty-seven per cent.

It should be pointed out that, for both groups, II (*d*) was so stated as to bring under it all not hitherto counted who would permit retribution,—at least for the crimes described,—on any terms whatever, whether by the State, the individual man, or by God, or who approved of it in principle, whatever they thought of the attempt to apply it to human affairs. For even where they were skeptical about the existence of God, II (*d*) could be put into some such form as the following:

> What I really want to know is whether you believe that where wrong has been done there should be visited upon the head of the sinner loss or suffering in return for the loss or suffering he has caused his victims, even though this may not be needed as a deterrent to other persons, and though the culprit may be so hardened that no punishment can effect his reformation or even awaken him for a moment to a sense of the wickedness of his deeds. Ought he, under such conditions, to be made to suffer as a matter of retribution for his misdeeds, provided there existed a being perfectly just, absolutely powerful, and omniscient to act as his judge and to execute the punishment?

With this as the final question of the series, it seems extremely doubtful that any advocate of retribution for the crimes described can have escaped undiscovered.

The total number of those who show any traces of the influence of the retributive ideal is to be found,—as was shown in the first paper (this JOURNAL, Vol. XX, p. 355),—by adding to the number of those who explicitly demand retribution in I or II the number of those who, while professing to approve of punishment for the murder in I (*a*) when it takes place in the United States on grounds of deterrence, reject the principle on which deterrence rests as incorporated in IV and V. This latter number is very small: one woman and three men. Thus there remain nine women and fifteen men whose judgments show no traces of the influence of the spirit of retribution, as against two in the Agricultural Course. It should be noted, however, that neither III (the murder

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of the physician by the feudist in the Kentucky mountains) nor the problem based upon seduction and desertion was given to the former group of students.

TABLE II. APPROVAL OF THE CHOICE OF THE GREATER GOOD.

	IV	V (*a*)	Total	V (*b*)	Grand Total
L. and S., Women.....	52	20	72	6	78
L. and S., Men.....	41.5	25	66.5	4	70.5
Agr.	30	15	45	—	—

The number of men in the College of Letters and Science who are represented in the above table is forty-eight, two having asserted that Monsieur A. was bound to denounce Jean Valjean to the police quite apart from any other consideration on the ground that, whether unjustly treated or not, he had no right to attempt to evade a legally imposed penalty. Accordingly their attitude toward the real problem could not be discovered. The women, not having been troubled by any such scruples, are represented in their full number.

As the table shows, a modification of V was introduced in the examination of the Letters and Science students, which, for several reasons, chiefly limitations of time, was omitted in the study of the members of the Agricultural Course. IV and V (*a*) deal with the conflicting claims of the greater and the less good, as such. But they do not accurately reflect the situation of a criminal who has been punished for exemplary reasons only. He is, indeed, a victim laid upon the altar of public safety. But, in any country which does not permit *ex post facto* legislation, he is laid there only because he has first chosen to run the risk of being laid there in order to obtain something which he desires to possess. In order, therefore, to make the position of the workman in Hugo's story parallel in all respects to such a criminal, except in the matter of guilt, V was reformulated, where necessary, for the university students, as follows:

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V. (*b*) Suppose the workman, just before his arrest, had been given a warning of the danger which threatened him; so that he was made to realize that his only complete safety lay in fleeing the country. But he chose to run the risk of which he had been warned rather than to leave his native town. Suppose, further, that Monsieur A. had known this fact. Ought this, in case he was otherwise inclined to decide in favor of the workman, to lead him to reverse his decision?

Five more persons came out in favor of the greater good when the question was put in this form. The majority, however, and possibly all of them had had either considerable or a great deal of difficulty in deciding V in its original form.

The total number of those who will permit punishment to be inflicted for the sake of its deterrent effects upon others, is to be obtained, as we have seen, by putting together data from various sources. First of all come those who in case of conflict between the greater and a less good, consider that the former has the prior claim. These, as the table we have just been examining shows, are (dropping percentages) thirty-six women and thirty-two (out of forty-eight) men. To these must be added those who appear in the table under V (*b*), numbering, respectively, three and two, giving us totals, for this test, of thirty-nine for the women and thirty-four for the men. The answers to I (*a*) (the case of the repentant murderer) reveal the existence of a number of others who belong to this group. They are: (1) Those who hold that the murderer upon the island should have been freed if his conviction was followed by the disbanding of the community, but that he should have been punished as "an example to others" if the crime had taken place in the United States; (2) those who, though in the end they decide that the murderer (on the island) ought to be punished in retribution for his crime, begin by asserting that he must be punished in order to deter the fellow-members of his community from the commission of similar deeds (cf. above pp. 442 f). These number five and four, respectively, for the women, and nine and zero for the men. For them, as has already been pointed out, the

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desire for retribution must come to the support of the claims put forward by the public good before they will consent to the sacrifice of the one for the many. There remain two women and five men. The question whether they would refuse to decide in accordance with the principle of social deterrence under all conceivable conditions was given careful attention, but we shall not here attempt to present the method of investigation employed. Suffice it to say that there does not seem to be one who would hold out against that principle to the very end.

Turning, finally, to the minor grounds for punishment, we find them even more poorly represented than among the agricultural students. One man and one woman are ready to demand punishment where reformation is the sole end in view. One woman takes the same attitude toward the considerations that have received the sanction of Hegel. All three regard the deterrence of others as affording, in itself, an equally legitimate ground of punishment.

The striking differences between the returns from the men and the women of the College of Letters and Science, and the still more striking differences between the men in this college and the students of agriculture, must have been noticed by every reader. These differences we shall not here attempt to explain. But it belongs to the descriptive side of the work with which this report concerns itself to show that the differences between the three groups brought to light in our tables are at once typical of the classes of persons from which the representatives examined were taken, and, furthermore, are not due to superficial causes which chance to be at work in this particular institution. The grounds for these statements we shall now endeavor to set forth.

In the first place, then, the individuals studied were fair representatives of the class from which they came. This fact appears from the following tables. They are, of course, arranged on the same plan as Tables I and II above. We begin with the Short Course in Agriculture.

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The two investigators each examined fifty students, comparing the results they obtained only after the entire work of investigation had been completed. The outcome was as follows:

TABLE III. STUDENTS IN AGRICULTURE; APPROVAL OF RETRIBUTION.

	I (*a*)	I (*b*)	Total for I	II (*a*)	II (*b*)	II (*c*)	II (*d*)	Total for II	III	Grand Total
Mr. Otto	16	14	30	8	2	2	2	14	1	45
Mr. Sharp	20	10	30	3	1	11	1	16	1	47

TABLE IV. STUDENTS IN AGRICULTURE; APPROVAL OF THE CHOICE OF THE GREATER GOOD.

	IV	V (*a*)	Total
Mr. Otto	13	8	21
Mr. Sharp	15	6	21

While the first of these tables shows very considerable differences between the returns from the sub-questions in the two halves of the group examined, yet the totals for the fundamental questions exhibit throughout an extraordinary uniformity. And when these groups of fifty were again divided into two parts arranged alphabetically, these same totals, again, did not vary in a marked degree. We therefore seem justified in concluding that the results we have obtained are valid for Short Course students as such, and that they accordingly throw real light upon the judgments of the class in the community from which these young men come.

In the College of Letters and Science, although the groups are only half the size of the agricultural group, they also seem to be large enough to be representative. Thus, if these students are arranged according to the order of the time in which they were interviewed, the returns from each twenty-five are as follows:

TABLE V. MEN IN LETTERS AND SCIENCE; APPROVAL OF RETRIBUTION.

	I (*a*)	I (*b*)	Total for I	II (*a*)	II (*b*)	II (*c*)	II (*d*)	Total for II	Grand Total
First Half	3	2	5	1	4	3	3	11	16
Second Half ...	5	1	6	3	0	4	3	10	16

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TABLE VI. MEN IN LETTERS AND SCIENCE; APPROVAL OF THE CHOICE OF THE GREATER GOOD.

	IV	V (*a*)	V (*b*)	Total
First Half	12	5	0	17
Second Half	8	7	2	17

TABLE VII. WOMEN IN LETTERS AND SCIENCE; APPROVAL OF RETRIBUTION.

	I (*a*)	I (*b*)	Total for I	II (*a*)	II (*b*)	II (*c*)	II (*d*)	Total for II	Grand Total
First Half	5	7	12	1	1	1	2	5	17
Second Half	4	8	12	2	3	3	3	11	23

TABLE VIII. WOMEN IN LETTERS AND SCIENCE; APPROVAL OF THE CHOICE OF THE GREATER GOOD.

	IV	V (*a*)	V (*b*)	Total
First Half	15	5	1	21
Second Half	11	5	2	18

It remains now only to show that the answers of the students in Letters and Science have not been affected appreciably by the more or less accidental fact that the teachers in this college who deal with theories of punishment, without exception reject the retributive theory and treat the deterrent theory as affording the fundamental and sole sufficient justification for the punishment of the criminal. This seems easy to do. A careful examination revealed the fact that there were but four persons,—two men and two women,—who had up to the time of their interview ever been in a class in which the *rationale* of punishment had been discussed. This number is so insignificant that it might seem unnecessary to carry the subject further. But in view of the exaggerated notions that prevail with regard to the influence upon moral ideals which can be exerted by the *ipse dixit* of a teacher, a brief analysis of this case may be worth making. The material which was presented to the class contained no reasoned argument for or against one position or the other, but in effect amounted to this: Retribution is barbarous, and the protection of society the only scientific ground for inflicting pain upon the wrongdoer. Furthermore, retribution is characteristic

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of the punitive ideals of primitive peoples, and deterrence of those of the most highly civilized ones. The treatment, in other words, took the form of an appeal to authority. Now this teacher is a man who enjoys a great deal of prestige among the students. He is an exceptionally effective lecturer, is a leader in his line of work, and, as they all know, possesses a national reputation. What effect has he produced upon these students? All four demand punishment for the sake of retribution in I (*b*), two of them demand it also in II (*a*), and a third in II (*b*). In the written answer to I (*a*) handed in by one of them, you may read: "Punishment for crime should not be retaliative, but to protect society. Therefore," etc., and this was repeated *verbatim* in the interview in answering I (*a*) again. When I (*b*) was thereupon given her, she fairly started, and, after a moment of perplexity, answered with decision, "Punish him." "I thought I didn't believe in punishment just for retribution," she added in explanation, "for I had been taught in Professor ——'s class it was wrong. But I am certain that this man ought to be punished, and I realize there is no other reason for it." She was given plenty of opportunity to recant, but refused to consider such a thing for a moment. She left the room having learned a lesson which many professional students of ethics and the allied sciences have still to learn, that in no human being are moral ideals mere putty in the hands of anyone else, however eloquent and however great his prestige; and also that there may be a great gulf fixed between what a person believes and what he believes he believes. In view of all these considerations we may conclude, I believe, that our students were fairly representative, not merely of our own institution, but also of the State universities west of the Alleghenies, and doubtless also of their alumni and of the class to which these alumni belong.

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THE MORAL MISSION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL.

CHARLES HUGHES JOHNSTON.

IN our scale of educational values, religious or moral training generally heads the list on paper and in theory. Even in practice, among those who appreciate and face the genuine problems, but who theorize only at close range, there exist consciously framed policies and plans for moralizing the nations through public educational measures. These latter rather than logic constitute the starting point for the present discussion. Fortunately for the purpose, we have some valuable data right at hand, the report of an international inquiry.[1] This is a report in two big volumes of nine hundred and ninety-two pages, containing in condensed form carefully prepared reports from ninety-four qualified contributors, most of them scholars of international experience and repute. At the Congress in London there were fourteen hundred in attendance; eighteen nations were represented; voices from thirty-four universities and one hundred educational organizations were heard; the sexes were about equally divided; and the tone of the conference is said to have been marked by a deeper purpose and a note of greater earnestness than that of any other of the eleven international congresses held during the same year in that metropolis. An eloquent spirit prevailed, and public opinion seemed ripe for the assimilation of the messages. The most regrettable omission seems to have been America's failure to be well represented in the debate and in the permanent record of the inquiry. The reasons for this will appear later. As one would expect, there is great difference of national and also of sectional conviction both as to how best to conceive the problem

[1] "Moral Instruction and Training in Schools." Edited by M. E. Sadler; reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, No. 2.

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and as to the best feasible methods for carrying out the issue involved. Most hopeful are the universally liberal disposition to learn from the experiences of others and the tendency to view the whole problem of morals and religion in education, as just now, throughout the world, in the experimental stage.

The main problems may be formulated as follows: In how far can the school utilize its 'corporate life' to promote civic loyalty and virtue? To what extent and how may the school employ methods and materials for direct moral instruction? What is the feasible policy for educational agencies to adopt as to the relation between moral and religious education?

If we accept the findings of the reported inquiry, above referred to, certain imposing conclusions are forced upon us. National educational systems are, morally, in a stage of evolution and are consciously experimenting. The school's function is more than ever that of character-making, chiefly because our modern life presents more varied and unique moral tests for every individual. The weakening of tradition, parental authority and home influence, the enrichment of knowledge and the urgency of industrial conditions have led to the social disparagement of the religious type of experience and attitude. It has come to be an actual question now whether we school men can, *in loco parentis,* so idealize for boys and girls the conceptions of 'national duty' or 'social solidarity' that such ideals may take the place of God, or religion with its more mystic element. On this profoundly critical issue, France and Japan represent the affirmative extreme; while England, English colonies, and Germany cling in different ways to a more conservative tradition. All agree that our modern social ideals are great moral assets, and that these, even if they may not supplant, must increasingly supplement traditional religious values. Granting that the school, in addition to its imperative duty of coöperating with the home, must do its moral work more systematically, its more specific practical

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problem is a strictly pedagogical one. Shall moral and religious education be given separately, or together, or not at all, in our courses of study; or must we recognize them as identical, or not recognize the religious at all, but include all we aim to dispense in this connection under the caption 'moral education'? Existing national methods answer our queries variously. England is inclined to view morals and religion as, in some essential respects, interdependent, and thinks that public educational framework should provide for schools in close relation to existing religious bodies. France would appear to disregard the social right of the church to participate in the public moral education of school children. Japan would identify or fuse the alternatives of moral or religous instruction in an interesting way to be pointed out later.

Beyond this, all agree that the purely (?) religious problem, the choice of a unit basis for individual and civic ideals, must be taken from local clues and racial traits. French social duty will be built upon prevailing French social ideals, and Irish character must evolve from educational recognition of the capacities of the Irish temperament. All grant that the most potent moral factor is the personality of the teacher; that the school can use more effectively for practice in morals the corporate life of its members; that biblical literature can be better utilized for its cultural and indirect, but inevitable, moral value; that religious exercises should never be required; and that the present subjects in the curriculum could furnish more intrinsic moral values than are at present realized. The preponderating majority, despite American practice, approve of specific direct moral instruction, which shall include such topics as personal hygiene, thrift, temperance, patriotism, civic duties, and social responsibilities. Some, our own John Dewey for example, incline to the conviction that moral training does not best come through the traditional methods of instruction; in short, that there is no place in the cur-

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riculum for direct moral instruction. G. S. Hall and others, however, would agree with the French and Japanese policies of placing the subject of morals in a definite, authoritative, and prominent place in the curriculum. M. E. Sadler goes even further, feeling that there are certain unassailable results that come also from purely religious instruction and ceremonies, and that some graded syllabus worked out by carefully chosen committees, subject to revision when necessary, is desirable. Lastly, everywhere also the note is strongly sounded that the teachers must be specifically and professionally equipped, so that they will realize, and be able to respond to, the urgency of this international call for moral training.

The conclusions of this important international inquiry demand that we postpone any theories as to their justice or sanity, until we have reviewed some of the data upon which the brief statements above recorded are based. To do this fairly, we should note, first, that which seems distinctive in each national method of solving the common problem. Beginning with England, we find in the public, grammar, county, municipal, private, and denominational schools, in varying degrees, emphasis laid on the conscious manipulation of the corporate life organizations of scholars, and on official moral and religious teaching. In her public schools, where most is made of corporate activity, there are good points, but also glaring deficiencies. Arnolds to run the famous Rugby system are not always to be found. The English plan seems to work best only for the born leaders. The interests developed are, after all, narrow and isolated, with no flavor of local patriotism and little connection with home; the studies are unsocial in function; and the amusements, rivalry, and consequent notoriety are unwholesome. These famous schools are, further, not in the current of the nation's life, and are not taken in hand by the nation itself. As in the day schools, parents do not understand nor enter into the work of the scholars;

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and home connections at present seem but to let down the frail moral bars that are set up by school. Most of the thinkers prefer not to divorce moral and religious training, but to reinforce present methods in this combined direction. Many do not hesitate to record their faith in the efficacy of direct moral instruction, for the reason that children of the adolescent age are naturally eager to enter into the spirit of such discussions as physical and moral purity and questions of honor. They agree in the belief that the right kind of teacher can as easily lead a class in morals as one in history, literature, or art. It is for them mainly a question of the seriousness and artfulness of the teacher.

Catholics in England, as elsewhere, never divorce moral and religious education, giving about two hours a week to such work, in addition to the Three Days Retreat. Definite religious influence here is brought to bear, and moral purity is specifically aimed at. They justify with plausible psychological reasons their consciously employed method of creating for the young learner a religious, mystic atmosphere, a 'religious climate,' a feeling of reverence for the unseen, with suggestive ceremonies which incite awe and reverence. They are, therefore, on psychological grounds, opposed to non-theological, matter-of-fact moral instruction. Religious experience cannot flourish and grow on the formulas of ordinary school instruction. Purity, chastity, reverence, even school honor, must be, from our very imperfect natures, bolstered up by the impressive religious sanction. Moral facts and moral reasons, for the adolescent at least, cannot stand alone.

In England all seem to agree that girls more than boys need to cultivate corporate activity, need more than non-theological moral teaching, and should be supplied with more practical and less literary work at their pubescent period. Some advocate a combined course in housewifery and child study (parenthood), extending far beyond the customary first two months of infancy. All

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here desiderate more definite knowledge of the actual stages in the evolution of the moral consciousness. Until this is worked out more fully everywhere we must proceed tentatively and very cautiously.

On the whole, as to the percentage of successes, English public schools are failures. They are too much adapted to the gifted few. Smaller classes, a definite religious atmosphere, and thoroughgoing coeducation,—as a moral not an economic issue,—are three supposed essentials; as are, also, equipment in civic responsibilities and hygienic knowledge. Physical pride and industrial skill are genuine moral props also. As to the teachers, they at present are insufficiently grounded in social ethics; and the moral function of their profession must be somehow included in their required professional equipment.

The Sunday-school movement of England assumes vast proportions, with its six hundred and ninety thousand teachers and seven million scholars. It ought to affect the early droppings from the school, but it has no standards for its materials, its methods of teaching, its system, its discipline, or its teacher qualifications, and is really thus in danger of being an anti-moral agency. The Catholic Sunday schools seek more definitely to meet the deficiencies of the public schools, utilizing desirable day-school subjects and methods. It should here be noted that in Wales the adult Sunday schools include nearly one third (seven hundred and fifty-nine thousand) of the population, though here the moral function is overshadowed by the intellectual, suffering from indefinite ethical ideals. The socialist Sunday schools show the interesting experiment of introducing myths, biography, general selected literature, folk-song, dancing, history of religions, social reforms, and evolution theories, into the subjects to be taught. In a general way, for the rest of Great Britain educationally, there are reasons to believe that the Welsh are knitting to Welsh characteristics and are courting the sterner virtues be-

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sides; that Scotland is experimenting, though she is much more conservative theologically; and that Ireland suffers from a superimposed educational system not congenial to the genius of her national traditions and her unique temper.

Because of the fundamental and profound principle explicitly involved, the uniqueness of the situation, the novelty of its legal basis, and the extensive scale of its exploitation, the moral instruction policy of France is of tremendous significance and of absorbing interest. From 1833 to 1850, French laws associated religious and moral instruction. In 1882, moral and civic instruction replaced the other combination; religious instruction had to be given outside the school on a week day. The authorized moral instruction, embracing the clause 'duties to God' was at first liberally construed. In 1905, this clause disappears from the Teachers' Training Regulations. The revised statute has been in force in the secondary schools since 1902. Social solidarity is to be the reverenced ideal, instead of the God of theology. The State looks upon the moral mission of its public schools as august, but anti-ecclesiastical. Parents take kindly to the measure, and mainly the clergy oppose it. Here moral instruction replaces moral training, and the result is, in secondary schools, too much premature quibbling and sophistry, with little of the human relationship between teacher and student,—a characteristic of French pedagogy throughout. It is too early to pass final judgment upon this critical departure of the French schools. There is thus far a notable absence of the moral atmosphere. Pécaut, the great promoter of this plan, through his wonderful and permanent personal influence, showed what can be accomplished in this way. In the hands of his literal followers, however, it has resulted in methods which repress individuality, and which foster monotony and intellectualism of an unimaginative variety. The child, in this system, has for his moral visions no vista, no mystery, no resort to the infinite, be-

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yond his pat formula. Everything is made too clear, too obvious, too matter-of-fact. As in the art instruction, the wistfulness of childhood is not fed, the children are prematurely old and *blasé* in moral affairs, and the school has yet to find its soul. Steeg, Pécaut, Fouillée, and Buisson, the leaders of thought, are not understood.

The Catholics, of course, think the scheme inadequate, see no ethical motives in the public schools, and demand a religious sanction. There is, say they, no universal human appeal in conduct save the religious; and no other policy is, for psychological and social reasons even, democratic. The child cannot replace God with formulas however reasonable. Human society, public opinion, patriotic appeals shift too capriciously to call forth the reverential attitude. They bring about jingoism, precipitate resort to the panaceas of socialism, and deprive childhood of its right to the God idea. The moral consciousness is not derived from scientific knowledge of social conditions. An echo of the social conscience is not inward morality. Spencerian agnosticism is a poor constructive moral attitude. These opponents of the state system are not slow to point to the appalling juvenile criminality of the younger generations.

The masters in the *lycées* honestly differ in their own opinions on the issue, and the keenness of the political fight further obscures the deeper genuine educational problem involved. The home fails to coöperate intelligently; the forces of teachers in the ranks have not yet absorbed the deeper conceptions of Pécaut, Buisson, and others; the made-to-order manuals in use in the moral instruction classes are not yet the best possible; and the professional training for these teachers is in the experimental stage.

So also in the moral education of French girls, the lack of a religious atmosphere and of the stimulating guidance in corporate activity is in evidence. As the

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teachers are social workers, some social linkage is effected. The State's attempt to be wholly impartial has here again resulted in a failure to give due psychological and historical importance to the Jewish and Christian literatures. Again, as with boys' morals, there seems to be a presupposition that, even if one can rely on no religion, one can rely on a set philosophical or sociological basis for a moral system. Certainly it seems that the attempt is made too early to lay for the young a theoretical foundation for their morals. One can at least say with assurance that the French catechetical instruction in morals, of all subjects, is too verbal to touch the students. The very attempt at democratic liberty in morals,—a nice contrast, for the student of this problem, to England's conservatism,—would seem to have overstepped psychological limitations. Anti-religiousness, anti-ecclesiasticism, socialistic morals, emotionless worship, forced adolescent moralizing, youthful sophistry, seem in France at present to be queerly mixed. Legal decisions determine the temporary continuance of the policy, however, and the world must carefully watch the experiment, hoping that the big ideals of Pécaut and Buisson may be thoroughly tested.

Switzerland, with secondary education free to all, with healthy competition among its twenty-five free cantons, with the strong points of the German system and the absence of the German bureaucratic spirit, is a real educational laboratory. Co-education is approved, though there are too many men teachers for adolescent girls. The clergy offer some elective religious teaching in the secondary schools, while some cantons are experimenting with special moral instruction. Though the educational theory is good, Swiss practice serves still to suppress individuality, chiefly because the pedagogic methods and materials are poor. Unsectarian in principle, ready for moral instruction on a high unprejudiced plane, a lover of liberty, averse to federal encroachments

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and secular quarrels, in sympathetic relation with the home influences, and with ethical training for its teachers, Switzerland's outlook for moral possibilities in its school work would seem to be very promising.

Germans provide against any educational experiment, caprice, or chance. Theirs is a safe policy, but repressive of spontaneity. Catechetical teaching extends even to her normal schools, and Herbartian methods seem over-refined. Hamburg and Bremen are free, and are instituting far-reaching school reforms, pregnant with promise and bolstered up by great popular sympathy. Among other things, these movements strike at formal religious teaching, not at the religious tone of the whole curriculum. At present, in general, instruction rather than education prevails in the empire, especially in these moral matters. Intellectual thoroughness and the ever-at-hand patriotic appeal of the fatherland are great indirect moral factors surely; but, in the opinion of many, even perfection of these sanctions cannot suffice. The continuation schools, compulsory in thirty-four of the provinces, insist upon civic and ethical as well as upon utilitarian functions. The church is, however, so powerful officially, and the State so rigorous, that the desirable free experimentation, possible in the United States, is not possible there. Many critics of the system would like to see other school forces following the lead of Hamburg and Bremen, free from numerous rigorous, limiting regulations. The teaching ranks need professional equipment in ethics, a less stilted and more moralized curriculum, and perhaps reformed or at least freer methods of instruction. Beyond this, it is a question whether systematic moral instruction would not help to focus the humane work of the school; and, with the aid of a needed journal of moral education, bring about a school atmosphere conducive to the better utilization of the corporate school life and sport. With smaller classes as a further desideratum, Germany might learn something from England in this last named measure. German girls

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leave school too early, and the girls' schools are open to the criticisms above offered of boys' schools. There is still too large a proportion of men teachers on the staff of girls' high schools.

In short, Germany does not provide for good teaching of morals. The ministers and other teachers of religion are often second-rate, and have not professional training and pride. The situation in two other interesting respects is unique; Germany is not ripe for co-education, and she is said not to welcome an intimate relation between the school and the home, in this way limiting the broad social function of the former. On the whole, Germany carries us no further toward the solution of the problem of moral instruction than does France, but we have the examples, on a big scale, of two great nations, one refining ultra-conservative and dogmatic usages, the other trying out radical measures. Paulsen and other Germans prefer gradual theological emancipation in the German way to the French 'exaggeration,' thinking it safer for the school to follow rather than to lead civilization in this manner.

As one might expect, Japan has many unique and admirable features in her system of moral instruction. With highly centralized educational machinery, with her popular reverence for the continuity of the dynasty and for her ancestors, she builds upon a spiritual, almost religious, patriotic feeling toward the *Imperial Rescript* and the moral education therein implied. All religions and literatures are accommodated to this cardinal purpose. Her *KoKutai* constitute what for us would correspond to our Bible, our modern Christianity, and our constitution combined. Eternal and temporal affairs are thus merged into a personal duty to a spiritual cosmos, Japan's destiny. Pécaut of France dreamed of social solidarity molded with a reverent religious attitude into a people's everyday school worship. This is more specific, more official, and nearer actualization in Japan than in France. Loyalty can thus be assured. Secular and

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religious attitudes are not severed; moral and civic duties are one. Education is compulsory and moral; ninety-five per cent. attend school; private schools do not flourish for good reasons. The State by a high standard manages the problem of text-books; the Rescript from the highest source dignifies moral education, and constitutes the material from which authoritative competent commissions compile moral instruction texts; close coöperation with the family is definitely aimed at; and, in addition, the whole course of study is moralized. In secondary schools, boys devote one, girls two hours, per week, to moral instruction; the Government syllabus allows teachers freedom; impressive moral ceremonies are arranged for stated occasions; sex problems are adapted to sex; and principles of etiquette, in the broad sense, constitute a part of the instruction. The whole system is based explicitly on the conviction that education can moralize a nation. This conclusion Japan has come to through experiments. Once all her education was moral; then came a non-moral era; with the Rescript of 1890 moral instruction was put on a specific basis; and Japanese think that this plan makes patriotism, deepens social responsibilities, affects the spirit of legislation, aids the family, and makes morality as a spiritual attitude pervasive among the people.

Finally, in regard to the situation in our own country little can be said at present. Morality in a democracy is a coat of many colors. Statistics of the varying local conditions are not at hand. State regulations, conditions, traditions, legislation, and even moral vitality are diverse. An extended census should be taken of actual prevailing opinion, in order that some inventory of profitable measures in this direction of public school work could be welded into such form as to bolster up popular support of a more definite policy. One writer sums up our obstacles as follows: municipal misgovernment, religious narrowness, and monarchical school administration and teaching.

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This hurried world survey[2] emphasizes for us quite unequivocally the following common convictions, the sort of world policy toward which we are tending. An educational policy not permeated by the moral motive is likely to be vicious; co-education is essentially a moral issue; the home, the community, and the national tradition must be the basis upon which to build; moral aspects of education must be part of the professional equipment of all teachers; corporate activity and social traits of school children must be more specifically and can be more effectively directed; selective literature including biblical lore offers material for an elementary course in morals; the whole course of study should be considered as possessed of greater intrinsic moral possibilities; facts of sex and paidologic physiology must be squarely but delicately imparted by authorities, preferably by sex to sex; by more delicate administration the home and the school can better coöperate, particularly in this moralizing function; a more natural school life is a further desideratum; and, finally, the moral ideal must be on a plane above that of a political or purely economic issue. The deeper demands are these: that we discover with scientific assurance the actual stages in moral development and perception through which the growing child inevitably passes; and that we acquire, especially in the different States of our country, a knowledge of the status of professional educational opinion now existing and prevailing in regard to definite moral education. In addition, we have noted remarkable unanimity in the view that national, even human society, is itself still in the process of moral evolution, and that this common prag-

[2] Various other unique national aspects of the problem and methods for its solution might be shown if one could, even cursorily, suggest the prominent features in Wales, Scotland, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, in the different provinces of Canada and of Australia, and in the youngest New Zealand democracy. Some institutions in our country, notably the Ethical Culture School of New York, the Hyannis Normal School of Massachusetts, and others are likewise exploiting various methods of approach to the same problem.

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matic conviction of the evolution of the moral law must give the clue as to the moral measures the schools of any nation shall adopt. Thus, only by building upon the child's endowment, racial, social, and individual, of instincts and symbolic cravings for objective ideals, and by idealizing the State as *par excellence* a moral institution, though not an ecclesiastical one, may the school find its fuller social justification.

The French system seems to base its reliance upon some existing philosophy, the English upon some presupposed serviceable and reliable theological conception of God. The one is perhaps in the end as dogmatic as the other. Our problem is, which hypothesis or what other workable formula will really furnish the most powerful and universal moral appeal. Paulsen, from sociological as well as practical reasons, would not have Germany attempt to follow France. Höffding says that religions represent the best means for the conservation of the finest human values. If this is true, that there is a law of the conservation of values, some definite articulation of our schools with these developing religious bodies and doctrines and attitudes would seem a natural social demand. The French way would tend to rest in public opinion's intellectual appraisal of temporary values, to be, therefore, lacking in true evolutionary momentum and perspective, and to issue in a temporizing sort of worship. The more conservative policy of keeping in touch with existing religious agencies would seem to give the school steady security. In a democracy, at all events, school ideas and ideals cannot safely ignore prevailing religious belief. School morals and church religion must develop interdependently. Sanity, candor, fairness, and tact will establish, despite creeds, the needed coöperation.

If our facts, above recorded, are correct, we have a genuine pragmatic test of religious theoretical opinion. The various national attitudes have resulted in actual school policies. We inherit the status just as it is. What

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to make out of it, is the practical problem. The smaller countries, with their specific unique developments, offer us surprising lessons. Their old historical and literary traditions are moral to the core; Denmark, Norway, and Japan can more easily make patriotism definitely moral and even religious than can we of a traditionally disunited and heterogeneously populated country.

Again, there is perhaps too much talk of the moral value of the course of study, in the superficial sense that this is an element to be added as an accretion to the primary purpose of the subject of study in question. If a subject has religious or moral value, it has it intrinsically, and genuine teaching will bring it out. The real question for the school is the practical one of whether we can hasten wisely the process of moralizing the scholars by a more differentiated curriculum, adding specific moral instruction. Ideally, the course of study should do everything for the child. In our actual situation, however, we have too few effective moral influences. Are we liable to bungle matters and deaden, rather than enliven, the moral sense by directly and officially recognizing and establishing a course in morals for our public schools? It is absurd again to say this cannot be done. It has been done in thousands of good homes; there are conspicuous examples of its success in public schools. Non-theological moral instruction should be adapted, of course, to social needs. It is a question simply of the degree of seriousness, judiciousness, and liberality of the ranks of teachers and of educational leaders. As with art in our curricula, it may well be that we as a nation are not yet sufficiently eager for social moral insight to create a telling demand for teachers who can convey moral truths delicately and yet directly. Intellectualism, the easiest deduction from Herbartian philosophy, with us as with Germany, and Spencer's salvation through scientific fact alone, powerful with us as with France, have effectually, for too long, obscured some of the finer aspects of the educative process. The so-called inci-

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dental culture of moral insight as of art appreciation is, in certain stages of development, a poor, spineless policy.

Again, college students, prospective and actual teachers in the public schools, confuse a religious attitude with a philosophy of religion. Such teachers are in the air themselves. They should be helped to sanity in this matter. Through their professional study in educational departments, through the regular courses, and, when feasible, through courses especially designed for treating the specific subject of juvenile morality, through the corporate life of the school, and through definitely planned personal contacts, they would quickly make moral insight the supreme end and the pervading tone of all public school work.

We are now striving to consider our relation to this actual social world of ours, as honestly and with as much faith and spirit, as we have learned to look upon inanimate nature. Before we, refining the spirit of Rousseau, learned to love nature as she is, to love her stupidity, her unresponsiveness, her massiveness, her mysterious air, her hidden and never more than half revealed meaning,—until this time we placed our educational hopes in mysterious processes, in forced faiths. Naturalism was a great step toward actuality under everyday guise. It meant that educators might use some of the resources of everyday environment. It meant, not that lifeless objects took the place of a living God, as the unimaginative and pessimistic would have it, but that we needed the nature symbol for an ever-present, ever-needed instrumentality to satisfy, even by a figure, some deep inner human craving. This is the truth at the bottom of all science of nature, and all school education founded on it. Now, despite Spencer's attempted sidetrack, science teaching alone is better than former religious teaching alone, simply because it is a better utilization of environment. But there is another possible step in advance. Nature is, even in the big sense above, not all

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of environment; the human element must be added. Environment in school now includes the social element also. Wordsworth did partly 'speak arrant nonsense,' as did Rousseau, as to the possibilities of vernal woods. The child must be inducted, as well, into social life by some sort of reproduced social activity. This is democracy. This is the public school's mission, morally, æsthetically, religiously. An understanding of modern complex social and industrial environment, with hygienic insight, idealized, will surely largely constitute our moral equipment. Higher sanctions than these, our faith in the conservation and even evolution of life's deeper values, will in due course be revealed in this vast social process whose central moving force should be the people's schools.

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RELIGION: A LUXURY OR A DUTY?

NORMAN WILDE.

TO ask whether religion is a luxury or a duty, is to ask whether it is one of those desirable comforts which may be, indeed, a help to right living though not of its essence, or whether it is so identified with the fundamentals of life that to lack it is to be incompletely human. To-day there seem unmistakable tendencies toward the defense of religion as one of the luxuries of life, as the most significant of all poetic ideas and practices, as that which adds the touch of beauty to a world otherwise hard and barren. Its æsthetic value is urged as its justification, instead of its theoretical truth. To lose it would be to lose the charm of life. The irreligious man is not a moral pervert, but an æsthetic defective whose lack is to be deplored but not condemned. Or it may be its personal pleasure to which attention is di-

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rected. Religion is, and has ever been, the great consoling agency in life. Death, disease, defect, misery of all kinds, are in religious hope removed. Visions of a future perfect life, in which earth's incompleteness is made good, form the greatest consolation life has ever known. And it is in the darkest times in human history that religious revivals have taken place as the reactions of the human spirit against its present misery. Take this hope from man and life becomes unbearable. Religion is beautiful, religion is a comfort, religion is the greatest luxury of life, say some of its present-day defenders.

And so, too, say some of its detractors. Religion is a consolation for life's defects, but just herein lies its danger. Luxury is enervating, luxury blinds to the evils of life, luxury dazzles the eyes of him who enjoys it, luxury is selfish. The vision of the New Jerusalem has too often tended to withdraw attention from the ills of the present life. Man is only too ready to feel that what another life is to make perfect can be neglected here. What we need is not luxurious consolation or cultured pleasure, but a vivid consciousness of the real evils of life and a stimulus to their removal. If the belief that God is in the heaven has only an æsthetic or personal basis, and if it carries as its consequent the belief that all is well with the world, let us in the interests of moral progress reject so enervating a faith. Let us substitute the duty of work for the luxury of religion.

The discussion of the problem carries us at once to the heart of religion and its relation to morality. In the variety of the types of religion may lie the explanation of its apparently varied functions. For convenience let us divide religions according to the concept of God involved in them, and then consider briefly their respective ethical significance. For our purpose the concept of God may be considered with reference to its relation to reality, and we have: I. God as real (1) the absolute whole, (2) an individual part; II. God as ideal. Ac-

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cordingly we may have three main types of religion, which may perhaps be described as I. Pantheistic Realism, II. Theistic Realism, III. Theistic Idealism.

I. The essential characteristic of the type described as Pantheistic Realism is that the object of worship is identified with the real whole. This monistic view may take various forms and God may be thought as nature, mind, spirit, thought, reason, energy, law, but in all he is the all-determiner, the absolute. Individuals do not stand in any external relation to this whole, but are its manifestations or moments, its relatively unreal constituents. As the absolute, God is eternally complete and perfect, and the apparent defects and struggles of time find in him no real place. Could we but know it, there are no unrealized possibilities in life. To see the world as such a perfect whole is religion. It is to rise above the finite partial view of things with its accompanying struggle and unrest into the peace of this vision of a perfect timeless world. Such blessedness is religion.

How shall we characterize a religion such as this, as a luxury or as a duty? Spinoza called such blessedness as this *virtue*, rather than religion, and knew no separation of the two. This intellectual love of God was man's highest and perfect good. But yet the term duty sounds strange in Spinoza's system as in all monistic realisms. If, from one point of view, religion is the sum of duties, from another and truer point of view it is the substitute for duties. To possess this religion is to have risen to a plane in which duty is unmeaning, and from which the struggles and virtues of the practical life are unreal illusions of finiteness. All is divinely perfect for him who has the gift of philosophic insight. There is no unrealized good for which to struggle, for God alone and simply *is*. Religion such as this cannot be denied to be a good, and to be significant for life as a whole. It is by no means an indifferent element to be added or subtracted at pleasure. It is an all-determining way of life, morality itself. Real success, real living, real blessed-

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ness is found only in this contemplative life, this vision of God or Nature. The object of religion and the principle of morality are the same. And yet, Spinoza's blessed life, like even Aristotle's contemplative life, is a luxury for the philosophic aristocrat, and even for him a luxury which is consistently impossible. It is a dualistic view of life with one term of the dualism ignored. The religious life is not built upon the basis of daily life, nor is its virtue consistent with the round of daily duties. Its perfection is based upon exclusion of inconsistent elements. To live we must recognize good and evil; to live blessedly we must rise above good and evil. To carry on the world's work we must descend into its markets and manufactories and public meetings, to attain the blessed insight we must retire to the seclusion of the study. The very condition of life is to ignore the knowledge of its own deepest moments. What is this but to possess a religion which we must taste but sparingly, a luxury for the wise rather than a duty for the many? Consistently carried out, Pantheistic Realism is life's negation, partially carried out, it leaves us with a dual morality and a religion for the few.

The conclusion would not be different were one to take other statements of the same type. The religion of absolute law, or energy, the modern scientific view of the world elevated into a religion and its object christened God, leaves the same dualism between the practical demands of right living and the scientific concept of necessary law. Consistently to objectify and worship a mechanical natural order is to nullify the moral life and cherish the luxury of a religion possible and valuable only from a most limited point of view. Nor is it different if we attempt to distinguish God from the world by making him its creator, and yet leave him absolute and omnipotent. In words, we may insist that the creature is created free and responsible, though his actions are in all cases overruled by the divine power; but when we come to analyze our notions, this created freedom

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vanishes in the divine omnipotence, and there remains but the one controlling power. The apparent responsibility of the individual is but the wilfulness of a child in the presence of his nurse: struggle as one will, only the will of God is done.

II. To characterize Theistic Realism in terms satisfactory to those who emphasize the meanings of transcendence or immanence is not easy. In its essence, however, it implies a distinction between God and individuals, such that the latter bear a real responsibility for the world's work, and the former is not absolute. God and other individuals together constitute the world, and together work for its perfection. "God is not the author of all things, but only of the good," to put it in the thought of Plato. The universe is not a despotism, but a coöperative organization in which God, though the master spirit, is yet limited by the inferior members of the system and partially dependent on their aid. Religion is the attitude of the inferior members to the master spirit, their recognition of their need for, and dependence upon, God. This is the religion of the strenuous life, the response to the call to come up to the help of Jehovah against the mighty. It is also the religion of the hopeful life, the faith in the comprehension and power of a greater and better than self.

The moral significance of such a type as this is manifold. From one point of view, this religion seems almost identical with morality, and its cultivation the supreme and all-comprehensive duty. God (and it is significant that this is so) is always thought as the leader in the struggle for the good and as its perfect individual embodiment. Serving God is serving good, since God's will has no other object than the good. To be religious, in the higher forms of this type, is to be moral. But the significant question is the reverse: Is religion included in the moral, so that to be moral is to be religious? It might well be that a sincere worker for the good might not recognize his relation to this

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supremely good will, and might fight on in isolated ignorance of the unseen comrade in the struggle. His devotion might be perfect, but he would miss the luxury of the reliance upon this greater power. Or is this recognition of God more than a luxury, and is it a vital factor in morality itself?

Its moral value may perhaps best be estimated in terms of friendship: God is the Great Companion or Friend, in whom we trust for aid and sympathy, and in whom we find realized all that we hold worthy. Inspiration, encouragement, sympathy, companionship, all these that men find in their human friends, the religious man finds in God. The pale precepts of duty grow vital and robust when thought as the will of this perfect friend, and enthusiasm for a person gives strength to the otherwise inert will. Devotion to the service of this great leader has been at the root of all the great sacrifices of history. Faith in his power has been the greatest support in the darkest times of the individual and the nation. Can we say that so powerful a motive in life is a mere luxury with which man may dispense without injury to his moral life? No and yes. It is an evident duty to find and make use of every stimulus to, and support of, the moral life. Friendships, human or divine, as such moral supports as well as essential constituents of the good, come within the sphere of duty. To find and cherish friends is part of all good living. But there are limitations to such duty. The having of friends is not wholly within one's power: it is dependent upon the existence, nature, and accessibility of the friend. If the friend is not to be found, either because he does not exist or because our powers are not adequate for his discovery and recognition, our conscience is clear. Our duty is done when we have attained the friendly attitude and shown our readiness for social life. The duty is not to have friends, but to treat friends as friends when found. So with the religion of friendship. If we can find the Great Companion, it is our duty to treat

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him as such, and to use his aid in the moral struggles of life. To find such a helper is the greatest good fortune of life, a luxury than which there can be none greater. The world is transformed as seen in this new relationship, and the duties of life take on another color. Prose gives way to poetry, and life becomes romantic. But the possession of this transforming conception is not itself a duty. We can say to a man, You ought to seek the truth, you ought to further the cause of goodness wherever found, you ought to be loyal to the highest in you and without you; but we cannot say to him with the same directness and certainty, You ought "to glorify God and enjoy him forever." We can only say to him, You ought to use all means to find God, and you ought to love and follow him if found, for he will be your greatest comfort and help, but there is always involved the conditional *if* of existence, for the existence of such a God is, from the moral point of view, accidental. Our loyalty to our ideal may be perfect, and yet its embodiment be never found. That the night is too dark to know whether our companions be few or many, or whether the battle be lost or won, may be no fault of ours. The night itself may be part of the larger plan of which we form a part. Our loyalty is not to the leader, but to the common cause we serve. We are fellow-workers in the cause of righteousness, service to which alone gives rank and leadership.

III. There are certain features of this last conception which are not wholly satisfactory to some minds. The idea of a struggling God, one with whom men may and do contend, and who might even conceivably be conquered, seems not quite to meet the requirements of religion. It meets the needs of the battling, but not the worshiping, man. There is a feeling that while it is well to have a leader such as this, yet that the end to which the leader looks is higher than himself. The motive to the conflict is not the leader or the army, but an ideal good for both. And so some think that though

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there may be this great Companion or Leader, yet that such a being is not what men mean by God, since he, as we, is struggling for a higher good,—is to this extent a means and not an end. And we have the conception of Theistic Idealism, of God as having ideal rather than real significance, as being a value implied in all existence rather than existence itself. The actual world process would be, as experience finds it, a struggle of imperfectly realized individuals,—a world of change and evil and imperfection. This, however, is not the whole truth. The imperfection, the evil, the change, imply an eternally perfect good as the completion of the process. The world is not merely a series of individuals, but of individuals dominated by an ideal which is their moving principle. Life is not merely a fact, a given dead somewhat, but it involves an outlook and a struggle upward. The conflicts and evils of life are not merely blind struggles and irremediable evils, but are significant stages in the realization of a perfect life. It is this ideal completion of our imperfection, this rounding out and realization of life, that we call God. He would thus not be identifiable with the actual world process, imperfect as it is, nor with an absolute reason of which the world process is the necessary manifestation, nor with any one individual in the world process, but with its ideal essence or goal, with "that which it was to be." As such a real ideal implied in individuals, God is the most significant aspect of the world and its final cause, moving it, as Aristotle put it, as the object of desire moves that which desires it. In this way the conception avoids the idea of a struggling God, a rival with others for the supremacy of the world. We do not rub shoulder to shoulder with God in the dust of the conflict. He is above the confusion of the world, and yet the inspiration and the strength of those who do the fighting. The burden of the world's work is upon the individual, but his strength is from God.

The ethical content of this type of religion is plain.

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The object of the religion and the principle of morals are the same. Not only is the religious man moral, but the moral man is religious, in that his morality involves the postulate of an absolute ideal, the realization of which constitutes his good. His moral faith necessarily carries him beyond himself and his feelings to an objective and ideal order which is the measure of his own and all men's worth. This order may be, indeed, a City of God, nowhere realized, but eternal in the heavens, yet the individual recognizes himself as ideally a citizen of this state and even now bound by its laws. The recognition of this ideal citizenship and its obligations is at once moral and religious. The externals of religion acquire psychological, and only psychological, significance as means for the promotion of this cosmic service. There can be no special religious duty apart from our duties toward finite beings. To love God is wholly and solely to devote ourselves to the furtherance of good wherever found.

Such a religion as this is no luxury, as many will complain. It is just the recognition of the infinite significance of our daily life and our common duties, of the ideal rather than the actual unity of the world. Life is presented as a problem, though not as an insoluble one. The individual is, indeed, left with his task; but it is no longer merely his own petty task set by himself, but part of the world task upon which the generations have toiled and which his faith holds as the rightful task for him. His joy in his work is that of the communion of saints. Nor need the holder of this sterner creed dispense with the luxuries of a faith in a Great Companion. If on any grounds he finds it possible and necessary to recognize the existence of such a helper, so much the better for him. He has found a friend greater than any earthly friend, and one of greater help in his life task. Only he will refuse to identify this friend with God as the supreme object of worship to whom his ultimate allegiance is due. The relation will be a per-

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sonal one on the plane of human relationship, as it has largely been historically, though it will be the ethically best of such relationships. Allegiance is due, however, to the least as well as to the greatest of one's brethren so far as he embodies an ideal good and is fulfilling an ideal function. Nothing less than universal good can be the supreme object of devotion and the center of religion. This greatest friend, unless he embodies all goodness, as he does not by hypothesis, can only be loved and honored as one good being among others and because of his goodness. He should therefore be recognized as a distinct person and indicated by a proper name rather than by the title God. This, of course, has been done in puritan Christianity, by the retention of the personal name Jehovah, and in popular Christianity by the identification of Jesus and God.

The matter of nomenclature is of small importance so long as our concepts remain clear, and it may be that some will prefer to call this Theistic Idealism a moral attitude rather than a religion, retaining the latter term for the attitude toward this Great Companion. There can be no objection if the moral significance of this relationship be kept clearly in mind. It would mean that religion in this sense is to be regarded as a luxury, the possession of favored persons of peculiar endowments rather than as part of fundamental duty. It is conditioned by the variations of temperament and intellectual capacity rather than by the more stable factors of character. In this respect it is closely akin to poetry, and the question of its truth tends to be merged more and more into that of its imaginative and emotional worth, so that its satisfactoriness as a romantic interpretation of the world is now being urged as its justification.

As to the historic justification for the use of the name religion by either of these last two types, something may be said for both. Religion has always been man's attitude toward that which he felt to be of ultimate worth.

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Originally this was thought as embodied in certain existing powers: man was in the beginning realistic in his conception of the gods. In so far the personalist may claim that his existing God is the legitimate descendant of the primitive type. But religion has also involved the element of ultimateness and infinity, though at first in vaguest form; and it is this which the personalist is now tending to deny to his finite Companion, while the moralist retains it as the essential in his ideal. The earlier conception of God has thus disintegrated into its two elements, the real and the ideal, each with its modern advocates. On the one hand, we have the psychologists and the lovers of psychical research exploring the abnormal aspects of mental life, seeking to discover God in the dark corners of existence overlooked in the researches of earlier science, men who would reveal God as an astronomer might exhibit a new star. On the other hand, we have the social workers and the poets, Platonizers by instinct, however they may in words affirm the positivist creed; men for whom life is not a series of facts, but a problem whose solution is its idealization. For these men God is recognized in the imperativeness of the ideal rather than in the existence of facts.

But whether or not Theistic Idealism is to be called a religion or only a metaphysically developed morality, it is important that the implications of these types of religious thought, suggested in this paper, be recognized if present day religious movements are to be valued justly. There is too widespread a feeling among religious thinkers and preachers that at last science is coming to the help of religion, and that in the law of evolution properly understood, or in the facts of abnormal psychology, or the deliverances of the subconscious mind, there is new evidence for the existence of God and the reality of religion. Pragmatism and humanism, with their pluralistic and personal view of the world, especially as expounded by Professor James, seem to offer new and solid supports for the religious

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attitude toward life. And yet to those for whom the moral element in religion has been the greatest gain in its history, these new developments appear tendencies toward superstition. For though we grant the claims made for the truth of the facts of trance and subconscious mind, these do at best lead us only into a larger world of supernatural fact,—a larger world, but not a better. Our outlook may be more extended but our ideals are left unchanged. This scientific supernatural, like the older theological one, is still only another natural and not a spiritual world. There may be much of comfort in the idea of this extension of our present life and in the possibility of intercourse with the great and good inhabitants of this other world, but after all it is only an extension of our present life and not an interpretation of its worth. It is not our ideals which are affected, but the chances of approximation to them. The religion of scientific spiritualism is a luxury rather than a duty.

A recognition of this distinction is also necessary if we are to understand and guard against the separation of religion and morality. There is too ready an assumption that religion includes morality, and therefore too little care taken to *make* it include morality, as is evidenced by the surprise roused by the immorality of a religious man. But if religion is a natural attachment to a person, it may well exist along with irregularity of morals. One may love God and not keep his commandments, if the love of God is other than the love of his commandments. To education in religion we must add education in morals; alongside the church will be the societies for ethical culture; as a basis for the luxury of religion, we must lay the necessity of morality.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

REVALUATIONS: HISTORICAL AND IDEAL. By A. W. Benn. London: Watts & Co., 1909. Pp. xv, 320.

Dr. Benn's volume consists entirely of reprinted essays, ranging in their original dates of publication from 1881 to 1908, on a variety of topics mostly ethical and religious, and written from a standpoint which the author describes as agnostic. To me Dr. Benn's point of view seems hardly to be distinguishable from that of a rather dogmatic positivism, and in view of the confident negations of the essay *What Is Agnosticism?* (pp. 281-312), I should say it ought at least to be called agnosticism of the left wing. At least one has always understood that agnosticism aimed at holding the balance fair on the ultimate issues of theism, immortality, and freedom, whereas Dr. Benn very definitely indicates that he regards denial on all these points as the only sound scientific attitude. He has, in fact, a very short and easy method with thinkers who venture to believe in God, the soul, and the life to come; they have only to be dubbed 'apologists,' or with a dubious compliment, 'ingenious apologists,' and their utterances are then allowed to be immediately discounted. Yet I confess I do not see why an opponent might not get rid of Dr. Benn as easily as he himself disposes of writers who are not to his taste. For what is Dr. Benn himself if not an 'apologist,' and a very 'ingenious' one too, for what may be called, without prejudice, as a matter of classification in metaphysics, the atheistic interpretation of science?

To my own mind the most interesting of the papers are that on *The Ethical Value of Greek Hellenism,* which should serve as a useful corrective of the curious notion, popularized by Matthew Arnold, that high seriousness in matters of conduct is an exclusively Hebraic endowment, that on Nietzsche, an excellent exposure of the hopeless inconsistencies of the German writer's so-called 'Immoralism,' and that on Buckle, an interesting study of a really great writer whose merits have been unduly ignored by the votaries of Carlyle and the authors of the German 'romantic' movement in philosophy.

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Dr. Benn's great defect as an interpreter and critic is, I should say, that he is too much of a propagandist to display the wholeness of view of the true historian. At his best he is always the clever partisan with a case to make out at all costs and an opponent always to be shown up. This comes out even in the otherwise excellent study of Hellenism as an ethical force. In a sense the whole thing is an *ignoratio elenchi*. What Dr. Benn vindicates triumphantly against Arnold is, after all, not the popular Greek morality, but the ethics of the humanists and philosophers who were, in point of fact, in opposition to the popular traditions on very much the same ground as the Christians after them. It must be said also that Dr. Benn is too much beset by the partisan's desire to give pain to the other side to know when to hold his hand. He is constantly spoiling a good case by trying to do better than well. Thus his argument about the high value set on truth in the Hellenic world is injured by his offensive description of "whole masses" of the Old Testament as "deliberate forgeries," and even more by his selection of the Deuteronomic "book of the law" as his example. All this language about forgery and fabrication is, to begin with, an anachronism when applied to the literature of an age in which the notion of a book as the work of an individual author has hardly grown up, just as it would be a anachronism to accuse an Homeric hero of piracy or felony on the high seas. Moreover, in assuming that "Hilkiah the priest" who found the Deuteronomic "book of the law" was acting a part, and had really hidden what he found, Dr. Benn is going far beyond the limits of legitimate criticism. All that he is really entitled to assume is that the "original Deuteronomy" was first published in the eighteenth year of Josiah, and cannot have been written, at the outside, before the reign of Manasseh, and these assumptions are consistent with good faith on the part of everyone concerned in its production. There is nothing at all in the contrast which Dr. Benn tries to draw between the success of the Deuteronomic reformation and the expulsion of Onomacritus from Athens for inserting prophecies of his own among those of 'Musæus.' The very currency of alleged works of 'Orpheus' and 'Musæus' shows that 'fabrication' was practiced in Hellas as well as in Judæa, and if Onomacritus was banished, while Hilkiah was not, that was merely, even on Dr. Benn's statement of the case, because Onomacritus was detected, as Herodotus says, "in the act,"

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whereas Josiah was convinced of the reality of the 'find' at Jerusalem.

In general I note that Dr. Benn's biblical studies seem to have come to an end twenty or thirty years ago, and that many of his confident assertions would be repudiated by the best criticism of to-day. Thus he follows the Tübingen school in regarding it as established that only the 'we' sections of *Acts* are the authentic composition of a contemporary of St. Paul, and that we have no earlier authority for the life and work of Our Lord than the second Gospel. It would seem that he knows nothing of the work which has been done by Sir W. Ramsay and Harnack towards establishing the genuineness of the *Acts* and the third gospel as compositions of St. Paul's friend Luke, nor of the present wide acceptance of the view that the so-called Q (the common source of Matthew and Luke in so much of their narrative as is independent of Mark) goes back to a date possibly anterior to the crucifixion. If there is any truth whatever in these views, they absolutely dispose of the theory that everything which Matthew and Luke add to Mark may be discounted by the historian as the results of a long incubation of tradition. *E. g.*, Dr. Benn will hear only of a single "word from the Cross," that recorded in Mark, and avails himself of the chance to utter the cheap gibe that "Jesus died with an exclamation of despair." But if the third Gospel is really the work of a friend of St. Paul, there is no more sense in assuming that its additions to the story of the Passion *must* be purely legendary than there would be, *e. g.*, in saying that no anecdote told of Dr. Johnson by Sir Walter Scott can be authentic unless it is also to be found in Boswell.

I am sorry that Dr. Benn's sense of decency should not have kept him from talking about Butler's "lingering regard for truth," and that he should have gone out of his way to insinuate a charge of plagiarism against a distinguished contemporary on no better ground than that the writer in question has apparently adopted from Dr. Benn an English rendering of one famous sentence of Pascal. To base such charges on such trivial grounds seems to me pitifully small-minded. This kind of recrimination has long been a scandal and a curse in German philosophical and scientific literature; I am distressed that an author of Dr. Benn's standing should help to import it into this country.

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NATIONAL IDEALISM AND THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER: An Essay in Reinterpretation and Revision. By Stanton Coit, Ph. D. London: Williams & Norgate, 1908. Pp. xxv, 467.

This book is a sequel to "National Idealism and a State Church," published in 1907, and reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, p. 499. The aims which the author set before himself in the later volume can hardly be understood without reference to the earlier one, on which therefore I may be permitted to make some comments. First of all, however, I wish to emphasize the fact that both these volumes are full of interest, suggestiveness, and positive instruction, for all who care about the meaning of contemporary religious thought. Their general value and suggestiveness is appreciable more especially by one who,—like the present writer,—is a member of a religious society which repudiates (as entirely inadequate to express the present religious needs of humanity) the main dogmas traditionally distinctive of orthodox Christianity. This appreciation of Dr. Coit's work is, however, not incompatible with a complete dissent from his main argument, and with a strong conviction that his proposals are neither practicable nor desirable.

His main assumption involves the rejection of supernaturalism, and an aspiration after, and an endeavor to realize, a 'Church,' which shall be a 'Humanist' Church. To replace 'supernaturalism' by 'humanism' means to discard "every trace of trust in moral intelligences who are not members of human society," and to replace it by "combined human effort under natural law." Now this is the exact definition of *Atheism;* the only goodness and truth which are real or existent (in any sense of the word) are the goodness and truth realized individually and collectively in human beings now living. The distinctive characteristic of religious thought is, on the other hand, the affirmation that human goodness and human rationality are not born out of nothing, nor manufactured by 'matter and force,' but spring from a central source, and are the universal manifestation, under finite conditions, of an Infinite Goodness and Reason which constitute the most fundamental of all realities. This conviction, it is affirmed, makes an actual difference to life; it is the implicit motive of that devotion to social causes which Dr. Coit speaks of as "sweeping through the souls of men today;" and it enables us to regard the multitudinous events of

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history as the pulsations of a continuous divine life, passing through time and giving it greater fullness as it goes.

Dr. Coit's definition of religion is as follows: "The focusing of men's attention . . . upon some Being from which they believe that they have derived the greatest benefits, in order to receive still further benefits" (p. 20), where it is explained that the 'benefits' are not individualistic or selfish, but social. But the 'Being,' "to which we should steadfastly and devoutly attend in order to receive life's highest blessings" (p 164), is nothing more than the Moral Ideal, or Moral Law as conceived by the actually existing human beings, and as the object which they endeavor to realize. When the attention of a people is concentrated on its highest ideal of national welfare or 'prosperity,' and on its efforts to realize the ideal, we have 'religion' or 'National Idealism.'

This involves constant emphasis on the idea of *social unity*. Society is conceived as a magnified individual. The name 'God' stands for the highest efforts of a Society (a nation? a community of nations? an empire?) directed towards its own welfare. It is insisted that the Nation is the true organic religious unit. But is the '*nation*' (or national state) such an organic *unit* in itself? Is 'National Idealism,' after all, only the egoism of a Colossus?

The writer holds that "a transference of religious faith from superhuman to human agencies does not touch the essential message of the Bible and the Church." This involves the assertion that the "essential message" of Judaism and of Christianity "is not touched" by the substitution of atheism (as defined above) for theism; and that both Judaism and Christianity were forms of "National Idealism," as Dr. Coit understands this term. The first assertion raises the whole question of the validity of the author's initial assumption, and the relation of morality to religion and of both to the fundamental unity of the cosmos. The present writer has elsewhere endeavored to indicate the main lines along which a reasonable solution of the question may be looked for.[1]

The other assertion (as to 'National Idealism' in its relation to Judaism and Christianity) suggests two remarks. Dr. Coit's

[1] "Leaders of Religious Thought," chs. vi, vii (Herbert Spencer and Auguste Comte).

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language in his chapters on "The Ten Commandments" conveys the impression that the religion of Israel was essentially an effort after an ideal of national welfare, and that ideas of a superhuman moral agency were comparatively unessential. Such a view is utterly unhistorical, and would at once be repudiated by all competent students of Hebrew literature. The essence of Hebrew religion is the conviction of a superhuman Being, gradually conceived as the Supreme Being, who is Moral Ruler of the world and Guardian of righteousness. Mr. C. G. Montefiore has concisely and accurately expressed the message of Biblical Judaism in the simple statement that *if there were no God, there would be no Goodness.* The consequent of this proposition depends on the antecedent; and on the relation of dependence thus asserted, depends again another proposition,—*the love of Goodness is a vital part of the love of God.* Dr. Coit appears to make this latter proposition equivalent to an identification of God with existing human ideas of goodness; he ignores or denies the other propositions on which this latter one depends; and therefore he appears to regard 'National Idealism' as the essence of Judaism, and in general feels justified in advocating the use of theistic terms in an atheistic sense. The only comment I can make on all this is,—that I am old-fashioned enough to believe in what Aristotle called 'Intellectual Virtue.' Dr. Coit's estimate of primitive Christianity, suggested by his chapters on "The Lord's Prayer," appears to be equally unhistorical. That movement found itself first in a life-or-death struggle with the National Idealism of the Jews and afterwards with the National Idealism (such as it was) of Roman Imperialism. These struggles strengthened and deepened the *cosmopolitan* significance which was implicit in the life and teaching of the Founder. Even in becoming itself imperial, Christianity never became merely national.

Assuming that the nation is the true religious unit, Dr. Coit advocates organization on a *national* basis. The religious life of the nation is to be organized like its political life, but on a strictly democratic (not monarchical or absolutist) basis; so that different parties, acting and reacting on each other, would be embraced within the one National Church, and not form sects outside it. The author thinks that at present "the spiritual forces of the nation remain in a state of relative anarchy and chaos, often nullifying and destroying one another, to the suffer-

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ing, moral detriment, and enervation of the whole people." There is some truth in this, as there is in the author's comments on the blindness of ecclesiastical leaders who cannot see why the churches are losing their hold on the masses. The Church of England, in particular, is becoming estranged from the best life of the people through its anti-democratic character and its supernaturalism. In this again there is much truth, if by 'supernaturalism' we understand the general claim of miraculous authority for certain ancient documents or for certain rites and ceremonies.

Notwithstanding all this, the author evidently deems it both practicable and desirable to make a 'humanist Church' out of the Church of England, and to adapt the existing Prayer Book of that Church, so that its most important and characteristic phrases could be used in a 'humanist' sense. His ideal is to widen and democratize the National Church so that all shades of opinion and experience may be included in it. He even draws up a scheme of such democratic government. The first step, in his view, is to admit diversity of ritual and liturgical practice. This is the main topic of the volume on *Common Prayer*. The strongest chapters, I think, are those on "English Poetry and the Psalter," "English Literature and the Lectionary," "Baptism," "The Communion Service," "The Marriage Service," and "The Burial Service." All these are matters in which the author proposes changes, many of which are radical, and are based on criticism which is morally and spiritually true. It is noteworthy that to the Creeds and Articles,—the central facts in the doctrinal apparatus of the Church,—Dr. Coit devotes only one chapter, which is, I think, the weakest in the book. His conclusion is, that "the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian creeds, like the Decalogue and the Lord's Prayer, are capable of being interpreted, without distortion, as expressions of humanistic idealism; when thus viewed, and when compared with analogous documents, they stand forth as three of the profoundest and most expedient utterances ever promulgated; and of these, the greatest is the Athanasian" (p. 144).

He is surely right in urging that great transforming developments, in the realm of ethical and spiritual life, do not come by mere natural growth, but require the coöperation of conscious effort. Yet conscious effort, just as little as natural growth, can

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transform a thing into its opposite. In such cases there is no 'reconstruction'; there is a destruction of one thing and construction of a different and in fact an opposite thing. Regarded as a reconstruction of the Church of England, Mr. Coit's whole scheme is so imaginative and so remote from reality that it does not call for serious argument; and if no such Church is possible, the question of Prayer Book revision on such lines does not arise. No adequate ground is shown in either book for taking the *nation* as "the organic unit of religious life." There is the Church of Rome, with its claim of *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.* If we are to have so much imagination, why not go a little further and imagine a 'humanist' Church Universal, modeled on a democratized Roman Catholic Church? Something like this appears to have been the aim of Comte's religious scheme, which Huxley described as "Catholicism minus Christianity."

The Church of England might well ask to be allowed to do 'her own work.' I will not venture to say what that work is; but whatever it may be, her resources for it are not small; with her prestige, wealth, and numbers, she is able to dictate the educational policy of a great political party. She must solve her own problems, and satisfy the demands of the age as best she can.

If anything is to me certain, it is that the Church of England could never be reconstructed in the manner required by Dr. Coit. She could never be made the instrument of 'National Idealism,' as he understands that term. It is enough to mention one plain reason: the *negations* which he insists are an essential part of this Idealism are (as I have indicated) opposed to the essential meaning of Judaism and primitive Christianity; and they are equally opposed to the essential meaning of the historical motives which gradually determined the ecclesiastical system of dogma and ritual.

It is of course true that among the motives determining the gradual formation (through four centuries) of the dogmas of the Church, were genuine ethical motives. The Church never quite forgot that "the love of Goodness is a vital part of the love of God." Forces of all kinds, good and bad, passion, partisanship, political expediency (as at the Council of Nicæa), religious instincts and aspirations, were gathered into the stream and worked towards the construction of the great system of orthodox

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theology. To follow out this history in detail is not a pleasant task, for the first suggestion it makes, and makes with no little force, is that the energy of the Church was being largely taken up with metaphysical subtleties and logical contradictions. The mischief arose because from the end of the second century Christianity was being made more and more into an Orthodoxy (*i. e.*, an authoritative dogmatic system), each pronouncement being taken as final and as incapable of modification even in form. This is the system that is now breaking down. I do not say that it was all a mere process of corruption (in the manner suggested by Joseph Priestley in his "History of the Corruptions of Christianity"),—a baseless fabric of mere human invention. I say that the work of the modern thinker is not to destroy ancient dogmas, but to discover and enlarge their deeper meaning, which underlies the defects or errors which may disfigure the form of their expression. The growing consciousness of what is demanded by veracity, in the present day, emphasizes all these considerations, and, in the name of morality and intelligence, adds to them a crowning demand of immense and fundamental importance: this process of enlargement and reconstruction is not consistent *with a retention of the ancient dogmatic forms.* And notwithstanding a radical divergence from Dr. Coit's main argument and proposals, which would make the existing religious confusion ten times worse confounded, I believe that religious reformers will welcome these volumes of his, as containing many helpful suggestions towards the ideals which they have in view; and they will all the more regret that so able and enthusiastic a teacher has allowed himself to be fascinated by a scheme involving the retention of forms which humanity has outgrown.

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THE ETHICS OF PROGRESS: OR THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE BY WHICH CIVILIZATION PROCEEDS. By Charles F. Dole. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., 1909. Pp. iv, 398.

"The design of this book is to set forth a simple, philosophical and inspiring vital principle, which governs all ethical questions, and insures the development of noble, useful, and happy

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character." There is no *a priori* reason why one who is not a professional teacher of philosophy should not succeed in this rather ambitious, but very laudable design. Indeed, the very freedom from the familiar daily use of the formulas and distinctions of the schools might lend an air of freshness and originality to an author's work; especially when the author does not obtrude upon the reader any knowledge he may possess of the history of ethical discussion. Mr. Dole is so careful not to refer to the views of individual moralists that when he writes: "As Kant, quoted by Thomas Hill Green, says, 'Nothing can be conceived in the world or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, but a good will,' " the reference is striking and one wonders whether he means to intimate that he has read Green or that he has not read Kant. Mr. Dole, moreover, has the pen of a ready writer and a very genius for expansion. In this instance he has succeeded in expanding his 'vital principle' into a volume the size of which is not explained even by the fact that its substance was originally given in a course of lectures before the Brooklyn Institute. In spite of these obvious advantages, I do not mean to imply that Mr. Dole has written a good book; still less, that it will utterly fail in its purpose of "helping men in the art of the good life." "The main object of the book is practical," and it should doubtless be judged from the pragmatic point of view. But that each reader must do for himself. I must be content first to say that to dig out the ore from this mountain of words is a tedious process; and then to illustrate the character, instead of summarizing the contents of the book.

Ethics is defined as "the art of living together humanely" (p. 266). "Ethics is social conduct" (p. 97). "Ethics and theism are one" (p. 145). Ethics and religion are also said to be one. Mr. Dole is thus quite unembarrassed by the 'subtle' distinctions of philosophers. He holds that "what counts most in the study of ethics is wealth of observation and richness of experience." The 'professional student' will be relieved to learn, however, that while he is at a certain disadvantage (p. 18), yet "ethics and happiness are not opposed, but harmonious with each other" (p. 62).

Happiness is a word to conjure with: it can easily be turned into so many different things. Happiness is defined as satisfaction. We should, however, aim at the highest happiness, and

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this consists in the expression of the highest form of life, namely, good will. The happiest man will be the most perfect ethical man, *i. e.*, the man of good will or the man who desires nothing but the social good (pp. 69, 73, 77). Mr. Dole does not distinguish between quantitative and qualitative hedonism; he simply assumes that highest happiness and greatest happiness are identical. He also thinks "it hardly needs to be said that the individual and the social welfare are not antagonistic but one and the same" (p. 81), and he denies the reality of sacrifice (p. 73) and of evil (pp. 170-180). These statements will not disturb the philosopher who delights in paradoxes and seeks to explain them, though they may possibly provoke the dissent of the plain man for whose edification the book is evidently written and who is less of a born optimist than the author.

Mr. Dole recognizes two rival ethical theories, the Epicurean or utilitarian, and the idealistic. "The characteristic emphasis of the utilitarian theory is in all cases the same, namely, its assertion that the grand and persuasive motive of ethics in each individual is his own happiness or welfare." That is, of course, a terminological inexactitude. Nor will the opponents of utilitarianism readily admit that "they have not succeeded in giving a clear and consistent account of their thought." Mr. Dole believes that "the facts of ethical experience build up into a theory of conduct wherein there is no discrepancy between the two views which have usually been thought opposed to one another" (pp. 18-22). He brings them into a 'comprehensive harmony' by the easy device of emphasizing 'the pleasure of goodness,' and hastily concluding that duty and happiness are always harmonious, if not identical.

The principle of good will is the key to all the problems of ethics. Be a man of good will and you will do right as a matter of natural consequence (p. 89). Mr. Dole casually recognizes the distinction between subjective and objective rightness (p. 127), but he is apparently unconscious of any difficulty in giving definite content to the idea of duty. He treats of the right in a series of parables. Right is like a highway as distinguished from the innumerable private trails; it is a mode of efficiency and is like the wire which carries energy; it is like the circulation of the blood; it is like the essential conditions of a partnership and the delicate adjustment of a wonderful

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piece of mechanism; it is also like the movement of life in every plant or tree (pp. 147-154). "Right, welfare, happiness, life, fulfillment are all one, as befits an orderly and rational universe." Now I submit that all this is far from illuminating. When Mr. Dole says in plain language, at the end of the chapter preceding his parabolic treatment, that "right is the method by which we bring about social welfare," we understand his meaning; but if the good will is a key to open all the problems of ethics, Kant should have made all subsequent discussion of them superfluous.

Mr. Dole's ethical theory is as conspicuously optimistic as it is eclectic. His whole theory,—of moral progress, of the educability and perfectibility of man, of the good will, of freedom and responsibility, of the essential unity of goodness and happiness,—is determined by a religious metaphysic of a peculiarly irritating optimistic kind. Hence I do not quite see how his ethics (which derives its optimistic tone from "the eminently religious philosophy upon which it seems to rest") "also holds good whether or not we accept the underlying philosophy" (pp. iv, 103). In discussing responsibility, blame, guilt, and desert in relation to conduct, he denies that these ideas involve any metaphysical theory about the freedom of the will, though he admits that "a logical question arises" if we deny that the wrongdoer could have done right and at the same time hold him responsible for his conduct. The author's own 'moral determinism' appears to involve more metaphysic than I have time to describe otherwise than by saying that the 'will of God' is given as an equivalent phrase (p. 263). It involves the belief that men are definitely improvable and educable, born for good and not for evil; that goodness is at the heart of the universe and is gradually working itself out through the good will of individuals, until we shall finally have a perfect society composed of persons possessed of the ideal freedom which we impute to God. Meanwhile men are not responsible for their conduct in the older and ordinary sense of responsibility, but they are praised and blamed and held responsible by society in order to furnish them with adequate motives for changing their mode of life; and for practical purposes this is held to be sufficient.

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THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM. (The Gifford Lectures.) By Hans Driesch. Vol. II. London: A. & C. Black, 1908. Pp. xvi, 375.

This second volume leaves no doubt of the first-rate importance of the science and philosophy of the organism in their bearing upon a spiritual view of the universe. The two volumes are a colossal piece of work, both in the importance of their conclusions and in the range of subjects treated. Perhaps the range is even too wide, since it is difficult to bear the development of the main argument in mind amidst so vast a multitude of fascinating topics. These have also tended to give a more fragmentary character than was necessary even in a work which leads to great issues concerning which final conclusions are yet impossible.

One might easily give a lengthy analysis of the numerous controversial points where one ventures to disagree with Dr. Driesch, but in dealing with so masterly a work, the more fruitful course is to outline the chief conclusions established.

Volume I, which was reviewed in April, 1909, was concerned solely with the science of the organism. This showed that the phenomena of life cannot be explained by the laws or concepts of inorganic science, but that biology must introduce something new and elemental,—the concept of the autonomy of life. Of this two proofs were given, one in connection with the study of organic form, the other in connection with the study of inheritance. Volume II completes the science of the organism with the wonderful study of organic movements. This gives some indication of vital autonomy. A third proof of it results from the individuality of correspondence, which is one of the chief characteristics of action. It is interesting to note that this proof involves a refutation of psychophysical parallelism, which was also worked out independently by the late philosopher Busse.

The author opens his philosophical section, to which the science of the organism has been merely introductory, with certain preliminary discussions. Amongst these he expresses his conviction of the possibility of a real philosophy of nature as Kant conceived it. Later, he maintains that the laws of science and life are not empirical, but are involved in categories which are logically prior to experience and independent of its amount. They are 'awaked' only by experience, not inferred from it, and once awaked they are axiomatic, systematizing all experience, and

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creating scientific themes. Philosophy has yet to establish a rational system of the categories, to show that they do form one whole and that no others can exist.

Part I of the philosophy of the organism gives an indirect justification of entelechy by showing that it does not contradict the *a priori* principles of inorganic nature. Thus, it does not conflict with the principle of univocal determination, for it is itself subject to it. Given certain circumstances and a certain entelechy, there will always result one corresponding event and no other. The examination of the relation of entelechy to causation includes many interesting discussions into which it is not possible to enter here. It is shown that though entelechy cannot be interpreted in terms of energy, vital or otherwise, it does not contradict the *a priori* principle of the conservation of energy, which is the first postulate of energetics. With regard to its second *a priori* principle,—nothing can happen where no diversities exist,—it is shown that entelechy cannot create diversities or differences of intensity, but, entelechy can suspend, for any period, any of the reactions which would inevitably happen with the materials present, were it not for its presence. This faculty of suspending events and setting free what it has itself suspended, is the most important ontological characteristic of entelechy. Its limitation to differences of potential already existing is later shown to explain the limits of regulability, disease, and death. The author's account of the way the suspending action of entelechy may increase the diversity of distribution in a system, although incapable of enlarging its amount of diversity of composition, is not convincing, partly because the meaning of diversity of distribution is not first made clear. Entelechy implies causation and substance, though no chemical substance can be its basis; it uses both for its own purposes. A material system left to itself behaves very differently from one that is controlled by entelechy. The origin and end of individual life are insoluble problems.

> With the starting of a new actual individual entelechy, begins a new manifestation, and with death it ends one. . . . What that manifestation, *qua* individual, was before that beginning, and what it is after death is absolutely unknown to us. . . . What science knows about death is simply this; a certain amount of matter that was formerly controlled by entelechy becomes freed from this control and then obeys the laws of physico-chemical causality exclusively. Does entelechy actively withdraw from matter or not, and, if actively, then why?

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These and others are unapproachable questions. The origin and end of life in general is likewise an insoluble problem. Dr. Driesch has, however, shown that it has not originated by a chance collection of inorganic elements. He also proves that there can be no gaps in entelechian manifestations. According to the theory of descent, their type has changed throughout their continuous history, but we never come to a beginning. It seems very strange that we only know of life in connection with a very few classes of complex chemical compounds. In connection with the multitudinous, and apparently unanswerable, questions which arise concerning the origin and end of life, Dr. Driesch states that they are of far less theoretical importance than those concerning the laws of life. This will be but poor consolation for the majority of his readers who burn with eagerness concerning problems of vital human, rather than speculative, interest. The Gifford foundation is itself a monumental testimony to these great spiritual interests of man, in comparison with which his purely intellectual ones have but a puny significance.

Part II of the philosophical section justifies entelechy directly by showing its legitimacy as one of the *a priori* natural factors. The analysis of what is given to consciousness, throughout a series of ordinary actions, shows that bodily processes are broken by states which cannot be related to any body in space. From this, vital autonomy is proved directly in the case of one natural body,—my own. Since entelechy has no place in the categorical system of Kant, although there are natural phenomena which need its application if they are to be understood, a new category must be introduced. This, Dr. Driesch calls Individuality or Constructivity. We are conscious of a manifestation of it in our own will when we ask, 'for what purpose'? Entelechy is a factor of nature though it only relates to nature in space and is not itself in space. Hence all constituents of nature created on the basis of Individuality, being non-spatial, are unimaginable, though their effects are realized in imaginable nature. 'Nature' means the sum total of what may be related to space in any way and includes the whole of what is given to consciousness,—mass, energy, vitalistic principles, acting, and *morality*. They are all parts of the mental elaboration of the 'Given' and should form one whole. Thus the Kantian conception of Nature is enlarged to include one completely, and another only partly, spatial portion.

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Part III deals with the problem of Universal Teleology and is suggestive of many questions still to be solved. The consideration of morality leads to two definite results. First, that it has a place in the system of categories, in nature and in psychology. Second, that morality as a category implies entelechy and vice versa. It would be impossible to feel morally towards others and yet regard them as mere machines.

In the last part of the book the author adopts the view of a limited teleology. The universe is said to be teleological so far as it allows the moral and intellectual perfection of the individual. It is certainly not so in every historical detail; if everything were immediately controlled by entelechy, there would be no room for causation except as posterior to entelechy.

Part IV gives the metaphysical conclusions of the book. The transition is from the 'Given,' as merely my phenomenon, to something absolute, not merely my phenomenon. The author considers that there are 'three windows' through which we may see that there is absoluteness; though absoluteness, being inconceivable, can never be proved. He does not make clear what he means by inconceivable; presumably he does not include within it the unbelievable. Morality he takes to be one of these windows, for morality towards or amongst mere phenomena to my Ego would be absurd. The unity of subjective experience and of memory is the second window. Phenomenalism would only admit as reality what is present to consciousness at any moment; but the Ego implies much more than this. We cannot explain its nature, since the categories, our only means, are its outcome. The last window is "the contingency of immediately given phenomena so far as sensations or presentations come into account, combined with the immanent coherence of this contingency within itself." Dr. Driesch states that these windows, combined with the conception of a limited teleology, give us a right to say: first, that absoluteness must be such as to be able to become part of the 'Given' as my phenomenon, under the forms causality, individuality, substance and so on; second, that there are "certain constellations in givenness, other than organisms, which are teleological in the sense of a statical *harmony of nature*." But this forces the mind to assume a primary entelechy in the universe which ordered the non-contingent constellations of reality.

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The 'primary entelechy' that natural science allows us to assume hypothetically, and epistemology allows us to refer by analogy to absoluteness, remains far behind any conception of a perfect absolute Being that man is able to form in his mind. But it does *not* contradict the concept of God as formed by the reasoning imagination.

Negative and fragmentary as many of the conclusions are, concerning the problems of intense human significance, yet they not only give our ideas concerning the existence of God, and the origin and end of life, a freer scope, but they suggest new truths which may well inspire literature worthy of such great themes. The book is one which no writer on these subjects can in future afford to ignore.

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ÆSTHETIC AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION AND GENERAL LINGUISTIC. Translated from the Italian of Benedetto Croce, by Douglas Ainslie. London: Macmillan & Co., 1909. Pp. xxxi, 403.

This is an ingenious, an attractive, but on the whole a disappointing book. The treatment has the defects as well as the merits shown by so many Latin thinkers, boldness and system, but also narrowness and delusive clearness. Not that Croce's leading formula is without value, only it does not seem to be adequate, nor always to mean the same thing. Stated in general terms, it asserts that the fundamental æsthetic fact is 'an intuition,' so clearly grasped that he who has it can express it. An intuition that cannot be expressed is not really complete, not really mastered. Thus we may say indifferently that Art is Intuition, or that Art is Expression. So far so good, but what does Croce mean by *intuition?*

At the beginning of his treatise (pp. 20*ff.*) he explains that he does not mean a peculiar kind of intuition, intuition plus something distinctive, but just intuition pure and simple. Now if he means *any* direct perception not reached by inference, then it would be hard to deny that "$1 + 1 = 2$" was an intuition. On this view language, considered as an expression of intuitions, would be part of æsthetic, and sometimes Croce (as the sub-title indicates) says this in so many words, and indeed asserts it of *all* language whatsoever (*e. g.*, pp. 39*ff.*). But from what he says elsewhere about the essential connection of the æsthetic

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fact with 'the individual' and 'the concrete' (*e. g.*, p. 46, p. 96, p. 388), it appears that he is really limiting 'intuition' to: (a) the direct consciousness that something is presented to sense, *e. g.*, "I hear this sound," or (b) the consciousness in the mind of something so fully concrete in its characteristics that it only needs a physical basis to become present to sense, *e. g.*, the sonata in Beethoven's head, which only needs the piano and the player to become audible. (a) is distinguished from (b) by including "the apprehension of something as *real*" (p. 5), and this distinction is secondary. The common element, apart from this, is 'intuition,' and such intuition is the primary fact of consciousness.

The first criticism that suggests itself here is that although intuition in this sense may be a primary element in consciousness, yet without some further element of abstraction, inference, and generalization, these 'intuitions' would be inchoate and blind. But the next criticism and the more important one for æsthetics, would be this: that between the intuition "this sound is present" (or the intuition "I am thinking of this sound") and the intuition "this sound is *beautiful*," there is a genuine difference,—a difference such that the last cannot be deduced from either of the former. With great boldness Croce does try to make the deduction; according to him beauty merely consists in the adequate expression of the intuition in the artist's mind.

With equal boldness he denies the existence of any beauty in nature at all, or the existence of the ugly except as indicating the struggle, not yet completed, to attain clearness of vision. Croce certainly has the courage of his opinions. It is also in perfect coherence with his formula that he puts all art upon the same level in so far as it attains clearness of expression. Art being nothing *but* expression, the things expressed have in themselves no artistic value whatsoever (pp. 129, 130). The connection of art with morality resides for him simply in this: that as regards practical life and action, it may be a question what intuitions we should communicate and what we should withhold, because of their indirect results. It does not occur to him to ask whether the intuitions in themselves have any degrees of value, other than 'æsthetic' in his meaning of the word. They all have value, he would appear to hold, as activities of the spirit, but not further. The idea that art could be a revelation of something in some sense external to man is entirely set aside.

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Yet it is exactly the combination of the search for 'the true' and the search for 'the beautiful' in art that seems to contribute its unique importance.

In a lecture on "Pure Intuition and the Lyrical Character of Art," printed here as an appendix, Croce gives a different turn to his theory by including *feeling* in the necessary artistic intuition. He seems induced to make this step by realizing that his formula, so far as stated in the treatise, would put the photographic vision of the 'Derby Day' on a level with a drawing by Botticelli; but he justifies the step by a most curious argument. The artistic intuition must have no element of inference or generalization in it; "it must be pure of every abstraction, of every conceptual element" (p. 394). "This means that the content of the pure intuition cannot be either an abstract concept, or a speculative concept or idea, or a conceptualized . . . representation." The critic can hardly fail to remark here that, if this is so, the pure intuition would appear to have no definite content at all. Croce sees this, and to fill the gap draws on the remaining 'psychic content.' "Pure intuition, then, since it does not produce concepts, must represent the will in its manifestations, that is to say, it can represent nothing but *states of the soul.*"

But whatever we may think of this argument, the conclusion is interesting, for it involves the view that behind all beauty there must lie an emotional experience. For those who accept the existence of natural beauty this opens a vista of speculation. One of the best things in the book, indeed, is the stress laid on the activity of the spirit necessary either for the creation or the enjoyment of beauty. See, for example, an admirable passage on page 199. There is a summary, by the translator, of Croce's "History of Æsthetic," a work which shows an amazing range of reading.

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The Symposium of Plato. Edited by R. G. Bury, M. A. Cambridge: Heffer & Sons, 1909. Pp. lxxi, 179.

Le Cycle Mystique: La Divinité, d'Origine et Fin des Existences Individuelles dans la Philosophie Antésocratique. Par Auguste Diès. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1909. Pp. iv, 115.

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La Définition de l'Être et la Nature des Idées dans le Sophiste de Platon. Par Auguste Diès. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1909. Pp. vii, 137.

In editing Plato's *Symposium* with an introduction and commentary Mr. Bury removes one of the reproaches of English scholarship; for this is the first edition of the dialogue with notes that has appeared in this country. It is fully worthy of the reputation for careful scholarship and sympathetic understanding of his author which Mr. Bury won by his previous edition of the *Philebus;* and students, to whom German editions are inaccesible, cannot do better than follow Mr. Bury in his analysis of the complex art by which Plato makes Socrates the central figure in his mystical theory, half jest, half earnest, of the divinity of love. Mr. Bury never, as the Germans often do, presses his points too hard: he is content, for instance, to indicate the affinity which the *Symposium* has with the Orphic mysteries on the one hand and Plato's theory of ideas on the other, without trying to wrest a logically coherent doctrine from his text.

The problem of the precise relation between Plato's philosophy and his religion is one about which much still remains to be said. Meanwhile Dr. Diès's study of the mystic cycle is a useful attempt to clear the ground by examining the connection between philosophy and religion in the thought of the pre-Socratic period. His essay falls into two parts. The thesis of the first part is that the belief, found in many religions, that God is the origin of all individual existences and that individuals are ultimately absorbed again in God, is a leading idea in Greek religion from the earliest times; not indeed in the 'classical' religion of epic poetry and the theogonies, where a very different conception of godhead prevails, but in the great body of popular beliefs and superstitions which is now recognized as having preceded and survived side by side with the orthodox cult of the Olympians. Dr. Diès follows such writers as Rohde and Miss Harrison in regarding the Dionysiac and Orphic mysteries, with their elaborate schemes of purification, as repositories of these older indigenous beliefs; and he argues that we know enough about their ritual to see that the attraction of the mysteries lay in the religious emotions connected with participation in a divine essence conceived as the origin and end of all things. Such doctrines as the transmigration of souls, rewards and punishments

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after death, and purification from sin, which are all prominent in Orphism, may be regarded, he thinks, as so many aspects of the central idea that all things flow from and revert to the divine being. So far Dr. Diès does little more than summarize the results of specialists. In his second part he advocates what appears to be an original view of his own. This is the view that two forms of the belief in God as the origin and end of all things can be distinguished: (1) the *mystical* form, born of the blind gropings of primitive religion, and elaborated in Orphism and Dionysus worship; and (2) the *rational* form expressed in the speculations of some pre-Socratic philosophers. He, however, shows that, except in the fragments of the philosopher-poet Empedocles, there is no evidence of any close connection between these forms; for although in the primitive hylozoism of the Ionians the universe is one and in a sense may be said to be divine, the notion of divinity tends to fall more and more into the background and to be replaced by a scientific rationalism. It is only in Empedocles that we find an attempt to combine a philosophical account of the universe with the specifically religious consequences of the view that, the world-all being one and being God, individual souls issue from God and return to him. The combination is, perhaps, an attempt to reconcile irreconcilables. Empedocles at any rate sublimely ignored the difficulties involved, and no one raised them seriously (though Plato touched them in his myths) until they reappear as the main preoccupation of Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and the gnostic sects of Christianity. Meanwhile the development of Greek philosophy proceeded on other lines. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were not interested in the ideas of popular religion; God, so far as they considered him at all, was for them a being externally related to and distinct from the world. The attitude of the 'classical' philosophers towards the problem of the divine is, in short, characterized by the dualism first clearly formulated by Anaxagoras. Such is Dr. Diès's theory. It may be questioned whether he does not sometimes read unduly modern notions both into primitive religion and into the speculations of the earliest philosophers; but his work teems with interesting suggestions, and is distinguished throughout by clearness and good sense.

His essay on the definition of being in Plato's *Sophistes* has the same merits. A large literature has grown up round a passage

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of that dialogue in which a definition of being is set up, first in terms of 'action' and 'passion' and then in terms of 'motion' and 'rest.' The stranger from Elea, who is the chief spokesman, says in effect: 'Whatever thing has the power of doing or suffering any action however small, that thing, we say, really has being: being, in short, is a potency'; and from this he proceeds to prove that being is both motion and rest. There are writers who regard this definition as the culminating point of the dialogue. According to them the whole argument is intended to introduce the view that being is motion; and in this definition they think that Plato was not only fundamentally modifying the theory of ideas, but also was anticipating certain modern theories as to the nature of reality. Dr. Diès's object is to prove that this interpretation is completely mistaken; and anyone who reads the dialogue without preconceptions must surely agree that he is right. The aim of the dialogue is not to prove that being is motion or is anything else (that cannot be Plato's aim, because it is essential to his argument that being should be indefinable), but to find a solution of the logical difficulties raised by the fact that there are such things as false propositions. Plato, in other words, is seeking for a solution of the problem of error; and he obtains his solution by proving (contrary to the doctrine of 'our father Parmenides') that 'not being' has being just as much as 'being' has. This paradox he explains by developing a theory of the relations which general notions like 'being,' 'not being,' 'sameness,' 'difference,' 'rest' and 'motion' have to one another, which, though it is an advance on the earlier theory of ideas, certainly implies no fundamental change in that theory. And in this argument the definition of being as motion is, rightly understood, a mere provisional step taken for controversial purposes which Dr. Diès very ingeniously explains. I have no space to give his analysis. It must be enough to say that Plato sets up the definition 'being is motion' as an argument against the extreme idealists who think that nothing 'is' except 'intangible' ideas. Against these extremists he urges that they admit, at any rate, that consciousness is. But consciousness implies an object of consciousness; *i. e.*, there is something which acts and something which is acted upon; in other words, there is motion and rest. Dr. Diès points out that the interpretation of the subject-object relation involved in consciousness as constituting in some sense a motion, occurs frequently in earlier dialogues, and is con-

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nected with the view that the world is a living being. But here it is introduced, he contends, simply as an argument *ad hominem*, and has nothing to do with the logical problem that is the main theme of the *Sophistes*.

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MODERN THOUGHT AND THE CRISIS IN BELIEF. By R. M. Wenley. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909. Pp. xv, 364.

This book contains eight lectures, originally delivered before the students of the University of Michigan, on the Baldwin Foundation, of which the nomination is in the hands of the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Michigan. The lecturer had two ends in view: a candid statement of the difficulties which have arisen for traditional belief from the growth of science and of history, and an attempt to restate the Christian view so as to separate its permanent elements from the accidental, and to show how it is still adequate for modern needs. In accordance with this aim, the book falls into two parts of fairly equal length.

Religious experience, a reality involving desire and will as well as intellect, is to be distinguished from its conceptual presentation, which is but symbolic. The root of difficulties and controversies "lies imbedded in the constant tendency to deal with the token as if it were the thing tokened." "As religion clarifies the religious consciousness, it fails proportionately to exhaust it." The creed of religion must therefore ever be fashioned anew. In dealing with its modern difficulties we must remember that what is valid for one part of experience does not necessarily apply without modification to another. There are four such 'universes' of human experience,—inanimate things, animate things, other minds, our own mind. Each of these has its own proper categories and truths.

Examining modern science in its spirit and results, we see that it is axiomatic for the scientist that "the universe is a single system of energy" and that "nature presents itself as a self-explanatory totality." In practice we all accept this view. All our material civilization is based on the mechanical theory, which is now often proclaimed as a sufficient metaphysic,—as Naturalism.

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In the face of the objections arising from this quarter, however, it was still possible for the religious consciousness to retire into itself and to assert that it had its own standards, different from those of science. But the results of the historico-critical method constitute an attack from within. As the scientist deals with a closed mechanical series, so to the historian "the history of human culture presents itself as a long, slow process amenable to explanation from within." On the general results of this method in the field of Old Testament research, all scholars are now agreed. It is natural that there should have been greater difficulty in its free application to the New Testament. But certain results may now be regarded as established. Conservative and radical critics agree that "the facts necessary for a life of Jesus, in the objective or historical sense, simply do not exist." "Later generations drew their own picture of an ideal Christ, and then threw them back, in default of historical information." The two chief factors in this process were Old Testament ideas and Hellenistic syncretism. These results must compel the church, if it is not to lapse into obscurantism, to face the problem whether the permanent elements of religion are capable of restatement. To discover what these permanent elements are, we must appeal to the 'universe' of self-consciousness, which as yet we have not entered.

In the first place, then, we must discard both Naturalism and traditional Supernaturalism, as equally self-contradictory abstractions. Generally speaking, Naturalism is an invalid generalization of special scientific ideas and methods. But Supernaturalism is equally guilty of trying to make a part function as a whole, though in a different way. For the historian, history is a single irreversible series in time, causally connected. It must be so, to be susceptible of scientific treatment. By its very nature, it excludes the supernatural. But the usual ideas of the Christian in regard to the origin of his religion, attempt to "proceed from a timeless universe to an event at once in time *and* unmediated by time." Hence endless confusion.

In order to state moral and religious experience adequately, we must abandon causal dependence, and take the teleological point of view alone. But if morality and religion are thus so similar, what is the reason that religion has always emphatically deprecated 'mere morality' and 'ethical culture'? Underlying this attitude on the part of the religious there is a profound

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intuition of the fact that morality by itself is an imperfect solution of the antinomies of our experience. In fact, we have many moralities, but no absolute morality. The very contrast between the implied ideal of morality and its actual realization "involves appeal to that supra-ethical reality which religion terms God." Yet this necessity does not in itself validate any particular form of religion, but only the religious consciousness in general.

What then is this consciousness? It is a divination of "that presence of the whole which alone endows the part with value and intimation." It is supra-rational, though not supra-experiential, "because, as a distinctive process of experience in its entirety, it cannot be reduced to a form of knowledge." This is mysticism; but in mysticism "we are compelled to distinguish between the fatuity of the philosophy and the inspiration of the mood," "the universalizing of the individual." In the light of this insight, we can see that the essential Christian conviction is ideal and normative. "In brief, Christian conviction declares God to be the normative content of human life." Its great distinction is that it "alone has exercised boldness to assert that the ideal order finds its most complete manifestation in and through our race." To realize this order is to live in the eternal, as Christ did and does. We cannot find Christ in the actual Jesus, concealed by pagan accretions, as a current school holds, for we know little of the biography of the earthly Jesus, and "Christianity persists in all that Christ continues to be, far rather than in what the man Jesus did during the recorded fragment of his temporal career." Neither is it adequate to conceive of Christ as a remarkable moralist, or as the great humanitarian. Professor Wenley says that his own feeling, "which is rather a matter of emotion and wish than of intellect," is that the fourth Gospel is the most adequate expression of the ideal Christ. Christ is universal life, "the active presence that operates within." The eternal, metahistorical Christ, realized through the experience of believers, "creates the importance attributable to a single Jew in time."

But if Christianity is to vindicate its claim to be the 'absolute' religion, it must show that it has no necessary connection with any form of polity. It has failed thus far to make any great progress among Asiatics, precisely because the accident of its western civilization and polity has been thrust upon peoples

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already civilized. Yet Christianity needs a polity for its full expression, even a secular polity. And this sets a wider task for it, especially to-day, than the conversion of individuals,—the "regeneration of cultures," since only by participating in religious idealism can they further the development of *persons*. For our civilization, "this purpose must be effected by Christianity, if at all. Hence its 'absoluteness.'" It is the principle, not the statement, which is absolute. Stereotyped theories of God and of the incarnation may, and probably will, be discarded. We shall come to speak less of a transcendent God, and more of the Holy Spirit in the church; "the stress of the Christian incarnation will be shifted from the divine to the human character." Jesus *was* a man; Christ *is* eternal. With this modern version of the Eternal Gospel of Joachim of Flores the book comes to an end.

Since these lectures were delivered on a church foundation, it is not surprising that they have aroused warm discussion in the religious press, especially by their statement of the results of historical criticism. It is not within my province to discuss this part of the book. Professor Wenley has succeeded in making a clear and readable summary, which the lay reader will find both interesting and useful. Whatever the judgment as to his orthodoxy may be, he is loyal both to his religious and to his philosophical affiliations. He stands with the modernists rather than with Harnack. He is too much a Catholic to suppose that ideal Christianity can be reached by stripping off so-called 'historical accretions,' and too much an Hegelian not to hold that the historical process is rational. As an essay in the philosophy of religion, the present reader's chief criticism of the book is that its author occasionally prefers to follow Bradley rather than Hegel. That "as knowledge clarifies the religious consciousness, it fails proportionately to exhaust it," is true only if judgment be always specification by abstraction. The statement that religion is supra-rational because, as a distinctive process of experience, it cannot be reduced to a form of knowledge, deserves attention as an example of an unwarranted inference not uncommon in discussions of this subject. Any type of experience might be termed supra-rational for the same reason, for experience involves a mind and its object. To know an object, either in religion or elsewhere, is not to reduce it to a form of knowledge. There is then nothing supra-rational

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in our experience, though there is much besides the purely intellectual. Some of Professor Wenley's assertions of the lack of continuity between the causal and the teleological, the historical and the metahistorical, are at least unfortunate in form, and really inconsistent with his interpretation of essential Christianity, since they would divide the temporal life of men from the divine unity which gives it meaning and value. In short, Professor Wenley seems to waver between two standpoints, epistemological and metaphysical, which cannot be further discussed within the limits of this notice. These criticisms, if admitted, would not destroy the value of his discussion of the permanent place and meaning of religion in human life. Its sincere effort to face all the difficulties frankly, and not to neglect any aspect of the truth, is of a nature to draw criticism from all sides; but the volume of this will be only a measure of the book's value to the thoughtful reader, whether or not he agree with its author. He will also find its manner pleasantly accordant with its matter, provided occasional passages which seem like reminiscences of Carlyle or of Hutchinson Stirling do not disturb him.

EDMUND H. HOLLANDS.

Hamilton College.

RELIGION AND THE MODERN MIND. By Frank Carleton Doan. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1909. Pp. ix, 201.

This is a book which it is impossible to read in cold blood. In most readers it will probably produce a mixture of the feelings of sympathy and hostility, for while the author's earnestness and sincerity are winsome, the vigorous way in which he anathematizes all who think and feel differently impairs the force of his statement. In the first place, the book is not so much the expression of reflective thought as the passionate, dogmatic utterance of a mystical nature. It is an exclamation, a cry. There is much heat, but the light which it gives is chiefly that which it sheds upon the author's temperament, and upon the results of a thorough-going application of the famous principle of the Will to Believe. The aim of the work is stated thus: "To show how a man of radical constitution may yet regain an honorable and positive experience of things eternal," and how the lovers of righteousness may find again the sense

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of moral companionship with God which is the need of our age. What he recommends is the doctrine of the immanence of God conceived in a special way. But instead of saying that God is symbolized by the best in human life, that God is a name for our highest ideals, and that in applying our human categories to him, we do so not because these names describe him, but because they are the highest that we have, he says that "God if not *merely* human, is at any rate *essentially* just that." He deliberately ascribes "to the cosmic character the ineradicable forms and passions of the human organism." He is anthropomorphic in the most literal sense. God he conceives of as the life of humanity, 'God-Man' and 'Man-God,' toiling, sweating, agonizing, greater in quantity than we, but distinctly not higher in quality, needing our sympathy and help, and wholly human. This God becomes literally very tired sometimes. "The cosmic life on its conscious side may well be assaulted by world weariness. It is, indeed, in the highest degree probable that the energy-strains in the universal life should become fearfully fatiguing."

Professor Doan scoffs at the idea of a God who is moral perfection, and proposes instead a God who "is not really infinite but finite, not really eternal and fulfilled, but temporal and in process, not really perfect but imperfect." Again and again he breaks out in ecstatic utterance when contemplating his deity, saying, *e. g.*, that God "is most actively and sweatingly human; that his spirit is right poignantly *involved* in human relations, very strictly present in human being; that he moves in human destinies, writhes in all our human bestialities, ascends in all our human flights of justice and righteousness; that his spirit watches and pushes and pulls in all the efforts of our human race! God almighty, what a God! God all-human, what a God! Cry out, sing, shout for joy! Unto us a God is born! Born of human labor! A Son of Man! Himself a man, a great Man-God, an incomparable God-Man, a God with a sweating soul!"

Such passages are frequent in this astonishing book, but the feeling they express is not contagious. The author evidently likes to speak of God as sweating, so often does he use the word. This, too, is constitutional, for he is a misologist, frequently declaiming against reason and the rationalists, and having a deeper feeling for the impulsive beginnings than for the goals of life. Indeed, he practically says that God is funda-

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mentally passion, not idea. "No matter how persistently a world-soul may in its present constitution be aiming at inward reasonableness, in its beginning it had no *idea* where or how its activity was coming out. . . . *The cosmic passion may be eternal, the cosmic idea is inherently temporal.*" (Italics his.)

The constant use of capital letters and exclamation points does not awaken our enthusiasm for such a conception, granting its truth. But if the reader, striving to keep in sympathy with his author, asks for proof, he is met with denunciation. "It is a matter not for proving but for seeing; not for demonstration but for vision. That mount of humanistic vision we were talking about is, of course, in your own living soul. Do you see there, do you find there in your own inner life, your own mystic humanity, the courage and the will to believe in this triumphantly and passionately regnant God of humanity? If not, you are blind, and so far, lost! Your own humanity, such as it is, is a lie! a most stupid, thoughtless, insensible lie! nothing short of that! . . . Who wants evidence of all this, I say, is denying his own humanity, is desecrating his own inner place of vision, is lying in the face of Man and in the sight of God!"

What end does the author hope to accomplish by such passages? Assuredly he may exercise his Will to Believe, if he thinks it moral to do so, but is it wise to attempt through abuse to impose his temperament and his method upon others who have a greater reverence for reason, a belief in the reality of truth as something more than a plan of action which works, and who worship a God who is rather the ideal goal of life, than its animal and passionate beginnings?

The bias of the author for the impulsive sources and his hostility to the rational goals of life come out plainly in the chapter on "Life Everlasting." For the child, life is largely play: Professor Doan insists that it shall never be anything else. He quarrels with maturity, and would arrest life in its childish stages. As Tolstoy measures everything, art, music, and literature, by the peasant's standards and powers, so this writer insists that life ought never to be anything more than it is to the child. Ask him for facts and reasons, and you bring on you the following: "Your contemptible vender of solid facts is a public nuisance and should be outlawed on Life's Playground. He is a foreigner there, nor has he any unspoken

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understanding of the serious play going forward there. Off with him to the dungeon. . . . I have observed that children and natural men do actually live upon mystery. To both, your literalist, your absolutist, your rationalist is of all creatures on God's earth the most pestiferous and preposterous."

Strong feeling certainly, but not convincing or enlightening. Such misology seems inseparable from thoroughgoing mysticism. How familiar to the student of religious history are such expressions as these: "He who would know God must sacrifice on the altar the very instruments of knowledge, his very intelligence," and cry, "Oh, thou great Unknown, accept now my supreme sacrifice. Longing above all else to know thee, I yet destroy my instruments of knowing." Those whose tendencies carry them in this direction may be permitted to indulge in their devotions and ecstasies, but they are on less defensible ground when they proceed to deny all religious life, all communion with God, to those who regard intelligence as one of the highest forms of life, and who are unwilling to make the sacrifice which the mystic demands, convinced as they are that the goal of life lies in the opposite direction. For there are many worthy members of society who agree with the clearest modern writer on this subject, that mysticism, with "its tendency to obliterate distinctions," is "a principle of dissolution," and who want no religious life that can be attained only by surrendering the ideal of reason, and sacrificing the very "instruments of knowing," and for whom progress means greater rationality rather than the emotional raptures of the mystic.

GEORGE R. DODSON.

St. Louis.

PARALIPOMENA. Remains of Gospels and Sayings of Christ. By Rev. Bernard Pick, Ph. D., D. D. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1908. Pp. ix, 158.

This is a very useful book. Dr. Pick has furnished to English readers an excellent collection of gospel fragments and extra-canonical sayings of Jesus. Preuschen ("Antilegomena," 2nd ed., 1905), and Klostermann ("Agrapha," 1904) had already given us in convenient form the original texts; and Resch, in a new edition of his "Agrapha" (1906), a careful discussion of

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the material, which still needs the criticism of Ropes, "Die Sprüche Jesu" (Texte und Untersuchungen, 1896). But Dr. Pick's collection is more complete, including the latest gospel fragments discovered in Egypt, and it is all translated into English. Besides, there is a most comprehensive bibliography, covering twenty-five pages, of utmost value to the student.

The ordinary reader, for whom the book is intended, would, no doubt, have been grateful for a brief introduction to each fragment and saying. He would like to know what the probable date is, and on what grounds a certain saying may be regarded as genuine. But such material as the author brings in from Baring-Gould's "Lost and Hostile Gospels" (1874), is not what the reviewer has in mind. There ought to be in English a work like Hennecke's "Neutestamentliche Apokryphen" (1904), with the "Handbuch der N. T. Apokryphen" (1904) included.

The designation of the 'longer recension' of the Ignatian epistles as 'Pseudo-Ignatius,' while the author of the shorter recension is honored as 'Ignatius,' is novel and confusing. A person not versed in the intricacies of the Ignatian question might easily, upon seeing the "Letter to the Trallians" ascribed to 'Pseudo-Ignatius,' gather the impression that Dr. Pick agrees with the host of eminent scholars from Flacius, Calvin, and Scaliger to Baur, Holtzmann, Hilgenfeld, and Schmiedel, who reject as spurious the entire Ignatian literature. This, however, is not the case. The author simply follows the present fashion in some circles, of not allowing the laity to know that there is any question about the seven epistles known to Eusebius. Editions of 'Ignatius' are nowadays given to the world, from which eight of the epistles ascribed to him, the shorter Syriac, the longer Greek, and the Latin recensions, are as scrupulously left out as the Apocrypha in a modern Protestant Bible. And Dr. Pick lumps all of these Ignatian apocrypha under the head of 'Pseudo-Ignatius,' still fortunately accessible in Lightfoot's and Hilgenfeld's editions, to which a reference should have been made.

In regard to the quotation of Hosea, xi, 2, in Jerome's 'Hebrew' Matthew (ii, 5), it may be remarked that the Greek version has unquestionably preserved the original text: "Out of Egypt I called my children." The first indication that the *waw* had been shortened to a *yod* (in the later square characters)

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appears in our Greek Matthew and the Greek versions of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion which all have "my son." The editor of our present Matthew, to whom we owe this passage, probably quoted it from the same revised Greek version which lies at the basis of Theodotion and goes back to the first century A. D.

The study of such testimonies as we possess concerning the contents of the Gospel according to the Hebrews soon leads to the conviction, hinted at by Dr. Pick, that this work grew and changed in the original and also in its Greek form. The same applies to our first canonical gospel. This would be more readily recognized, were it not for the unconscious effect of the distinction once made between canonical and apocryphal writings. There is not much in the literature collected by Dr. Pick that throws any light on the teachings of Jesus. This is, of course, a subjective judgment. But none other is possible. The conservative who thinks he listens to Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, naturally hears the same voice in the Oxyrhynchus fragments, and is led by his subjective impression to declare in favor of their genuineness. Lured by the siren song of tradition, he is tempted to increase the material, heedless of the size of "the oral tradition from Mount Sinai" in the Talmud and the Christian tradition concerning the apostles, which should be warnings. On the other hand, the critic who finds no authentic sayings of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel and much that is wrongly ascribed to him in the Synoptics may, indeed, be too sceptical in dealing with the agrapha. But in either case, it is historical probability that decides.

Dr. Pick has rendered a real service by this work.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

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TENNYSON AS A THINKER. By Henry S. Salt. London: A. C. Fifield, 44 Fleet Street, E. C., 1909. Pp. 32.

This essay was first printed some eighteen years ago in reply to the extravagant claims which were then being made on behalf of 'Tennyson as a Thinker.' It thoroughly deserves to be republished, and I hope that it may be widely read, both as a model of wise, balanced criticism and as a memorial of an old controversy, which will probably never be renewed on the

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old terms. That Mr. Salt's contentions, duly attenuated and robbed of their sting, have become the commonplaces of academic and 'safe' criticism, in no wise detracts from the merit of his attack. Many will be lazily inclined to ascribe the modification in our attitude toward Tennyson to some insensible gradual changes of fashion, or some mysterious process in the collective mind. But we would do well to consider first whether the credit is not really due to those who, like Mr. Salt, maintained for long years the unpopular cause. Mr. Salt's strength lies in the sureness of his literary judgment, which leads him to recognize freely the merits which may justly be allowed to Tennyson's poetry, and in his firm grasp of the best thoughts and tendencies of the period in which Tennyson wrote; and he accomplishes with ease the task which he has undertaken of showing how incompetent and puerile, in respect of such thoughts and tendencies, whether as exponent or as critic, Tennyson showed himself to be. It would be well if more criticism were so well informed, so discriminating, and so sure as this little work.

W. J. ROBERTS.

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